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Abstract
This thesis assesses the extent and relevance of the prevailing debate 
over the use of privatization schemes at a local level in Mexico, after 
decades of highly centralised and rigid political and economic decision­
making. The aim is to examine the privatization debate by analysing 
events following the modifications made to Article 115 of the Mexican 
constitution in 1983, which marked the inception of a new set of policies 
regarding the provision of public utilities at the local level. The theory of 
privatisation, as promoted by the Mexican Government, was for the first 
time on the political agenda, and debate spread rapidly. However, because 
research into privatisation has hitherto focused largely on economic 
explanations, this thesis will instead attempt to analyse the politics of the 
privatisation programme at a local level. Basically, it looks to explain and 
demonstrate that economic policies are subject to political scrutiny and 
demands.
The process of moving the control of traditionally government services 
from federal to state and thus to local level seems to be an ongoing trend 
focused upon encouraging improved governance capabilities and increased 
social wealth. Far from achieving this, though, it has instead generated 
great controversy in the political arena concerning the implementation of 
public policies. Increasing concern regarding the size of governments in 
the Mexican municipalities, and thus their ability to cope with the provision 
of public utilities, has prompted these authorities to pursue their objectives 
by means of privatisation programmes. Of such programmes, the vast 
majority have taken the form of concession schemes, and it is one such 
scheme, concerning water utilities in the city of Aguascalientes, that 
represents both the most controversial and, consequently, forms our case 
study.
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Preface
A Not-So-Unreal Case: From Theory to Practice
Let's assume that you have run for mayor of Aguascalientes for the 1993- 
1995 period of government. The municipality is one of the 20 most 
important in Mexico, in which is concentrated 70 per cent of the total state 
population and 80 per cent of the total economic activity of the small but 
prosperous state with the same name. The state, located in the heart of 
Mexico, has always been privileged by presidential policies, and during 
recent years has been used as a practice laboratory for any policy 
innovation though federal prerogative. I t  was also a bastion of the official 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and enjoys the highest standard of 
wealth in the country.
After an intensive campaign for mayor financed by the PRI you have won 
by a huge majority (60 percent of the votes cast). The ayuntamiento (city 
hall) is well balanced for your future government, including a number of 
party members that will make your life easier as mayor. After the 
celebrations, you begin your first day in office, to find yourself facing an 
uncertain situation. Your plans for managing the municipality do not look 
as promising as they had, and your future political ambitions could be 
jeopardised. The cost of providing the public utilities, with current or fixed 
costs, represents between 70 and 80 per cent of your annual budget. You 
are left with a ridiculous 10 to 20 per cent margin for discretion. 
Considering that the water utilities represent the greatest burden on your 
budget (60 per cent), and more specifically that the privatisation of the
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water utilities has been promoted from the centre, with your municipality 
selected as the first to apply this scheme, you have no chance to hesitate. 
There is an extra pressure because while campaigning (both elections 
were held almost simultaneously) you were included in discussions 
between the elected state governor from the official party (a former close 
collaborator of the Mexican president) and the incumbent state governor, 
on the future of the water utilities. I t  had been agreed that the 
administration then in power would not make any moves towards 
privatisation, since this was to be one of his primary policies of 
government at state level, and consequently of yours at local level. Very 
soon after assuming power, therefore, the state governor has 
'encouraged' you to privatise the water utilities. In this, he is clearly 
fulfilling a promise to the Mexican president, who is keen on privatisation 
at this level.
In order to show your loyalty, and to avoid turning back, you decide to 
follow the British experience of privatisation of the water utilities. 
However, there is a great difference - namely, a lack of knowledge of what 
privatisation really means for your city. Only a few days after taking power 
you announce the concession of the city water utilities (the intention was 
clear even in your inaugural speech). After all sorts of lobbying you have 
no great hesitation over this policy. The PRI majority inside the city hall 
and the state chamber of deputies make things easy and it takes only ten 
months to make legal the first concession of the water utilities in the 
country, promoted by the technocratic federal government. ICA, a leading 
construction group, headed by a businessman under federal protection
and ongoing presidential support gains this water concession, the first in 
Mexico and Central America. For this purpose, ICA group has a partnership 
with the world leaders in water supply, the French company, Generate des 
Eaux. There is no auction system; your argument supporting the company 
is based on their previous experience in partially managing the water 
utilities in the municipality in the form of a contract service. Presidential 
support for this company is clear, and you have no choice but to justify its 
presence in the managing of the water utilities. The aim is to promote this 
company helping it to obtain the water management of the 100 most 
important cities in Mexico. The results in Aguascalientes will set the 
boundaries of action for this company, which has been so generously 
promoted by the federal authorities.
You believe that the arrival of the concession scheme is a ticket directly to 
the first world, and that your policies will remain as a great legacy, not 
just in your municipality but in Mexico. Unfortunately you are wrong; it 
does not take long for the first negative effects of the water concession to 
reach the people. There are serious mistakes, like a lack of an auction 
system to grant the concession scheme, lack of an appropriate regulatory 
body, and endless mistakes in the concession title (legal loop holes, 
financial and economic inaccuracies) which cause problems for the 
inhabitants and lead to price increases. To add to the problems, the 
Mexican peso is devalued in the middle of your three-year period of 
government. The situation becomes complicated, and the water 
concession by the PRI prerogative is more highly politicised than any other 
issue.
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As a prelude to the imminent fall of the PRI in the state, elections for 
mayor are scheduled during your last year of government. An opposition 
candidate from the right wing party PAN appears on the scene with 
populist and messianic promises to revoke the water concession. The 
people's desire for change, affected by the politicisation of the water 
concession, helps him to power, and you witness the arrival of the first 
opposition government in the history of the municipality. Not even the PRI 
machinery and the corporativist vote can prevent this great loss. In a clear 
lesson, the result of an economic policy based largely upon a privatisation 
scheme has been the arrival of the democratic process in the state.
The PAN wins not only the municipality and in consequence the majority in 
the city hall, but also a majority inside the state chamber of deputies. 
Consequently, it has the opportunity to reproduce previous PRI practices. 
However, an uncomfortable relationship with the state governor from the 
official party, who still has left three years in power out of six, is to mark 
this new period of government.
The first aim of the PAN government is to revoke the concession scheme, 
arguing that it won an irrational and perverse concession title. I t  does not 
take long however, for the municipality to rethink this action and return 
the concession. To the surprise of the inhabitants it is given back using the 
PAN machinery in the state to the same company (ICA group) which 
previously managed the water utilities. Once again there is no auction 
system or proper regulatory body, and there are similar mistakes in the 
concession title (non autonomous regulatory body, legal loopholes, 
financial and economic inaccuracies) as in the previous one as a
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consequence of this rushed procedure. The old PRI practices (mayoriteo, 
negotiations under the table, ambiguous speeches and submission 
practices) are repeated inside public corridors. The PAN campaign 
promises are left out of the discussion and under clear federal pressure, as 
well as internal financial problems, they realise the impossibility of 
reassuming responsibility for the water concession.
During this period of government, major macro economic pressures 
(increases in interest rates, devaluation, political uncertainty and 
international financial crises) highlight the weakness of the concession title 
by PAN prerogative during this period of government. They add an extra 
social connotation to the water concession (higher tariffs, unplanned 
programs and lack of a proper regulatory body), and there are daily fights 
amongst all the parties involved (social representations, private entities, 
political parties and public representatives).
The biggest test for this PAN government is the imminent 1998 elections 
for governor, mayors and the renewal of the state legislature. Logic points 
to the fall of the PAN, considering that the inhabitants and the political 
machinery in the state are over heated by the concession scheme under 
PAN control (influenced by the unfulfilled campaign promises regarding the 
water utilities). Nonetheless, to the surprise of the PRI members, the PAN 
candidate for mayor retains the municipality and a great majority inside 
the state chamber of deputies is made up.
Furthermore, an opposition candidate, in fact of PAN militancy obtains the 
state governorship for the first time. The public perception of the water 
concession still lays the blame on the PRI —not PAN— and the effects of
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the voto razonado (conscious vote) and the lack of a truly democratic 
selection of PRI candidates persuade the inhabitants to retain and increase 
the PAN presence. In this sense, these elections are not influenced by the 
problems generated by the water concession.
So, this illustrative case is the actual situation described, explored and 
analysed in this research. The story of privatisation and post-privatisation 
of the water industry is complex. However, the key themes are as follows. 
They are the importance of party politics. The hidden role of the centre in 
determining municipal decisions. The confusing way in which the issue was 
presented to the public. The general lack of public understanding of what 
was afoot. The ability of a large private-sector company to run this 
confused situation to its advantage. The question of ownership of a utility 
is almost secondary to problems of the legal framework, the regulatory 
structure, and the general operating environment. I f  there are problems 
with these, then privatisation will not solve problems.
This research hypothesis has been planned around the following debates. 
Firstly, it will look at how far the technocratic era, and centralised 
decision-making, have influenced the role of local government in Mexico, 
particularly in the delivery and provision of the public utilities by means of 
promoting alternative schemes with clear neo-liberal ideology. Secondly, it 
will argue that local democracy itself does not guarantee a better policy or 
the renewal of earlier practices. Whether local democracy makes a 
difference to policy will, in essence, be questioned. Thirdly, privatisation 
has been seen by many authors as likely to improve economic efficiency. 
However, this is only true if there is genuine competition or if there is an
effective regulatory framework. Where these do not exist, privatisation 
may not be such a good idea, as this thesis will demonstrate.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
The Rise of the Technocratic Era: Promoting Privatisation 
Schemes in Mexico
Introduction
This thesis defines a specific area of public policy - local water 
privatisation - in order to describe the effects of neo-liberal policies on the 
political scene in Mexico. The main purpose is to understand better the 
nature and role of local government in Mexico. It  is not so much interested 
in the economics of privatisation or the logic of democratisation per se, 
but in the way in which these interacted to transform the nature of local 
government. As a result of the degree and influence of decentralisation in 
the Mexican political system, the municipalities have to cope with the 
increasing demands of managing the public utilities. Despite the high 
profile of decentralisation policies in recent years, this research shows that 
Mexican presidentialism is still very much in place.
1.1 Thesis Hypothesis
Aims of the Thesis
In searching after the core hypothesis of the thesis it is necessary to 
review our case study by asking how the municipality of Aguascalientes 
has been tied to higher levels of government, and how it is influenced by 
this political relationship. The economic and political development of the 
municipality of Aguascalientes has been tied for decades to state and
l
federal prerogatives, and more specifically, to the president. In this case, 
centralisation has resulted in a relatively positive economic development 
compared to the remaining municipalities in Mexico. On the other hand, it 
has tied local politics and policies to federal prerogatives, with little 
autonomy from them.
The political hegemony created by the control over the state by the official 
party, at least until 1995, made Aguascalientes, and particularly the 
municipality, the ideal place to introduce any kind of public policy
innovation. Likewise, the tied relationships between the centre and the 
state governments, so that major federal policies were applied as 
experiments in the municipality, was decisive. Thus, the privatisation of 
the water utilities in Aguascalientes represented the first case nationally to 
be applied at this level. An international private company (ICA /  Generate 
des Eau'x) wanted to use Aguascalientes as a learning experience, while 
the international community liked privatisation as a concept.
It is also important to consider that the state of Aguascalientes, and thus 
the municipality of Aguascalientes, has privileged characteristics, strategic 
geographic location, developed industrial infrastructure and workforce, 
good economic growth, a low unemployment rate, a competitive
competitive level of wages and salaries, social stability, multinational
investments, a developed public utility infrastructure (electricity, water 
and wastewater and telecommunications), and labour stability. All these 
have encouraged the establishment of federal policies.
The impact on the municipality is similar to that of the state, since the 
state's political, economic, and social variables have benefited from
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centralised policies that have encouraged development at this level. The 
municipality represents one of the most developed (in all senses of the 
term) cities in Mexico. As a response to the encouragement received from 
federal policies during the last 25 years to the state of Aguascalientes and, 
more precisely, the municipality, federal authorities have granted more 
responsibilities (economic, social, urban, and hence political) to both levels 
of government. One of the inheritances received by the municipality was 
the granting of the concession of the water utilities to a private group by a 
PRI decision. However, political changes occurring at the same time as the 
water privatisation but independent of it led to some very unexpected 
outcomes. As electoral democratisation developed, so water became a 
political issue in Aguascalientes. It was a major factor in explaining 
political change in both the municipality and the state.
The results achieved by this federal policy have been diverse and 
complicated, affecting and changing the local economic, social, and 
political scenario. The roles of policies and actors have been transformed, 
and the new structures of government at this level have been challenged. 
However a lot of detailed problems with the privatisation were not 
properly thought through. This became evident over time. Overall, the 
story of water privatisation in Aguascalientes is a good example of 
superficial neoliberalism and crony capitalism. I t  was not considered 
attempt to provide good solutions to specific economic problems.
Although competitive democracy developed in Aguascalientes, the 
municipality proved not be a competent policymaking body. At a political 
level, then, the thesis explores the limitations of local government in
Mexico, to some extent countering the work of others writers 
(Ward/Rodriguez) who possibly over-state the virtues of decentralised 
governm ent.1 Accurate picture of what happened in some states but does 
not fit Aguascalientes. In Aguascalientes real progress in increasing 
democratic competition was not matched by a deliberative or even 
intelligent treatment of a complex policy issue.
The federal government continues to be significant in the water affairs of 
Aguascalientes because local government wants this to be the case. So 
obstacles to decentralisation are not simply based on obstructive federal 
authority but also on a lack of desire for autonomy in some major 
municipalities. However the greater openness arising from the 
democratisation of politics has at least enabled people to be more aware
1 Peter Ward. 1996. Problemas Actuales en el Gobiemo y la Administration de las 
Megaciudades Latinoamericanas, Gestion y  Politico. Publica, vol V, num. 1, pp. 127-149. 
Mexico: CIDE. Peter Ward, Victoria Rodriguez and Enrique Cabrero. 1998. Bringing the 
States Back In: New Federalism and State Government in Mexico, Austin, LBJ School of 
Public Affairs- University of Texas. Victoria Rodriguez. 1992. Mexico’s Descentralization in 
the 1980s: Promises, Promises, Promises., in Morris, A., and Lowder, S, (eds.) 
Decentralization in Latin America: An Evaluation. New York: Praeger. Victoria Rodriguez. 
1993. The Politics of Decentralisation in Mexico: From Municipio Libre to Solidaridad, 
Bulletin o f Latin American Research 12 (2), pp. 133-145. Victoria Rodriguez. 1994. Political 
Change in Baja California. Democracy in the Making?, La Jolla, California: Center for US- 
Mexican Studies. Victoria Rodriguez. 1995. Municipal Autonomy and the Politics of 
Intergovernmental Finance: It is Different for the Opposition?, in Victoria Rodriguez and 
Peter Ward (eds.). Opposition Government in Mexico, Alburqueque, University of Mexico 
Press, pp 153-172. Victoria Rodriguez, (eds.). 1996. New Federalism, State and Local 
Government in Mexico, memoria de la conferencia realizada en la Universidad de Texas en 
Austin, 25-26 de Octubre, ILAS- Mexican Center. Victoria Rodriguez. 1996. The New PRI. 
Recasting Its Identity, en R. Atkin et al., Dismantling the Mexican State?. Londres: McMillan, 
pp.92-115. Victoria Rodriguez. 1997. Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal 
to Solidaridad, University of Texas at Austin: Westview Press. Victoria Rodriguez and Peter 
Ward. 1991. Opposition Politics, Power and Public Administration in Urban Mexico, Bulletin 
o f  Latin American Research 10 (1), pp. 23-36. Victoria Rodriguez. 1995. Opposition 
Government in Mexico. Alburqueke: University of New Mexico Press.
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of the failures of the water privatisation policy. This does mean that 
lessons can be learned which may be useful for the future.
This high degree of centralisation has had both positive and negative 
effects. I t  has encouraged the development of the state, and thus the 
municipality, far beyond that of the rest of the country. However, this 
greater economic development has not guaranteed an equal distribution of 
benefits, an effective provision of public services. Whilst the municipality 
of Aguascalientes was ranked top in the country (quality of life), the 
wealth has been concentrated in only a small number of inhabitants; the 
majority suffer conditions below the national average. The greater 
economic growth leads to more inhabitants demanding more and better 
public services, and when, as in the case of the water utilities, these have 
been neglected for many years, the necessary investment represents a 
burden on local finances. Furthermore, centralisation has limited the 
scope, power, and independence of the municipality, whilst imposing more 
responsibilities because of growth in population, thus creating problems of 
governance.
1.2 Privatisation: A Political Tool 
Privatisation - What does it mean?
The term privatisation was first developed in the United Kingdom by the 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher.2 A review of the literature
2 Cento Veljanovski.1987. Selling the State: Privatisation in Britain. London: Weindfeld and 
Nicolson.
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presents as many definitions as writers about the subject.3 It is still a new 
word, particularly at a local level in developing countries, but has already 
attracted a controversial reputation.4
In establishing a definition that is adequate for this research, and that can 
be applied at a local level in Mexico, Starr's distinction between two uses 
of the term is very useful. In the strict sense of the meaning, privatisation 
is a specific policy related to the transfer of assets, total or partial, from 
public to private ownership. Diverse techniques or mechanisms can be 
included within this definition, and such changes are prompted by the 
belief that the new enterprise will perform under market considerations.5 
Within this definition, there is clearly a change from the public to the
3 To find at least fifteen different concepts related to privatisation, see: T, Thiemeyer. 1986. 
Privatisation: On the Many Senses in Which This Word is Used in An International 
Discussion on Economic Theory. In Thiemeyer and Quaden, G. (eds.), The Privatisation o f  
Public Enterprises: A European Debate. Liege: CIRIEC, pp 7-10. Some authors prefer to use 
different terminology for the same process: ‘capitalization’, ‘divestiture’, ‘corporatization’, 
‘rolling back the state’, ‘destatification’, or ‘demunicipalization’ amongst others.
4 The outcomes o f the privatisation programmes implemented throughout the world have been 
criticised by opposition leaders, especially in less developed countries, as defined by: World 
Bank. 1992. Privatisation: Eight Lessons o f Experiences. Washington, DC: Country 
Economics Department. July. Outreach # 3.
5 To find more about theories related to private ownership see: Milton Friedman, 1969. 
Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; J.E. Stigler. 1988. The Effect 
of Government on Economic Efficiency. Business Economics, January, Friederic, Von Hayek. 
1986. The Use of Knowledge in Society, in L. Putterman, (ed.), The Nature o f The Firm: A 
Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; D.A. Heald. 1985. Will Privatisation of 
Public Enterprise Solve the Problem of Control? Public Administration 63, pp. 7-22 [#35]and 
A. Alchian and H. Densetz. 1972. Production, Information Cost and Economic Organization. 
American Economic Review, 62(5), pp. 777-95.
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private sector as regards the supply of goods or services. 6 It  does not 
imply spending cuts, liberalisation or deregulation, tax reduction, or any 
policy reforms, except for those policies which transfer the form of 
production. Thus, the author suggests that most forms o f deregulation do 
not shift production from public to private firms and hence do not 
constitute privatisation in the restricted sense.7 However, if a previous 
monopoly is deregulated, some form of production will move into private 
ownership - for example, governmental withdrawal from providing a public 
service encourages intervention from the private sector.8 
An all-encompassing definition of privatisation remains elusive, but it has 
been established that it includes the transfer of public enterprises or 
responsibilities to the private sector in any of its forms or mechanisms 
when under applied public observation (regulatory frameworks).9 Hence, it 
is important to distinguish the privatisation elements per se from those of
6 For this point see: E.S. Savas 1987. Privatisation: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, 
NJ: Chatham House Publishers, pp 3. This author also cited Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 9th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam, 1983), pp. 936. Nonetheless the earliest use 
of the word privatisation appears to have been in Peter F. Drucker, The Age o f Discontinuity 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969), as ‘reprivatisation’. Robert W. Poole, Jr., shortened it to 
‘privatisation’, in the Reason Foundation newsletters (Santa Monica, Calf.) at the beginning 
of 1976.
7 Paul Starr. 1990. The New Life of the Liberal State. Privatisation and the Restructuring of 
State-Society Relations. In John Waterbury and Ezra Suleiman, eds. 1990. Public Enterprise 
and Privatisation. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, pp.22-54.
8 E.S. Savas. 1987. Privatisation: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham 
House Publishers.
9 These arguments are described in: John, Kay and D, J. Thompson. 1986. Privatisation: A 
Policy in Search of a Rationale. Economic Journal 96, pp. 18-38. Veljanovski, C. 1987. 
Selling the State: Privatisation in Britain. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Wortzel, Heidi 
V, and Lawrence H. Wortzel. 1989. Privatisation: Not The Only Answer. World Development, 
pp. 633-41 and Christopher Adam, William Cavendish, and Percy S. Mistry.1992. Adjusting 
Privatisation: Case Studies from Developing Countries. London: Villiers.
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economic deregulation or liberalisation (increasing competition) and public 
enterprise reforms - which for our purposes fall within the non-strict sense 
of the meaning.10 These elements do not necessarily involve any change in 
the form of supply, and therefore do not represent a privatisation 
mechanism under public scrutiny.
The Inherently Political Nature of Privatisation Policies
Throughout the case study the debate will focus on demonstrating the 
political nature of privatisation policies. Privatisation is a political approach 
that includes market, economic, legal, social, and financial considerations. 
It is not an isolated variable. 11 Before considering why it is necessary to 
view privatisation as an approach, it is necessary to review the question of 
why privatisation is a political tool.
It can be argued that politics is inherent in public policy formation; that 
the evaluation of any policy development demands political analysis. In 
this sense, privatisation is invariably a political resolution for any country. 
As Adam, Cavendish and Mistry argue, the change from public to private
10 BJ. O’ Toole and G. Jordan. 1995. Next Steps: Improving Management in Government. 
Aldershot: Darmouth.
11 To find more about the term in strictly economic reasoning see: Von. F. Hayek 1960. The 
Constitutions o f  Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; John, Kay A and D. J. Thompson. 
1986. Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale. Economic Journal 96, pp. 18-38; T. 
Thiemeyer and G. Quaden, G. (eds). 1986. The Privatisation o f Public Enterprises: A 
European Debate. Liege: CIRIEC, John Vickers and George Yarrow, G. 1985. Privatisation 
and The Natural Monopolies. London: Public Policy Centre. John Vickers and George 
Yarrow. 1989. Privatisation in Britain, in Mac Avoy, et al., (eds.) Privatisation and State 
Owned Enterprises. USA: Kluwer Academic Publisher. John Vickers and George Yarrow. 
1989. Privatisation:An Economic Analysis, Cambridge: MIT Press; Dieter Bos. 1987. 
Privatisation o f Public Enterprise, European Economic Review, 31, pp. 352-60. Dieter Bos.
1988. Recent Theories on Public Enterprise Economics, European Economic Review 32, pp 
409-14 and Dieter Bos. 1991. Privatisation: A Theoretical Treatment. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
ownership, in any of its forms, is an inherently political process.12 
Supporting this argument, Donaldson and Wagle state that: privatisation 
is always political, however - political in the sense that governments have 
aims that are non-economic.13 Thus, whilst countries have economic aims 
besides these other considerations, the main goals are always political.14 
They may, for example, be aiming to leave the market in private hands, 
redistribute the shares of the enterprise with special emphasis on local 
investors, maintain the work force, or provide better services at a lower 
cost. There are also social implications.
In this sense, decisions to privatise emerge from political beliefs 
encouraged by external or internal actors, including economic 
considerations. In fact, the relationship between political and economic 
objectives is an inherent determinant of the success or failure of 
privatisation policies in any country.15 The nature of privatisation as a 
political tool emerges from the fact that all the actors involved - without 
focusing exclusively on economic beliefs or market considerations - play
12 Christopher Adam, William Cavendish and Percy. S. Mistry. 1992. Adjusting Privatisation: 
Case Studies from Developing Countries. London: Villiers, pp.52.
13 David Donaldson and Wagle Dileep. 1996. Privatisation: Principles and Practices. 
Washington: World Bank.
14 To find more about the World Bank support for privatisation policies see: World 
Bank. 1995. Bureaucrats in Business. World Bank: Oxford University Press, p. 257, Sunita, 
Kikeri, Nellis, John and Shirley, Mary. 1989. Public Enterprise Reform: Privatisation and The 
World Bank, World Development pp. 659-72. Washington, DC: World Bank; World Bank.
1989. Public Enterprise Reform: Privatisation and The World Bank, World Development, 
pp.659-72. Washington, DC: World Bank; World Bank. 1992. Privatisation: The Lessons o f  
Experience. June. Washington, DC: World Bank, and World Bank. 1992. The Welfare 
Consequences o f  Selling Public Enterprise: Case Studies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
The United Kingdom. Washington, DC: World Bank.
15 Ibidem., pp.52.
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important roles in the policy-making process. For the privatisation to be 
successful, it is necessary to evaluate all those involved in the process, 
and to determine the most desirable approach. This will be demonstrated 
through the case researched herein.
Bos argues that large-scale privatization changes the distribution o f power 
within a society...thus leads to a new distribution between private and 
public economic power.16 This redistribution of power will emerge in any 
privatisation on any scale, involving power groups, state authorities, trade 
unions, and investor and international organisations, amongst others. For 
example, in some cases the transfer from public to private ownership will 
lead to a reduction of trade union power, especially in third world 
countries where there is a greater degree of involvement of the state in 
the economy.
The political constraints upon policy formation come fundamentally from 
civil servants, who will tend to oppose any change. Opposition may also 
come from any other source of power where privatisation is considered as 
a menace to the interests of a specific group, and even from groups who 
will benefit from the application of this policy. For example, privatisation is 
linked to severe cuts in employment and subsidies, and can hit, in 
particular, bureaucrats and trade unions. It redefines those who benefit 
from the public utility or enterprise.
Supporting these arguments, Letwin argues that:
16 Dieter, Bos. 1991. Privatisation: A Theoretical Treatment. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 2.
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Probably the most important but least understood reason for 
engaging in privatisation is the effect that a transfer o f 
ownership from the state to the private sector can have upon 
the nature o f government. This aspect o f privatisation is 
frequently ignored by the commentators, who concentrate 
almost exclusively on financial and economical effects and 
thereby ignore the fact that privatisation is in origin a political 
rather than an economic or financial act. The decision to 
privatise is made by politicians and administrators, not by 
businessmen or financiers - it  is, in other words, made by 
people whose primary concern is with the role o f government 
and the formation o f public policy.17 
Letwin's arguments are much more persuasive than previous definitions, 
explaining that privatisation is a political process made by state authorities 
rather than private managers. Economic considerations cannot, alone, 
make the implementation of the policy feasible, as will be demonstrated 
further in the thesis.
In the words of Robert Robin, Director of the Finance Industry and 
Regulation at the UK treasury: there is no such thing as a successful 
privatisation. Privatisation is a political process.18 I t  is political in the sense 
that the transfer is constrained by political actors rather than by economic 
mechanisms. The World Bank supports these arguments. After reviewing
17 Oliver, Letwin. 1988. Privatizing The World:A Study o f International Privatisation in 
Theory and Practice. London: International Privatisation Unit, p.2.
18 Euromoney Magazine. February, 1996.
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several cases from different countries, it concluded that politics is the 
most important factor when reforming any public enterprise.19 
Privatisation must be considered as an approach rather than a method 
because it is not a single or specific mechanism that one can thus 
guarantee will be successfully implemented. This argument, supported by 
Veljanovski and Hanke, applies to the Adam Smith definition of 
privatisation:20
privatization is not a method but an approach. I t  is an approach 
which sees no substitute for the market to the reality it  self...it 
is the flexibility o f privatization as an approach which makes it 
capable o f being applied to so many situations in so many 
economies... needs to be defined as an approach and not as a 
method.21
Thus, privatisation is not a unique solution or method that one can rely 
upon to obtain a universal result. I t  is an alternative mechanism for 
policy-makers when considering new forms of providing specific public 
goods or services, since political factors are the main considerations
19 World Bank. 1995. Bureaucrats in Business. World Bank: Oxford University Press, p. 257. 
To find more about the World Bank support for privatisation policies see: Sunita, Kikeri, 
Nellis, John and Shirley, Mary. 1989. Public Enterprise Reform: Privatisation and The World 
Bank, World Development pp. 659-72. Washington, DC: World Bank; World Bank. 1989. 
Public Enterprise Reform: Privatisation and The World Bank, World Development, pp. 659-72. 
Washington, DC: World Bank; World Bank. 1992. Privatisation: The Lessons o f Experience. 
June. Washington, DC: World Bank, and World Bank. 1992. The Welfare Consequences o f  
Selling Public Enterprise: Case Studies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and The United 
Kingdom. Washington, DC: World Bank.
20 To find this argument see: Cento Veljanovski 1987. Selling the State: Privatisation in 
Britain. London: Weindfeld and Nicolson, p. 2 and Steve Hanke. 1987. Privatisation & 
Development. Washington, D.C: Institute for Contemporary Studies, p. 19.
21 Madsen Pirie. 1988. Privatisation. London: Adam Smith Institute, pp. 11-12.
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besides any economic reasoning, privatisation policy-making acquires 
political characteristics.
P r i v a t i s a t i o n :  A n  O v e r l o o k  t o  t h e  M e x i c a n  C a s e .
The intervention of federal government in the economic activities of the 
country has been a fact of political life in Mexico since the beginning of the 
century. Under the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911), government 
concentrated on private investment from the US, Britain, and France. The 
mining, electricity, and oil sectors were managed privately, attracting the 
first export income for the country. The first public enterprise was the 
Ferrocarriles Nacionales, created for the railway system in 1908 with the 
m ajority of shares retained by a mixture of Mexican (public) and French 
investments.
Nevertheless, the great economic achievements and modernisation of the 
country oversaw the concentration of wealth in a few hands (international 
investors). For the majority of the people, and especially for peasants and 
the indigenous communities, lives remained characterised by poverty, 
ignorance, and extreme marginalisation. In consequence, the Diaz 
government fell a few months after the start of the Mexican revolution in 
1910. This event set the stage for state intervention in the main economic 
activities of the state by the promulgation of the new constitution in 1917 
(at tha t time, these were: currency coinage, telegraphs, the postal 
service, radiotelegraphy, and billing under the control of the federal 
government), marking an invisible line between the public and private 
sectors for the provision of the key sectors of the economy. In subsequent 
decades, constitutional amendments brought new public responsibilities
13
and the country began to see the further growth of the state. Table 1.1 
describes the evolution of public enterprises, divided into four stages, 
between 1920 and 1982.22
After eight decades of direct state intervention in the key sectors of the 
economy, and the increasing burden of public enterprises, the technocratic 
government of Miguel de La Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) considered that 
it was time to introduce privatisation. The accumulation by the state of 
1,155 public enterprises was seen by neo-liberals as a symbol of state 
obesity. The state exercised control not just over banks and almost all of 
the electrical and petroleum sectors, but also over night clubs, TV 
channels, soccer teams, hotels, and aeroplane companies.
T a b le  1 .1  N u m b e r  o f  P u b l ic  E n t e r p r is e s  in  M e x ic o  ( 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 8 2 )
Y e a r N u m b e r  o f  P u b l ic  E n t e r p r is e s
1) 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 4 0 36
I I)  1 9 4 1 - 1 9 5 4 144
I I I )  1 9 5 5 - 1 9 7 0 272
IV )  1 9 7 1 - 1 9 8 2 1,155
Own Elaboration using data from: Jacques Rogozinski. 1997. La 
Privatizacion en Mexico: Razones e Impactos. Mexico: Trillas.
As in most countries, the privatisation programme was partly determined 
by fiscal considerations. The economic burden in developing countries was 
a result of a growing external debt, creating fiscal imbalances and severe
22 These stages are defined by one of the pioneers and experts in the use of privatisation 
policies in Mexico, Jacques Rogozinski. To find more see: Jacques Rogozinski. 1997. La 
Privatizacion en Mexico: Razones e Impactos. Mexico: Trillas, pp. 60-75.
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economic recessions. Nevertheless, the privatisation followed ideological 
aims and international trends in its implementation.23 
These policies have prevailed until recently, setting the context for the 
implementation of the privatisation programme and the neo-liberal policy 
reforms in Mexico. The structural adjustments brought about by the 
privatisation policies implemented by the government of Miguel de la 
Madrid resulted in the decline of public enterprises considered as non 
priority or strategic for the economy (Table 1.2).24
T a b l e  1 .2  E v o lu t io n  o f  t h e  P r iv a t is a t io n  P r o g r a m m e  in  M e x ic o  ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 8 )
Y e a r N u m b e r  o f  P u b l ic  E n t e r p r is e s
1 9 8 2 1,155
1 9 8 3 1,074
1 9 8 4 1,049
1 9 8 5 941
1 9 8 6 737
1 9 8 7 617
1 9 8 8 412
Own elaboration using: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. 1983. La 
Venta de Empresas del Sector Publico. Fundamentos, Procedimientos y  
Resultados 1983-1988. Mexico: SHCP.
The privatisation programme reached the peak of its development, and 
controversy, during the Carlos Salinas administration (1988-1994). 
Political turmoil, including accusations of election fraud, generated great 
strains within the national political system. In economic terms, the start of 
the sexenio was marked by severe cuts in public spending, intended to
23 Supporting the conditional role of the World Bank in Mexico see: Jim Cason and David 
Brooks. 1999. En poder de la jornada, documento secreto del organismo Insta Banco 
Mundial a Mexico a acelerar las privatizaciones. June, 24. Mexico: La Jornada Newspaper.
24 According to the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito 
Publico. 1988. La Venta de Empresas del Sector Publico. Fundamentos, Procedimientos y  
Resultados 1983-1988. Mexico: SHCP.
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reduce inflationary pressures and avoid an impending devaluation. The 
burden of the public external debt resulted in low economic growth (1.2 
per cent during 1993).
In consequence, the Salinas government became even more tied to 
international financial institutions (World Bank). Under the 1989 
renegotiation of the Mexican external debt (the Brady Plan), the federal 
government had agreed to "voluntarily" apply or intensify certain 
measures (privatisation, the reduction of public expenditure, and new 
regulatory frameworks allowing foreign investment and trade 
liberalisation) in exchange for debt reduction (net transfers abroad) that 
accounted for $4 billion US dollars.25 Mexico joined commercial 
partnerships with the US and Canada, notably the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and also joined the circle of the most 
industrialised nations (OECD). Increased US influence and interest, along 
with international trends (privatisation and globalisation) all contributed to 
a climate in which the Mexican government intensified the privatisation 
movement (Table 1.3). Nevertheless, the privatisation program in Mexico 
was driven by a political imperative. The former Mexican president Carlos 
Salinas (1988-1994) wanted to gain international credibility and he 
needed private finance to help the official party (PRI).
The use of privatisation programmes at a federal and local level have 
been deficient, creating a misconception of the theory in Mexican politics 
in which the term remains a legacy of a technocratic era and a damaged
25 Ibidem., pp. 89-90.
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society.26 For example, the results achieved (such as banks bankrupted), 
and the means used (selective beneficiaries of the divestitures 
programme) to justify privatisation to the country, have converted the 
privatisation debate into a never-ending political controversy.
T a b l e  1 .3  E v o lu t io n  o f  t h e  P r iv a t is a t io n  P r o g r a m m e  in  M e x ic o  ( 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 4 )
Y e a r N u m b e r  o f  P u b l ic  E n t e r p r is e s
1 9 8 8 412
1 9 8 9 379
1 9 9 0 280
1 9 9 1 241
1 9 9 2 217
1 9 9 3 210
1 9 9 4 219 *
Own elaboration using: Jacques Rogozinski. 1997. La Privatizacion en 
Mexico: Razones eImpactos. Mexico: Trillas, pp. 111.
* The increment refers to the creation of Administraciones Portuarias Integrates (API).
The Mexican case, in particular, demonstrates that privatisation policies 
are not a unique solution, but represent only one possible option. It is 
important to consider that private ownership works better in some 
environments, whilst public institutions are preferable in others. 
Ultimately, the success of any privatisation relies on its political feasibility, 
rather than its economic nature. In narrowing the privatisation experience 
on the evidence from our case study, it was found that there is in part a 
gap between theory and practice, e.g., the key decisions are still made (or 
not made) by the state, there is no competition for the concessions, there 
is little intervention regarding tariff levels or social and political action 
against water disconnections. In fact, these beliefs, far from being 
achieved, have represented a further pressure on the public utilities.
26 See: Judith A. Teichman. 1995. Privatisation and Political Change in Mexico. Mexico: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.
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1.3 Privatisation Policies at a Local Level in Mexico: A Promise or a
Threat?
T h e  E f f e c t s  o f  C e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o n  P r i v a t i s a t i o n  P o l i c ie s :  A  T h r e a t  t o  L o c a l  
D e v e l o p m e n t ?
Since the 1983 constitutional reforms, local authorities have employed a 
diverse range of privatisation methods, with equally diverse results. 
However, the aims behind the reformation of Article 115 from the Mexican 
constitution in 1983 are far from being met. The provision of public 
services by private means (strict form) seems an ongoing trend for a few 
municipalities in Mexico, but with different implications for each of them, 
especially considering that the chances of real development are 
concentrated in only a few cities. What is clear is that the public utilities 
are the most basic and direct manifestation of government, representing 
the first point of contact with the public.
Privatisation policies have not been limited to the wealthiest or largest 
municipalities in Mexico. In fact, there has been private involvement in 
almost all the municipalities since long before the introduction of 
privatisation theory and its promotion by the federal government during 
the last two decades. Such involvement can be traced back to the 
constitution of the firs t municipality in Mexico, w ithout ever being 
recognised as a specific policy. The necessity to provide the services has 
often been greater than the means the private sector possesses, creating 
a permanent confusion regarding this policy.
I t  is important to bear in mind that local governments in Mexico suffer 
from two main disadvantages when providing services by public means.
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First, there is a lack of financial resources, and the mechanisms to find 
alternative sources of funding are few or absent. Second, there is 
inexperienced management, with unclear objectives, high turn-over of 
personnel, and changes in public policies every three years. Enterprises 
are highly politicised and resistant to change and certain mechanisms and 
procedures are used to innovate public services w ithout public knowledge. 
Legal loopholes in the state and local legislation also represent common 
problems in the implementation of privatisation policies or the use of 
alternative schemes allowing private intervention.
Little work has been done on the results achieved by privatisation policies 
at local level, specially for the water utilities, and the Mexican 
municipalities are still far from exploiting privatisation to the extent to 
which theory, and Mexican law, allows. Nevertheless, the privatisation 
process has arrived in almost every municipality in Mexico, albeit without 
acknowledgement ( it is an 'unknown' policy). In other words, it is common 
at a local level to allow private intervention w ithout ever considering such 
action to be 'theory-driven'. The lack of information, and major political 
and economic aspects, have jeopardised the development of this policy, 
and one could easily argue that any privatisation scheme at this level 
depends not on the economic feasibility of the programme, but on its 
political nature.
W a t e r  U t i l i t i e s :  A  P u b l i c  R e s p o n s a b i l i t y  o n  t h e  P r i v a t e  I n t e r e s t
The water services represent the most controversial u tility  for any local 
authority, and the one for which there is the greatest necessity and 
demand. Water represents a natural monopoly, in which capital-intensive
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and long-term investments are needed due to the fixed costs and, 
because it is the most important resource, essential to the public good and 
for the development of any society. From the experience of privatisation of 
this natural monopoly, one may make assumptions and draw conclusions 
regarding the nature and affects of the privatisation debate for the public 
utilities as a whole.
When examining the water services in Mexico one found two dominant 
cultures: the culture of non-payment, which impacts on price; and the 
lack of a responsible water culture, which affects the service provided. In 
this sense, privatisation is not entirely to blame for the water privatisation 
problems, but is instead affected directly by the general public opinion 
that the water services must be provided free and by the government 
under a paternalist structure, a term known as papa gobierno. 
Macro-economic variables (inflation and the exchange rate) are always 
main determinants of the failure or success of a policy at a local level. For 
example, a policy innovation such as privatisation, which is tied to real 
costs values, is heavily affected by the inflation rate. Investments in 
infrastructure are generally the result of other countries, and will thus be 
affected by any devaluation of the local currency, the greater the 
instability at a macro level, the greater the effect at local level.
The subsidies received by the public utilities, and specifically the water 
services, are results of the achievements of the Mexican revolution in 
1910. All the water services in Mexico receive direct or indirect subsidies 
to solve their problems. These subsidies are both a cause, and a result, of 
irresponsible behaviour, and help to explain the prevalence of the non­
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paying culture, and abuse of the service. Nevertheless, whilst the debate 
over a more conscientious use of the water utilities is tied to this ideology, 
the main aims of removing subsidies and setting cost-based prices are 
political. Quite simply, the poor tax collection rates and high debts in the 
Mexican economic system pose the question: Who is going to pay?
There will always be great potential for the politicisation of any 
privatisation scheme. In the case of the water utilities, the affects on the 
water ta riff and the availability of the service are principal factors used to 
evaluate private efficiency, but nevertheless, external private entities are 
always under social scrutiny and politics determines their permanency. 
They face a chain of requirements, so that even where the tariff is 
acceptable, the provision is questioned; where the provision is good, the 
quality of the water is questioned; if the water quality is acceptable, the 
exploitation of the wells is seen as damaging, and so on. Private bodies 
face endless but not inevitable questions, which have more to do with 
political beliefs than with economics.
I t  is also relevant to point out that privatisation beliefs and practices must 
take into account the issue of sustainable development. Attention must be 
paid to the role played by the private sector in the protection of the 
environment, which in theory is a state issue. For the Mexican 
municipalities, the lack of water resources is a clear problem, particularly 
in the 100 cities in which are concentrated most of the population. The 
problem is exacerbated by a deficient system and obsolete means of 
provision. Thus, it seems inevitable that in the near future these cities will 
be facing water shortages, and increases in prices. Federal and state
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subsidies are in short supply, and the only viable solution is gradually to 
bring prices to a realistic level in order to balance the market conditions. 
In so doing, careful consideration must be given to the political 
implications, and to defining the risks and the benefits.
It  is clear that the inherent characteristics of the water utilities as a 
natural monopoly add extra implications to the consideration of 
privatisation beliefs. In particular, monopolies lead to inefficiencies in the 
private sector and, consequently, the water utilities may lead to a market 
failure, e.g., constant prices increases due to the lack of competition. To 
guard against this, competition must be used as a tool to promote 
efficiency and improve quality, whilst regulatory frameworks should also 
ensure efficient provision of the services and fair prices. Attention must 
also be given to the external factors that jeopardise the privatisation 
movement: democracy, bureaucracy, and institutions. All of these play a 
key role, whereby the government fails to allocate resources efficiently. 
Even when regulation is used to back up any privatisation, special 
attention must be given to the transfer from a public to private monopoly. 
Private entities are accountable first to their shareholders, which in most 
cases are international companies miles away from the city; and then to 
the regulatory body, which often fails, in practice, to represent the 
interests of the public. Prices are commonly set without considering 
market forces, or are modified according to partisan beliefs within each 
period of government. This leads to a vicious circle, in which the only 
objective is to obtain a profit without considering social necessities, 
resulting in a permanent politicisation.
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Chapter Two
Reinventing Ways to Provide Public Utilities at a Local 
Level under Technocratic and Centralised Observance in 
Mexico: The Background to the Privatisation Programme
Introduction
This chapter begins by describing the Mexican political system and its 
main characteristics, focusing upon the effect of privatisation policies on 
policy formation and implementation at the local level, and highlighting 
the traditional influence of the official party. Attention will be given to the 
degree of centralisation, and to the influence of technocratic beliefs, 
present at every layer of government, as well as to the relationships 
between local level and the state and federal governments. Finally, this 
section will look at the varying role of opposition governments at both 
state and local level in changing the forms and mechanisms of governing. 
Section 2.2 goes on to identify the links between local governments and 
public services, examining the legal and administrative structure, and 
main characteristics, of the Mexican municipalities in this regard, and 
describing the broad heterogeneity present; whilst section 2.3 examines 
the ways in which local governments in Mexico provide public services, 
classifying them according to their size and degree of development. The 
section will look at the legal support behind the provision of the public 
utilities at a local level and then explain the basic techniques available. 
Section 2.4 presents the relationship between the public and private 
sectors, and describes the extent to which the latter can be involved in the 
provision of public services. It  seeks to explain why Mexican municipalities
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have been reluctant to allow this, identifies the services provided, and 
examines the techniques used, before looking at the number of public 
utilities actually provided in this manner. Finally, section 2.5 looks at the 
debate about privatisation and its implementation in the Mexican 
municipalities.
2.1 The Role of Technocratic Policies Under Central Observance at the
Local Level in Mexico 
Central-Local Relationships: An Historical Submission
The Mexican constitution states that Mexico will take the form of a federal, 
democratic, and representative system with three levels of government. 
Thus, in 1997, Mexico was ruled by a federal government, 31 state 
governments, and 2,418 municipalities.27 There is also one Distrito Federal 
- D.F. - (Federal District) elected for the first time by popular vote on June 
6, 1997, and represented by a je fe de gobierno (chief of government) and 
by 16 deiegaciones (boroughs) rather than municipalities. Considering that 
our debate focuses upon the local level, for the purposes of this research 
the Distrito Federal clearly does not represent a state government due to 
the legal impediment that it is not constituted by municipalities.28 The 
population of the country was estimated, in 1998, at about 96 million 
inhabitants (71 per cent urban - including the 22 per cent from the Distrito
27 Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Information 
para el Desarrollo, Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN, (CD- ROM).
28 There has been discussion recently, (1998-99) regarding the integration of the Distrito 
Federal as a state government, and thus its being constituted by municipalities. If approved, 
this could open a bigger gap within the municipalities in Mexico.
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Federal and inner boroughs - and 29 percent rural).29 
The creation, in 1519, of the first municipality, Villa Rica de la Vera-Cruz, 
marked the beginning of central-local relationships in Mexico, and was the 
first sign of how useful a municipality can be to obtain specific objectives 
under unilateral decisions.30 However, Mexican-style centralisation (the 
semi-authoritarian state) can be traced back to the foundation, by the 
Aztecs, of Tenochtitlan. More recently, major constitutional changes have 
been introduced to alter the balance between federal, state, and municipal 
government relationships, but little has actually been achieved. Rather 
than attempting to explain federal-local issues in detail, though, this 
chapter will concentrate only on the main developments. The detail will be 
provided later.31
The arrival in power of Miguel de la Madrid for the 1982-1988 period 
marked the beginning of the technocratic era in Mexico, an era in which 
neo-liberal policies have appeared openly on the economic agenda (with 
privatisation and decentralisation as primary aspects).32 This was 
accompanied by the federalism debate; although moves toward federalism
29 Consejo Nacional de Poblacion. 1998. Poblacidn Nacional, accesed through the Internet 
www.conapo.gob.mx on August. 1998.
30 This municipality was created with two objectives: to obtain legality and to legitimate the 
conquest with an autonomous institution from the Spanish crown. To find more about this 
argument see: Jose Mejia Lira. 1992. Modalidades Administrativas de Los Municipios 
Mexicanos, Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 10), Mexico: CIDE.
31 For a study of the Mexican, amongst other Latin American municipalities, see: Andrew 
Nickson. 1995. Local Government in Latin America, USA: Lynne Riener: Boulder, pp. 199- 
235.
32 For an interesting debate on De la Madrid’s decentralization policies and municipal reforms 
see: Victoria Rodriguez. 1997. Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal to 
Solidaridad to Nuevo Federalismo, University o f Texas at Austin: Westview Press.
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have, in practice, been postponed because of the characteristics of the 
Mexican political system.33 The failures of this ideology in recent decades, 
including major political reforms and policy innovations such as 
privatisation and, consequently, regulatory policies, have been 
proportional to the degree of political and economic centralisation. For 
example, the federal government retains power over all policy-making and 
implementation. Consequently, other tiers of government can play only a 
limited role.34
One aspect on which experts in Mexican politics and Mexican citizens 
agree is the existing form of government. This is unambiguous: Mexico 
has the characteristics of a semi-authoritarian or monolithic government - 
in other words, a centralised federalism.35 Historically, local governments 
have been used to pursue specific political, military, or economic goals 
reflecting the federal interest. Nickson argues that the corporativist 
system, led by the official Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (which 
has been in power for the last seven decades), is no exception. It
33 For discussion on the federalism debate see: Luis Medina. 1997. La Division de Poderes 
Vertical: El Federalismo, Documento de Trabajo (DEP No.70), Mexico: CIDE, Alicia 
Hernandez Chavez. 1993. Federalismo y gobemabilidad en Mexico, in Marcello Carmagnani 
(coord), Federalismo Latinoamericanos: Mexico, Brasil, Argentina, Mexico: FCE, and 
Yamile Mizrahi. 1997. Pressuring the Center: Opposition Governments and Federalism in 
Mexico, Documento de Trabajo (DEP No.71), Mexico: CIDE.
34 An extensive debate on the degree of centralisation of the Mexican government is found in: 
John Bailey. 1994. Centralism and Political Change in Mexico: The Case of National 
Solidarity, in Wayne A. Comelious, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox, Transforming State- 
Society Relations in Mexico. The National Solidarity Strategy, San Diego, Center for U.S. 
Mexican Studies, University o f San Diego, California, US.
35 This term was used on Alicia Hernandez Chavez. 1993. Federalismo y Gobemabilidad en 
Mexico, in Marcello Carmagnani (coord), Federalismo Latinoamericanos: Mexico, Brasil, 
Argentina, Mexico: FCE.
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promotes local governments oriented to serve only federal interests or, in 
most cases, to serve the Mexican president almost exclusively, a system 
known as presidencialismo.36
The power of the Mexican president is sometime defined as meta- 
constitutional, whereby the president is able to remove governors and 
mayors, and to decide the future of any member of the political 
machinery.37 The Mexican constitution even gives exclusive powers, and 
the president, in turn, formulates agriculture, labour, health, and poverty 
eradication policies, amongst others. The political circle of the Mexican 
president is limited to a specific number of members of his cabinet, known 
as the camarillas (power circles) and including civil servants, inside the 
executive branch of the official party.38 The president is also able to select 
his successor, and although it is thought that the current president, 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, will not exercise this power, it is 
nonetheless true that the political machinery of the official party has 
remained steady for the last 70 years.39
36 This argument is reviewed in: Andrew Nickson. 1995. Local Government in Latin America. 
Lynne Riener, BoulderiUSA, pp.200.
37 To find more on this discussion see: Jeffrey Weldon. 1998. The Political Sources of 
Presidentialism in Mexico, in Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Shugart, Presidentialism in 
Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
38 For a discussion on these groups see: Joy Langston. 1997. An Empirical View o f the 
Political Groups in Mexico: The Camarillas, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP No. 15), Mexico: 
CIDE, and Joy Langston. 1993. The Camarillas: A Theoretical and Comparative Examination 
o f Why They Exist and Why They Take The Specific Form They Do, (Documento de Trabajo 
DEP, No. 12), Mexico: CIDE.
39 To find a broad discussion see: Joy Langston. 1994. The Role o f the Political Groups in The 
Succession Process, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP No. 19), Mexico: CIDE.
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The Legacy of the Mexican Political System at the Local Level: A Threat to Its 
Survival
The centralisation of power has limited each municipality's capacity for 
manoeuvre and development. In seeking to further identify the results of 
decades of centralised government, this rigid political hegemony had 
concentrated the economic expansion exclusively in 24 cities by 1998.40 
Thus, by the year 2000 onwards, most human, capital, and infrastructure 
resources will be concentrated in a very few cities. The fact that the 
municipalities in Mexico are relatively small and rural (85 per cent have 
less than 15,000 inhabitants), together with the important issue of 
migration to the wealthiest areas, could help to explain why local 
governments are so dependent upon, and submissive to, centralised 
decision-making. The federal government provides up to 90 per cent of 
each municipality's total income. This financial dependency represents the 
main reason for acquiescence to upper levels of government. However, 
whilst the federalism debate argues for more local authority control over 
their own financial resources, the lack of accountability and enforcement 
delimits its perspective at this level.41
There are three basic mechanisms to finance the municipalities: federal 
participation, state funding, and municipal taxes. Extra funding is only 
available from federal funds called partipaciones extraordinarias 
(extraordinary tax revenues), which are distributed according to
40 National (Section). Reforma Newspaper. December 1, 1998.
41 An historical perspective about federalism is found in: Luis Medina. 1997. La Division de 
Poderes Vertical: El Federalismo, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP No.70), Mexico: CIDE.
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mysterious formula, and thus represent an element with unknown 
characteristics. Such as, for example, a federal programme called 
PRONASOL or SOLIDARIDAD in the former Salinas administration (1988- 
1994). At this level, success in obtaining extra resources relies, to a great 
extent, upon the relationship (regardless of party affiliation) with the 
president. Thus, municipal subordination clearly attends political aims. 
Therefore, the lack of resources (human, technological, financial, and 
administrative) clearly limits the ability to pressure the federal 
government with social demands. In addition, political subordination to the 
official party, ignorance, and partisan interest are common denominators 
at this level. 42 I t  is inevitable that politicians and civil servants at the 
federal level will be more interested in attending to serious matters, 
instead of dealing with what seem to them to be insignificant situations at 
local level.
Supporting our arguments, there is evidence of highly-centralised 
decisions, relying on the fact that local development strategies, or federal 
programmes, are useless in all senses, due to the strict control and 
monitoring from federal bodies like the Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit (SHCP), the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) and the 
Comptroller's General Office. These bodies promote the objectives of the 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (Government National Plan) without
42 An interesting debate about the electoral effects of this federal programmeme under Salinas 
administration is reviewed by: Scott Morgenstem.1997. Spending fo r Political Survival: 
Elections, Clientelism, and Government Expenses in Mexico, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP 
No. 61), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 11.
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considering local needs, as the results clearly prove.43 The only alternative 
sources of funding for municipalities - the development banks, the Banco 
Nacional de Obras y Servicios (BANOBRAS), or Nacional Financiera 
(NAFINSA) - are under strict federal control.
State-Local Relationships: The Reproduction of Federal Practices 
The relationships amongst state and local authorities are extremely 
important. Upon these depend major resolutions affecting the internal life 
of the municipality. Thus, it is necessary to consider the degree of 
centralisation within state authorities. Rodriguez states that the 1983 
Municipal Reform constitutional amendments of the de la Madrid 
government (reviewed further in detail), did not grant independence or 
autonomy to the municipalities. On the contrary, these allowed more 
control at state level, and the subordination to federal decisions remained 
the same.44
It is important to note that the state authorities represent the immediate 
upper tier of government to local authorities. Major financial, human, and 
technological resources are concentrated at this level, as are regulatory 
and normative frameworks. It is here that major decisions are taken; for 
example, any large infrastructure project would need approval at this 
level, in conjunction with federal decisions. The extreme financial
43 Andrew Nickson. 1995. Local government in Latin America. Lynne Riener, Boulder:USA, 
pp. 203.
44 Victoria Rodriguez. 1992. Mexico’s descentralization in the 1980s: Promises, Promises, 
Promises. In Morris, A., and Lowder, S, (eds.) Decentralization in Latin America: An 
Evaluation. New York: Praeger, pp.136.
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dependency of the small and medium-size municipalities encourages state 
governments to exchange funding for political favours. Considering that 
most official party state governors owe their political posts more to the 
president than to the electors, their own submission is clear, and affects 
the development of the region and the management of local politics. A 
state governor - particularly, but not exclusively, one from the official 
party - will strive to maintain a good relationship with the president. Any 
confrontation might lead to a hostile relationship or even the loss of the 
political post, jeopardising the governor's chances of remaining within the 
political machinery.
As discussed earlier, funding and centralised decisions on its distribution 
represent the most common problems. I t  is necessary here to consider 
how these factors relate to the state authorities. First, it is to this level of 
government that financial contributions are sent for distribution amongst 
the municipalities according to a specific formula. The city water supply, 
local road construction, the collection of local taxes, and land use planning 
are all financially dependent on the state government.45 All represent 
serious financial burdens to local authorities, yet in most cases the 
allocation of funds has little to do with reality; rather, it is dependent on 
centralised beliefs. Furthermore, such decisions by state governments are 
not only politically accepted, but are supported by the normative and 
regulatory frameworks surrounding state legislation. Thus, little autonomy 
is granted to local authorities to define their strategic framework.
45 This discussion is reviewed in Richard, Batley. 1992. Urban Management in Mexico. 
Birmingham: University o f Birmingham, pp. 29.
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Determining the limits of how to charge for the right to use public 
services, the collection of taxes, and external borrowing all require state 
approval in the first instance. This legal structure, which in most cases 
denies the reality of the situation, represents an extra pressure on the 
municipality.
Municipal tax collection, which represents a direct source of income, is 
concentrated in state governments, affecting on the means to distribute it. 
This helps to explain why major developments are located in the 
cabeceras del estado (head municipality of the state).46 I t  is in these 
municipalities that major developments (infrastructure, financial 
resources, technological, educational, and agricultural) are concentrated, 
and also where the majority of the state population reside. These 
municipalities also enjoy a comparative advantage in the provision and 
development of public services, since these cities are perceived as the first 
'face' of the state government. Other, smaller municipalities tend to be left 
behind, leading to sharp contrasts, especially in large states with many 
municipalities. Thus, state-local relationships reproduce the practices of 
federal-local relationships, further limiting the freedom of local 
government.
Local-Lower Tiers Relationships: Reproducing the Vicious Circle
Topics such as federalism and decentralisation are constantly under 
discussion between local and federal authorities, but the important
46 For an analysis o f the provision o f the public utilities outside the cabecera municipal see: 
Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1994. Encuesta Nacional de Gestion Municipal: Los Servicios 
Publicos. Primeros Resultados. In Gestion y  Politico Publica, Primer Semestre, Mexico: 
CIDE, pp. 417.
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question is the extent to which the Mexican municipalities are, in fact, 
centralised. This thesis will show that this variable has chain effects and 
that, consequently, local authorities are as centralised as their 'higher' 
counterparts. This impacts upon the provision of the public utilities and on 
policy-making decisions, thus affecting the development of the cities. In 
other words, most of the policy innovations at this level are dominated by 
inflexible and partisan ideologies.
After decades of rigid and monolithic structures in Mexico, it is arguable 
that local authorities have, inherently, the same kind of government. 
There is evidence of presidentialism on a small scale, whereby decisions 
are concentrated in just one man, the mayor, while the city hall 
represents the other body in which these decisions are jointly 
concentrated under strict partisan ideologies. Thus, any decisions 
regarding the municipality are monopolised by these two entities.47 In 
consequence, the efficient provision of the public utilities is under their 
prerogative and scrutiny.
Empirical evidence for this discussion can be found in the local 
communities (suburbs). These are located in specific areas that, according 
to the Mexican constitution, the local authorities control, monitor, and 
encourage development within. Consequently, these communities, or inner 
cities, are expected to provide public services (supposedly under municipal 
observation), thus suffering the effects of centralised decisions. I t  is
47 Ibidem., evidences that at least 62 percent o f local decisions rely on the mayor. The City 
Hall is mentioned as the second main body in which local decisions are centralized in 82 
percent o f cases.
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common for influential groups to be concentrated in these areas since they 
include both the less developed regions of the city and, in some cases, the 
wealthiest ones. Obtaining control and making necessary arrangements 
with the leaders or representatives are the main political goals - first, 
when campaigning for the municipal presidency and, afterwards, when 
assuming the public post. The mechanisms used to encourage the 
development of these suburbs replicate those used by the major tiers of 
government. These include corrupt practices, the assisting of specific 
groups, using certain areas for political 'goals', and pressuring 
communities with opposition representatives. Bureaucratic procedures, 
and withholding resources and skilled personnel, are common practices 
and, as mentioned above, it is common for major developments to be 
concentrated exclusively in the cabecera del municipio.
In a series of personal interviews, reinforced with extensive surveys from 
the CIDE, it became clear that local authorities are as centralised as their 
major counterparts.48 The extensive empirical evidence shows that while 
Mexican municipalities complain about centralised governments, their own 
mechanisms of government remain on the same grounds.
Considering these factors, is private ownership by means of privatisation 
schemes the solution? At the federal level, arguments for the use of 
privatisation schemes at local level were supported by the advocacy of the
48 An extensive discussion supporting our arguments can be found in: Rodolfo Garcia del 
Castillo. 1994. Retos y Perspectivas de la Administration Municipal en Mexico. In Gestion y  
Politico. Publico, Vol III, num. 2, Segundo Semestre, Mexico: CIDE, pp. 399-449.
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economic theory. As a result, privatisation ideology arrived at this level as 
a legacy of Mexico's technocratic era, whereby private ownership or 
intervention was seen as a tool with which to close the gap between local 
necessities and government responsibilities and led, consequently, to a 
much wider political debate. It  is not the intention of this research to 
explore the feasibility of private ownership. It is, however, assumed that 
using privatisation schemes to provide public services leads to a reduction 
in political inertia (government passiveness) and to interest groups (the 
breakdown of quotas of power) encouraging a permanent politicisation of 
the arena.
Our research will focus on this argument and will show how economic 
policies in the form of privatisation schemes at this level rely upon local 
politics, even when backed by federal support. The degree of failure is 
determined, in the first instance, by the political nature and influence of 
the project (internal and external actors involved in the process) and, 
consequently, by its economic benevolence.
The Rise of Opposition Governments at a Local Level: A Threat to the Political 
Machinery
In defining the politics surrounding any tier of government in Mexico, it is 
important to emphasise the role played by opposition governments. These 
represent a new source of power in domestic politics at all levels, 
particularly considering their influence during the last decade - breaking 
the political hegemony and representing a constant threat to the official 
party, and undermining the power of the Mexican president. It is 
necessary, therefore, to look at the effects of opposition governments
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upon the old political machinery, and consider their influence at a local 
level.
Without attempting to explain, in detail, the relationship between 
democracy and decentralisation (other than its effect on the provision of 
the public utilities), it is important to consider that, since the major defeat 
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) - Institutional 
Revolutionary Party - in the 1997 federal elections for the lower chamber, 
Mexico could possibly have been heading for new forms of government. 
This was recognised by Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, 
who stated that I  am not sure that the next presidential candidate from 
the PRI will be the next president o f Mexico.*9 The possibility that in the 
next presidential elections, in the year 2000, a candidate from the 
opposition could win, whilst not guaranteeing a decentralised government 
per se, clearly identifies the new tendencies present at all levels of 
Mexican politics. Clearly, it is necessary to consider whether the end of 
presidentialism may be on the agenda.50
Elections at the state and local levels are valuable tools with which to test 
the strength of the official party. They also represent a new source of 
power in the Mexican political system, in which state governors are able to 
openly participate in the next presidential elections (in 2000), and local 
mayors are moving forward to obtain higher posts. This trend, whilst
49 No es seguro que el Proximo Presidente sea Priista: Ernesto Zedillo. La Jornada. July 21, 
1997.
50 An interesting debate can be found in: George Philip. 1998. Democratisation and Executive 
Power in Mexico, presented at the LSE seminar in Mexican Politics,(document in print).
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undermining the presidentialis system, has shown the growth of 
regionalism and local quotas of power. Thus, with the arrival in power of 
opposition governments, Mexico is facing the fall of the presidentialist 
system at some future stage, with collateral affects on the strength of 
regional and local powers.
Nonetheless, recent state and local elections (1998) have seen a recovery 
by the official party, evidencing a clear shift of electoral ideologies during 
the 'democratisation' process resulting in the view, finally, that the 
candidate is more important than the party ideology.51 Table 2.1 illustrates 
the political parties governing the Mexican municipalities by 1999.
In recent years, opposition governments, especially at local level, have 
emerged on the political scene with stronger perspectives. Mizrahi argues 
that opposition governments have fewer incentives to subordinate 
themselves to a federal government still controlled by the PRI.52 Evidence 
from the recent past allows us to examine how, in practice, these 
opposition governments have employed alternative mechanisms with 
which to provide the public utilities.
The relationships between, opposition governments and public services in 
Mexico can be explained with reference to the cases of Ciudad Juarez and 
Chihuahua, where the PAN governments introduced new techniques,
51 To find more about this discussion see: Scott Morgenstem.1997. Spending for Political 
Survival: Elections, Clientelism, and Government Expenses in Mexico, (Documento de 
Trabajo, DEP No. 61), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 6.
52 This idea is debated in: Yemile Mizrahi. 1997. Pressuring the Center: Opposition 
Governments and Federalism in Mexico, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP No.71), Mexico: 
CIDE, pp. 3.
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additional resources, and undermined state control over local issues, 
eventually leading to more independence. Later on, PRI governments 
emerged on the scene and followed this trend .53
T a b l e  2 .1  P o l i t i c a l  A f f i l i a t io n  o f  t h e  M e x ic a n  M u n ic ip a l i t i e s  ( 1 9 9 9 ) .
P O L IT IC A L . A F F IL IA T IO N
P A R T Y M U N IC IP A L IT Y P O P U L A T IO N
T O T A L % T O T A L %
PAN 287 11.86 27,513,398 33.24
PRI 1,385 57.26 42,427,591 51.26
PRD 278 11.49 10,353,436 12.51
PT 26 1.07 473,858 0.57
PVEM 10 0.41 321,763 0.39
PRT 2 0.08 30,107 0.04
COALITION 4 0.17 343,526 0.42
UYC * 418 17.28 1,173,983 1.42
CM ** 3 0.12 54,413 0.07
OTHERS 6 0.25 72,307 0.09
T O T A L + 2,419 100.00 ++ 82 764,382 100.00
Source: CEDEMUN. 1999. filia tio n  Politico de los Municipios en Mexico. MexicorSEGOB- 
CEDEMUN, accessed though the Internet on www.cedemun.gob.mx. (July, 1999).54 
* UYC \Usos y  Costumbres * *  Consejos Municipales +one municipality was added by 1999 and 
one municipality in Michoacan are still in dispute. ++Data reflects the INEGI.1995. Censo 
Nacional. Mexico:INEGI.
Thus, new opposition governments in Mexico may be willing to alter the 
balance between the different levels of government, regardless of political 
affiliation. They may also bring innovation to the provision of public 
services, and the necessity to find alternative techniques will emerge 
naturally, precisely because they are opposition government.55 For 
example, policy innovations (such as privatisation techniques) are
53 Ibidem.,
54 PCM: Partido Civilista Morelense, in the State of Morelos, PC: Partido Cardenista in the 
State of Oaxaca, PDM: Partido Democrata Mexicano in the State of San Luis Potosi, PI: 
Planilla Independiente in the State of Tamaulipas and PPS: Partido Popular Socialista in the 
State of Veracruz. The Coalitions refers to PRD-PT in the State of Baja California Sur and 
PRD-PVEM in the State of Nuevo Leon.
53 Yemile Mizrahi. 1997. Pressuring the Center: Opposition Governments and Federalism in 
Mexico, (Documento de Trabajo, DEP No.71), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 3.
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considered to, automatically, represent pressure upon more competitive 
political scenarios. However, the reader must remain sceptical, since the 
results of the present research point to a different conclusion.
The fact of there being an opposition government is closely related to the 
identification of a substantial change, a change that can make a significant 
difference to society in the new market scenario. Nonetheless, the political 
aspects of reform tend to delay innovation in the provision of public 
services. In a series of interviews with mayors the answer was plain: any 
innovation is always risky and especially [so ] when being an opposition in 
a hostile environment.56
Financial dependency also puts opposition governments in a highly difficult 
position in negotiations with the federal government, which has to act 
under old rules while attempting to cope with local demands under strict 
federal prerogatives. On one hand, it is financially impossible to act 
without federal support; on the other hand, it is urgently necessary to find 
alternative ways to manage the public finances. Thus, there is a dilemma 
between pragmatism and idealism.57
Cases of opposition governments acting under the shadow of centralised 
government have been reviewed in the current literature. These 
demonstrate that there is no guarantee that an opposition government will 
perform better; there is only the expectation of some sort of innovation in 
public policy and policy-making structures. Nonetheless, by remaining
56 Ibidem.
57 Ibidem, pp.7.
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under federal scrutiny in an almost unchanged political system, the scope 
of any opposition government is severely limited. For example, in the 
1998 elections, the official party recovered against opposition gains, 
clearly demonstrating its persuasive power. In this sense, without a 
change in the Mexican presidency, movement through more democratic 
practices at state and local levels that can be translated into realistic 
policies will be very limited.
Furthermore, a change in the presidency does not necessarily guarantee a 
change in practices, particularly considering the remaining political 
machinery, and the inexperience of the opposition parties. While the 
official party relies on the corporativist and clientelis system (inner circles 
of political power), opposition governments need to gain citizens' support. 
This leads to great tension in the political system, limiting the scope for 
any sort of innovation or reform, especially regarding the public utilities. It 
is relevant that in our case of study both official and opposition 
governments relied, at some stage, on similar practices in order to control 
the local situation. Opposition governments reproduced early practices of 
the official party, with the aim of paying back the official party for the 
treatment it had suffered under their administration.
The opposition movement is not perceived as a threat to society. 
Nonetheless, the democratic scenario facing Mexico has both pros and 
cons. The inhabitants who benefit from the official party are taking a more 
active role, largely in order to stop any policy innovation that could be 
translated into a loss of power or resources; whilst the results obtained by 
opposition governments or the introduction of democratic practices are
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unpopular in some circles (local quotas of power and members of the old 
guard-PRI-), because of a natural inertia. Thus, an opposition government 
does not guarantee new forms of government, only a search for 
alternative means to provide public services.
2.2 Local Governments and Public Utilities in Mexico: The Legal and
Administrative Structure 
Local Government in Mexico: The Background
Our discussion of local governments in Mexico will be set in the context of 
the economic and political changes that have taken place since 1982.58 
Mexico has emerged from several economic crises and political conflicts, 
and local governments have clearly been influenced by these 
developments. The start of the 1980s marked the beginnings of new 
paradigms and policies for the years to come, with the arrival in the 
Mexican presidency of Miguel de la Madrid for the 1982/88 sexenio (a six- 
year presidential term) supporting new trends in Mexican politics - 
decentralisation and municipal autonomy. This represented an aspect of 
neo-liberal policies, and the advent of the new technocratic era in Mexico. 
In 1983, De la Madrid's government made the first significant amendment 
regarding the municipalities since 1917. Article 115 of the Mexican
58 To find a discussion at a local level in Latin American countries see: Alicia Ziccardi (cord.) 
1991. Ciudades y  Gobiernos Locales en la America Latina de los Noventa. Mexico: Miguel 
Angel Porrua-InstitutoMora-Flacso, For a description of innovative mechanisms of 
government at this level see: Alicia Ziccardi. 1995. La Tarea de Gobernar: Gobiernos 
Locales y  Demandas Ciudadanas. Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua-UNAM.
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constitution was changed in order to grant a higher degree of autonomy to 
local governments.59 Along with other constitutional changes, the aim was 
to provide the municipalities with greater financial resources, from federal 
and local participation, that would allow them to decide how, when, and 
on what to spend their own resources. The total responsibility for the 
delivery of public services would be transferred to local authorities, 
together with the introduction of a democratic system using a multi-party 
political scheme, providing the hegemony needed to perform in a fair 
environment. The amendments would grant local governments political 
and economic autonomy from state and federal control, with the intention 
that economic liberalisation would lead to political transformation.60 These 
reforms became law in 1984 and were nationally promoted by De la 
Madrid's government as the reforma municipal (municipal reform). The 
arrival of this constitutional reform marked the beginning of a new era for 
local government authorities. They were, indeed, the result of a social 
demand for municipio libre (free municipality), a slogan used by the 
Mexican revolutionaries of 1910.61
59 In theory it can be argued that the amendments made to Article 115 granted significant 
changes to local governments, and were the first signs of a clear interest in decentralised local 
authorities. In practice the results are not so optimistic, as will be stated further in the 
literature.
60 See: Victoria Rodriguez and Peter Ward. 1995. Opposition Government in Mexico. 
University of New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, pp.154.
61 An interesting debate o f the modifications to Article 115 from a legal perspective can be 
found in: Juan Ugarte Cortes. 1985. La Reforma Municipal y  Elementos para Una Teoria 
Constitucional del Municipio, Mexico: Porrua. A definition of the administrative and legal 
framework of the Mexican municipalities can be found in: Maria Emilia Janetti Diaz y Arturo 
Pontifes Martinez. 1996. La Proteccion Jurisdiccional y  Administrativa del Municipio, 
Mexico: CIDE-Colegio Nacional de Ciencias Politicas y Administration Publica.
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By the time this thesis was concluded, during 1999, the federal chamber 
of deputies for the period 1997-2000, and the Senators chamber for the 
period 1994-2000, had approved constitutional changes to Article 115 
(June-July), changes aimed at providing local authorities with enhanced 
opportunities to control and monitor their governance, public 
management, and financial resources (incomes). This is expected to 
become law in April, 2000.62 Those areas of core concern to this thesis 
(i.e., the provision of the public utilities), however, remained unchanged. 
The Legal Framework of the Mexican Municipalities
There are four main categories with which one can describe how the 
municipalities are legally constituted in Mexico: First, by a gobierno 
(government), defined as a jurist-political institution in which the demands 
and the interests of the society are integrated in the ayuntamiento (city 
hall); second, by the poblacion municipal (municipal population) 
representing a social community in which similar interests and necessities 
interact within a specific society; third, by the territorio o circunscripcion 
territorial (territorial or municipal circumscription), which corresponds to a 
specific land or area where the population lives, interacts, and establishes 
their relationship with the community; and, finally, by the ley de 
organizacion municipal (jurist municipal order), whereby local 
governments are ruled by a specific law and not by who represents the
62 To find about these constitutional reforms see: Camara de Diputados LVII Legislatura. 
1999. Gaceta Parlamentaria de la Camara de Diputados. Ano 2, Numero 286, June 15, 
Mexico, or on the www at http://gaceta.cddhcu.gob.mx.
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power. Thus, one can identify the municipality framework on its four basic 
principles: territory, government, inhabitants and laws.63 
In order to understand how these bodies are represented by the public 
institutions, and the connection between the society and the municipality, 
the following description presents the two core bodies of local 
governments. Figure 2.1 presents data on the legal and administrative 
structure of the Mexican municipalities.64
Figure 2.1
The Legal and Administrative Structure of the Mexican Municipalities (1999).
Administrative Structure
Presidencia Municipal 
(Mayor’s Office)
Ayuntamiento
SindicoslRegidores
Every municipality has the right to elect its government, which is 
structured as follows: The first level of government is represented by the 
ayuntamiento, also known as the salon de cabildos. I t  is the highest level 
of government, where major resolutions concerning social, political, and 
economic issues are discussed. I t  can be identified as a chamber of
63 This classification was used by Jose Mejia Lira. 1991. Notas Para el Estudio de la 
Administration Publica y  Estatal y  Municipal en Mexico, (Documento de Trabajo) Mexico: 
CIDE, pp. 31.
64 To find more see: INAP (coed). 1995. Administration Publica Municipal. Guia Tecnica 
3.Mexico:INAP-CEDEMUN-SEGOB, and Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo y Misael Hernandez 
Torres. 1994. Formas Clave para la Prestacion de los Servicios Publicos Municipales, 
Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 16), Mexico: CIDE.
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representatives at this level. According to the reforma municipal, the main 
goal of this body is to promote a fair environment in local demands using 
a multi-party political scheme. The objective is to represent a balance 
between the party in power and the parties with political presence in the 
municipality during a three-year period of government.
I t  includes two internal social representations, intended to look after the 
interests of the society and to create a balance between the different 
levels of government. Both are elected according to plurinominal 
(proportional) representation - PR - (no direct vote) for a similar period of 
time and are made up of members from different political parties.65 Thus, 
the political hegemony inside this body lies with the political party that 
wins the election for mayor.
The first body is the sindicatura, commonly invested in one or two sfndicos 
selected from the same political party as the one elected - one is 
responsible for legally representing the interests of the ayuntamiento, and 
the other serves as internal controller. Both have juridical responsibility. 
The second body is made up by a specific and variable number of council 
members or aldermen, known as regidores, concentrated in a specific 
number of regidurfas. The first regidor is invested in the mayor, who has
65 This mechanism of proportional representation for selecting the members from the 
Ayuntamiento has been debated since it always leads to a majority inside this body for the 
party in power, For a broad discussion see: Tonatiuh Guillen Lopez. 1996. Gobiernos 
Municipales en Mexico: Entre la Modernizacion y  la Tradicion Politica, Mexico: Miguel 
Angel Porrua-Colegio de la Frontera Norte, pp. 174-175.
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the voto de calidad (quality vote), and is the only member elected by 
direct vote.
The majority of the remaining members (70-80 per cent) are always 
members of the governing party, whilst the rest are members of other 
political parties with a presence in the municipality but in a minority, 
acting as opposition. Thus, the party in power always has total control 
inside this body, which is commonly subject to partisan ideologies 
governing its policy-making. Nonetheless, both these bodies are intended 
to represent the interests of every administrative municipal body in order 
to ensure the efficient functioning of the public utilities. 66 For example, 
water and wastewater is a commission represented by a member of the 
regiduria.
The second level of government is the presidencia municipal 
(municipality). This institution is elected by direct vote and is exclusively 
invested in the presidente municipal (mayor). The administrative functions 
are concentrated in this body and it is intended to represent the interests 
of the society. It is legally conceived as the last tier of government, and 
serves for a period of three years with no possibility of re-election.
Local Governments in Mexico: A Broad Heterogeneity
The Mexican municipalities have just one variable in common: their
66 According to Article 115 o f the Mexican constitution, besides each ley organica municipal 
and state laws, the number of sindicos or regidores may vary accordingly to the size and 
number of the population. Commonly the Ayuntamiento is integrated by one or two sindicos 
and the number o f regidores may vary from 4 to 18 depending on the services provided. They 
can be elected for the next term only if  they represent the position as suplente (substitute). 
Members representing the post as propietario (proprietary) are not entitled to be elected as 
suplentes for the next term.
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remarkable heterogeneity and disparate rate of growth.67 The number of 
municipalities has increased dramatically, from 13 at the beginning of 
1921, to 2,418 by 1997,68 an increase of almost 19,000 per cent during 
the last nine decades. How can this trend be explained? Diverse situations 
have been encouraging the creation of new cities. 69 On the one hand, 
massive migration to the wealthiest or most prosperous cities is a reliable 
explanation for the concentration of people in specific regions, with the 
repercussion of more cities growing in parallel.70
On the other hand, though, some less-developed regions have also faced 
the creation of new municipalities, as part of an ongoing trend whereby 
small communities become municipalities that are governed not by direct 
election but by usos y costumbres (custom and practices). The disparities 
are evident. For example, while the State of Oaxaca comprises 570 
municipalities (162 municipalities elected by direct vote and 408 by the 
mechanism of custom and practices), Guanajuato state has 46,
67 To find an analysis o f the Mexican municipalities see: Alfredo Ramirez y Roy Campos. 
1997. Encuesta Nacional de Gestion Municipal 1993: Informe Metodoldgico, Documento de 
Trabajo (DAP No. 51), Mexico: CIDE.
68 Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Informacion 
para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN-ENEGI, (CD- ROM).
69 An important historical development was the creation in 1519, by the Spanish conqueror 
Heman Cortes, of the first municipality in Mexico, then called Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz, 
now Veracruz in the state with the same name. On the historical development of the Mexican 
municipalities see: Gustavo Martinez Cabanas. 1995. La Administracion Estatal y  Municipal 
en Mexico, Mexico: 1NAP, pp. 80-93.
70 For an extensive analysis o f this remarkably uneven growth in the Mexican municipalities 
see: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1997. Analisis del Municipio Mexicano. Diagnostico y  
Perspectivas. Parte 1. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No.32), Mexico: CIDE and Rodolfo 
Garcia del Castillo. 1997. Analisis del Municipio Mexicano. Diagnostico y  Perspectivas. 
Parte 2. Documentos de Trabajo, (DAP No.33), Mexico: CIDE.
47
Aguascalientes 11, and in Baja California Sur there are only 5 (all elected 
by direct vote, adding an extra dimension of unequal growth).71 By 1995, 
there were 153,813 communities with less than 2,500 inhabitants, in 
which 29 per cent of the total inhabitants of the country resided (rural 
areas). Over 70 per cent of these communities had less than 100 
inhabitants, a statistic representing a clear challenge regarding the 
provision of public services.72
This non-planned growth has caused irregular urbanisation and 
disproportional regional development, all of which has affected directly 
upon the public utilities provided.73 In order to explain this trend it is 
necessary to review the ways in which Mexican municipalities are divided 
according to their size. The development and the hegemony of each city is 
different but, for the purposes of this thesis, they can be identified 
according to three categories, as presented in Table 2.2.74
71 The above data was obtained through: Daniel Moreno. Reforma, in Enfoque Suplemento, 
No. 199, November 22, 1997, Mexico.
72 Presidencia de la Republica. 1995. Programa Hidraulico 1995-2000, Mexico, pp. 4.
73 A typology evidencing the dramatic differences amongst the Mexican municipalities can be 
found in: Alejandro Medina Giopp.1992. Experiencias Relevantes Sobre Tipologia Municipal 
Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 11), Mexico: CIDE.
74 This classification was obtained from Consejo Nacional de Poblacion. 1998. Clasificacion 
de Localidades. Mexico: CONAPO and Jose Mejia Lira. 1991. Not as para el Estudio de la 
Administracion Publica Estatal y  Municipal en Mexico. (Documento de Trabajo), Mexico: 
CIDE, pp. 35-37. Also, data to describe the following percentages were taken from the 
INEGI. 1998, accessed through the Internet www.inegi.org.mx and CONAPO. 1998, accessed 
on www.conapo.gob.mx/princinia.html.
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T a b le  2 .2  C a t e g o r ie s  o f  t h e  M e x ic a n  M u n ic ip a l i t i e s  ( 1 9 9 5 ) .
C a te g o r y  o f  
M u n ic ip a lity
P o p u la tio n P e rc e n ta g e  o f  
M u n ic ip a lit ie s
C o n c e n tra t io n  
o f  N a t io n a l 
P o p u la tio n
N u m b e r  o f  
M u n ic ip a lit ie s
i) R u ra l under 15,000 85% 36% 2, 064
iii)  U rb a n 15,000-99,999 12% 28.2 % 281
iv ) M e tr o p o lita n 100,000
onwards
3 % 35.8 % 73
T o ta l (N a t io n a l) 201, 138 
localities
100% 100%* 2,418
Own elaboration using data from the C E D E M U N -IN E G I census and CONAPO. 
*  The 100 percent does not include the inhabitants from the Distrito Federal.
The results obtained from these classifications illustrate the dramatic 
differences between and amongst each category. Thirty-six per cent of the 
total population lives in the less-developed areas - i.e., rural, with less 
than 15,000 inhabitants. Such areas constitute 85 per cent of the total 
municipalities, with a significant population of indigenous inhabitants (ten 
to 15 per cent). The lack or underdevelopment of public services is a 
common problem in this category.
Another 28.2 per cent of the population lives in the urban regions, which 
represent 12 per cent of the total municipalities. Nonetheless, the starkest 
contrast relies on the fact that only three per cent of the total 
municipalities, but 35.8 per cent of the population, live within 
'metropolitan' entities.
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2.3 The First Responsibility of Local Governments: The Provision of
Public Utilities 
The Provision of Public Utilities: The Legal Support
As noted earlier in this chapter, Mexico is a federal republic in which the 
federal and state constitutions grant specific responsibilities to local 
governments as the third level of government.75 These responsibilities 
include the provision of the public services that are required by all the 
population, regardless of their role in the economy (i.e., for industrial, 
commercial, agricultural, or public use). It is thus not remarkable that the 
local authorities rule - that they provide almost all the public utilities.76 
Exceptions are telecommunications, national road systems (federal and 
state motorways), electricity infrastructure, post office, education, and 
housing and health services, the responsibilities for which lie at the federal 
and state levels. The present situation of the public utilities in Mexico 
needs to be analysed within the context of the historical developments of 
the last two decades. The first provision of services (in a contemporary 
sense) by the municipalities took place at the beginning of the 1980s.77 
Therefore, it is vital to identify those public services that the municipalities
75 For the background supporting the administration of the public services see: INAP (coord). 
1995. La Administracion de los Servicios Publicos Municipales, Guia Tecnica 10, Mexico: 
INAP-CEDEMUN- SEGOB.
76 The terms public services or public utilities will be used to mean the process to satisfy 
collective or individual necessities or demands by public or private means using specific 
schemes and according to what is established in federal, state or local laws in Mexico.
77 An interesting analysis can be found in: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1997. Los Municipios 
de Mexico: Los Retos Ante el Futuro, (in print), Mexico: CIDE.
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are required to provide.78 These functions are set out in the constitutional 
amendments concerning the provision of public services made in 1983 by 
the Miguel De la Madrid government. As stated on Article 115, fraction III, 
of the Mexican Constitution:79
The municipalities, with the participation o f the state 
governments when necessary or when determined by law, will 
be responsible for the provision o f the following services: a) 
Water supply and wastewater, b) Street Lighting, c) Street 
Cleaning, d) Markets and food supply centres, e) Cementaries, 
f) Slaughterhouses, g) Streets, parks, and gardens, h) Public 
safety police and Traffic Police, i) The others services 
determined by local legislators according to territorial and socio­
economic conditions in the municipality, therefore its 
administrative and financial capacity.
In order to provide the above services, every municipality has a normative 
framework previously approved by their own ayuntamiento and 
subsequently by the state chambers of deputies, which states the forms 
and uses of the public utilities and the guidelines for public administration 
management. This is the ley organica municipal (organic municipal law), 
also known as the codigo municipal (municipal code). This legislation is
78 On the recent modifications in 1999 to Article 115 fraction III the new adds consist 
exclusively in paragraphs a) potable water, drainage, sewer, treatment and disposition of its 
residual waters c) city cleaning, compilation, movement, treatment and final disposal of 
residues g) streets, parks and gardens and its instrumentation h) public safety, in the terms of 
the article 21 o f this constitution, municipal preventive police and traffic police.
79 Constitution Politico, de los Estados JJnidos Mexicanos, Mexico: Me Graw Hill.
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compulsory and self made at this level. It applies nationally with similar 
conditions and criteria; however, every municipality has its own ley 
organica municipal with different specifications according to the size, 
population, and services provided.
In explaining the relationship between municipalities and the provision of 
public services, it is necessary to review how they are related. According 
to the Mexican constitution, the provision of public services is a major task 
for any municipality in Mexico. It  represents the most basic form of 
manangement (often confused with governing) the public interest at this 
level, and is identified by the public as the primary justification for the 
creation and functioning of the municipalities.
Paradoxically, the income obtained from such provision represents only a 
small portion of the budget. Instead, the municipalities rely upon federal 
participation, thus creating a subordination circle in which authorities at 
this level are under scrutiny from higher levels.80 Consequently, the 
results achieved are always below social expectations due to the lack of a 
real income with which to ensure better services. The water utilities 
represent an important case. They face a lack of investment that, 
consequently, generates health problems, particularly in the less- 
developed regions.
The provision of public services is identified as one of the legacies of the 
1910 Mexican revolution, based on the assumption that public services
80 For a broad discussion on federal financial dependency see: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 
1994. Retos y Perspectivas de la Administracion Municipal en Mexico. In Gestion y  Politico. 
Publico, Vol. HI, No. 2, Segundo Semestre, Mexico: CIDE, pp. 427.
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must be provided with public means and particularly by the municipality. 
The selection of the proper techniques or mechanisms with which to 
provide public services is closely related to the political beliefs of the party 
in power, to local idiosyncrasy, to personal interest from the 
ayuntamiento, and to interest groups. Overall, in terms of local 
governments and public services, the evidence suggests that the 
administrative organisation of the Mexican municipalities has been 
increasingly inefficient since the reforms made by Miguel de La Madrid.81 
The Provision of Public Utilities: The Techniques
In order to understand how local governments in Mexico provide public 
services, it is important to review the techniques used in practice, as well 
as the relationships with other entities, such as the private sector.82
i) Directa (Direct)
This mechanism represents the most orthodox form of providing public 
services by public means. In this case the municipality is wholly 
responsible for providing and delivering the services, including the 
administrative, regulatory, and normative frameworks.
81 According to one o f the most important scholars in municipal works in Mexico; Raul 
Olmedo.1985. El Desafio Municipal, Mexico: CNEM- SEGOB, pp. 111.
82 To find more about the techniques used by the Mexican municipalities for the provision of 
public services see: INAP (coed). 1994. Manual de Servicios Publicos Municipales. Mexico: 
INAP-BANOBRAS, Jose Mejia Lira. 1994. Servicios Publicos Municipales. Mexico: UAEM, 
Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1992. Cobertura y  Calidad de los Servicios Publicos 
Municipales, Mexico: CIDE, and INAP. 1995. La Administracion de los Servicios Publicos 
Municipales. Guia Tecnica 10, Mexico: INAP-CEDEMUN- SEGOB. and Rodolfo Garcia del 
Castillo y Misael Hernandez Torres. 1994. Formas Clave para la Prestacion de los Servicios 
Publicos Municipales. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 16), Mexico: CIDE.
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ii) Acuerdos Intergubernamentales (Inter-Governmental Accords)
These are administrative jo in t ventures between federal or state and the 
local governments. They are intended to help provide a specific public 
service (or services).
iii) Cooperation con la Comunidad (Inter-Community Co-operation)
This is a direct mechanism that works in close accord with social demands. 
I t  is intended, in the first instance, to represent members of the public and 
to serve as their link with the municipality. The aim of this kind of 
agreement is to tackle the lack of the most basic public services via 
mutual co-operation (municipality-society), and a common strategy with 
which to achieve it is to obtain funding from alternative sources including 
the society itself, private entities, and state or federal institutions. 
Ultimately the municipality manages the resources, though, and no private 
or social representation is permitted.
iv) Contratos de Servicios (Service Contracts)
This technique is used in cases where private intervention is allowed for a 
short period of time to perform a public service under public observance 
but without considering any private (financial) investment (this would 
represent a concession or an alternative sub-scheme). Its existence 
depends upon a balanced profits set-up (incomes and expenses) and two 
basic sub-schemes are possible. Firstly, the private element could perform 
a specific task or service (for example, invoicing, or installing water 
meters); or, alternatively, they could manage an entire 'system' (for 
example, by taking on all the administrative and operational functions of a 
water utility). Such approaches are considered by experts to be potentially
54
the most competitive form o f privatisation and impose the least regulatory 
burden, and could be viewed as a first step towards obtaining the full 
control and responsibility of the utility (concession). For example, private 
involvement in administrative areas gives the 'know how' to encourage 
local authorities to make the concession.83
v) Concesiones (Concessions)
These include the partial or total transfer of the management of public 
resources or services to private sector investment for a long or even 
indefinite term, and include Lease (L), Build-Own-Transfer (BOT), and 
Build-Operate and Own (BOO) approaches (Table 2.3).84 
Capital investment is generally the responsibility of the private body and 
remains public only in lease contracts. The municipality retains implicit 
characteristics like normative law and regulatory frameworks and the 
contract relies on these bodies.85 It  can be renewed and extended or, 
alternatively, cancelled before the expiry date if it does not meet the 
objectives for which it was created.
83 As stated by Judith Rees. 1998. Regulation and private participation in the water and 
sanitation sector. National Resources Forum, Vol. 22, No. 2, Great Britain: United Nations- 
Elsevier Science Ltd, pp. 101.
84 To find more about these sub techniques available see: Alejandro Villagomez. 1995. 
Mecanismos de Participation del Sector Privado en el Funcionamiento de los Proyectos 
Gubemamentales: La Experiencia en Mexico, in Gestion y  Politico. Publico, vol. IV, N o.l, 
Primer Semestre, Mexico: CIDE, pp. 207-234.
85 The legal framework for the concession is found in: Virginia Alcantara Palma y Arturo 
Duran Garcia. El marco juridico para la concesion de los servicios publicos municipales, in 
Federalismo y  Desarrollo, Ano 11, Julio-Agosto-Septiembre de 1998, Mexico: Banobras, pp. 
125-139.
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T a b l e  2 .3  P r iv a t e  P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  t h e  P r o v is io n  o f  P u b l ic  U t i l i t i e s .
O p tio n M a n a g e m e n t  
&  O p e r a tio n  
(M & O )
A s s e t
O w n e rs h ip
C a p ita l
In v e s tm e n t
C o m m e r c ia l
R is k
D u ra t io n
(Y e a rs )
S e r v ic e
C o n tra c t
Public/Private Public Public Public 1-2
M a n a g e m e n t
C o n tra c t
Private Public Public Public 3-5
L e a s e Private Public Public Shared 8-15
C o n c e s s io n Private Public Private Private 25-30-50
B O T Private Public/Private Private Private 20-30
B O O Private Private Private Private Indefinite*
D iv e s t itu r e +  
(F u ll o r  
P a r tia l) .
Private Private or 
Private and 
Public
Private Private Indefinite 
(*may be 
limited by 
license).
Own Elaboration by using data from : Judith Rees. 1998. Regulation and private participation in the 
water and sanitation sector. National Resources Forum, Vol. 22, No. 2, Great Britain: United 
Nations- Elsevier Science Ltd, pp. 95-105 and World Bank. 1997. Toolkits fo r  Private Participation 
in Water and Sanitation. Washington DC : IBRD.
+ Even when this technique is not explored by the Mexican Constitution on Article 115, 
represents and alternative for the provision of the public utilities.
v i )  Organismo Descentralizado ( D e c e n t r a l i s e d  B o d y )
This approach is used when a municipality decides to create an external 
body to administrate a specific service with the aim of improving quality. 
The creation of this body relies on the approval, in the first instance, of 
the ayuntamiento, as well as the state deputies chamber. It  has its own 
budget and administrative independence, but its regulatory framework lies 
exclusively within the municipality under state and federal observation. An 
example is the junta del agua (water local administration). This body was 
created with the aim of regulating, controlling, and monitoring the water 
and wastewater services of the city. Nevertheless, private participation is 
allowed - largely by means of contracting out some operational or 
administrative functions in the form of service contracts (as with the 
example of invoice generation provided above).
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vii) Empresa Paramunicipal (Paramunicipal Enterprise)
This has the same features and responsibilities as a decentralised body, 
but it is granted financial and legal autonomy to perform in a specific 
environment. I t  has its own regulatory framework - defined by the 
ayuntamiento and approved by the state legislatures. Consequently, it is 
permitted to operate in three different ways: first, via public means; 
second, indirectly, using public and private bodies; and, third, by a 
mixture of public, private, and NGO associations.86
Any public or private participation (capital investment) is permitted to 
retain a majority of the shares and the control of the enterprise, but it 
must do so without losing sight of the public purpose for which it was 
created. For example, external financial resources are permitted as long 
as they do not alter the social role of the enterprise. In order to achieve 
this goal, the objectives and means are supervised by the municipality. 
Otherwise, a specific body is appointed to monitor the enterprise. This 
technique clearly allows private participation and can be considered to be 
a jo in t venture.
viii) Fideicomiso (Fiduciary)
This technique involves the creation of an administrative body to which 
financial resources are granted in order to provide a specific public service. 
The role of private intervention is limited exclusively to the management 
of the resources - in other words, private intervention is used to manage
86 Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo y Misael Hernandez Torres. 1994. Formas Clave para la 
Prestacion de los Servicios Publicos Municipales, Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 16), 
Mexico: CIDE, pp. 18.
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public financial resources, the aim being to obtain better premiums. The 
surplus is then used to finance specific public services. This mechanism 
clearly allows private participation, but does not afford it any 
independence with which to formulate, control, or make decisions 
regarding the public services.
ix) Asociacion o Convenio Intermunicipios (Association or Inter-municipal 
Agreement)
Article 115 of the Mexican constitution places special emphasis upon this 
sort of co-operation, stating that The municipalities from similar state 
governments, previous accord within the municipalities and subjected to 
the law, could make associations and co-ordinate same efforts for the 
better provision o f the public services.87 This form represents a 
mechanism between two or more municipalities in order to achieve 
specific objectives, including the formulation of strategies and the 
management of public services, as well as the co-ordination of efforts. It is 
restricted to local agreements and does not permit any other kind of 
private intervention.
x) Bonos o Cupones de Servicio (Bonus or Service Coupons)
The basic characteristic of this form relies on direct subsidy, with bonuses 
or coupons to be freely exchangeable for specific goods or services. A 
private entity is allowed to perform the service and to charge the
87 Constitution Politico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico, Me Graw Hill, pp. 115- 
119.
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municipality for the goods or service provided. Examples are transport 
coupons or bonuses for cultural activities.
Section (i) of Article 115 clearly states that the above mechanisms are not 
the only alternatives for the public provision of goods or services, when 
permitted by NGOs or private means. It does state what the 
municipalities, according to the ley organica municipal, are explicitly 
allowed to do in this regard, but further possibilities include the 
formulation of new schemes, such as a privatisation policy, or the 
exclusion of certain public services from this article.
Any change depends, in theory, on local demands, and is subject in the 
first instance to approval by the ayuntamiento, and therefore by the state 
chamber of deputies (in other words, the full or partial divestiture from 
any public utility is not considered, but not excluded, by this article. 
Rather, its application depends on the above considerations). Nonetheless, 
the delivery of public services represents, if not the only reason for the 
existence of local authorities, then one of the most controversial functions 
of government at this level, and services such as public safety or traffic 
are not included in the discussion about private involvement.
2.4 The Role of the Private and Public Sectors in the Provision of Public
Utilities in Mexico 
Public Utilities and Private Means: The Involvement
This section presents the relationship between the public sector and the 
permitted involvement of the private sector in the provision of public 
services, according to the techniques reviewed earlier and presented in
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Table 2.4.88 The evidence suggests that the participation of the private 
sector in the delivery or management of public goods or services is 
allowed in six out of ten alternatives. In these cases, there is a transfer 
between public and private of the right to perform or provide a specific 
service and, in five of the cases, such transfers could be seen as 
privatisation schemes in the strict sense of the term.
T a b le  2 . 4
T y p e  o f  P u b l ic  S e r v ic e  D e l iv e r y  o f  t h e  M e x ic a n  M u n ic ip a l i t i e s  ( 1 9 9 7 )
P u b l ic  S e r v ic e  D e l i v e r y P u b l ic
In t e r v e n t io n
P r iv a t e
In t e r v e n t io n
i) Direct / X
ii) Intergovernmental Accords / X
iii) Intercommunity Co-operation / X
iv) Concession / y
v) Service Contracts / y
vi) Decentralised Body / y
vii) Paramunicipal Enterprises / y
viii) Fiduciary / y
ix) Intermunicipal Agreements / X
x) Service Coupons / y
Source: Own elaboration by using data from  the SEG O B -C E D E M U N -IN E G I census.
The first alternative is the services contract, in which a private entity 
agrees to manage specific areas of a public utility (invoicing, water micro
88 A relevant analysis of the debate about the provision of public utilities by private or public 
participation is reviewed by: Richard Batley (ed.). 1997. Private Participation in Urban 
Service Delivery, in The Latin American City: New Directions in Urban Policy and 
Management, School of Public Policy: University of Birmingham and Institute for Housing 
and Urban Development Studies, The Netherlands, City Symposium, March 13-15, 1997, 
Barcelona, Espana, pp. 33-38.
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and macro measurement and quality control, amongst others). Next, there 
is a form of concession scheme, which allows private involvement and 
investment in all of its variants (Lease, BOO, and/or BOT). A third form 
involves using a decentralised body, which may lead to concession 
schemes or service contracts, amongst other approaches.
A fourth technique relies on paramunicipal enterprises, whereby private 
participation is possible under two basic schemes: first, by indirect 
participation, whereby the municipality makes concessions, contracts, 
leases, franchises, and other arrangements between public and private 
participants; and, second, by allowing a mixture of enterprises - 
governmental, private, or social - to form partnerships.
A fifth alternative is in the form of a fiduciary, an approach through which 
public funds are managed via private participation.89 The last scheme, of 
service coupons, allows private intervention only in a non-strict sense of 
the term, since there is no transfer between public and private per se. 
Private intervention is allowed, but for the purposes of this chapter this 
scheme does not represent an alternative because it clearly does not 
change the supplying or transferring of a specific product or service from 
public to private ownership.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider that any of these schemes can 
lead to a mix of techniques that could modify the original background. For
89 To find a broad description see: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo and Misael Hernandez 
Torres. 1994. Formas Clave para la Prestacion de los Servicios Publicos Municipales, 
Documento de Trabajo (DAP N o.16), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 17-18.
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example, service coupons can lead to contracted services, etc.
The Relationship in Practice between Public and Private Intervention for the 
Provision of Public Utilities: The Empirical Evidence.
Having established that private participation is allowed jn the majority of 
the schemes supported by the Mexican constitution, it becomes necessary 
to determine the number of services provided, in practice, by private and 
public means in the Mexican municipalities. Even though it is not the aim 
of this chapter to explain why a government might need to privatise, it is 
important to review the degree of actual private and public involvement in 
the provision of public services, in order to build our case study.90 For this 
purpose, use has been made of the survey made by the SEGOB through 
the Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal - CEDEMUN - (National Centre 
for Municipal Development) in conjunction with the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadfstica, Geograffa e Informatica - INEGI (National Institute for 
Statistics, Geography, and Information Science) - prepared in 1995 and 
actualised by 1997. At this time it is the only source available through 
which to obtain this specific kind of information.
In explaining this trend, Table 2.5 considers only those public services 
stated in our survey; it is not the intention to discuss or explain other 
developments. These figures are not entirely accurate, as will be shown
90 The survey used is: Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de 
Mexico: Information para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN-INEGI, (CD- ROM). 
Interesting use o f this survey can be found in: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1997. Los 
Municipios de Mexico: Los Retos ante el Futuro, (in print), Mexico: CIDE. To find the 
methodology used for this survey see: Alfredo Ramirez y Roy Campos. 1997. Encuesta 
Nacional de Gestion Municipal 1993: Informe Metodoldgico. Documento de Trabajo (DAP 
No. 51), Mexico: CIDE.
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later in this chapter; however, they do show that local governments are a 
big provider of public services - at least 23,327, or 92.44 per cent, of all 
the public utilities are provided by public means. Only 1,910, or just 7.56 
per cent, of them employ any kind of privatisation scheme in their 
provision. It is particularly relevant for the purposes of this research that, 
at least in theory, the water utilities are provided, in 99.05 per cent of 
cases, by public means.
T a b l e  2 .5
P r iv a t e  a n d  P u b l ic  P a r t i c ip a t io n  in  t h e  D e l iv e r y  o f  P u b l ic  S e r v ic e s  a t  L o c a l
L e v e l  in  M e x ic o  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
P u b l ic  U t i l i t y
P u b l ic
In t e r v e n t io n
N a t io n a l
P e r c e n t a g e
P r iv a t e
I n t e r v e n t io n
P r iv a t e
P e r c e n t a g e
Water 2,309 99.05% 22 .95%
Wastewater 1,703 99.48% 9 . 52%
Street Lighting 2,295 99.53% 11 .47%
Public Safety 2,212 99.95% 1 .05%
Traffic Policing 1,105 99.82% 2 .18%
Street Cleaning 1,957 99.95% 1 .05%
Garbage Collection 1,906 98.80% 23 1.20%
Paving 1,809 99.75% 5 .25%
Markets 1,058 99.17% 88 .83%
Food Supply Centres 85 50.59% 42 49.41%
Cementaries 2,308 99.65% 8 .35%
Slaughter Houses 942 61.79% 36 38.21%
Parks 1,702 99.71% 5 .29%
Public Gardens 1, 609 99.32% 11 .68%
Public Transport 327 20% 1, 636 80%
T o t a l 2 3 ,  3 2 7 9 2 . 4 4 % * 1 ,9 1 0 7 .5 6 % * *
Source: Own elaboration using data from  the CED EM U N -IN EG 1 census. 
* the result is obtained by multiplying 23,327*100/25,237= 92.44 
** the result is obtained by multiplying 1,910*100/25,237= 7.56
Certain questions arise from this data. For example, if the Mexican 
constitution allows local authorities to apply specific privatisation schemes, 
why has so little been done in this regard?
According to extensive surveys - such as those provided by CIDE -
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supported by personal interviews, a lack of financial resources is the major 
justification provided by local authorities for avoiding any kind of policy 
innovation, notwithstanding the fact, paradoxically, that privatisation 
policies should, in theory, reduce the public's financial burden.91 Other 
factors mentioned are inexperienced management, technical 
insufficiencies, and centralised decisions (over-control by federal and state 
bodies). 92 But why, when money is the problem, do local authorities not 
find alternative ways to provide public services in order to gain some 
financial relief? Furthermore, when experienced management is lacking, 
why is little or nothing done to tackle this problem?
Common sense and the experiences of other countries were not applied to 
these questions. The results, instead, highlight local idiosyncrasies in 
Mexico - a series of interviews with civil servants (mayors, sfndicos, 
regidores, and public officials in charge of public utilities) from different 
categories of municipalities elicited answers that remained firm ly couched
91 To review the financial characteristics from the Mexican municipalities from a legal 
perspective, see the study made by: Hugo Nicolas Perez Gonzalez. 1993. La Problematica de 
la Administracion Financiera en el Municipio Mexicano. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 
17), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 12.
92 On the use o f innovative policies in empirical cases see: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1993. 
Cobertura y  Calidad de los Servicios Municipales. Estudio Sobre el Estado de Mexico, 
Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 12), Mexico: CIDE, Jose Mejia Lira (comp). 1994. Formas 
Clave para la Prestacion de los Servicios Municipale. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 16), 
Mexico: CIDE, Misael Hernandez Torres. 1994. Servicios Publicos Municipales: Una 
Experiencia de Concesion. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 23), Mexico: CIDE and 
Enrique Cabrero Mendoza y Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1994. La Gestion de los Servicios 
Urbanos: Un Reto a la Innovacion en los Gobiernos Locales. Documento de Trabajo (DAP 
No. 15), Mexico: CIDE.
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in political rather than economic terms, even where it was necessary for 
local authorities to improve the quality of the services in general terms. 
Internal (local interest groups) and external pressures (legal 
impediments), besides central relationships, clearly jeopardise any kind of 
agreement with the private sector.
Another reason cited for the failure to implement any reform in this regard 
is related to the Mexican constitution, which states that local authorities 
will remain in power for a period of three years with no opportunity for re- 
election, applying to both members of the ayuntamiento (sfndicos and 
regidores) and the mayor. This could explain why politicians and civil 
servants involved in the municipalities take a passive role. Most wish to 
hold on to their jobs (in cases of low rank officials) or hope to obtain a 
political post in the next election. In such a short period of time little, 
anyway, can be done, and the less risky the decisions, the better chance 
to remain politically alive (or on the payroll of the succeeding 
administration).
But why is there so much resistance to change? What can be assumed 
with some certainty is that the use of any privatisation technique will lead 
to enormous resistance from the actors involved (bureaucrats, pressure 
groups, society, and federal and state governments). This could explain 
why medium and long-term projects generally do not suit the interests of 
the political parties and local municipalities. The risks are high and the 
premiums are perceived as low or non-existent, especially when one 
considers the role of regulatory agencies affecting their partisan interests. 
Taking passive roles is a common behaviour in order to avoid any new
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policy that could jeopardise, if not the future of the city, at least personal 
projects. Without trying to explain the limits of human behaviour, it can 
be assumed that any policy innovation, and more specifically the use of 
alternative schemes by private participation for the provision of the public 
utilities at this level, are measured in the first instance by the effect on 
personal projects, second by the public perception, and third by the 
political feasibility. Thus, the economic and financial defence of the 
programme, amongst other justifications or privatisation promises 
(technical improvements; de-bureaucratisation; a reduction in the size of 
the state and, consequently, the immediate current costs), are in practice 
considered at a later stage but commonly identified as the main reason for 
adoption.93 Nonetheless, the determining factor for policy innovation, 
specifically by means of privatisation schemes, is federal support (as 
shown further in the literature). Thus, all municipal innovations result, 
inevitably, in an unavoidable politicisation, and the majority of the cases 
depend on higher decisions and not local necessities.94
93 An analysis o f this argument can be found in: Gabriela Nava Campos. 1997. Autonomia 
Administrativa: Una Introduccion a la Discusion Sobre la Influencia en la Toma de 
Decisiones de Agendas Reguladoras de Mercado. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 54), 
Mexico: CIDE, pp.13.
94 On the degree o f centralisation and federal dependency amongst the interest groups at this 
level see: Enrique Cabrero Mendoza. 1997. La Experiencia Descentralizadora Reciente en 
Mexico. Problemas y  Dilemas. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No.28), Mexico: CIDE, pp. 4, 
and Enrique Cabrero. Las Politicas Descentralizadoras en Mexico. Logros y  Desencantos 
(1983-1993), Mexico: CIDE (in print) and on local sources of power see: Lorenzo Meyer. 
1986. Un Tema Anejo Siempre Actual: El Centro y las Regiones en la Historia Mexicana, in 
Blanca Torres (comp), Descentralizacion y  Democracia en Mexico, Mexico: Colmex.
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T h e  T e c h n i q u e s  U s e d  in  P r a c t i c e  t o  P r o v id e  t h e  P u b l ic  U t i l i t ie s :  A  P r a c t ic a l  
V ie w
This chapter has shown the degree of private involvement in the provision 
of public utilities, and has hypothesised that private intervention is seen as 
a menace to the political interests surrounding privatisation policies. In 
addition to these arguments, important evidence is obtained by reviewing 
the actual techniques used for the provision of public utilities (Table 2.6).
T a b l e  2 .6
T e c h n i q u e s  U s e d  in  P r a c t ic e  b y  P u b l i c  a n d  P r iv a t e  M e a n s  a t  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t
L e v e l  in  M e x ic o  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
T e c h n i q u e  U s e d  ( P u b l ic  &  P r iv a t e  
I n t e r v e n t io n )
N u m b e r  o f  
S e r v ic e s
N a t io n a l
P e r c e n t a g e
P u b l ic  In t e r v e n t io n
Direct 15, 925 63.10%
Inter-municipal Agreement 1,855 7.35
Co-provision with the State Government 2, 422 9.59
Co-provision with the Federation 382 1.51
Community Collaboration 2,743 10.86
Public Intervention 23,327 92.44%
P r iv a t e  In t e r v e n t io n
Concessions
1, 910 7.56%
Total by Public and Private 25, 237 100%
Source: Own Elaboration using the SEGOB-CEDEMUN-INEGI census
Considering exclusively the provision of the public services by public 
means, Table 2.6 shows that in 63.10 per cent of cases this is achieved 
using a direct mechanism, the most expensive of the techniques available. 
(Extensive surveys (CIDE) prove that this alternative represents, in most 
cases, the greatest economic burden upon local finances). In response to 
the capital-intensive investment, and the lack of the technological and 
human resources required by the public utilities, the local budget and thus
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social spending are directly affected.95 Alternative mechanisms are used 
only in the remaining 36.90 per cent, showing that local governments in 
Mexico are entirely passive as regards finding alternative options for the 
delivery of public services, even when these options remain within the 
public 'sector'. But why are local governments so engaged in providing 
public services by direct means, even when this represents the most 
expensive option? Even when there is the clear necessity to find fresh 
resources with which to cope with the public utilities' financial demands, 
local authorities remain steadfast.
In contrast to what logic might suggest, in a series of interviews with 
members of ayuntamientos (mayor's, smdicos, and regidores) from 
different categories the answers showed that local decisions do not rely on 
local needs, but are more subject to political influences from the centre, to 
rigid decisions from the mayor, and to partisan ideologies. This illustrates 
clear presidentialism, on a small scale, in which local decisions are 
concentrated in just one man - the mayor. Furthermore, the 
ayuntamiento, which represents the other body in which these decisions 
are jointly concentrated, is under mayoral control and manipulation.
A common practice is for members of this body to negotiate under the 
table with the mayor, local officials, federal and state deputies, and any 
person or interest group that has any kind of immunity against local
95 Some of the most relevant data supporting our arguments are found in: Rodolfo Garcia del 
Castillo. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Los Retos ante el Futuro, (in print), Mexico: CIDE. 
See also: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1994. Retos y Perspectivas de la Administracion 
Municipal en Mexico. In Gestion y  Politico Publica, Vol. IE, No. 2, Segundo Semestre, 1994, 
Mexico: CIDEbidem.,
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resolutions. However, at the end of the day, the mayor has the final 
decision that could lead to support for specific parties, interest groups, 
civil servants, or even just the mayor's own reputation.
One of the most important problems that arises from these considerations 
is that decisions regarding public services are decided at this level. I t  is 
common practice to use extra resources to finance problematic services 
according to partisan ideologies (mayor-city hall), leaving the rest of the 
services with minimal funding. For example, the water utilities require 
capital intensive investments and, in most cases, do not meet local 
expectations. The mayor is often more interested in promoting urban 
infrastructure, which is highly visible although not, of course, a prime 
necessity. 96
The results obtained from the interviews can be generalised so as to apply 
to all municipalities. On the one hand, the bureaucratic behaviour of local 
authorities demonstrated a lack of experienced managers and employees, 
politicised enterprises, civil servants unwilling to find new techniques or 
alternative procedures, pressures from the public, and the fear of losing 
control over a certain public utility, all of which contributed to the 
tendency to avoid any kind of new policy. On the other hand, of course,
96 An interesting debate about the presidencialismo or degree of centralisation at this level is 
found in: Tonatiuh Guillen Lopez. 1996. Gobiernos Municipales en Mexico: Entre la 
Modernizacion y  la Tradicion Politica, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua-Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte, pp. 179-190. See also: Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1994. Retos y Perspectivas de la 
Administracion Municipal en Mexico. In Gestion y  Politica Publica, Vol. Ill, No. 2, Segundo 
Semestre, Mexico: CIDE, pp.409.
69
financial and economic (macro-economic) pressures are also used as 
justifications for privatising by local authorities. Nevertheless, local 
governments have political reasons (personal projects, external and 
internal pressures) to continue to provide public services using direct 
mechanisms.
As an additional pressure, Article 115 of the Mexican constitution states 
that the public services must be provided by the local authorities, without 
considering the prevailing situations in which the public utilities find 
themselves (financial, technological, and operational), the rigid political 
systems (centralisation at all levels), or the high resistance to change 
from the actors involved (society, civil servants, and politicians). Thus, 
local responsibilities in this regard become a controversial point of 
discussion. An important task of any municipality is to be perceived as a 
good government, focused on serving social demands above any other 
interest. The failure to provide any constitutional public service will clearly 
jeopardise the public perception of "good" government. Furthermore, 
using any other mechanism that does not guarantee a positive outcome - 
not to mention the word privatisation - will jeopardise the political and 
economic stability of the municipality.
In this sense, it is better to provide a bad service (in all aspects) than to 
assume the risk of new changes. This philosophy creates a chain effect in 
which the precarious conditions of most of the public utilities are affected 
by the lack of investment and interest from public officials, generating a 
potential problem for future administrations in which local necessities are 
growing faster (water, wastewater, and garbage collection, amongst other
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public utilities) than any capital investment. The authorities take a passive 
role in order to avoid any major political problems. Any change 
(administrative, legal, technical, or geographical), and any increase, in 
real terms, in the price for the service, represent a clear menace to the 
interests of, if not the society, then at least the mayor. In turn, the party 
in power, or pressure groups (work unions, social leaders, business 
representatives, or local quotas of power - caciques), will tend to be 
jeopardised by any innovation. It is also important to consider that any 
policy innovation is tied to macro-economic variables that jeopardise any 
privatisation scheme at this level, due to the constant economic and 
political turmoil prevalent in Mexico during recent decades.
Another important aspect relies on the assumption that any attempt to 
alter the balance between these developments could easily lead to what 
the society perceives as the cultura del no-pago (non-paying culture). In 
the majority of the municipalities the lack of regulatory frameworks and 
non-administrative mechanisms, besides technical inefficiencies, all result 
in public services being easily cheated. This situation leads to a vicious 
circle (municipality-society) in which local authorities argue against the 
society, and vice versa, in order to avoid any kind of innovation affecting 
the services provided (for example, it is common for local authorities to 
demand that potable water users pay on demand, whereas, at the same 
time, the user will argue that the water must not be charged for at all).
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2.5 Local Governments and Privatisation Policies: The Empirical
Evidence
The Provision of Public Utilities by Private Means: The Evidence.
Having reviewed the implications involved, not just in privatisation 
policies, but in any kind of reform of the provision of public services, it is 
now necessary to identify the kind of privatisation techniques that have 
been used in practice by the municipalities in Mexico, in order to review 
the degree of private involvement in their provision.97 In doing so, this 
thesis will highlight the lack of an accurate official survey, using empirical 
experiences with which to reinforce our arguments.
As stated earlier and shown in Table 2.6, the use of privatisation policies, 
in the form of concession schemes, appears in 1,910 cases. Thus, 100 per 
cent of private engagement relies exclusively on this type of scheme. How 
can this be explained? In fact, after analysing the data collected from the 
SEGOB-CEDEMUN-INEGI institutions, inconsistencies and inaccuracies 
within the official surveys and mechanisms used by these bodies have 
been identified.98
The number of municipalities providing public services by private means is
97 For a broad study on innovative mechanisms at a local level in Mexico see: Enrique 
Cabrero Mendoza. 1996. La Nueva Gestidn Municipal en Mexico. Analisis de Experiencias 
Innovadoras en Gobiernos Locales, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua-CIDE.
98 Experiences in Latin American countries using privatisation schemes can be found in: 
BANOBRAS. 1994. Experiencias de Privatizacion en Latinoamerica, in Federalismo y  
Desarrollo, No.42, Enero-Febrero 1994, Mexico: Banobras, pp. 36-41; also, Andres Filon. 
1997. Experiencias Efectuadas por Distintos Municipios de la Argentina en Materia de 
Privatizacion de Servicios Publicos, in Revista Hacienda Publica, No. 58, March, Mexico, pp. 
44-47.
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both overestimated and, at the same time, underestimated by these 
bodies. The figures seem to show that local governments provide many 
more services using a concession technique than is actually the case, 
whilst at the same time the number of public services provided by private 
means appears lower. How can this contradiction be explained?
The first inconsistency originates in the evaluation of the number of 
municipalities providing public services. The question asked by these 
official bodies was: How does the municipality provide public services? The 
alternatives considered in answering this question were: a) direct, b) 
intermunicipal agreement, c) co-provision with the state government, d) 
co-provision with the federation, e) community collaboration, and f) 
concession. The only mechanism evaluated by these bodies, though, was 
that of the concession scheme - omitting other privatisation techniques, 
even those reviewed earlier.
Consequently, the answers obtained in the majority of cases were 
disproportionate to the reality. As previously argued, Mexican 
municipalities tend to suffer from two main problems: the lack of financial 
resources, and ineffective management. A common strategy to solve 
these problems is to provide some public services, or parts of services, 
using private intervention without acknowledging it as such. This often 
occurs in small and medium-sized municipalities, where the intervention of 
external bodies plays a fundamental role due to the lack of municipal 
infrastructure.
A common scenario is for the mayor to require an external member to 
help them with specific duties. In most of these cases, the helper provides
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its private assets in order to perform the services, but the municipality 
pays them back as a private entity - with clear public responsibilities, but 
without any kind of agreement. In such cases, private intervention is used 
in order to perform public services without the knowledge of any of the 
parties involved.
Thus it appears that, when evaluating the degree of private intervention, 
no consideration is given to the external helper providing the service in an 
informal way, and nor are such cases accounted for as a kind of informal 
privatisation (non-contract), thus altering the results of the survey. In 
some cases the external helper is identified as a concession (due to the 
idea of private involvement) without any actual agreement.
One such case personally reviewed involved a family member (mayor's 
relative) transporting cattle from the ranch to the slaughter house, using 
his or her private truck, own personnel (more family members), and 
gasoline. The usual form of payment is from municipal sources or by 
charging cattle owners for the transportation. Here, public functions are 
clearly undertaken by private entities (there is a transfer between public 
and private), representing a privatisation in the strict sense of the term. 
The lack of agreements, contracts, or even acknowledgement of this 
development, however, is a common situation encountered when 
evaluating private intervention, one which can lead to nonsensical results. 
I t  is clear, therefore, that private involvement has arrived in the majority 
of the municipalities in Mexico, but without being acknowledged as a 
privatisation technique.
On the other hand, some cases counted by the surveys as concessions are
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not, legally, any such thing. In fact, only a few concessions, as legally 
defined, have been made at a local government level. The over-estimation 
of this trend is due to the fact that the surveys consider only concession 
schemes (due to the lack of information, which creates a permanent 
confusion) when, in theory if not in practice, other types of private 
intervention agreements exist. This helps to explain why there are 
supposed to be 1,910 concessions, when in reality only a few have been 
made. Other techniques, such as franchising, joint-ventures, service 
contracts, leases, BOO, BOT, or the liquidation of public utilities, are all 
forced into the 'concessions' category.
For example, the greatest number of 'concessions' (1,636, or 84.29 per 
cent) can be found in the transport sector; however, the legal privatisation 
schemes used in this sector are actually closer to service contracts, as in 
the majority of other cases (slaughter houses, markets, city cleaning, and 
water treatment plants, amongst others).
The Term Privatisation: A Political Threat
In explaining the common misconceptions regarding the use of the terms 
'privatisation' and 'concession', one must recognise the inherent political 
nature of them both. According to official surveys, rather than evaluating 
the degree of private intervention using privatisation as a mean, one 
should instead classify all as concession schemes. Teichmann argues that 
the word privatisation was never used by Mexican government officials— a 
reflection o f the politically sensitive nature o f the issue." The evidence of
99 Judith A. Teichman .1995. Privatisation and Political Change in Mexico. University of 
Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, pp. 129.
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personal interviews is that even the people involved (mayors and civil 
servants) in any privatisation procedure do not recognise it as such. 
Official documents add to the confusion, defining concession and 
privatisation as totally different things, but simultaneously interchanging 
the terms indiscriminately, leading to obvious problems when evaluating 
the practices.100 However, a concession scheme is only a specific form of 
privatisation in the strict sense of the term ,101 and the confusion of the 
terms reflects the delicate political nature of the issue. In fact, all that can 
be assumed is that the term 'privatisation7 refers to a controversial policy 
that has nothing to do with the nature of local governments.
The lack of information regarding privatisation also encourages an 
immediate association with an unfair, neo-liberal policy, implemented in 
order to sell the sovereignty of the state and applied, in particular, during 
the presidential term of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). Also, 
contradictory and controversial results, in the current government of 
President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), have been achieved 
by means of privatisation policies at a federal level, thus making any 
debate regarding this policy - at any level - highly political. This, in turn, 
affects the implementation of privatisation polices in the Mexican 
municipalities, since at this level it is an issue related not to the market 
per se but to the imminent necessity to find alternative ways to provide
100 To find out about this confusion see: INAP (coed.). 1994. Manual de Servicios Publicos 
Municipales, Mexico: INAP-BANOBRAS, pp. 69.
101 An interesting debate explaining the meaning of concession in legal terms is found in: 
Angilberto Castaneda. 1993. Comentarios Respecto del Concepto y Naturaleza Jurldica de la 
Concesion, in Revista Hacienda Municipal, No. 42, March 1993, Mexico, pp. 46-57.
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public services, as a means to avoid federal and state subordination and to 
cope with local necessities.
The Role of Privatisation Policies at a Local Level: An Overview of the Cases in 
Mexico.
Having disputed the accuracy of the official data in classifying the 
privatisation techniques actually used, one must examine those 
municipalities that have actually used privatisation schemes,102 which in 
their proper variants have been a common alternative to the state 
provision of public utilities (and largely occurred during the Carlos Salinas 
period of government (1988-1994)).103 Recent cases, which have not been 
recognised in full by official surveys (SEGOB-CEDEMUN-INEGI), produced 
controversial results, suggesting two main outcomes.
The first, challenging earlier discussions, involves the breakdown of local 
idiosyncrasies and passive inertias and the subsequent emergence of a 
number of municipalities that have moved forward in finding alternative 
ways to provide public utilities. Examples include the cases of city cleaning 
and garbage collection in the cities of Naucalpan in Estado de Mexico,104
102 To find cases using concession schemes see: Enrique Cabrero Mendoza (cord). 1996. Los 
Dilemas de la Modernization Municipal: Estudios Sobre la Gestion Hacendaria en 
Municipios de Mexico, Mexico: Miguel Angel Ponua-CIDE.
103 To find a discussion supporting privatisation programmemes at a local level see: Jacques 
Rogozinski. 1997. La Privatizacion en Mexico. Razones e Impactos, Mexico: Trillas, pp. 188- 
189.
104 To find more about this specific case from a financial perspective see: Jenny Mercedes 
Reyes Espinoza. 1994. La Concesion de los Servicios Publicos: Una Option de 
Financiamiento Municipal, Masters Thesis, Mexico: CIDE. Also, on alternative mechanisms 
to provide public services see: Rigoberto Soria Romo. 1995. Hacia un Modelo Altemativo en 
el Financiamiento y Prestacion de los Servicios Municipales, in Federalismo y  Desarrollo, 
Ano 9, No.5, Sept-Oct 95, Mexico: Banobras.
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Morelia in Michoacan,105 Reynosa in Tamaulipas, Guadalupe and Monterrey 
in the State of Nuevo Leon, Torreon in the state of Cohauila, Acapulco in 
Guerrero, Guadalajara in Jalisco,106 and La Paz in Baja California Norte. 
These are all cases, ranging from 1993 until 1998, in which private 
participation in the form of concession schemes, service contracts, BOT, 
and leases, has been allowed. However, only a few have succeeded, and 
by 1999 the legal contracts had been modified completely or, in the worst 
cases, dispensed with altogether.107
As a result, a second outcome common to all cases is that the 
politicisation brought about using privatisation techniques is always 
greater than any effort to implement any policy innovation.108 This leads 
to controversial results that have little to do with the rhetoric of 
privatisation theory or the character of the municipality in question. 
Consequently, the lesson is clear: any attempt to use privatisation policies 
is always influenced by politics. This is especially so considering those 
schemes in which a great deal is transferred (e.g., water utilities), altering 
the perception (public good under private exploitation) of the policy­
105 This case is reviewed in detail by: Misael Hernandez Torres. 1994. Servicios Municipales: 
Una Experiencia de Concesion. Documento de Trabajo (DAP No. 23), Mexico: CIDE.
106 A review of this case can be found in: Carlos E. Real Ramirez. 1995. Nuevas Estrategias 
Para la Prestacion de Servicios Publicos Municipales: El Caso de Guadalajara, 1995, Master 
Thesis, Mexico: CIDE.
107 A discussion of this case can be found in: Servicios Publicos, Mai Negocio. El Financiero. 
Negocios Suplemento. October 26,1997.
108 To find an analysis of the political factor in the provision of public utilities see: Alfonso 
Altamirano Estrada. 1994. Aproximacion al Estudio del Factor Politico en la Prestacion de 
los Servicios Publicos, Master Thesis, Mexico: CIDE.
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makers and the inhabitants.
Still, it is important to bear in mind that the use of private participation in 
the strict sense (using deliberate privatisation schemes such as 
concessions, services contracts, franchising, or direct transfers), and in 
the non-strict sense (liberalisation or deregulation of public utilities such 
as public transport or public bonus), became more evident immediately 
after the modifications to Article 115. However, the use of private 
participation, both as an official policy, and unofficially and without 
acknowledgement, can be traced back to the first provision of public 
utilities in Mexico, regardless of the size or degree of development of the 
municipalities. In this sense, privatisation schemes have always been used 
- the differences lie in the policy's concept and implementation.
The greatest legacy of Salina's privatisation movement for the water 
utilities, in terms of money invested and the promotion by federal 
authorities with World Bank back-up, has been limited to two concession 
schemes for the water utilities: one representing our case study, in the 
city capital of Aguascalientes in the state of the same name; and the other 
in the conurbation of Cancun-Isla Mujeres, in the state of Quintana Roo.109
109 The case of the water concession in Aguascalientes is reviewed using a rationalist 
perspective and with great incongruencies by: Ruben Salazar Jasso. 1996. La Concesion de 
los Servicios Publicos del Agua en el Municipio de Aguascalientes Bajo Una Perspectiva 
Racionalista, Masters Thesis, Mexico-CIDE, a further review of this case, though not in great 
detail can be found in: Manuel Diaz Flores y Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1995. Innovacion 
Financiera en Gobiernos Locales: El Caso del Municipio de Aguascalientes. Documento de 
Trabajo (DAP No. 35), Mexico: CIDE. An economic analysis o f both cases is to be found in: 
Alec Davis Carstens. 1995. Analisis Econdmico de la Privatizacion Como Solucion a los 
Problemas de los Servicios Urbanos de Agua en Mexico: Los Casos de Aguascalientes y  
Cancun-Isla Mujeres. Bachelor’s Thesis, Mexico: ITAM, also, for a private perspective o f the 
water utilities management: Lilian Saade.1993. Perspectivas de la Participacion de la 
Iniciativa Privada en el Servicio de Agua Potable en Mexico, Bachelor’s Thesis, ITAM:Mex.
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The concessions were granted in 1993 and 1994 respectively, both under 
federal support and encouraged by international bodies. The initial plan 
promoted by federal authorities had been to apply the scheme, eventually, 
in the 100 most important municipalities.
Concluding Note
To conclude this chapter it is necessary to identify whether local 
governments, public services, and privatisation policies are sufficiently 
balanced (economically, legally, and technologically) to assume inherent 
responsibilities for the provision of the public utilities according to the 
constitutional amendment. One answer is that local governments and 
public services are not balanced enough to perform according to local 
realities, thus generating dysfunctional results. However, privatisation has 
been applied without consideration for the proper balance between local 
and public services, occasioning unfair and unexpected results and leading 
to a permanent politicisation of this policy. This applies to all the 
municipalities using private intervention at any level, especially when a 
large transfer is involved.
Clearly, since the 1983 constitutional reforms, local authorities have 
employed a diverse range of privatisation methods, with equally diverse 
results. The aims for which Article 115 was reformed are far from the 
national reality. The provision of public services by public or private means 
seems an ongoing trend, but with different implications for each 
municipality in Mexico, especially considering that the true chances of 
development are concentrated in only a few cities. What is clear is that the
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public utilities are the most basic and direct form of governing, 
representing the first relationship or contact with the society.
According to the findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that local 
governments in Mexico suffer from two main disadvantages when 
providing services by public means. Firstly, there is a lack of financial 
resources, and the mechanisms to find alternative sources of funding are 
few or non-existent. Secondly, there is inexperienced management, with 
unclear objectives, a high turnover of personnel, and changes in public 
policies every three years. Enterprises are highly politicised and resistant 
to change, and certain mechanisms and procedures are used to innovate 
public services without public knowledge. Legal loopholes in the state and 
local legislation also represent common problems in the implementation of 
privatisation policies or the use of alternative schemes allowing a degree 
of private intervention.
On the other hand, the politics surrounding any change represent a major 
obstacle to overcome. As noted above, local governments are influenced 
by a series of developments - often from upper levels of government - 
that have little or nothing to do with local experiences. Hence, centralised 
and highly monopolised decisions at any level of implementation have 
been found in federal, state and local government. At the lower tier of 
government these are what were identified as presidentialism on a small 
scale. Another important development is that Mexican municipalities will 
have to deal with the new political order in Mexico, represented by 
opposition governments; thus, the public services will be influenced by 
this trend.
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Little work has been done on the results achieved by privatisation policies, 
and the Mexican municipalities are still far from exploiting privatisation to 
the extent to which theory, and the state, allows. Nevertheless, the 
privatisation process represents an irreversible trend that has arrived in 
almost every municipality in Mexico, albeit without acknowledgement (as 
an unknown policy). The lack of information, and the major political and 
economic aspects, have jeopardised the development of this policy. I t  can 
be argued that any privatisation scheme at this level depends not on the 
economic feasibility of the programme, but on its political nature.
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Chapter Three
Politics, Policies, Elections and Water: The Context in 
Aguascalientes
Introduction
The aims of this chapter are to look at the demographic and economic 
variables, and 'to  explain the roles played by politics, policies, and 
elections in the granting and running of the water utilities concession. In 
section 3.1, this thesis establishes the relevance of the state and 
municipality of Aguascalientes and illustrates the path taken toward the 
first privatisation (a concession scheme for the water utilities) in Mexico. 
In section 3.2, it links the development of Aguascalientes with political 
influences from the centre. Emphasis is placed on the ways in which the 
federal government has promoted the development of Aguascalientes by 
experimenting with federal policies and on the pressure exerted by them 
in this regard upon local politicians. After looking at the federal actors 
influencing the development of Aguascalientes, this section goes on to 
examine local politics and to describe how the state is socially represented 
according to the laws. Section 3.3 focuses on the elections period, 
analysing the dominance of the official party until its fall. The aims of this 
section are to examine the PRI's control over the presidential elections and 
to identify the first signs of the arrival of the PAN in the state. Elections for 
the state governor do not differ considerably from presidential ones -the 
official party had, until 1998, always gained the most votes. However, 
while it was not until 1998 that the party suffered its worst-ever defeat,
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the 1995 elections saw an opposition government (PAN) win the mayoral 
elections for the first time (after attempting to do so since 1944). The 
writing was clearly on the fall for the PRI. Section 3.4 overviews water 
management and administration in the country and in the state and city of 
Aguascalientes, and the concluding section demonstrates how the city 
capital of Aguascalientes is relevant in a wider, national context.
3.1 Demographic and Economic Perspectives: The Background in
Aguascalientes 
A Demographic Perspective on the State of Aguascalientes
The State of Aguascalientes, literally Hot Waters, was originally named 
after the thermal springs that dotted the area, an indication that this 
resource was once plentiful.110 Paradoxically, the resource that gave the 
city and the state their names was, in time, to become one of their main 
concerns. Aguascalientes is located at the heart of Mexico in one of the 
most strategic economic corridors, surrounded by the states of Zacatecas 
and Jalisco (the state of Guanajuato is nearby). I t  is one of the smallest 
states (28th out of 31 - covering an area of just 5,589 square kilometres 
and accounting for 0.29 per cent of the national land area), but is one of 
the five most densely inhabited. I t  is also one of the five states with the
110 The City o f Aguascalientes was founded on October 22, 1575 by Captain Juan de Montoro 
Rodriguez, and was then named Villa de Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion y  de las Aguas 
Calientes. It was granted independence and delimited as today in 1835, and in 1857 was 
granted by the Carta Magna as a state government. To find more see: Eugenio Herrera. 1989. 
Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politico y  Cultura. Mexico: UNAM-CIIH and Gobiemo 
del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1998. Aguascalientes. Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes 
accessed through the Internet on August, 1998 on www.ags.icanet.net.mx.
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best quality of life. It  comprises 11 municipalities (covering 1,357 
communities), all of which are cabeceras municipales (head 
municipalities).111 These include the city capital, of the same name, which 
is the cabecera del estado (municipality head of the state,), since it is 
where the power of the state government is based.112 Table 3.1 illustrates 
the demographic variables evident within the state and the municipality.
T a b l e  3 .1  D e m o g r a p h ic  V a r i a b l e s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  a n d  M u n i c i p a l i t y  o f  
A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 5 )
S ta te
K m (s q .)
N u m b e r  o f  
M u n ic ip a lit ie s
S ta te
P o p u la t io n
U rb a n  A r e a s R u ra l A r e a s
State
Government
5,589
100%
11 862,335
100%
620,164
71.91%
242, 171 
28.09%
Municipality 1,176
21%
City Capital 
(532 localities)
582,628
67.6%
534,852
91.8%
47,776
8.2%
Source: Own elaboration using information from the Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. 
Los Municipios de Mexico: Informacion para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEG OB-CEDEM UN, (C D - ROM), 
IN E G I. 1996. Cuaderno Estadistico Municipal. Aguascalientes. Mexico: IN E G I and IN E G I. 1996. 
Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes- 
IN E G I
By 1995, the total state population was around 862,335 (in 1998 it was 
estimated to be 923,137), representing 0.95 per cent of the national 
population, with an annual growth rate of 3.3 per cent (this has slowed 
during the last decade, but has maintained its growth tendency compared 
to the national average). The majority of the population (71.91 per cent) 
live in urban areas, even though these account for only 6 per cent of the 
state territory. The remaining land areas are mainly agricultural and forest
111 The Municipalities are: Aguascalientes (city capital), Asientos, Calvillo, Cosio, Jesus 
Maria, Pabellon de Arteaga, Rincon de Romos, San Jose de Gracia, Tepezala, Palo Alto and 
San Francisco de los Romo.
112 Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Informacion 
para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN, (CD- ROM).
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land. Population density is 154 inhabitants per square kilometre, though 
this differs widely between rural and urban populations - 21.7 per cent of 
the population live in communities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. 
Women represent a slight majority, at 51.06 per cent of the population. 
The average age of the population is 19 years (48.8 per cent) and life 
expectancy is 71.2 years. The indigenous community is almost 
extinguished, representing only .08 per cent of the total population, with 
the illiterate population representing only 5.50 per cent. However, by 
1997, more than 40 per cent of the population was classified as living in 
poverty. Clearly, the development of the state has not guaranteed a fair 
economic distribution.113
Nonetheless, it is clear that the state of Aguascalientes is one of the most 
progressive and well-developed in Mexico. I t  is distinguished from the rest 
of the country by its inherent characteristics, and by its being 
predominantly young and with a demographic tendency (birth rate and 
internal migration) greater than the national average (1.8 per cent 
annually). Consequently, the state's communications, education, health, 
housing, and service provision sectors are amongst the best in the 
country. The youthfulness of the population, with almost 50 per cent of 
them under 20 years old, and the tendency for population growth, 
besides the internal balance of net migration, has encouraged the 
development of the state, and thus promoted greater demands. The 
immediate effects are on the provision of public services, and more
113 Viven en la pobreza 40 % de los aguascaletenses. El Universal (National Section). July 8, 
1997.
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specifically on the provision of the water utilities.
The City Capital: A Demographic Perspective
In order to explain how the development of the state is linked with that of 
the city capital (see table 3 .1),114 it is useful to first mention that, in terms 
of population, the city of Aguascalientes is the 19th largest metropolitan 
municipality in Mexico.115 Its population, currently estimated (1998) at 
623,712, represents more than two-thirds of the total state population, 
and is growing slightly faster than that of the state, at 3.5 per cent 
annually. This population is concentrated in 532 localities.116 
In contrast to the other ten municipalities in the state, which have 
populations of less than 60,000 (accounting for 32.4 per cent of the state 
population), the inhabitants are concentrated in a single territory of
1,176.5 square kilometres. Of this, only 6.6 per cent represents urban 
territory. However, population is distributed in inverse proportion: 534, 
852, or 91.8 per cent, of the inhabitants live in the urban area (areas with
114 To find more about the city capital o f Aguascalientes see the official web page on the 
Internet on www.muniags.gob.mx.
115 During 1992 the municipalities o f El Llano and San Franciso de los Romo were created out 
o f the city capital territory, suffering a decrease in real terms of its population and land area. 
Nonetheless, it kept a constant pace in its demographic growth.
116 The data used to elaborate the statistics on the city capital o f Aguascalientes were obtained 
through the following documents: Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los 
Municipios de Mexico: Informacion para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN, (CD- 
ROM), INEGI. 1996. Cuademo Estadistico Municipal. Aguascalientes. Mexico: INEGI, 
INAP. 1997. La Administracion Local en Mexico. Mexico: INAP, Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes (1996-1998). 1996. Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1996-1998. Aguascalientes, 
Mexico and Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Aguascalientes: Your Competitive 
Advantage, Aguascalientes, Mexico and Ma. Concepcion Martinez Omana. 1994. 
Aguascalientes: Un Ensayo de Descentralizacidn. Mexico: Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes- 
Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes.
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more than 2,500 inhabitants), and the remaining 47,776, or 8.2 per cent 
of the inhabitants, are concentrated in rural locations (areas with less than 
2,500 inhabitants). The indigenous population is almost entirely 
concentrated in and around the city capital, and represents 0.10 per cent 
of the population. The illiteracy rate is 5.4 per cent.
I t  is evident that the development of the state is tied to that of the city 
capital. Indeed, it is common to recognise Aguascalientes as a capital 
without a state, in which the state and municipal governments have the 
same geographical relevance and share almost all the economic and 
political power.117 In this sense, the development of the city capital is 
proportional to that of the state, each affecting the variables of the other. 
The Background to the Economic Development of the State 
The broad heterogeneity of the state has encouraged the concentration of 
the main activities in the capital city. In order to exemplify the tied 
economic relationships, this section will look at the ways in which the 
economic variables are concentrated in the state (Table 3.2).
Strategic geographic localisation has helped the state of Aguascalientes to 
develop more efficient economic variables than those for the country as a 
whole. I t  has become a prime location for multinational enterprises and 
investments,118 while the local industrial and commercial sectors have also 
been heavily intensified, encouraging the development of qualified labour
117 Victor Aviles. Aguascalientes, Una Capital sin Estado. Periodico Uno mas Uno. April 6, 
1986.
118 Some o f the multinational enterprises in Aguascalientes are: Xerox, Texas Instruments, 
Detroit Diesel Allison, Siemens, Nissan and Com Products.
and technical procedures, and the creation of corredores industriales 
(industrial corridors). 119 As a result of this industrial development, the 
state of Aguascalientes has become a focal point for exports.120 
The impact on labour has been one of the main determinants of economic 
growth. By 1995, the number of inhabitants in the urban areas over 12 
years old and potentially integrated in the economically active population 
(EAP) reached 639,852, or 74.1 per cent of the total state inhabitants. Of 
these, the active population was 322,485, or 50.4 per cent.121 In recent 
decades the unemployment rate has been fluctuating below the national 
average: by the second quarter of 1998, it was 2.1 per cent (the lowest 
for 5.5 years).122
Employment is mainly in the service sector, which accounts for 34.4 per 
cent of the EAP. Industry accounts for 20.3 per cent; business 23.1 per 
cent; construction 4.9 per cent; communication and transport 5.8 per 
cent; and government 8.1 per cent. A further 3.4 per cent includes
1,9 The State o f Aguascalientes has six main industrial parks in the city capital surroundings, 
created by a mixture of private and public partnerships: a) Ciudad Industrial, b) Parque 
Industrial Valle de Aguascalientes, c) Parque Industrial El Vergel, d) Parque Industrial Alta 
Tecnologia, e) Parque Industrial Siglo XXI and f) Parque Industrial San Francisco, which is 
located in the municipality of San Francisco de los Romo.
120 Other national and local industries or business are established neither by national or joint 
national and international investment. These include: Grupo Textil San Marcos, J.M. Romo, 
Motodiesel Mexicana, Vekhel Mexico, Nutribebidas de Aguascalientes, Productos la Huerta, 
Grupo Maty, Gilsa, Lucky Star de Mexico, Cinemas United Artists, Indiana Cash Drawer, 
Monticello Spring Co., Standard Products, amongst others.
121 INEGI. 1996. Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico: INEGI-Gobiemo 
del Estado de Aguascalientes.
122 Descendio el desempleo 2.1%. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. June 19, 1998.
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agriculture, mining, cattle raising, and fishing, amongst others.123
T a b l e  3 .2  E c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s  f o r  t h e  S t a t e  o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 5 )
E c o n o m i c  V a r ia b le s P e r c e n t a g e
EAP (last quarter of 1995) 50.4%
Economic Growth (1990-1998 average) 6.7 %
Contribution to National (GIP) 1 %
Unemployment Rate (second quarter 1998) 2.1 %
E A P  x  S e c t o r
i) Service 34.4 %
ii) Business 23.1 %
iii) Industry 20.3%
v) Government 8.1 %
vi) Communication & Transport 5.8%
vii) Construction 4.9%
viii) Agriculture (primary sector) 3.4%
T o t a l 1 0 0 %
C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  S t a t e  G D P  x  S e c t o r
I) Manufacturing 38%
ii) Commerce, tourism, & transport 31.3%
iii) Financial Services 17.8%
iv) Agriculture (primary sector) 7.6%
v) Construction amongst other sectors 5.3%
T o t a l 1 0 0 %
Own elaboration, using data from : Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. 
Aguascalientes: Your Competitive Advantage. Aguascalientes, Mexico, INEGI.
1996. Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico: INEGI- 
Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes and Centro Nacional de Desarrollo 
Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Informacidn para el Desarrollo.
Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN, (CD- ROM).
By 1995, the primary sector accounted for only 7.6 per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP); the manufacturing sector about 38 per cent; 
commerce, services, tourism, and transportation represented 31.3 per 
cent; financial services produced 17.8 per cent; while the construction 
sector and other services made up 5.3 per cent. By 1998, the state
123 INEGI. 1996. Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico: INEGI-Gobiemo 
del Estado de Aguascalientes, pp. 101.
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producto interno bruto (PIB) (gross internal product [GIP]) had grown by
6.7 per cent, making this the third most progressive state in the country, 
as the national average was 3.3 per cent per annum.124 The economic 
impact on GIP nationally accounts for 1 per cent.125
The state has evidenced a dramatic change during recent decades - from 
being predominantly and rudimentarily agricultural, it has become soundly 
industrialised (including the agricultural sector, which has increased in real 
terms), encouraging the development of the remaining sectors. Between 
1990-1995, economic growth reached levels of 6.8 per cent, compared to
2.8 per cent nationally. Moreover, there has been no serious strike during 
the last two decades.126
The Economic Development of the City Capital
In any explanation of the economic variables of the state, one common 
denominator is always visible: the economic development of the state 
influences the economic activity in the city capital (Table 3.3). As shown 
on the table, the EAP in the city capital represented 330,585 inhabitants, 
of which 150,885 (46.6 per cent) were economically active (98 per cent 
employed, only two per cent unemployed). The economically inactive 
population (EIP) represented 52 per cent, or 171,831 inhabitants; the
124 Tercer Lugar Queretaro y Aguascalientes en el crecimiento del PIB, revela COEF. El Sol 
del Centro. July 15, 1998.
125 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Aguascalientes: Your Competitive 
Advantage. Aguascalientes. Mexico, pp. 14-13.
126 To find more about the state of Aguascalientes see the Internet page from the State Council 
for Economic and Trade Development from the State Government o f Aguascalientes on 
www.mexonline.com. The state government has its own web page on 
www.aguascalientes.gob.mx.
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remaining 1.4 per cent is non-accounted for from the total 100 per cent.127 
The total EAP in the city capital was concentrated as follows: primary 
sector 4.6 per cent; secondary sector 35.7 per cent; tertiary sector 58 per 
cent, and non-specified 1.7 per cent, centralising 74.22 per cent of the 
total state EAP and providing 80.6 per cent of the total state GIP. The 
construction sector in the city capital accounted for 72.5 per cent of the 
total for the state, the agricultural sector 42 per cent, manufacturing 89 
per cent, and commerce, services, and the electricity sector 85 per 
cent.128 Inevitably, the development of the state has centralised all the 
economic activities in the city capital, promoting a growth disproportionate 
to that of the remaining ten municipalities, which show signs of being 
underdeveloped. In 1994, 80.21 per cent of the total industrial activity in 
the state was concentrated in the capital city.129
The development of the city capital has always been recognised as a 
national model. I t  has promoted investments, employment, and policy 
innovations - in fact, the influential Wall Street Journal argued that i f
127 INEGI. 1997. Cuaderno Estadistico Municipal: Aguascalientes. Mexico: Gobiemo del 
Estado de Aguascalientes-INEGI, pp. 75-85.
128 Ibidem., according to this official publication the primary sector is made up by agriculture, 
cattle raising, forestry, fishing and hunting. The secondary sector includes mining, gas and 
petroleum extraction, in bond industries, electricity generation and construction. The tertiary 
sector corresponds to services and commerce. The non-specified sector complements the total 
100 percent.
129 To find more see: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1993. Aguascalientes los Retos 
Frente al Siglo XXI. Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 1992-1998, Aguascalientes, Mexico and 
Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1994. Programa de Desarrollo Urbano de la Ciudad 
de Aguascalientes 1994-2010. Periodico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes, tomo LVII, 
August 14, 1994, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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Mexico has luck, its future could be like Aguascalientes.130 The 
centralisation of economic activity in the city capital has tied its 
development to that of the state and vice versa, and it can be argued 
that, in effect, the city capital almost controls the state. Thus, state and 
local authorities tend to consider Aguascalientes as a small state with a 
big city capital, or as a big city capital in a small state.
T a b l e  3 .3  E c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s  o f  t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y  o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 )
E c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s P e r c e n t a g e
EAP 46.6%
Contribution to State EAP 74.22 %
Contribution to State GIP 80.6 %
Unemployment Rate 2%
E A P  x  S e c t o r
i) Primary 4.6 %
ii) Secondary 35.7 %
iii) Tertiary 58%
v) Non-Specified 1.7%
T o t a l 1 0 0 %
C o n t r ib u t io n  t o  S t a t e  G IP  x  S e c t o r
i) Construction 72.5%
i) Agricultural 42%
ii) Manufacturing 89%
iii) Commerce, services and electricity 85%
Own elaboration, using: INEGI. 1997. Cuaderno Estadistico Municipal: Aguascalientes. Mexico: 
Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes- INEGI, Manuel Diaz Flores y Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 
1995. Innovation Financiera en Gobiemos Locales: E l Caso del Municipio de Aguascalientes. 
(DAP No 35), Mexico: CIDE and Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los 
Municipios de Mexico: Informacidn para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB-CEDEMUN, (CD- 
ROM).
130 The article, published in the Wall Street Journal was quoted by Aguascalientes es Modelo 
Nacional de Desarrollo. El Hidrocalido. July 10, 1998.
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3.2 The Role of Politics and Policies in Aguascalientes 
The Political Influences on the State Development: A Federal Perspective
Federal decisions have always privileged Aguascalientes by means of 
specific public policies. Therefore, in order to understand the degree of 
development of the state, it is necessary to have some understanding of 
the political actors at federal level, and the ways in which they have 
influenced the economic development of Aguascalientes.
Since the presidency of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) federal authorities 
have applied special development projects in the state. Luis Echeverria 
Alvarez (1970-76) introduced the first industrial city. The presidency of 
Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) brought greater industrialisation projects, 
with the state being considered as a priority region for the implementation 
of specific industrial federal policies.
The most significant developments accompanied the arrival to the Mexican 
presidency of Miguel de La Madrid (1982-88). During this period of 
government, major decentralisation programmes, and the creation of 
polos de desarrollo (development poles) were distinctive policies in the 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1982-88 (National Development Plan). The 
city capital of Aguascalientes was one of 60 cities in which population 
decentralisation policies were implemented.131 The state was included in 
the Proyecto Estrategico de Ciudades Media 1984-1988 (Strategic Project
131 Manuel Diaz Flores y Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1995. Innovation Financier a en 
Gobiernos Locales: El Caso del Municipio de Aguascalientes. Documento de Trabajo (DAP 
No 35) Mexico: CIDE, pp.3.
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for the Medium Size Municipalities) and the Programa Nacional de 
Fomento Industrial y Comercio Exterior (National Programme for Industrial 
Development and International Commerce or PRONAFICE), as well as in 
industrial decentralisation policies emanating from this presidential term. 
The (1983) modifications to Article 115 discussed earlier represent one 
example.
In this sense, Aguascalientes (particularly the city capital) was used as an 
experiment prior to the implementation of policies at a national level. For 
example, the creation of the programa estatal de vivienda popular 1981- 
86 (state programme for popular housing) evidenced the interest of 
federal authorities in promoting the development of the city capital 
through housing decentralisation programmes.
The arrival of Carlos Salinas (1988-94) marked the beginning of a new set 
of public policies supported at federal level. The intensification of economic 
reform was a main determinant of this period of government. The 
privatisation of the water supply at a local level was strongly supported by 
federal bodies such as the Comision Nacional del Agua CNA (National 
Water Commission), and the objective was to implement the programme 
in the municipality of Aguascalientes with the ultimate aim of introducing 
it into more municipalities. For this purpose, Las 100 Ciudades Basicas 
1990-1994 (the 100 basic cities) federal programme, promoted by the 
Secretarfa de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL - Secretariat of Social 
Development), encouraged state and local policies to keep pace with 
federal beliefs, specifically with regard to. decentralisation and privatisation 
policies.
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The current government of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000) 
has maintained economic policy strategies similar to those of its 
predecessors. Although economic and political turmoil in recent years ('94 
and '98) has affected negatively on national policies, and consequently on 
the state; nevertheless, federal programmes like the Programa Hidraulico 
1995-2000 (Hydraulic Programme 1995-200), the Programa de Desarrollo 
Urbano 1995-2000 (Urban Development Plan 1995-2000), and the Nuevo 
Federalismo 1995-2000 (New Federalism 1995-2000) are evidence of the 
intention to maintain the state of Aguascalientes as the focal point for 
development. 132 Our case of study is a clear example of this. The water 
concession in the city capital continues to be the role model for further 
privatisation policies for the water supply: the earlier presidential 
programme for the 100 most important cities in Mexico has been updated, 
even though external factors (economic and political) have delayed the 
application of these policies in more municipalities.133 This development 
will be discussed in more detail elsewhere in the thesis.
State-Central Relationships: Influencing the State Tendencies
During the last two decades, the federal policies and programmes
132 To find more about the decentralisation program in Aguascalientes see: Ma. Concepcion 
Martinez. 1994. Aguascalientes: Un Ensayo de Descentralizacion (1982-1988). Mexico: 
Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes-Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes and Jose Antonio 
Rojas Nieto. 1990. El Desarrollo Industrial Reciente: El Caso de Aguascalientes, published in 
the Cotidiano Magazine, Mexico: UAM-Azcapotzalco, No. 33 (January-February, 1990), on 
urbanism and society in Aguascalientes see: Marco Alejandro Sifuentes. Aguascalientes: 
Urbanismoy Sociedad. Mexico: Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes-Gobiemo del Estado.
133 To find more about this program see: SEDESOL. 1994. Experiencias Relevantes en 
Administracion Urbana: Innovaciones Tecnicas y  Administrativas Establecidas por 
Autoridades Locales. Mexico: Sedesol.
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implemented in Aguascalientes have had one common denominator: 
central-federal links have promoted the intensification of federal 
programmes that could be applied at a national level, converting 
Aguascalientes into a practice laboratory.134
Since the governorship of Enrique Olivares Santana (1962-68), who was 
heavily involved with the Mexican presidents Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1959- 
1964) and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970), the agricultural sector and 
cattle raising (milk production) have been accorded great importance and 
have been highly developed in the state. The state governors Francisco 
Guel Jimenez (1968-74) and Jose Refugio Reyes Esparza (1974-80) 
introduced the first industrialisation programmes. However, the greatest 
developments in Aguascalientes took place during the governorships of 
Rodolfo Landeros Gallegos (1980-1986), Miguel Angel Barberena Vega 
(1986-92), and Otto Granados Roldan (1992-98). Major industrialisation, 
decentralisation, and privatisation policies were implemented, using the 
tied relationships that existed between these governors and the presidents 
at the time.
All of these governors had two things in common: first, the same political 
party (PRI) promoted them; second, their political careers had been 
promoted from the centre, implementing federal policies and using the 
state as an experiment for further policies at a national level. Some of 
them even held top level public posts or were close collaborators of
134 Manuel Diaz Flores y Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1995. Innovation Financiera en 
Gobiernos Locales: El Caso del Municipio de Aguascalientes, Documento de Trabajo (DAP 
No. 35) Mexico: CIDE, pp.3.
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Mexican presidents. The former governor Enrique Olivares Santana 
became Secretary of the Interior during Jose Lopez Portillo's presidency, 
while Otto Granados Roldan and Miguel Angel Barberena Vega were close 
collaborators of the former presidents Carlos Salinas and Miguel de La 
Madrid respectively.135
The core focus of this research regards the influence of governor Otto 
Granados Roldan. He used his personal relationship with the president 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari to facilitate federal policies and influences, using 
the city capital of Aguascalientes to launch the first privatisation scheme 
for the water utilities in Mexico. Over the last two decades, development 
in Aguascalientes has depended to a great extent on the heavy impulse 
from the centre. The first challenge to this unwritten principle came in 
1998 with the arrival of the PAN governor, Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez, 
representing a clear breakdown in that which politics and policies have 
previously meant for the development of the state.
Local Politics and Social Influences in Aguascalientes: The Actors 
Since the economic and social resources of the state are mainly 
concentrated in the city capital, it can be assumed that the political actors 
defining the state tendencies are also concentrated there. In order to 
understand how the political, social, and institutional influences in the
135 Otto Granados is a former Director de Comunicacion Social de la Presidencia de la 
Republica (1988-1992). As well, he served as secretario particular and Oficial Mayor when 
Carlos Salinas was Secretario de Programacion y  Presupuesto (SPP) during 1986-1988. 
Miguel Angel Barberena served as Director de Comunicacion Social de la Presidencia de la 
Republica (1982-1988) before been elected as governor o f Aguascalientes.
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state are concentrated, and how they interact in the city capital and 
influence local policy decisions, this section will concentrate on five of the 
most influential groups dominating the economic and social - and thus the 
political - life of the state and the city capital. Their selection is based 
upon previous surveys and field work:136 
• Elected government (federal, state, and local levels).
Until 1998, the official party dominated the state, and was therefore a 
main determinant on its internal political life. Until very recently, the 
influence and interference of federal authorities, and specifically the 
president, prevailed in the selection or approval of official party (PRI) 
candidates for 'important' posts in the state.
It  is common practice for local PRI members to obey decisions from the 
centre, in this case from the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional del PRI (CEN - 
National Executive Branch of the PRI), in order to benefit a specific 
candidate or group. Elections for governor, senators, and federal deputies 
are clear examples of this. The 1998 PRI defeat in the election for state 
governor was attributed to the controversial selection of its candidate, 
Hector Hugo Olivares Ventura (who had been seeking the state governor 
candidacy for the last three elections).
Ironically, the local PRI 'current' of democratisation, headed by senators
136 To find more about groups o f power in Aguascalientes see: Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. 
Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  Cultura. Mexico: UNAM (CIIH), Ma. 
Concepcion Martinez. 1994. Aguascalientes: Un Ensayo de Descentralizacion (1982-1988). 
Mexico: Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes and Fernando Salmeron Castro. 1996. 
Intermediarios del Progreso. Politica y  Crecimiento Economico en Aguascalientes. Mexico: 
CIESAS.
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and federal deputies, appeared only recently, and only when a personal 
project was jeopardised by a centralised decision. Otherwise, the 
alignment of PRI members is determined by the fact that most of them 
owe their political careers to this process of selection. Senators, mayors, 
and federal deputies have long been exchanging public posts between 
themselves - concentrating power in a specific group and leaving behind 
new generations.
Public policies at state level are in accordance with federal ideologies, 
which do not necessarily match those of the state. The degree of 
subordination at this level is clear, especially in view of the fact that all the 
state governors from the official party owed their position to the president. 
However, it is important to recognise that federal interference has 
favoured, more than it has limited, the development of the state, thus 
affecting on the development of the city capital. For example, 
decentralisation policies have been accompanied by more economic 
resources, and industrialisation polices have significantly developed 
competitive companies.
Moreover, these policies accompanied a rate of population growth that 
was higher than the national average, which has directly affected the 
services provided and created greater social demand. The water utilities 
are far from adequate to meet local needs; public safety represents a 
major concern; and other public services are performing below social 
expectations. As suggested earlier, federal development is not always 
accompanied by greater and more efficient public utilities. This could 
explain why centralised decisions are not always followed by better control
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mechanisms.
At the state level, until 1995 when the official party lost the city capital 
and, consequently, most of the state control, the power over all the main 
political activities was concentrated in the state governor. Obedience to 
state decisions was obligatory for any local candidate and, further, for all 
elected members from the PRI. The state chambers of deputies, and the 
municipalities, were strategically balanced in order to serve higher levels 
of government. Centralised decisions, and the system of presidentialism, 
were reproduced on a smaller scale.
This trend was particularly evident in the selection of local candidates. The 
candidate for mayor in the city capital was usually someone linked with 
the governor, whilst the remaining municipalities were decided according 
to their importance. Furthermore, the state governor, besides being 
federally supported, encouraged the implementation of specific public 
policies. The state chamber of deputies was the main instrument with 
which to apply these policies because, until 1995, the PRI dominated the 
chamber, and any amendments were easily made. At the same time, this 
body pressured other levels of government to follow decisions from the 
state governor. The concession of the water utilities in 1993 is one clear 
example.
The reproduction of practices from higher levels of government is common 
at the local level. Candidates for the ayuntamiento (sfndicos and 
regidores) are selected according to their preferences for mayor, bearing 
in mind that these members are intended to work closely with, and favour 
any decision from, the mayor, without regard for party ideologies. Thus, a
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chain of subordination can be identified in which similar practices are 
reproduced by lower tiers of government and the official party serves only 
as the link through which to reproduce it.
Furthermore, it is clear that the first opposition party (PAN) to come to 
power in the city capital, for the period 1996-1998, has been recalling 
previous PRI practices in local policy decision-making. The concession of 
the water utilities was used as an electoral flag to bring it to power in 
1995. During 1996, the concession was revoked, and then granted again 
to the same private group by using the PAN majority in the ayuntamiento 
and the state legislature. However, the PAN has changed some former 
practices. For example, previously, interference from the state 
government to promote a policy did not require approval from the 
ayuntamiento or the state chamber of deputies. By the time the opposition 
won for the period 1996-98, though, the relationships between these 
bodies had deteriorated, creating a political confrontation in which state 
and local policies were the main target.
The water utilities have been affected by these non-cordial relationships. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the arrival in government of a former 
opposition party does not guarantee per se different means with which to 
make policy. Earlier PRI practices were reproduced by the PAN and since, 
by 1998, the PAN had absolute control over the state, it is questionable 
that partisan ideologies will take precedence over local necessities. This 
will be discussed throughout the case study.
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• Local business owners
local politics are decided to a large extent by who controls the money in 
Aguascalientes (micro-medium and large industries or commerce 
organisations). As was shown earlier, these economic sectors are the most 
important in terms of money and people employed in the city. The above 
groups are integrated in organisations (trade, industrial, and labour) that 
have an important influence on the state and local decisions, and can be 
identified as a real power over the society.137 Paradoxically, the larger 
corporations, like NISSAN, Siemens, or Texas Instruments, interfere very 
little with local politics. Their relations rely on higher levels of government. 
The Japanese population in particular, although large in number, tend not 
to interact with local society.138
The selection of candidates, for all political parties, is almost always linked 
to employer organisations. For example, former PRI Mayor Hector Manuel 
del Villar (1987-1989) was linked to CANACINTRA, and Fernando Gomez 
Esparza (1993-1995) has been involved with the private construction 
sector. Recently, members of these organisations have run successfully for
137 Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  Cultura. 
Mexico: UNAM (CIIH).
138 The following business organisations represent the most influential: Centro Empresarial de 
Aguascalientes (CEA) and Centro Coordinador Empresarial (CCE), both conglomerating 
different business organisations; Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformacion 
(CANACINTRA); Camara Nacional de Comercio (CANACO); Camara Nacional de la 
Industria del Vestido (CNIV); Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Construccion (CNIC); 
Consejo Obrero Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (COPARMEX), and Ejecutivos de 
Ventas y  Mercadotecnia (EVM). To find more about the role and philosophy of this group 
see: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografia y Estadistica. 1993. INEGI: Ejemplo Nacional de 
Descentralizacion, on INEGI, Evaluation del Desarrollo Urbano Regional de Aguascalientes, 
XII Congreso Nacional de Geografia 1986-1992, Mexico.
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public posts as representatives of the PAN, whilst promoting their non­
political background. The former Mayor, Alfredo Reyes (1996-1998), is 
involved with the private inbound and commercial sectors, and is a former 
President of COPARMEX. Among the most recent cases, the elected 
governor (1998-2004) from the PAN, Felipe Gonzalez, has a business 
background and is linked to business organisations (CANACINTRA and 
COPARMEX, amongst others). The Mayor-elect, Luis Armando Reynoso 
Femat (1999-2001), is involved in the private sector and thus indirectly 
with employer organisations. A common creed effective at least during the 
PRI dominance in public corridors was the unwritten agreement between 
businessmen and local career politicians that the city capital will be 
governed for one period by a politician and the next period by a local 
businessman. Nonetheless, until 1998, the state governor was always a 
career politician promoted from the centre. This year, electoral 
preferences have changed considerably and members from this sector will 
have a major role to pay in moulding the development of Aguascalientes.
• Union workers and social organisations
Until relatively recently, union workers kept a low profile as activists in 
local politics. In recent years, however, they have played a key role in 
furthering the political stability of the state and thus in domestic politics. 
Many of these organisations are linked to political parties or pressure 
groups; for example, CNOC, CROC, CTM, and the influential FTA support 
the PRI. Social organisations, which are linked to a certain extent with the 
business sector, unions or political parties, have recently been exhibiting
104
signs of real power over local politics.139 The water concession has been 
jeopardised by these groups, especially since the corporativist PRI system 
lost its persuasive power amongst them. Furthermore, political parties 
have been promoting these groups, as in the cases of PAN support for 
FOCA, A.A., and the FEAP.
• The clergy has been politically active since the creation of 
Aguascalientes, and holds real influence over the society and local 
politics.140
The state inhabitants are extremely religious (Catholics), and the society 
is traditionalist and conservative. The relationships amongst politicians, 
local business owners, and the clergy are evident: most employer 
organisations have links with religious ones and vice-versa. The PAN 
attracts voters with its religious doctrine and its support from the local 
clergy. The influence of the clergy on the political life of the state and the 
city goes far beyond passive support: it promotes candidates and openly 
participates in local politics. I t  is arguable that the lack o f neutrality from  
the clergy is because it  is immersed in a social dynamic, and is thus 
sensitive to political events and to who controls the power and the
139 These organisations appear on the scene whenever there is a chance to politicise the local 
political arena, as in the case o f the concession of the water utilities. Frente Estatal de Acidn 
Popular (FEAP), Frente de Organizaciones Civicas por el Agua (FOCA), Frente Estatal de 
Organizaciones Independientes (FEOI), Union de Usuarios del Agua y  Servicios Publicos 
(UUASP), Organizaciones de Coldnos and Alianza Popular para la Defens a Ciudadana are 
amongst the many organizations that have emerged spontaneously on the political arena 
mainly promoted and guided by partisan ideologies and interest.
140 Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  Cultura. 
Mexico: UNAM (CIIH), pp. 44.
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money.141
I t  also has links with local universities and social organisations, and even 
runs businesses142 - a popular saying has it that Aguascalientes is an 
orphan son in which the stepfather is the government and the stepmother 
the church.143
• The media has a great effect on public preferences, and in some cases 
is even committed to specific interest groups, political parties, or 
external influences.
Personal interviews with public officials found that the common 
denominator was i f  you do not have a good relationship with the media 
(more precisely with who controls the media) as a top or ambitious 
politician or civil servant your chances o f being successful are very low. I t  
is the local media who really form public opinion, and pressures the 
society to take action. In most cases, the same media group owns local 
newspapers and radio stations. The advantage or disadvantage accorded 
to any politician or specific public policy is linked to the media. As will be 
made clear through the case of study, the privatisation of the water 
utilities represents a clear example of what the media can do to local
141 Salvador Camacho Sandoval. 1987. Proyecto Modernizador y  Grupos de Poder en la 
Universidad Autonoma de Aguascalientes. Aproximaciones a Un Problema, en Revista 
Sociologia -Mexico, Otono 1987.
142 Some of the social-politic and religious organisations are: Club Rotarios (Rotary Club), 
Club de Leones (Lions Club), Club Serra, Caballeros de Colon, Movimiento Familiar 
Cristiano, Grupo Pro Vida, Union de Padres de Familia, Cursillistas and Gente Nueva.
143 The above creed was used by Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, 
Economia, Politica y  Cultura. Mexico: UNAM (CIIH), pp. 45.
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politics. 144
The Political Structure in the State
In order to understand local politics it is important to review how the state 
of Aguascalientes is socially represented according to federal, state, and
local laws (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Political Representation in the State of Aguascalientes
Federal Level
State Level
Ayuntamientos 
MayorlSmdicos and RegidoresLocal Level
State Governor
Local Deputies
Senators
Mexican
Presidency
Federal
Deputies
Own Elaboration using data from the Official Resolutions
According to the Mexican constitution, Aguascalientes will be formed 
according to federal beliefs, with the leadership of the state invested in 
the gobernador del estado (state governor), who stays in power for a six- 
year period. There are also three senadores (senators), two elected by 
direct vote and the third allocated to the majority opposition party within 
the state. This mechanism is known as proportional or plurinominal 
representation (PR). The state is also represented by three diputados
144 According to the INEGI. 1997 Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico: 
INEGI- Gobiemo del Estado, pp. 64 and 65. The media in the state o f Aguascalientes are 
integrated by eighteen Radio stations (Am 12 and Fm 6), two local T.V and 8 retransmission 
channels, one cable T.V. besides three Internet nodes. Likewise, five local newspapers are 
currently in circulation: El Hidrocalido, El Sol del Centro, El Heraldo de Aguascalientes, 
Pagina 24 and the controversial weekly Tribuna Libre amongst national, regional and 
international newspapers and magazines.
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federates (federal deputies), elected for a three-year period by uninominal 
election or direct vote; alternatively, during 1997, two federal deputies 
were elected by proportional representation.
State laws require that the congreso del estado (state legislature) will 
comprise 27 diputados locales (local deputies), of which 18 are elected by 
direct means and the remaining 9 by proportional representation (PR) for 
a period of three years. The hegemony of the state is concentrated in 11 
municipalities elected by direct vote for a three-year term, having their 
own social representation invested in the ayuntamiento. There are one or 
two sfndicos from each municipality. The number of regidores may vary 
according to each ley organica municipal, with all except the mayor being 
elected through proportional representation. Invariably, however, the 
majority inside this body is controlled by the party represented by the
145mayor.
The sexenal (six-year term) for state governor is not concurrent with 
presidential terms and elections. There is a difference of three years, so 
that when a new president is elected, the state governor has already been 
in power for three years and vice versa. However, elections for federal 
deputies coincide every six years with the presidential and senatorial 
elections, and every three years are held alone. These elections are one 
year behind local ones and, every six years, run parallel to federal 
elections. Elections for senadores (senators) are held every six years and
145 To find more about m,ayors in the municipality of Aguascalientes see: Presidencia 
Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1992. Aguascalientes: Presidentes Municipales 1945-1992. 
Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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are always parallel to presidential elections.
Elections for the state legislature (local deputies) and presidencias 
municipales (city mayors), the core bodies that represent the internal 
political life of the state, are in parallel every three years. Every six years 
these elections are held at the same time as state governor elections. 
Local elections are held one year after federal ones, depending on the 
election term (three or six years). In the year 2000 there will be elections 
for president, senators, and federal deputies; local elections will be held in 
2001; and during 2003 there will be elections for federal deputies. During 
2004 there will be local elections and elections for the state governorship. 
Thus, local and governor elections are separate every three years and 
never coincide with federal ones.
The pattern of major electoral campaigns highlights the constant political 
effervescence in the state. I t  also shows that the state has two different 
sorts of elections - federal and local - both having different connotations 
for the electorate, especially considering that political influences from 
Mexican presidents have encouraged the development of Aguascalientes 
and, more specifically, of the city capital. The issue of tied relationships 
between the president and the state governor cannot be ignored. There is 
an inevitable and permanent campaign by state governors to promote 
themselves not just with one president but with all the future possible 
candidates, since from time to time the state governor will have to deal 
with two different presidents in power.
In an interview, a top official from the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional del PRI 
(National Executive Branch from the PRI) stated that: A common trend
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until recently for these sorts o f cases is when a state governor (PRI) is 
elected. Its  loyalty to the actual president is inevitable for the first three 
years (the post was decided neither by the president nor by centralised 
decisions). In  exchange, federal support arrives and specific policies are 
encouraged. When the president leaves the post, things change 
dramatically and everything depends on how good the relationships are 
with the new one.146
In most cases, the new president will not have the same considerations 
and will want to erase any trace of the former sexenio, including specific 
policies and close collaborators. Clearly then, the governance of the state 
of Aguascalientes requires a strong political vision, and an abundance of 
political energy. The elected PAN governor Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez - who 
will be relying, until the year 2000, on a president from the opposition 
(PRI), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon - has publicly favoured the PAN 
presidential candidate and former Governor of the State of Guanajuato, 
Vicente Fox Quesada. I t  can be assumed from this that central-state 
relationships are always on the agenda of any state authority without 
regard for political affiliation; the aim is to obtain sympathy from a 
candidate that can be translated into a better situation for personal 
projects and thus the state. Therefore, any political party will at some 
stage promote the centralisation of government decisions, since after 70 
years of monolithic governments it is difficult to break this 'tradition'.
146 The interview was held in Mexico City (1997) at the CEN o f the PRI, a pledge of 
confidentiality was asked by the official interviewed.
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3.3 Elections in Aguascalientes: The Fall of the PRI Hegemony and the
R i s e  o f  P A N  D o m i n a n c e  
T h e  R o le  o f  P r e s id e n t ia l  E le c t io n s  in  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 9 4 )
This section will examine the PRI's hegemony and control of the 
presidential elections, and show the first signs of the arrival of the PAN in 
the state. The development of presidential elections in the state illustrates 
the domination of the official party until the 1994 elections (Table 3.4).
T a b le  3 .4
P r e s id e n t ia l  E le c t io n s ,  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  V o t e s  f o r  t h e  P R I a n d  t h e  O p p o s i t io n ,  
L e v e l  o f  A b s t e n t io n  a n d  E le c t o r a l  N o m in a l  R o l l  in  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 9 4 )
Y e a r O p p o s i t io n
V o t e s
P R I
V o t e s
N o m in a l  
E le c t o r a l  R o l l
A b s t e n t io n
1 9 6 4 8 . 80% 91 . 20% 100 , 551 26.60  %
1 9 7 0 12 . 90% 87 . 10% 152,001 37.40  %
1 9 7 6 6 . 20% 93 . 80% 198,930 44.30  %
1 9 8 2 30 . 00% 70 . 00% 269,000 23 . 40%
1 9 8 8 45 . 19% 45 . 84% 334,920 48 . 00%
1 9 9 4 52 . 51% 47 .49% 420,935 19 . 3 2 %
Own elaboration-using data from : IFE, various years. Estadisticas de las Elecciones: Aguascalientes, 
accessed through the Internet www.ife.ora.mx on August 1998, Andres Reyes Rodriguez (1994). 
^Elecciones o Designaciones? 50 anos de Historia Electoral en Aguascalientes. Mexico: ICA-
Gob.Del Estado, Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  
Cultura. Mexico:UNAM (CIIH) and Eugenio Herrera Nuno y Andres Reyes Rodriguez. 1997. 
Aguascalientes, In Silvia Gomez Tagle. 1994, Las Elecciones en los Estados, Mexico:UNAM.
The table shows the dominance of the PRI in elections from 1964 onwards. 
Despite a slight decrease in support in real terms in 1970 and 1976, there 
was no real threat to the PRI. Moreover, the level of abstention had no 
real affect on electoral outcomes: greater levels of abstention were not 
traduced into PRI defeats. In 1988, however, preferences started to 
change, and opposition parties showed the first signs of becoming a
i l l
political threat. Support for the PAN and the PRD marked them out as the 
second and third forces in the state. This trend continued in the 
presidential elections of 1994, with the voto razonado (conscious vote) 
from the urban areas showing greater influence among the electorate than 
the corporativist vote from the PRI in the rural sector.
E l e c t o r a l  P r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  E le c t io n s  f o r  S t a t e  G o v e r n o r  ( 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 9 8 )
Elections for state governor do not differ considerably from those for 
president; the official party always won, until 1998, when the PRI suffered 
its historic defeat (Table 3.5).
T a b le  3 .5
E l e c t i o n s  f o r  S t a t e  G o v e r n o r  in  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s .  V o t e s  O b t a in e d  b y  t h e  P R I ,  
V o t e s  O b t a in e d  b y  t h e  O p p o s i t io n ,  E le c t o r a l  N o m in a l  R o l l ,  a n d  L e v e l  o f
A b s t e n t io n  ( 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 9 8 ) .
Y e a r O p p o s i t io n
V o t e s
P R I
V o t e s
E le c t o r a l  
N o m in a l  R o l l
A b s t e n t io n
1 9 6 2 8 . 37% 91 . 63%
1 9 6 8 99 . 08% 118 , 343 32 . 08%
1 9 7 4 16 . 61% 83 . 39% 184,854 58 . 60%
1 9 8 0 12 . 67% 73 . 85% 190 , 053 42 .47%
1 9 8 6 28 . 37% 69 . 70% 310,228 37 . 08%
1 9 9 2 25 . 07% 72 . 02% 334 , 458 41 . 39%
1 9 9 8 61 . 09% 37 . 51% 515 , 743 32 . 49%
Own elaboration-using data from : IFE, various years.. Estadisticas de las Elecciones: 
Aguascalientes, accessed through the Internet www.ife.orq.mx Andres Reyes Rodriguez (1994). 
IElecciones o Designaciones?. 50 afios de Historia Electoral en Aguascalientes. Mexico: ICA- 
Gob.Del Estado, Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  
Cultura. Mexico: UNAM (CIIH) and Andres Reyes Rodriguez. 1998. Elecciones de 1992 y el 
quiebre de la tradition politica, in Revista Crisol (May), Aguascalientes, Mexico.
As can be seen, the elections in 1962 and 1968 yielded massive victories 
for the PRI. In 1974, the official party suffered a slight drop in support, 
with a corresponding increase for the PAN. However, whilst support for the 
PRI declined again in 1980, the PAN got only 7.42 per cent of the total 
votes, a decrease in real terms. In 1986, support for the official party
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declined again, while the PAN, one of eight opposition parties, recovered 
to gain 11.14 per cent of the votes. The level of abstention was also lower 
than in the previous election.
During the 1992 elections, the PRI was strongly promoted from the 
centre, and this was reflected in the results. Otto Granados Roldan, a 
former collaborator of the Mexican president, obtained 72.02 per cent of 
the total votes - opposition parties declined and the level of abstention 
rose. The result in 1998 was in stark contrast to previous years, with 
victory for the PAN candidate, Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez, and these 
elections will be discussed in detail later. Thus, until 1998, a PRI majority 
always dominated elections for state governor. Abstention has always 
played an important part, but did not compromise the PRI hegemony until 
the 1998 elections, in which its defeat can be linked to the conscious 
decision on the part of the electorate to vote against the PRI.
Elections at Local Level (1974-1998)
At a local level, the weakness of the PRI was shown earlier than it was in 
federal or state elections. The 1995 elections marked the beginning of the 
new electoral tendencies in the municipality of Aguascalientes, when an 
opposition party (PAN) won the elections for mayor after competing for 
the post since 1944. The PAN then retained the city capital in the 1998 
elections until the year 2001 (Table 3.6).
The table shows the predominance of the official party in the elections 
from 1974 until 1980. Abstention levels did not represent a threat, and 
the PAN represented the only real opposition. By 1983, with more 
opposition parties, the total opposition vote had increased, with the PAN
113
receiving 32.99 per cent. There was also a decrease in the level of
abstention.
T a b le  3 .6
E le c t io n s  f o r  M a y o r ,  V o t e s  O b t a in e d  b y  t h e  P R I , P A N  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  a n d  t h e  
O p p o s i t i o n ,  a n d  L e v e l  o f  A b s t e n t io n  in  t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y  o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s
( 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 9 8 ) .
Y e a r O p p o s i t io n
V o t e s
P R I
V o t e s
A b s t e n t io n
1 9 7 4 21 . 70% 78 . 20% 61 . 43%
1 9 7 7 100% 56 . 63%
1 9 8 0 14 . 50% 85 . 50% 44 . 34%
1 9 8 3 37 . 33% 62 . 67% 40 . 76%
1 9 8 6 32 . 30% 67 . 70% 35 . 32%
1 9 8 9 34 . 70% 65 . 30% 61 . 76%
1 9 9 2 29 . 45% 68 . 65% 40 . 23%
1 9 9 5 66 . 01% 31 . 86% 40 . 17%
1 9 9 8 O p p o s i t io n P A N
V o t e s V o t e s
45 . 67% * 52 . 83% * * 31 . 34%
* votes obtained by the PR I, PRD, P T  and P V E M  * *  Refers exclusively to P A N  votes.
Own elaboration-using data from : IFE, various years. Estadisticas de Elecciones: Aguascalientes, 
accessed through the Internet www.ife.org.mx Andres Reyes Rodriguez (1994). iElecciones o 
Designaciones?. 50 ahos de Historia Electoral en Aguascalientes. Mexico: ICA-Gob.Del Estado, 
Eugenio Herrera Nuno. 1989. Aguascalientes: Sociedad, Economia, Politica y  Cultura. 
Mexico:UNAM (CIIH).
In 1986, however, this trend reversed: the official party enjoyed an 
increase in support while opposition parties declined slightly. The level of 
abstention was the lowest registered, at 35.32 per cent. In 1989, an 
increased level of abstention, and an increase in support for opposition 
parties, led to a drop in support for the PRI. The official party recovered in 
1992, although the level of abstention was again high. The real change 
came in 1995, which saw the election of the first opposition government in 
the city capital. The PAN repeated this success in 1998, this time with a 
significant decrease in the level of abstentions. The fall of the PRI during 
1995 and 1998 will be discussed in detail, since the defeats were linked to
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the water concession. It  is clear that support for the PRI dropped steadily, 
especially in the city capital, where the party had lost its persuasive 
power. In view of the fact that the majority of the electorate is 
concentrated in the city capital (70 per cent), it is clear that the conscious 
vote of the urban inhabitants determined the fall of the PRI.
Extensive surveys prove that the rural regions are where the PRI obtains 
the most votes, especially in those areas with less than 1,500 inhabitants, 
and according to the population increases the electoral votes for the PRI 
decreases considerably...In the same way the PAN advances in the 
opposite way.147 This could explain how the PRI had the majority of the 
votes in the rural areas, but as soon as the majority moved to the urban 
zones the PRI lost persuasive power, defining the PAN and PRD as the only 
opposition parties with real electoral presence.148
Nonetheless, the PRI has been an opposition party since 1995, 
representing, at least until the year 2001, the second political force in the 
city capital. Furthermore, other opposition parties have registered and 
have obtained some minor political positions according to proportional 
representation, although they do not represent any threat to local politics.
147 Andres Reyes Rodriguez. 1993. j Elecciones o Designaciones?. 50 anos de Historia 
Electoral en Aguascalientes. Mexico: Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes- Gobiemo del Estado 
de Aguascalientes, pp. 149.
148 According to the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), accessed through Internet 
www.ife.org.mx March, 1998, the political parties registered in Aguascalientes are: Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); Partido Accion Nacional (PAN); Partido de la 
Revolucion Democratica (PRD); Partido Verde Ecologista (PVEM); Partido Cardenista 
(PC); Partido del Trabajo (PT); Partido Popular Socialista (PPS); Partido Democrata 
Mexicano (PDM) and the Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruccion Nacional 
(PFCRN).
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3.4 The Water Structure in Mexico: The Background in Aguascalientes 
The Water Administration & Management in Mexico
Under the Mexican constitution (Art. 27 and Art. 115), the Comision 
Nacional del Agua (CNA) is a non-incorporated federal authority with 
exclusive responsibilities for administrating the water usage in the 
country. I t  is subject to the Ley de Aguas Nacionales y su Reglamento, 
and to the internal regulation of the SEMARNAP and other applicable 
arrangements (Figure 3.2).149
According to CNA, there are two main objectives: 1) to manage and guard 
the national waters, and the goods that are linked to these, according to 
the applicable legal arrangements; to monitor the fulfilment of the Ley de 
Aguas Nacionales and to provide what is necessary for the preservation of 
its quality and quantity to achieve its sustainable integral use; and 2) to 
study, regulate, project, promote, build, monitor, manage, operate, 
preserve, and rehabilitate the hydraulic infrastructure, and the 
complementary works that correspond to the Federal Government.150 In 
practice, the CNA receives technological support from the Instituto  
Mexicano de Tecnologfa del Agua, or IMTA, and therefore concentrates on 
the water management resources (quality and extraction control). I t  also 
promotes the national hydraulic development through programmes such
149 For a detailed description see: CNA. 1997. Ley de Aguas Nacionales y  su Reglamento. 
Mexico: CNA.
150 This definition was obtained in the CNA official web page on www.cna.gob.mx accessed 
on June, 1999.
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as the Programa Hidraulico 1995-2000, part of the Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo of the current government of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).
Figure 3.2 Water Administration in Mexico (1999)
River Basins Committees (3)
CNAIMTA
Mexican Constitution 
(Art. 27 & Art. 115)
SEMARNAP
Ley de Aguas 
Nacionales y  su 
Reglamento
State and Local Authorities
CNA State Representations
CNA Regional Bodies (6)
Own Elaboration using data from the Official Resolutions
The CNA is sub-divided into six regional managements, grouped 
geographically so that the borders between them almost coincide with the 
limits of their river basins, but not with the political divisions of states and 
municipalities. Therefore, each state has a CNA representation (state 
management) from the regional body. The regional management organise 
and co-ordinate the water use for each hydrological basin, while the state 
management represents the most direct form of contact with the daily 
user and is the link between state and local authorities.
There are also consejos de cuenca (river basins committees) covering the 
most important rivers in three blocks: a) Lerma, b) Bravo, and c) Valle de
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Mexico.151 These are intended to tackle the existing pollution and 
competition problems, both above and below ground. The consejos de 
cuenca are integrated in order to work together to formulate and execute 
programmes for the better management of the waters, the development 
of the hydraulic infrastructure and respective services, and for the 
preservation of the resources of the basin under federal, state, municipal, 
and water users' (agriculture, commercial, industrial and domestic) 
support and observation.152
The Water Administration and Hydrological Characteristics in Aguascalientes
According to official sources the water management in Aguascalientes is 
the responsibility of the CNA Northeast regional management, which also 
covers the states of Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Veracruz, and the south of 
Tamaulipas. This area accounts for 11 per cent of the national territory 
and 13 per cent of the national population. The geographical position of 
the region exposes it to extreme meteorological phenomena: hurricanes 
from the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean affecting the states of Veracruz 
y Tamaulipas; frosts and droughts in the plain areas (Aguascalientes, 
Zacatecas, and, partially, San Luis Potosf). More specifically, 
Aguascalientes is located on the Lerma-Santiago river basins, and depends 
directly on the Lerma committee.
151 A broader explanation can be found in: Presidencia de la Republica. 1995. Programa 
Hidraulico 1995-2000. Mexico: Gobiemo Federal.
152 Ibidem.,
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The two principal river basins that drain the state of Aguascalientes are 
those of Rio Verde Grande and Rio JuchipHa. Both are in the same zone as 
the Rio Santiago, which forms part of the hydrological region Lerma- 
Chapala-Santiago. The basin of the river, Verde Grande, which originates 
to the south of Zacatecas and the north of Aguascalientes, has as its 
current principals within the state the rivers San Pedro, Aguascalientes 
(which represents the most important), Incarnation, Chicalote and 
Morcinique, all of which, due to the decreasing natural rainfall of the 
territory, are of scarce use. The basin of the Rio Juchipila is located in the 
Western part of the state and its mainstream is the Calvillo river. The 
most relevant water storage works contributing to the water supply are 
the President Calles, General Abelardo L. Rodriguez, the Niagara, and the 
Malpaso.153
Water use in the state is defined under two categories: 1) consuntivos, or 
non-reusable, of which 81 per cent is for agricultural use, 17 per cent for 
urban-domestic use, and 2 per cent for industrial use; and 2) no 
consuntivos, or reusable, which mainly covers water used for recreational 
practices, fisheries, and transportation via natural currents. Water usage 
in the state is delimited by the CNA through the Ley de Aguas Nacionales 
y su Reglamento, which specifies the guidelines for water concessions.154 
According to the Mexican constitution (Art. 115) the potable water,
153 The data comes from the state government official web page on 
www.aguascalientes.gob.mx accessed in June, 1999.
154 For a broader explanation see: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: 
Desafios y  Oportunidades para el Siglo XXI. Mexico: Oficina de Coordination de Asesores- 
Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes pp. 214-217.
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wastewater, and its treatment are the responsibility of the municipalities, 
which may use any of the schemes allowing private or public participation 
(as reviewed in Chapter Two). Nevertheless, all three levels of 
government play a fundamental role in water management (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 Water Management in the State and Municipality of Aguascalientes
Mexican
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Own Elaboration using data from the Official Resolutions
The Mexican constitution and the Ley de Aguas Nacionales y su 
Regalmento are the legal basis for water management in the country.155 
The CNA has the federal responsibility, through programmes such as the 
Programa de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento 1995-2000. 
State authorities (state government and state chambers of deputies) are 
responsible for the elaboration or modification of state water laws and 
those regarding the public utilities, and in some cases for the direct 
provision of the water services through Juntas de Agua. Under local laws
155 For a broad discussion of the water framework in Mexico see: Banobras. 1996, various 
articles, No. 54, Ano 9, Mexico: Banobras. Also, for an interesting debate about the law and 
economics of the water resources in Mexico see: Andres Roemer. 1997. Derecho y  Economia: 
Politicas Publicas del Agua, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua-CIDE.
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(Ley Organica Municipal-Reglamento de Agua Potable), the municipality is 
the last tier of government and most direct form for the provision of the 
water utilities, and also serves as a regulatory body in cases of private 
intervention.
According to official sources, the provision of water utilities comprises 
three main activities or services: the supply of potable water, wastewater 
services, and sewage treatment.156 They are also intended to cope with 
two core functions: the provision of the water in optimal conditions for 
human consumption, and the disposal of the water used (that is, the 
extraction, conduction, distribution, and drainage of the water, including 
all the administrative and technical specifications).157 Potential water 
sources are surface water (lakes, rivers, seas, and reservoirs) and ground 
water (aquifers or subterranean rivers). Water utility users are categorised 
as: a) domestic use, b) productive (industrial, commercial and
agricultural), and c) social (hospitals, public schools, public gardens).158 
The Water Resources and Infrastructure: The Background in the City of 
Aguacalientes
This section will describe the general water resources and infrastructure in 
the state and the city capital. The detail will be supplied throughout the
156 For a description of the role o f the water utilities in the municipality see: Ramon Aguirre 
Diaz. 1998. El Agua Potable en el Fortalecimiento Municipal, In Federalismo y  Desarrollo, 
No.63, Ano 11, Mexico: Banobras, pp. 62-83.
157 The above data was obtained from the state government official web page on 
www.aguascalientes.gob.mx in June. 1999.
158 The data comes from: INAP. 1993. La Administration del Servicio de Agua Potable y  
Alcantarillado. Mexico: INAP.
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case study; however, it should be noted that there has been no formal 
study of the characteristics of the water sources in the state. This was 
asserted by former state governor, Otto Granados Roldan (1982-1998), 
and reinforced by the elected governor, Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez (1998- 
2004). Consequently, this description will rely on the few official sources 
available and on personal interviews (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7 Water Infrastructure and Use in Aguascalientes (1998)
Water Coverage 98% (84% national media)
Wastewater Coverage 84% (67% national media)
Water Uses • Agricultural 77.2 %
• Domestic 21.1 %
• Commercial & Industrial 1.6 %
Water Lost in the Process 
(evaporation, illegal connections, 
and pipeline fractures)
50-70 %
Annual Precipitation 522mm (777mm national media)
Range of Water Extraction 90 % Deficit of natural recharge
Own Elaboration using data fro m : Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: Desafios y  
Oportunidades p a ra  el Siglo X X I. Mexico: Oficina de Coordination de Asesores-Gobiemo del Estado 
de Aguascalientes, Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Situacion Actual y  Perspectivas del 
Agua en Aguascalientes. Mexico: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes, June.
The development of the state and the city capital, encouraged by a 
demographic and economic boom, has affected an invaluable resource in 
the state: the water. As has been stated, the state was named after its hot 
springs. Ironically, however, the state is located in a predominantly dry 
territory with limited water resources and a low precipitation level 
(522mm annually, compared to the national average of 777mm).159 
Combined with the uneven allocation and use of water resources, this
159 The former state governor Otto Granados Roldan gave an interview to the Economista 
Newspaper on July 30, 1998. The elected governor Felipe Gonzalez mentioned the lack o f a 
serious study in Aguascalientes in a personal interview in October, 1997.
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leads to serious water problems in the state.
These problems are exacerbated by the over-exploitation of 90 per cent of 
the underground waters, the only developed source of supply.160At the 
current rate of depletion, the life expectancy of this natural resource is 
now only 30 years.161 Over 72 per cent of the water extracted is consumed 
by the agricultural sector, which has the lowest value use and the greatest 
irrational utilisation. Furthermore, inefficient water conduction and 
evaporation mean that between 50 and 70 per cent of this water is not 
properly used. The remaining productive sectors (commerce, industries, 
and services) use only 1.6 per cent of the water extracted; with domestic 
services make up the remaining 21.2 per cent. Nevertheless, only 50 per 
cent of this total of 22.8 per cent is actually used - the rest is lost due to 
underground fractures and pipeline leaks.162 Internal fractures, deep 
extraction, and the scarcity of the resource in its natural sources have 
caused a deterioration in the quality of the water, from acceptable to a 
situation where it is now high in salts, dirty, and mixed with wastewater. 
As has been shown, two problems are affecting the water sources: the
160 Some o f the literature used for these purposes are: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 
1996. Agua: Desafios y  Oportunidades para el Siglo XXI. Mexico: Oficina de Coordination 
de Asesores-Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 
1996. Situacion Actual y  Perspectivas del Agua en Aguascalientes. Mexico: Gobiemo del 
Estado, June 1996. Data was also obtained through exhaustive discussions with members 
from the federal body Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA). Likewise, Martin Molina Ochoa, 
the General Manager o f the CNA in Aguascalientes, gave me important ideas and data.
161 Orientan a Univesitarios sobre los Servicios del Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. March 
20, 1998.
162 To find more see: Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1993. Aguascalientes: Los 
Retos Frente al Siglo XXI. Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 1992-1998. Mexico: Gobiemo del 
Estado de Aguascalientes.
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over-exploitation of the underground waters is encouraged by an irrational 
use or non-water culture; and the lack of modern and efficient water 
systems means that 50 to 70 per cent of the water extracted is lost in the 
process.163
These problems lead to higher extraction costs and affect the quality and 
availability of the resource. It  can be assumed that many of the factors 
affecting the water resources begin in the rural areas, and then go on to 
affect urban regions. For example, even when the water lost in the 
process is similar (50-70 per cent), the volume extracted in the rural 
areas affects the availability of the resource (water sources are linked) in 
urban areas, thus affecting costs and quality.
However, despite these problems, the water services infrastructure in the 
state is considered as one of the five most developed. I t  has the most 
extensive coverage of potable water and wastewater: 98 per cent and 
94.3 per cent compared to 84 per cent and 67 per cent respectively 
nationally.164 The city capital has the greatest coverage in the country: 
potable water, at 98.9 per cent, and wastewater at 97.8 per cent.165 
Nonetheless, as will be shown through the case study the water
163 For a broad discussion on the water services in Mexico, from a legal and economic 
perspective, see: Andres Roemer. 1997. Derecho y  Economia: Politicas Publicas del Agua, 
Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua-CIDE. For a clear idea o f how water resources are managed in 
Mexico according to the law see: Comision Nacional del Agua. 1997. Ley de Aguas 
Nacionales. Mexico.
164 For a broad discussion on water and wastewater coverage in Mexico see: Presidencia de la 
Republica 1994-2000. 1995. Programa Hidraulico 1995-2000. Mexico: Gobiemo Federal.
165INEGI. 1997. Cuaderno Estadistico Municipal: Aguascalientes. Mexico: INEGI-Gobiemo 
del Estado de Aguascalientes, pp.41.
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infrastructure is predominantly old, with poor quality materials affecting 
the provision of the service, and it has been identified by local inhabitants 
as the first and most problematic public utility in the state and the city 
capital. Thus, the reality facing the most developed city in terms of its 
water and wastewater infrastructure is in sharp contrast to what the 
official statistics suggest - a clear sign of that which faces the other 
Mexican municipalities.166
Intervention from the private sector, in the form of a concession scheme, 
is used only in the city capital. The remaining ten municipalities in the 
state provide the services exclusively through public involvement: in 
seven cases by direct means or through decentralised bodies; in two 
municipalities through the intervention of the state government, and in 
one case via use of a community collaboration scheme.167
Concluding Note
In order to explain and justify the selection of the city capital of 
Aguascalientes as the case study for this research, in which the 
privatisation of the water utilities is the core focus of analysis, this chapter 
has reviewed the development of the state and the city capital, the 
political and electoral trends of the last two decades, and the management 
and infrastructure of the water resources. The main points highlighting the
166 An interesting analysis of the water resources in Mexico can be found in: Banobras. 1996. 
Federalismo y  Desarrollo, No.52. (Abril-Mayo-Junio de 1996) Mexico: Banobras.
167 Centro Nacional de Desarrollo Municipal. 1997. Los Municipios de Mexico: Information 
para el Desarrollo. Mexico: SEGOB -CEDEMUN, (CD- ROM).
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relevance of Aguascalientes to the national context can be summarised as 
follows.
The city capital of Aguascalientes is located in a state with privileged 
characteristics. The strategic geographic location, industrial infrastructure, 
work force, economic growth, low unemployment rate, competitive level of 
wages and salaries, social stability, multinational investments, 
comparatively well-developed public utilities infrastructure, and labour 
stability have all encouraged the establishment of federal policies. Since 
most of the economic activity and state population is concentrated in the 
city capital, this allows us to compress our area of reference - to assess 
the results of federal policies in one specific area.
The political hegemony created by the official party's total control over the 
state - at least until 1995 - made Aguascalientes the ideal place in which 
to introduce any kind of public policy innovation. Likewise, the tied 
relationships amongst the centre and the state governments, whereby 
major federal policies are applied as experiments in the city capital, are 
decisive determinants. Thus, the privatisation of the water utilities 
represents the first case, nationally, to be applied at this level. The effect 
on the city capital is similar to what has been achieved in the state, since 
the state political, economic, and social variables have been centralised at 
this level.
The city capital represents one of the most developed (in all senses of the 
term) cities in Mexico, and federal authorities, through the CNA, play a 
key role in its water management and regulatory frameworks. State and 
local authorities also have responsibilities, and the local level of
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government is directly responsible for the water utilities. However, it must 
be borne in mind that the supply and quality of the water itself has been 
under threat (to be discussed in detail further). Amongst other factors, the 
scarcity of the resource presents a great challenge for its efficient 
provision, whether by public or by private means.
In summary, this chapter has shown that the development of the state is 
tied to that of the city capital and vice versa. In this sense, Aguascalientes 
is one of the most advanced and well-structured cities in Mexico, 
accompanied by the seal of federal development through policies such as 
privatisation and decentralisation. Federal support has encouraged a high 
rate of economic and social growth in the state, with a consequent 
increase in needs, especially in terms of the provision of public utilities. Of 
these utilities, water has been selected to constitute the first concession 
scheme in Mexico. The results achieved by means of this federal policy are 
diverse and contradictory, and have changed the local economic, social, 
and political scenario. The roles of policies and actors have been 
transformed, and the new structures of government in Mexico have been 
challenged, as will be shown in the following chapters.
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Chapter Four
The Path Towards the First Concession Scheme for the 
Water Utilities in Mexico: The Beginnings in the 
Municipality of Aguascalientes (1989-1993)
Introduction
This chapter will examine the development of privatisation policies for the 
water utilities in Mexico, focusing on the municipality of Aguascalientes. 
Section 4.1 will examine the earliest stages of water utilities management 
by state and local government, and the introduction of the first 
privatisation scheme in the municipality of Aguascalientes. Section 4.2 
considers the 1992 election period, and the influence of political actors in 
thwarting the first attempt to grant the concession. The condition of the 
water utilities at the end of that period are also defined. Section 4.3 
describes the role of the governor, mayor, and state legislature in the 
evolution of the concession scheme in 1993, and explains why local 
authorities approved the scheme. The debate around the terms 
'privatisation' and 'concession' will also be examined. Section 4.4 
describes how the private group, SAASA, obtained the concession scheme, 
and looks at the economic and political factors supporting it. The 
concluding section gives an overview, and a summary of these 
developments.
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4.1 The Steps towards the First Concession Scheme for the Water 
Utilities in Mexico: The Background in Aguascalientes (1989-1992)
The Provision of the Water Utilities in the State of Aguascalientes: The Early 
Stages
Traditionally, water utilities in Mexico had been provided by federal 
means. In late 1980, though, a national decentralisation programme was 
launched to encourage new investment in the sector. By this time, the 
water utilities were in a perilous situation. For 20 years (1960-1980) no 
improvements - technological or administrative - had been made in the 
provision of water utilities in Mexico.168
The state of Aguascalientes took over responsibility for 69 water utilities, 
and thus became directly responsible for the provision of services 
throughout the whole state. The first state water law, the Ley para 
Regular la Prestacion del Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado 
(Regulatory Law of the Water and Wastewater Utilities) was introduced on 
August 30, 1981, along with the Direction General de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento (General Direction of Water and Wastewater Utilities). These 
provided the framework with which to manage and control the water 
utilities in the state.169
The state government did not operate the water utilities from the capital. 
Instead, they were handed to local authorities and managed through the
168 According to an interview on January 14, 1998, with Martin Molina Ochoa, General 
Manager o f the Comision National del Agua in Aguascalientes (CNA).
169 It is important to note that the transfer o f the water and wastewater utilities took place 
without any extra resources (economic, technological or human).
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Direction de Obras Publicas Munitipales (Municipal Public Works 
Direction), accountable to the Secretarfa de Obras Publicas y Vivienda 
Popular (Secretariat of Public Utilities and Housing) of the State 
Government. No extra support was given, and the failure to provide the 
water services efficiently represented a major concern.170 In 1988, the 
state government passed responsibility for the provision of the water 
utilities to the remaining municipalities, to be managed first through direct 
means and later by using decentralised bodies.171
The Creation of CAPA in 1984: The First Decentralised Water Management in 
the Municipality of Aguascalientes.
In 1983, the reform of article 115 of the Mexican Constitution granted the 
municipalities new responsibilities. At the same time, alternative schemes, 
including decentralisation bodies and privatisation policies, were available 
to provide public utilities. Aguascalientes took advantage of this 
constitutional amendment and, on February 5, 1984, the Periodico Oficial 
del Estado de Aguascalientes (POEA - Official Newspaper of the State of 
Aguascalientes) announced the creation of a new divested body to provide 
the water utilities in the capital.172
This was the Comision de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de La Ciudad de 
Aguascalientes (Potable Water and Wastewater Commission for the City of
170 Fernando Gomez Esparza. 1993. Razones para la Concesion del Agua. Presidencia 
Municipal de Aguascalientes (1993-1995). Aguascalientes. Mexico.
171 SEDESOL. 1994. Programa de las 100 Ciudades. Mexico: Secretaria de Desarrollo Social.
172 For these resolutions, the dates given are those of publication in the Periodico Oficial del 
Estado de Aguascalientes. Some were approved earlier by the state legislature or the 
ayuntamiento.
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Aguascalientes), or CAPA, promoted by Governor Rodolfo Landeros 
Gallegos (1980-1986) in order to allow the municipality to use a 
decentralised (independent) public agency according to federal, state, and 
local laws, avoiding the necessity to provide the services by direct means. 
However, CAPA was under the observation and control of the municipality, 
as well as being financially tied to it. Furthermore, the city and state 
governments served as the normative policy and regulatory bodies. 
According to the official resolution, CAPA was to be responsible for the 
management, operation, and conservation of water and wastewater 
systems in the capital, including building, rehabilitation, planning, 
programming, enlarging, and maintaining the infrastructure of the service. 
The creation of CAPA was the first decentralisation policy, supported by 
state authorities, to be applied at this level.173
1988: The First Step towards the Implementation of Privatisation Schemes for 
the Water Utilities
The first step toward using privatisation schemes for the water utilities 
was made when governor Miguel Angel Barberena (1986-1992) asked the 
LIV state legislature to create a new regulatory law, the Ley del Sistema 
de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (Water Potable System and Wastewater 
Law), to supersede the water law divestment of 1981.
The new law, published on March 20, 1988, was intended to promote the
173 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. Creation de un Organismo Descentralizado 
CAPA. Periodico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes. February 04, 1984, Aguascalientes. 
Mexico.
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withdrawal of local authorities from the provision of water utilities 
throughout the state, but with special emphasis on the capital. Article 71 
extended CAPA's responsibilities to the full provision of water utilities in 
the capital, including the establishment of financial, operational, and 
technical specifications. The law also allowed for the participation of third 
parties, including those from the private sector.174
In terms of the background to Barberena's new law, it is evident that, 
during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988), the 
federal government was also clearly identified with decentralisation and 
privatisation policies. Aguascalientes was both following national trends 
and being used as an experiment.175 State Governor Miguel Angel 
Barbarena, who had promoted the Ley del Sistema de Agua Potable y 
AlcantariUado, was linked with the Mexican president, and the clear aim 
was to apply federal policies in Aguascalientes before any other state in 
Mexico. In fact, the state governor provided a link between the de la 
Madrid presidency's policy of divestiture programmes, and the subsequent 
government of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), which promoted major 
economic reforms, including privatisation policies.176 Local government
174 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. Ley del Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado. 
Periodico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes. March 20, 1988, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
175 On privatisation and decentralisation policies during the Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 
administration, see: Wiliam Glade (ed).1995. Privatizacion de Empresas Publicas en America 
Latina. Mexico: Gemika.
176 On the privatisation program during Carlos Salinas de Gortari's presidency (1988-1994) 
see: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. 1994. Desincorporacion de Entidades 
Paraestatales. Mexico: FCE.
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was on the agenda and Aguascalientes was selected to continue applying 
federal resolutions.177
In the accords signed in May 1989, the governor encouraged the 
municipality (CAPA) to take advantage of the Ley de Agua Potable y 
AlcantariUado. Later, the ayuntamiento passed the law allowing CAPA to 
include private bodies in its structure.178 According to the official 
resolution, the governor's petition was justified on the grounds that, from 
its creation in 1984, CAPA had faced constraints, including deteriorated 
infrastructure, lack of resources, pipeline leakage, non-accountable 
consumers (i.e. non-payment and illegal connections), old equipment, lack 
of specialised personnel, bureaucratic practices, and a general lack of 
expertise in water management. Financial resources were also inadequate 
to meet demand.179 It  was clear that the objective for which CAPA had 
been created in 1984 had not been met, and this persuaded local 
authorities to approve the governor's request. There were serious 
economic reasons for it, and it was made politically feasible by the state
177 On previous federal policies encouraged in Aguascalientes see: Ma. Concepcion Martinez 
Omana. 1994. Aguascalientes: Un Ensayo de Descentralization, Mexico: Instituo Cultural 
Aguascalientes-Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes.
178 During this month two sessions were held, Session 47 on May 10, and Session 48 on May 
19, encouraged by the state governor Miguel Angel Barberena Vega (1986-1992). In both 
sessions the ayuntamiento approved the inclusion of private entities in CAPA's structure, 
none o f the sindicos or regidores rejected or seemed interested in knowing how private 
schemes had to function. This was basically because the PRI had total control of the 
ayuntamiento'.
179 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1988-1990) 1989. Condiciones de los Servicios 
de Agua Potable y  AlcantariUado, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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governor's control over the political machinery.180
The First Privatisation Policy for the Water Utilities in 1989: A Service Contract 
Scheme
The first moves towards the implementation of a new set of public policies 
in Mexico were at a local level. Aguascalientes took the lead in applying 
alternative schemes that allowed private entities to be involved in the 
provision of the water services. An agreement allowing a mixture of 
partnerships amongst public and private bodies was signed on August 2, 
1989, by state governor Miguel Angel Barberena Vega, and Jorge Antonio 
Ortega de Leon, General Manager of CAPA, representing the Municipality; 
and Enrique Valencia Sandoval, representing the recently-hired Servicios 
de Agua Aguascalientes, S.A de C.V (Aguascalientes Water Services, 
Limited Company).181 This private body, known as SAASA, represented an 
affiliate of ICA group (Ingenieros Civiles Asociados), which was heavily 
favoured by the federal government because of its association with the 
French company, Generate des Eaux.182 For this reason a holding 
company, Operacion y Mantenimiento de Sistemas de Agua S.A., or
180 The PRI had total control o f the state legislature and the ayuntamiento. Opposition parties 
represented only a small section of the political scenario.
181 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1988-1990). 1989. Contrato de Prestacion de 
Servicios con SAASA. August 02, 1989, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
182 According to data obtained from Generale des Eaux (1998) this French group is a world 
leader in water supply, serving 40 million people around the world. It has presence in Europe 
in France, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. It has also penetrated Asia, including China and Malaysia, as well as Australia and 
the Americas, where the United States, Puerto Rico, Mexico (where it supplies 2.2 million 
people in part o f Mexico city and around 600,000 inhabitants in Aguascalientes city), 
Colombia and Argentina represent its bigger partnerships. {Generale des Eaux (1998) on the 
Internet www.generale-des-eauxs.com accessed on May 10, 1998.
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OMSA, was created. Evidence of this partnership was reinforced by 
Generale des Eaux's representative, Jean Michel Tiberi, in his statement 
that since 1989 we have had a partnership with ICA group (OMSA) but 
without any physical presence in the municipality, which was increased 
during 1993 and 1994.183
According to the agreement the water services remained in public hands. 
Although CAPA was serving both as a regulatory body, and as the 
manager of the water utilities, it was unable either to make the rules or to 
elaborate them. Its functions included contracting, supervision, 
rehabilitation, infrastructure, conservation, and enlargement.
This first privatisation policy using a mixture of private and public 
participation in the form of a contrato de servicios (service contract) was 
presented in the form of a ten-year contract, due to run until 1999. I t  was 
an exclusively technical contract, with the private sector responsible for 
obtaining the raw water, for the water and wastewater reticulation 
systems, and for providing water treatment, as well as acting as an 
internal advisory group. Nevertheless, no investment or set tariffs were 
accorded at any stage, and this would pose a threat to SAASA's efficiency, 
as will be shown later.
However, SAASA did become involved in further areas of CAPA's structure, 
and four clear stages of this involvement can be identified. The first was 
granted during the government of Hector Manuel del Villar Martinez
183 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: Desafios y  Oportunidades para el 
Siglo XXI. Mexico: Oficina de Coordination de Asesores, pp. 201.
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(1987-1989), with the last three heavily promoted during the presidency 
of Armando Romero Rosales (1990-1991), and concluded, after his 
resignation, under Marfa Alicia de la Rosa Lopez (1991-1992).184 These 
mayors were all members of the PRI; their periods of government were all 
notable for privatisation policies; and all were subordinate to the governor 
of the state, Miguel Angel Barberena.
The First Stage (1989)
According to the contract signed in 1989, SAASA was authorised:
• To create detailed records of all consumers, including names, 
addresses, and water consumption; to maintain the water distribution; 
to operate the raw water source; to improve and control the quality of 
the water; and to remove blockages from the wastewater collection 
system (sewerage).
The Second Stage (1990)
The new local authorities, in power for the period 1990-1992, gave SAASA 
extra responsibilities, including:
• The provision of metering; issuing invoices; and charging for the rights 
to use the water services.185
The Third Stage (1991)
The third stage came in the form of new resolutions, published in the
184 Mayor Armando Romero Rosales resigned to run for a post in the state legislature. The 
ayuntamiento offered the appointment to Fermin Barba (vice Mayor), who declined. Maria 
Alicia de la Rosa Lopez was serving at the state government as Sub Secretario de Gobiemo 
(Under Secretary o f Internal Affairs), but resigned, and was invested as mayor of the 
municipality o f Aguascalientes. She clearly had support from the state governor Miguel Angel 
Barberena. She was only the second woman in power since 1957-59.
185 CCAPAMA. 1998. Evolucidn de la Contratacion, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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POEA on March 3, 1991. The newly-created Comision de Agua Potable y 
AlcantariUado del Municipio de Aguascalientes (Potable Water and 
Wastewater Commission for the Aguascalientes Municipality), or CAPAMA, 
superseded CAPA, and was granted the status of organismo fiscal 
autonomo (autonomous fiscal entity), with greater financial attributes and 
autonomy. The responsibility for approving water tariffs was transferred to 
CAPAMA, and the legal nature of the ta riff changed, becoming a source of 
direct income for CAPAMA. Thus, water revenues were separated from 
local authorities' general budgets. However, the services were still 
functioning under federal, state, and local subsidies. I t  is questionable 
whether CAPAMA could be truly independent whilst relying on public funds 
(federal, state, and local subsidies) and remaining under political scrutiny, 
but no alterations to the relationships with SAASA were made. There was 
a clear intention to move ahead with further privatisation schemes.
The Fourth Stage (1992)
In 1992, CAPAMA and SAASA signed a new, and complementary, 
agreement, under which the private entity was encouraged to take on new 
operational responsibilities.186 According to the official document, SAASA 
activities would be complemented by the following:
• The faculty to operate, maintain, administrate, and preserve the water 
and wastewater utilities, including the water treatment plants in the 
capital. For this purpose, CAPAMA agreed to place all the necessary
186 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1990-1992). 1992. Convenio Complementario. 
February 19, 1992, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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resources at the disposal of SAASA.
This agreement represented the final stage in the movement towards the 
concession of the water utilities - the concession scheme was launched in 
1993 after the arrival of the new local authorities. During 1992, Governor 
Miguel Angel Barberena (1986-1992), and the Mayor substitute Maria 
Alicia de la Rosa (1991-1992), had attempted, but failed, to make the 
concession. Table 4.1 summarises the path taken, from 1980 to 1993, 
towards the water utility concession scheme in the municipality of 
Aguascalientes.
T a b le  4 .1
T h e  P a t h  T o w a r d s  t h e  C o n c e s s io n  S c h e m e  f o r  t h e  W a t e r  U t i l i t i e s  in  t h e  
M u n i c i p a l i t y  o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 3 )
Y e a r A m e n d m e n t
1 9 8 0 • Aguascalientes was granted 69 water utilities from federal authorities. The 
municipality provided the services by direct means.
1 9 8 1 • Ley para Regular la Prestacidn del Servicio de Agua Potable.
1 9 8 3 • Constitutional amendment to article 115, allowing the municipalities to use 
alternative schemes for the provision of public utilities, including private 
bodies.
1 9 8 4 • Inclusion of the first decentralised figure from local authorities (CAPA) to 
provide the water utilities.
1 9 8 8 • Creation of the Ley del Sistema de Agua Potable y AlcantariUado allowing 
private intervention for the water utilities provisions.
1 9 8 9 • First stage of privatisation policy using a contrato de servicios scheme 
granted to the private group SAASA (ICA group).
1 9 9 0 • Second stage granted to SAASA (ICA group).
1 9 9 1 • Third stage amendments modifying CAPA to CAPAMA.
1 9 9 2 • Fourth stage granting operational functions to SAASA (ICA group).
1 9 9 3 • Creation of the Ley de Agua Potable, AlcantariUado, Saneamiento y su 
Reuso del Estado de Aguascalientes..
• Concession Scheme.
Source: Own elaboration using data from the official resolutions.
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4.2 Fighting for the Paternity of the Concession Scheme: The 1992
Elections
Public Utilities equal Private Interests: The First Attempt to grant the 
Concession Scheme in 1992
The private group SAASA made known its interest in obtaining the 
concession very soon after the granting of the third stage, and on 
February 28, 1992, presented a formal petition to state governor Miguel 
Angel Barberena, requesting the concession for the water utilities in the 
capital. SAASA aimed to gain greater control over the financial, 
commercial, and technical resources; in other words, to totally control the 
water utilities of the municipality of Aguascalientes.187 On March 11, 1992, 
the state government passed an initiative to the state legislature in order 
to consider SAASA's petition. In fact, the state governor's support for this 
policy was a personal project, coming almost at the end of his 
administration.188
The negotiations with SAASA were moving forward, backed up with the 
support of the state governor. However, in order to continue, a resolution 
from the ayuntamiento was needed. The state legislature followed the 
governor's instructions and, because of the legal impediment to the
187 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1992. Petition de SAASA. February 28, 1992, 
Aguascalientes. Mexico. It was sent directly to the state governor and signed by Ing. Raul 
Lopez Roldan, Executive Vice-president of SAASA.
188 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. LIV State Legislature. 1992. It was signed by 
Enrique Pasillas Escobedo, Secretario General de Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes 
(General Secretary for the State Government) on March 11, 1992. It was sent by this 
dependency to Lie. Roberto Padilla Marquez, Presidente de la Gran Comision de la LIV 
Legislatura, state legislature reference number 265.
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preventing the body actually approving it, on April 3 it passed an initiative 
persuading local authorities to evaluate the case, and to return with a final 
resolution.189
On April 22, 1992, the ayuntamiento returned the initiative. There was 
little debate, and the resolution was approved by fourteen votes, with just 
one abstention. The PRI was still the main political force in the 
ayuntamiento, and were thus able to ensure a 'fast track' decision. Even 
so, during this period there was no opposition from other parties - 
basically, no objections were raised regarding the water concession. 
Consideration of the core topics supporting the decision may help to 
explain why local authorities were so willing to move ahead with the 
concession programme in 1992.
• Administrative: A new ideological current in Mexico, sponsored by the 
federal government, proposed the privatisation of the public services 
in order to eliminate bureaucracy, provide insulation from political 
intervention, and encourage professional administration.
• Operations: It  was believed that the private sector would be more 
efficient, encouraging better services at a lower cost. Special emphasis 
was placed on the water management system, where most complaints 
were concentrated.
• Financial: Transferring internal debts to the private sector was
189 Signed on behalf o f the state by Deputy Roberto Padilla Marquez, Presidente de la Gran 
Comision (President o f the Greater Commission) during the LIV legislature. Returned on 
April 3, 1992 with expedient I-E-3-92 and with serial number 14521.
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considered financially beneficial to the municipality. I t  was supposed 
that no further expenses would have to be met by local authorities.
• Legal, local, and state laws would be modified in order to maintain the 
integrity of the society and the service provided by the private entity.
I t  is also necessary to consider that the decisions were made in line with 
national currents (divestiture policies), and that economic factors 
represented the main variable in the concession scheme. In this context, 
the ayuntamiento judged that the concession for the water utilities was 
supported and legally feasible. I t  is important to note the speed with 
which these resolutions were made. I t  took less than a month for the state 
legislature to consider the petition from the state government to legally 
(not operationally) form the concession. The ayuntamiento approved it in 
only a few days. Clearly, it is reasonable to ask how it was possible that a 
decision to privatise a public utility was made without the decision-makers 
actually knowing the facts.
Nineteen Ninety-Two represented the last year in office for the state 
governor, mayor, and state legislature, putting them under pressure to 
make a quick decision. At the same time, the start of electoral campaigns 
for these posts meant that state and local officials wished to make a 
resolution in order to avoid jeopardising the PRI candidates. Furthermore, 
and crucially, it was necessary to obey any decision from a higher level of 
government - in this case from the governor, Miguel Angel Barberena. 
However, it was necessary to obtain the approval of state legislature, due 
to the legal impediment faced by the ayuntamiento that prevents it from 
granting resolutions exceeding its legal period of government (three
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years).190
The Paternity of the Concession Scheme: The Influence of the Political Actors 
in the 1992 Elections
On May 6, 1992, the Comision Legislativa y Puntos Constitucionales 
(Legislative Commission and Constitutional Matters) of the LIV State 
Legislature passed a resolution postponing indefinitely any pronouncement 
regarding the concession of the water utilities. This was a major change, 
since the commission had previously supported the concession. Thus, the 
concession scheme came to a sudden halt, even though the ayuntamiento 
had already approved it according to their instructions. 191 
The key to this sudden change on the part of the state legislature was the 
elections. The PRI candidate for governor, Otto Granados Roldan, who was 
heavily supported by the Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994), realised that the concession would stay longer than public 
officials. He wished to ensure that he would have total control of it from 
the beginning, in order to strengthen his own position in negotiations. 
Thus, Otto Granados Roldan chose the concession scheme as a personal 
policy for his administration, with direct support from the Mexican 
president. Evidence for this came from Enrique Pasillas Escobedo, General 
Secretary of Government during the governorship of Miguel Angel
190 See: Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1990-1992). 1992. Sesion del Ayuntamiento. 
April 22, 1992, Aguascalientes, Mexico. The document was signed by the Regidores Juan 
Pablo Ruiz de la Rosa, Jose Garcia Franchini and Jose Manuel Rosales Cortes.
191 The document was signed on May 6, 1992 by four members o f the Comision Legislativa y  
Puntos Constitucionales, deputies Roberto Padilla Marquez, Mario Garza, Sylvia Palomino 
Topete and Alfredo Gonzalez Gonzalez.
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Barberena (1986-1992), who stated in an interview that the approval o f 
the concession scheme was suddenly stopped due to internal negotiations 
amongst the state governor Miguel Angel Barberena, state legislature, 
federal authorities (CNA and SHCP) and candidates from the PRI (Otto 
Granados and Fernando Gomez).192
The aim was to pass responsibility for the concession to the future state 
governor, mayor, and the coming legislature. The PRI candidates 
considered that the water policy might have been controversial, and did 
not want to go into the elections with the issue alive. I t  is evident that the 
decision to apply the concession during the coming government was taken 
while PRI members were campaigning for the public posts. They had 
control of the state and were confident of winning all the posts.
Otto Granados Roldan was elected as governor, with Fernando Gomez 
Esparza as the new mayor. Both brought new sets of public policies 
(privatisation) supported through federal bodies, specially designed to be 
identified as the new face of Mexican politicians, of a new form of public 
management at this level. The private sector was also extremely 
interested in the development these policies. Elections for the state 
legislature resulted in a massive victory for the PRI, in which they gained 
20 out of 25 seats. This guaranteed the level of discipline necessary to
192 Enrique Pasillas Escobedo previously served as Secretario General de Gobiemo (General 
Secretary o f Internal Affairs) -1991-1992— with the former governor Miguel Angel 
Barberena (1986-1992). Later, he run succesfully (PRI) for a post in the LV State Legislature.
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implement any decision from the elected governor. 193 
The Situation of the Water Utilities in 1992
As the 1990-1992 municipal term, and the electoral campaigns for the 
next term, were coming to an end (the last quarter of the year 1992), 
discussions about the concession were still ongoing in the corridors of 
political power. However, the Mexican public was unaware that decisions 
had already been taken regarding the future of the water utilities. 
Important evidence regarding the failure of previous privatisation schemes 
(service contracts) appeared in a document presented to the general 
public and the ayuntamiento by Juan Pablo Ruiz de la Rosa, who served as 
the Regidor (PAN) for the water utility commission during the 1990-1992 
administration.194 He rejected the mixed public and private partnership 
between CAPAMA and SAASA, and argued that only two options for 
provision of the water utilities were feasible. First, total responsibility 
should be returned to the municipality, to provide the service by direct 
means; or, second, the concession must be implemented. Overall, the first 
option was the preferred policy.
The document defined the concession initiative as a policy serving only 
private interests, and PAN ideology prevented any consideration of private
193 Otto Granados Roldan took office on November 22, 1992. He was elected with a huge 
majority (72.02 per cent o f the votes) to serve a six year term (1992-1998). Fernando Gomez 
Esparza, won the elections with 68.65 per cent to serve a three year period (1993-1995). He 
took office on December 31, 1992.
194 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1992. Evaluation del Servicio de Agua Potable y  
AlcantariUado (1990-1992), Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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participation. I t  also showed the conditions of the water utilities during the
1990-1992 period of government, arranging them under five main
headings:
1) Water Supply. The lack of resources (economic and technical) to 
improve the water supply infrastructure had generated irreparable 
problems (non-paying customers and pipeline leaks, amongst others). 
The conditions had not been markedly improved, either - there was 
still not 24-hr availability of water. The sources of supply were facing 
serious problems, needing immediate attention.
2) Wastewater. The city had 850 km of sewers that were more than 40 
years old and carrying both wastewater and excess rain water inflows. 
The problem was worse during periods of heavy rain, when all the 
sewers overflowed, thus posing a health hazard.
3) Water Quality. The potable water represented only 55 per cent of the
total extracted, even though the municipality had the treatment 
capacity to deal with 94 per cent of the supply. The municipality still 
used chlorination in order to make it drinkable. Critically, 55 per cent 
of all water put into supply was lost though pipeline leakage. The 
pipelines were more than 40 years old and frequently damaged by the 
public urban services infrastructure.
4) Financial Scheme. Three main problems were detected: water leaks, 
invoicing procedures, and charging mechanisms. All impacted on the 
quality and quantity of the service provided, representing a burden on 
local finances.
5) End Users. There were 74,000 registered users in 1989, a figure that
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rose to 105,000 by 1992. There had been a considerable increase in 
the number of complaints, as well. Tariffs represented the main area of 
concern, along with the constant errors in individual water 
measurement, so that water receipts did not reflect actual 
consumption.
These official descriptions show that the water utilities had been little 
improved between 1984 and 1992. The creation of a decentralised public 
figure (CAPA) in 1984, and the inclusion of privatisation schemes in 1989 
(service contracts), had not solved the problem. One must ask, therefore, 
why so little had been achieved - despite the implementation of 
alternative schemes (public and private) - and why local and state 
authorities were so keen to move forward with the concession scheme? 
One can assume that solving problems at a local government level does 
not rely exclusively on potential solutions. Political factors always play a 
part, as our examination of the early stages of the concession scheme has 
shown. Even so, it is necessary to point out that local necessities in 
Aguascalientes grew at a greater rate than financial, technological, or 
human aid for the provision of the water utilities. Between 1982 and 1992, 
in particular, there was huge population growth in the municipality of 
Aguascalientes, and public funds did not match this growth. This affected 
the overall results of the private intervention (SAASA), particularly 
because the public responsibility for capital investment in the water 
utilities was not fulfilled.
In explaining why PRI candidates were willing to implement the concession 
of the water utilities, the elected Mayor Fernando Gomez Esparza argued
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in a personal interview that the elected governments favoured the 
concession o f the water utilities o f the city's capital, due to the fact that 
while they were on campaigns a main petition represented the public 
concern about the water utilities, not necessarily the means to provide it 
(private or public) but the service itself. A t that time, the provision o f the 
water services represented a dear political demand that had to be solved 
by the elected governments.195
The PRI considered that the concession scheme would solve the problems 
facing the municipality. The risk of failure seemed small because of the 
level of support from federal authorities, especially considering the close 
relationship between the elected governor, Otto Granados Roldan, and the 
Mexican president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who was promoting the 
concession. Furthermore, the interest shown by the private sector (ICA 
group) seemed to guarantee success.
This confidence belied the results achieved by 1992, which pointed to a 
lack of efficiency on the part of SAASA, even if the main reasons for poor 
performance were a lack of public capital investment, a lack of regulation, 
and the obsolete technical, financial, management, and operational 
conditions of the services granted to the private company, limiting their 
capacity to improve matters.
195 The interview was held at his private office in Aguascalientes on January 20, 1998.
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4.3 The First Stage of the Approval of the Concession for the Water 
Utilities: '93, the Year of a Final Resolution 
The Political Ideology behind the Concession Scheme
The preliminary negotiations (governor-mayor) regarding whether to 
move forward with the concession had already been concluded, but 
approval was still necessary from the state chamber of deputies and the 
ayuntamiento, since the previous form of service contract did not endorse 
the concession scheme. As has been seen, the decision had been taken 
months earlier, during the electoral campaigns, influenced in particular by 
the governor and mayor elect. The first stage of local and state 
authorities' official lobbying for the concession began in early 1993. It 
must therefore be asked why they considered the concession scheme to 
be a policy that had to be launched during their period of government?
The new governor immediately made clear his intention to favour 
privatisation schemes. His Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 1992-1998 (State 
Developing Plan) declared the intention of his government to grant a 
concession of the water utilities in order to improve their provision in the 
state. The plan was to start with the capital, whilst also giving 
consideration to the remaining municipalities.
In his inaugural speech, on December 31, 1992, Mayor Fernando Gomez 
Esparza declared that his government intended to propose the concession 
o f the water utilities to the private sector. He justified this intention by 
pointing to the lack of quality in the services and to the financial 
constraints facing the municipality (CAPAMA) in their provision. These 
constraints included disproportional current costs, debt repayments, lack
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of public investment, excessively low water tariff, and a high level of 
subsidy. He also considered that national trends were moving towards 
government with greater regulatory functions and fewer executive 
functions.196
Nevertheless, he did not suggest the application of a privatisation scheme 
during his electoral campaign, or in the Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 1993- 
1995.197 He did briefly describe the water utility conditions of the capital, 
but emphasised the economic, technological, and administrative 
constraints.198 Governor Otto Granados Roldan supported the mayor's 
decision by declaring that a world-wide tendency to privatise public 
utilities has arrived in Mexico, and Aguascalientes is not an exception. 199 
Later, he stated that there were even plans in the medium term to 
privatise other public utilities, such as city cleaning.200 
These declarations make clear the close relationship between the governor 
and the mayor. They also indicate that the concession of the water utilities 
was decided during the campaign. Otherwise, it would not make sense 
that both elected candidates would suddenly discover the benefits of
196 Iniciativa Privada Manejara el Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. January 1, 1993.
197 The main topics during Fernando Gomez Esparza's campaign were: urban development, 
more and better public utilities, public safety, water utilities and to have total regulatory 
control o f the municipality o f Aguascalientes.
198 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1993. Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1993-1995, 
Aguascalientes, Mexico.
199 Iniciativa Privada Manejara el Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro January 1, 1993.
200 On privatisation programs in Mexico see: Jacques Rogozinski. 1997. La Privatizacion en 
Mexico: Razones elmpactos. Mexico: Trillas.
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privatisation as soon as they came to power. However, it was the state 
governor, Otto Granados Roldan, who had the greater interest in applying 
the concession scheme. I t  represented a personal policy for his period of 
government, and was promoted using his personal relationship with the 
Mexican president, Carlos Salinas.201 It  can be assumed that the new 
mayor was acting under the governor's instructions from the day he took 
office. The aim was to persuade the ayuntamiento and the state 
legislature to approve the concession for the water utilities in the capital 
as soon as possible as a way to implement federal policies regarding 
privatisation schemes.
A Rushed Start by Local and State Authorities: Why was the Concession 
Scheme approved in 1993?
Soon after Fernando Gomez took office as mayor, the state legislature and 
the ayuntamiento began fulfilling all the legal requirements in order to 
pass the concession scheme. Discussions by the newly-elected 
ayuntamiento (1993-1995) began at its first extraordinary session on 
January 15, 1993, only 15 days after the mayor's announcement 
proposing concession schemes for the water utilities.
It  is important to emphasise that the PRI represented the majority in the 
ayuntamiento, with 7 regidores. One of the two sfndicos was a member of
201 Poder Ejecutivo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1992. Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 1992- 
1998. Aguascalientes: Los Retos Frente al Siglo XXI, Aguascalientes. Mexico. See especially 
section regarding the Estudios del Agua (Water Estudies) pp. 173-180.
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the PRI, the other was Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez (no political affiliation) 
serving on the exchequer commission on behalf the private sector.202 
Opposition parties were represented by only three members (PAN, PRD, 
and PFCRN) out of 12. One of these was the Regidor (PAN) for the water 
utilities commission, Fernando Herrera. At this first session only opposition 
Regidores questioned the initiative; PRI members were clearly following 
instructions. By the end of the session the ayuntamiento had agreed on 
the creation of a commission to evaluate the concession proposal.203 
On January 19, 1993, the state legislature modified article 97 of the Ley 
Organica Municipal del Estado de Aguascalientes. The state governor 
pushed the reform forward, allowing the municipalities to make such 
concessions. He argued that the federal government had been 
encouraging this trend and that Aguascalientes would be a pioneer in the 
privatisation of public utilities.204 As mentioned above, the close 
relationship between the governor and the Mexican president were well 
known, and the first visit of Carlos Salinas to Aguascalientes came right on 
time: he inaugurated a wastewater treatment plant using private
202 No Debe Ser Bandera Politica la Privatization del Agua, Dice FGG. El Hidrocalido. 
January 26,1993.
203 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1993-1995). 1993. Sesion de Cabildo No. 3. 
Enero 15, 1993, Aguascalientes. Mexico. The members o f the commission to evaluate the 
water privatisation were Mayor Fernando Gomez Esparza and three other Regidores: 
Fernando Herrera, Roberto Martinez and Socorro Ramirez, representing Water and 
Wastewater, Exchequer and Internal Affairs commissions.
204Autorizan a Concesionar Servicios. Hidrocalido. January 20, 1993. and Participation de la 
IP en las Tareas Publicas. El Sol del Centro. January 20, 1993.
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capital.205
According to official documents, the ayuntamiento passed an important 
resolution approving the water concession on January 25, 1993.206 In this 
session, the PRI members passed the initiative, with only the opposition 
regidores voting. The ayuntamiento's decision to grant the concession can 
be summarised as follows:
• The municipality faced economic constraints: internal public debt 
represented a burden of 92 MNP, including debts to SAASA, 
BANOBRAS, state and federal governments, and other institutions 
(described in detail later).207 The water utilities (CAPAMA) accounted 
for almost 87 per cent of the total public internal debt.208 I t  was also 
necessary to implement reasonable pricing and to recover costs. Future 
investment in the services was emphasised. The ayuntamiento 
estimated that, by the end of the trienio in 1995, there would be a 
debt of around 189 MNP if the water utilities continued to be provided 
via public means (CAPAMA).209 
Furthermore, the federal government had decided to cut all subsidies for
205 El Presidente Estara aqui el Jueves. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 24, 1993.
206 Presidencia Municipal. 1993. Sesion Extraordinaria de Cabildo. Acta No. 4. Enero 25, 
1993. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
207 Presidencia Municipal. 1993. Deuda Publica del Municipio de Aguascalientes al 4 de 
Enero de 1993. Aguascalientes. Mexico, published in El Sol del Centro. January 14, 1993.
208 El Monto de la Deuda Publica Municipal: $92 mil Millones. El Sol del Centro. January 12, 
1993.
209 La Deuda en Agua Subira a 189 Millones NP en 1995. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes, 
January 27,1993.
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this utility for cities with more than 80,000 inhabitants.210 Without federal 
subsidies, local authorities would have to increase the water tariff, 
inevitably leading to social problems. Nonetheless, increases were 
contemplated even with the concession (as mentioned above).
• There were also technological and environmental problems, including 
over-exploitation of the ground water, water leakages, non-paying 
customers, and a lack of micro and macro water measurement.
The public body CAPAMA was primarily responsible for the weak local 
finances and the water infrastructure. The clear intention was to mobilise 
public opinion in favour of the concession scheme by emphasising the 
financial and technological constraints facing the municipality. The local 
authorities also argued that there was public demand for the concession, 
expressed during the electoral campaign for mayor.211 
However, the real reason for the decision to grant the concession was 
political,212 in particular the desire of the governor to stay in step with 
federal policies, and the local authorities were, therefore, simply following 
instructions. Paradoxically, although the critical circumstances facing the 
municipality were evident, the real reason behind the concession scheme 
was not. The municipality of Aguascalientes had been selected by the
210 Cubren Formalidades Legales Para Pasar el Agua a La IP. El Sol del Centro. January 27, 
1993.
211 A Concesionar el Agua. Linea Privada. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 31, 1993.
212 Aprobo el Municipio Privatizar el Sistema de Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. January 26, 
1993, Concesion, Con Serias Condiciones. El Hidrocalido. January 26, 1993, Autoriza el 
Cabildo Concesionar el Agua a Particulares. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 26, 1993.
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Mexican president Carlos Salinas to pilot the application of a concession 
scheme for the water utilities. The programme was then to move on to the 
100 most important cities in Mexico, thus influencing on 95 per cent of the 
total population.213 This shows us the importance of its implementation, 
but begs the question of why Aguascalientes was chosen. For the purposes 
of this research two sets of reasons will be considered:
• Internal: the municipality of Aguascalientes had all the political and 
economic characteristics necessary to establish the path towards 
further privatisation schemes in other municipalities in Mexico. The 
strategic geographic and economic activities of the state were located 
in the municipality of Aguascalientes, and almost 70 per cent of the 
total population, accounting for 74.22 per cent of the economic activity 
in the state, were concentrated there.214 The official party (PRI) had 
total control in all the municipalities, in the state legislature, and held 
the governorship. The political and economic stability of the state were 
also important determinants, and distinguished Aguascalientes from 
most other Mexican municipalities.
• External: the economic achievements of federal authorities, and their 
tendency towards privatisation policies, facilitated the launch of the 
first concession scheme in Mexico, with federal support through the 
World Bank prerogative and initiative. The most influential variable,
213 A broad description demonstrating federal support is presented in the coming chapters.
214 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1993. Plan Municipal de Desarrollo (1993- 
1995). Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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however, was the close relationship between the governor, Otto 
Granados, and the Mexican president, Carlos Salinas.
I t  is clear that up to this point the ayuntamiento had simply been following 
instructions, approving a policy over which it had no control. Public opinion 
recognised this and the PRI faced a loss of credibility. PRI Regidor 
Herminio Ventura found it necessary to deny categorically that we were 
authorising something already decided and that the ayuntamiento was 
serving as a puppet o f the state and local authorities.215 The public was 
also quickly realising that privatisation schemes did not guarantee 
success. Since the introduction of SAASA in 1989, very little had been 
achieved, and the water utilities were in the same, or perhaps in an even 
worse, condition.
In the meantime, while the water concession was still under debate, the 
Mexican president Carlos Salinas visited Aguascalientes for the second 
time, for the XVI PRI national assembly. A few days later he declared in 
Mexico City that Otto Granados Roldan, despite his being recently 
elected... has dedicated all his energy, his enormous taientf social 
vocation, to serve his fellow citizens....216 For a Mexican politician to be 
flattered by the Mexican president is a clear sign of being one of his 
favourites. Presidential support makes it easier to make an impact in the 
local context. I t  can be translated into public admiration and the 
submission of political colleagues. On January 29, 1993, the state
215 Desde la Redaction. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 26, 19973.
216 Aguascalientes en el Animo Presidential. El Sol del Centro. January 28, 1993.
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legislature passed a resolution authorising the ayuntamiento to grant the 
concession of the water utilities, including the water treatment plants. It 
was passed by all the PRI members, as well as two opposition members 
(PARM and PFCRN). Only the members representing PAN, PRD, and PPS 
voted against.217
This approval allowed the municipality to make progress with the 
elaboration of the concession title (contract) and to select a private entity 
via an auction mechanism. The application of the concession scheme for 
the water utilities was now at the first stage of approval. However, further 
endorsement by the state legislature - of the contract and the private 
body in charge of the water utilities - was still necessary.
Privatisation and Concession: Two Words in the Political Debate 
The approval of the concession scheme led to a debate about the terms 
'privatisation' and 'concession'.218 Enrique Pasillas Escobedo, leader of the 
PRI faction in the state legislature and a former collaborator of governor 
Miguel Angel Barberena, declared the official judgement of the LV 
Legislature to be that concession does not mean to privatise or to break 
down.219 At the same time, members of the PARM and PFCRN insisted that 
the proposal was not to privatise the water utilities but to make a
217 This resolution was published in the Periodico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes on 
January 31, 1993.
218 The terms were confused because o f the definition o f privatisation as selling the whole 
public utility. One evidenced in Chapter One that privatisation is a specific policy allowing 
private intervention for the provision of public utilities; a concession scheme is a mechanism 
relying on a formal privatisation policy.
219 Vo.Bo. A Concesionar el Agua. El Hidrocalido. January 30, 1993.
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concession o f it. One can see, therefore, the degree of confusion 
generated by the officials involved in the privatisation initiative.
It  is not surprising that the general public was also confused. Indeed, Juan 
Rodriguez Martinez, a PARM Deputy, argued that the privatisation 
programme for the water supply has been surrounded by a lack o f 
information...The society is confused due to the fact that local and state 
authorities have not been able to explain the necessity to make the 
concession.220
Governor Otto Granados Roldan, however, continued to maintain that 
private participation in the provision o f public services is welcomed... This 
trend represents a world tendency that should not scare us.221 I t  is clear 
both that he considered the concession of the water utilities as a personal 
project and that there was a very clear identification of Aguascalientes 
with presidential policies. President Carlos Salinas actually instructed the 
mayors of the most representative cities to make concessions for water 
and garbage collection. Aguascalientes was the first to implement this 
policy as, according to Mayor Fernando Gomez, we will follow presidential 
recommendations.222
220La Privatization del Servicio de Agua, Paso Necesario Para Mejorar la Economia. El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes, January 31, 1993.
221 La IP Puede Aportar Servicios de Excelente Calidad, El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
January 31, 1993.
222 Seguiran los Alcaldes Todas las Recomendaciones Presidenciales, El Sol del Centro. 
August 19, 1993.
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4.4 The Concession Scheme: A Free Road to Implementation 
The Role of SAASA (ICA group) in Obtaining the Concession Scheme
Local authorities had now to elaborate the concession title or contract, and 
to select the private body that was to be in charge of the concession. 
Since 1992, SAASA had made public its intention of obtaining total control 
of the water utilities. One can assume that i f  money calls money, 
analogically, water calls water.223 Local investors were also interested 
(Aguas de Aguascalientes SA de CV), arguing in support of themselves 
that there is not much capital but a lot o f spirit instead, as well as 
international companies such as the French Lyonnasie des Eauxf and the 
top Mexican construction company Gutierrez S.A (GUTSA). 224 
Despite the interest of other parties, Mayor Fernando Gomez declared that 
SAASA was ahead to obtain the concession due to the fact that it  had been 
working for many years on the water utilities in the city capital 225 At the 
same time, public opinion (media, local inhabitants, opposition parties, 
and social representations) started to question SAASA's efficiency.226 The 
poor results obtained since SAASA's partial integration with CAPAMA, in 
1989, were used as arguments against its obtaining the concession.
223 This phrase appeared in: Hidrocalidas, El Hidrocalido. February 7,1993.
224 La IP Local, Aspira a Operar el Servicio de Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. February 
4, 1993.
225 Saasa, en Ventaja Para Obtener la Concesion. El Hidrocalido. February 19,1993.
226 These groups included: La Asociacion de Abarroteros y  Pequenos Comerciantes de 
Aguascalientes (AAPC), Federacion Estatal de Agrupaciones Populares (FEAP), Vecindades 
Unidas and the Union de Usuarios del Agua. Political parties were headed by the PAN, PRD, 
PFCRN and PT. Local newspapers included: El Sol del Centro, El Hidrocalido, Pagina 24, El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes and the weekly Tribuna Libre.
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Complaints included unjustified charges, illegal stoppages of potable 
water, a lack of quality control, and an increased number of pipeline leaks. 
SAASA was perceived as a selfish private company detrimental to the 
public interest. CAPAMA was also accused of working for private interests 
rather than for the municipality. Questions arose concerning CAPAMA's 
public debt and non-control of the public utility. The accusation was that it 
was being used by the private body SAASA in order to exploit consumers. 
It  was commonly assumed that the concession would be assigned to 
SAASA without the use of an auction mechanism, since it had been 
involved since 1989, and the agreement did not expire until 1999. It  was 
also supported by state and local authorities. The economic factors 
constraining local finances, and the prospect, under the terms of the 
concession, of transferring the internal public debt of CAPAMA to the 
private body, also strengthened SAASA's position.227 According to official 
documents, by 1993 the internal debt from the municipality to SAASA was 
of the order of 19 MNP.228 Since the municipality had to indemnify this 
money to SAASA, it is clear who held the advantage in the negotiations. 
Even when privatisation policies were little known, the euphoria over
227 Concesion, Pero con Pasivo Actual. El Hidrocalido. January 16, 1993.
228 Presidencia Municipal. 1993. Cuenta Publica 1993, Aguascalientes. Mexico, published on 
the El Sol del Centro. January 14, 1993.
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privatisation soon became evident. An official bulletin from the Presidencia 
Municipal (1993-1995) stated that the Mayor Fernando Gomez Esparza 
announced that his administration intends to make the concession o f the 
water and wastewater services (due in a very short time), the sanitary 
stuff, city cleaning and the slaughterhouse.229 The fourth presidential visit, 
on July 22, 1993, added to this mood. It  was extremely clear that 
presidential support was behind any policy decisions made in the sta te .230 
Rushing the Concession Scheme: The Economic Argument 
The economic constraints on the municipality of Aguascalientes expedited 
the concession. One must therefore consider why the local authorities 
were so keen to use economic justifications. According to Mayor Fernando 
Gomez, i f  in the following days the concession is not approved...The 
municipality will enter a severe crisis o f economic resources.231 In the 
short-term, the municipality's financial difficulties could only be eased by 
obtaining fresh resources. This would be achieved, of course, by granting 
the concession; consequently, the full legal implications were not 
considered. At that time, only two potential groups, SAASA (represented 
by ICA group) and GUTSA, remained interested in the concession,232 as
229 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. Concesionaran agua, limpia y rastro. El 
Hidrocalido. September 18, 1993.
230 Cuarta Visita Presidencial. El Sol del Centro. July 22, 1993.
231 La Concesion del Agua, inaplazable. El Hidrocalido. July 6, 1993.
232 Un Descuido Puede Desplomar Los Servicios Publicos. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. July 
30, 1993.
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well as certain local investors, but little was achieved in the negotiations - 
according to the mayor because of the internal debt to be absorbed by the 
private entity, and the necessity that a further 320 MNP be invested in the 
water utilities.233
Official sources laid special emphasis on the critical financial circumstances 
facing the municipality, with arguments mentioning an economic subsidy 
from public funds of more than 100 per cent.234 In 1993, the municipality's 
public debt reached 100 MNP, and the water utilities (CAPAMA) still 
represented the main concern. The ayuntamiento considered that, with or 
without the concession, there would have to be a price increase of around 
35 per cent.235 Federal authorities like the CNA supported the municipality 
and Martin Molina Ochoa, then CNA representative in Aguascalientes, 
stated that i t  is urgent to make the concession o f the water to avoid 
further problems. Later he emphasised that the water utilities are 
subsidised 100 percent...while a cubic meter is charged around one new 
peso (98 cents) its extraction and conduction costs double.236 
According to Mayor Fernando Gomez, the situation was even more 
extreme. He argued that the cubic meter is set on a medium fixed basis at 
98 cents while the real cost is 2.80 new pesos. This would mean that the
233 Sigue Pendiente lo de la Concesion del agua. El Hidrocalido. August 3, 1993.
234 Mayor al 100% el subsidio al agua. El Hidrocalido. September 25, 1993.
235 Concesionada o no, el agua encarecera. El Hidrocalido. September 22, 1993.
236 Es Urgente Concesionar el Agua Para Evitar Problemas. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
October 3, 1993. The other declaration was obtained in: Subsidio del 100% en el suministro 
del agua entubada. El Hidrocalido. October 3, 1993.
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water tariff would have to be increased by 290 per cent for the utility to 
become self-financing and profitable.237 Such declarations explain the 
federal interest in applying the privatisation programme in Aguascalientes 
- clearly, privatisation was seen by the federal authorities as a solution to 
local level water supply problems.
At that time, all levels of government agreed on the privatisation of the 
water supply and were working together toward its implementation. Local 
enterprise groups, though complaining about its monopolistic nature, also 
supported the programme, and others such as the CANAIVE, CANACO, 
and CANIRAC were keen on privatisation policies and even accepted the 
water ta riff increases. Thus, all the representative private actors in 
Aguascalientes strongly supported the concession scheme. The local 
media were publishing, on a daily basis, statements regarding the 
concession scheme, but their main function was to disseminate 
information about their concerns regarding the water supply.238 Local 
inhabitants were persuaded of the benefits of the programme, and of the 
urgent need to make the concession due to the financial constraints facing 
the municipality. The idea of a new form of government, focused on the 
more efficient provision of the water utilities, was also emphasised.
237 Se Requiere Aumentar en 290% las Tarifas Para que sea Autofinanciable el Agua Potable. 
El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. October 6, 1993.
238 Acepta la IP el aumento en el agua. El Hidrocalido. October 19, 1993. Listo el Texto que 
Entregara a la IP, El Servicio de Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. October 10, 1993. The 
groups included the Centro Empresarial de Aguascalientes, represented by Alfredo Reyes 
Velazquez (first Presidente Municipal of the opposition in Aguascalientes 1996-98) and 
Manuel Reed Segovia (vice-president o f this organisation and later designated as general 
manager o f CAPAMA during Alfredo Reyes Velazquez* presidency).
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However, the public was never informed about what this would consist of, 
or of the effects of the concession.
The Final Resolutions Granting the Concession Scheme to SAASA (ICA 
Group): The Lack of an Auction System
The first reverse suffered by SAASA (ICA group) came when the 
Presidente de la Gran Comision del Congreso del Estado, Enrique Pasillas 
Escobedo, announced that the Aguas de Aguascalientes S.A. de C.V. 
enterprise, established by local investors, would be in charge of the 
concession of the water utilities.239 At this stage, however, the LV state 
legislature still needed to validate the concession by approving the legal 
initiative for the water utilities and, subsequently, the tftulo de concesion 
(contract). On October 18, 1993, the state legislature scheduled two 
agreements regarding the concession scheme for further consideration 
during this period of sessions (four extraordinary sessions in the last 
quarter of 1993).
■ The first was La Iniciativa de Ley de los Sistemas de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del Estado de Aguascalientes (Law 
Initiative for the Potable Water, Wastewater, and Treatment Systems 
of the State of Aguascalientes), which was to supersede the 1988 Ley 
del Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado.
This law was intended to make available to the private sector all water,
239 A la IP local, la Concesion del agua. El Hidrocalido. October 16, 1993.
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wastewater, and treatment services of all state municipalities, in 
accordance with the Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 1992-1998. The main goal, 
though, was to legalise the concession of the water utilities in the capital. 
The law provides evidence of the intention of state governor Otto 
Granados Roldan to privatise all the water services of the state. 
Aguascalientes was dearly following presidential objectives using 
privatisation policies.
This helps us to explain why SAASA exerted considerable pressure in order 
to obtain the concession. Managing the water utilities of the state capital 
would not bring an enormous income, but would facilitate the obtaining of 
the concessions for the rest of the state. I t  would also put the ICA group 
(SAASA owner) in an advantageous position as regards obtaining the 
water utilities concessions in other mexican municipalities. The General 
Director of CAASA, Humberto Blancarte, stated later that we were not ju s t 
looking for Aguascalientes or the state municipalities...We wanted to 
become the leaders in the provision o f the water utilities in Mexico...In 
which Mexico city was one o f our main goals. 240
• The final point was the resolution concerning the Tftulo de Concesion 
de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado, Tratamiento de Aguas 
Residuales y su Reuso en el Municipio de Aguascalientes (Concession 
Title of the Potable Water Utilities, Wastewater, Treatment Plants, and 
Reuse in the Aguascalientes Municipality).
240 The interview was held at CAASA headquarters on January 20, 1998. Aguascalientes, Ags, 
Mexico.
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On October 19, 1993, the state legislature received the concession title 
(contract) from the Mayor of the capital, Fernando Gomez Esparza. This 
stated in detail the conditions of the contract. To the surprise of some 
members, the ICA group (SAASA) was granted the concession,241 with the 
justification that SAASA's experience and presence in the city capitaI 
guarantees the success o f the concession scheme.242 
The group made up of local investors (Aguas de Aguascalientes SA de CV) 
was suddenly erased from the scenario. I t  is clear that negotiations 
between SAASA and all levels of government (state government and 
municipality) had been ongoing since the early discussions on 1992. The 
resolution favouring local investors had been no more than a diversion to 
make the public believe that an auction bid was taking place. This never 
happened: the intention had always been to grant the concession to this 
private group (ICA).
In looking for the causes of this situation, it should be remembered that 
the precarious condition of the water utilities, and the risk inherent in an 
auction system where other interested parties could back off, placed 
SAASA (ICA) in a favourable negotiating position. An anonymous source, 
who played a key role during the concession process, argued that the aim 
was to endorse the water concession to the ICA group, which had a
241 A 20 anos sera la Concesion de agua. El Hidrocalido. October 19, 1993.
242 Agua Concesionada. El Hidrocalido. October 6, 1993.
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partnership with the world's leading private water supply company,
Generate des Eaux. The burden on public finances, along with direct 
orders from the federal government, made it impossible to consider any 
alternative.
Nevertheless, no major complaints were received from the other private 
enterprises that had expressed an interest in the concession scheme. The 
Mexican Under Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Martin Werner, 
later stated that the concession for the water utilities was given in 
Aguascalientes without using an auction system. This far from honest 
practice clearly jeopardised the concession scheme... 243 
On October 19, 1993, the Ley de los Sistemas de Agua Potable,
Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del Estado de Aguascalientes (Law of the 
Potable Water, Sewer, and Reparation Systems of the State of 
Aguascalientes,) was passed (decree 60).244 All 20 PRI members and one 
from the PARM (who became independent) voted in favour of the 
resolution. The remaining opposition parties, PAN, PPS, PFCRN, and PRD, 
voted against.245
This represented the last step before final approval of the concession.
Nonetheless, there is no official record that the contract was authorised
243 The interview was held at the Mexican Embassy in the United Kingdom on June 27, 1997.
244 It was published in the Periddico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes on October 20, 
1993.
245 Aprobada la Ley Estatal de Agua potable y Alcantarillado. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
October 20,1993.
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earlier by the ayuntamiento, clear evidence of the subordination of the PRI 
representatives into passing an initiative promoted by the state governor 
without considering the legal mechanisms.246 The creation of this law also 
evidenced the rashness exhibited at all levels of government in their haste 
to legalise the concession title or contract.
The legal contract, Tftulo de Concesion de los Servicios de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado y Tratamiento de Aguas Residuales y su Reuso en el 
Municipio de Aguascalientes (Concession Title of the Potable Water 
Services, Sewer, and Residual Waters Treatment and its Reuse in the 
Municipality of Aguascalientes) was passed on October 21, 1993, at the 
last session of the extraordinary period. It  was published (decree 62) in 
the POEA on October 24, and took effect on November l . 247 All the PRI 
members, representing the majority in the state legislature (80 per cent), 
approved the concession scheme. The five opposition members voted 
against.248 Table 4.2 illustrates the evolution of the approval of the 
concession scheme during 1993, according to the official resolutions 
published in the POEA and the sessions held by the ayuntamiento.
246 During the period o f government o f Fernando Gomez (1993-1995) there are no public 
records from the sesiones de cabildo (city hall sessions) in the form of minutas de trabajo, 
only official documents providing partial evidence of how the contract was authorised.
247 It is important to note that this official newspaper did not include the annexes o f the title, 
and thus, the public remained unaware o f the details.
248 Tratan de Garantizar ‘Agua para las decadas siguientes’. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
October 22, 1993.
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T a b le  4 .2
E v o lu t io n  o f  t h e  C o n c e s s io n  S c h e m e  f o r  t h e  P r o v is io n  o f  t h e  W a t e r  U t i l i t i e s  in  
t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y  o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .
1 9 9 3 A m e n d m e n t
J a n u a r y  1 5
F ir s t  S t a g e
• First session of the ayuntamiento creating a commission to evaluate 
the proposal for the concession scheme.
J a n u a r y  1 9 • Modification to article 97 of the Ley Organica Municipal del Estado de 
Aguascalientes by the state legislature, allowing the municipality to 
make the concession of the water utilities.
J a n u a r y  2 5 • The ayuntamiento authorised the concession of the water utilities in the 
municipality of Aguascalientes.
J a n u a r y  31 • The state legislature (decree 32) empowered the Mayor Fernando 
Gomez to represent the ayuntamiento to prompt the concession of the 
water utilities.
O c t o b e r  1 9
S e c o n d  S t a g e
• The state legislature received the formal petition (concession title) from 
the ayuntamiento to grant the concession to ICA group (SAASA 
owner).
O c t o b e r  2 0 • The state legislature approved (decree 60) the Ley de los Sistemas de 
Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del Estado de 
Aguascalientes.
O c t o b e r  2 4 • The Titulo de Concesion de los Servicios de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado y Tratamiento de Aguas Residuales y su Reuso en el 
Municipio de Aguascalientes (Concession Title) was granted to ICA 
(decree 62).
O wn E lab o ra tio n  using data fro m  the o ffic ia l resolutions.
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Concluding Note
I t  is clear that Aguascalientes took the lead in applying privatisation 
policies to the water supply in Mexico, and that after the first programme 
was introduced, two different privatisation schemes were used. The first 
was in the form of a contra to de servicios (service contract), in four 
different stages from 1989 to 1993; the second, from October 1993, was 
a concession of the water utilities.
The common factor, from the launch of the first privatisation scheme until 
the concession scheme was approved in 1993, was the lack of knowledge 
about privatisation theory (a lack of know-how). The critical circumstances 
facing the water utilities (human, technological, hydrological, and 
economic) jeopardised any private effort to improve the services until the 
last stage (1992). Another important aspect is the absence of any 
exchange of experiences (socialisation) at this level. I t  is, unfortunately, 
common for Mexican municipalities to implement new policies without 
external support. The three-year municipal period is also often too short a 
period in which to evaluate these policies.
Official arguments justifying the concession of the water utilities point to 
two main considerations. Firstly, economic constraints and the financial 
burden on the municipality. The water tariff was under-priced and 
increases would be unavoidable. The goal was to pass the responsibility 
for the increases to the private sector. The local authority clearly wanted 
to wash their hands of any social or political conflict resulting from this 
decision. Secondly, the lack of water infrastructure and the dramatic 
hydrological situation facing the state were further incentives to use
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alternative privatisation policies - i.e., concession schemes. I t  was 
supposed that expanding the role of private entities in the provision of the 
water utilities through privatisation would solve the economic difficulties of 
the municipality of Aguascalientes, and impact positively on a 
rationalisation of the service.
However, the most important factor was the influence of federal decisions. 
Political factors (never mentioned by any authority) played the critical 
role. First, governor Miguel Angel Barberena Vega (1986-1992) promoted 
the scheme in accordance with federal ideologies. Later, governor Otto 
Granados Roldan promoted the concession, clearly considering it a 
personal project. Aguascalientes was selected to implement this policy, 
with the intention being to apply similar schemes in the 100 most 
important cities in Mexico. The decision had already been taken and local 
authorities were expected to justify it, presenting a unified front with 
federal authorities. This explains the real facts behind any economic or 
technical justifications.
In the case of Aguascalientes there were serious concerns regarding the 
concession scheme. A public monopoly became a private monopoly, with 
no auctions or bids considered, and no competition allowed. Local 
authorities kept the normative and regulatory framework, but with little 
chance to be truly independent of other levels of government.
Moreover, the efficiency of the private group would inevitably be 
jeopardised by public inefficiencies and irregularities. Furthermore, the 
public was allowed very little involvement in the evolution of the 
privatisation schemes. Local and state authorities even confused the terms
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'privatisation' and 'concession'.
In summary, these developments represent important evidence for 
economic theorists, or sceptics, regarding the application of privatisation 
policies at a local level. The economic feasibility of any privatisation 
programme relies on the political interests involved. Economic 
considerations play an important role, but considering how local 
authorities in Mexico operate, one must assume that they are subject to 
political decisions. Our case study represents a clear example. From the 
launch of the first privatisation scheme in 1989, until the concession 
scheme, the same economic arguments were used. The privatisation 
policy introduced to solve these problems achieved little. This could help 
us to explain why Aguascalientes decided to privatise in stages. Finally, 
the results obtained highlight just one main variable - politics.
In the next chapter, this thesis will look in greater detail at the above 
arguments. I t  will explore the development of the concession scheme 
(contract conditions) from the implementation of the policy in October 
1993, concentrating especially on the remaining period of government of 
Fernando Gomez Esparza (1993-1995).
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Chapter Five
The First Water Utilities Concession in Mexico: From 
Theory to Practice (1993-1995).
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the development of the concession 
scheme for the water utilities in the city capital of Aguascalientes. The 
case study is presented in three stages: the start of the concession in late 
1993, and the years 1994 and 1995. In section 5.1, the administrative 
and legal structure of the concession is examined, highlighting the links 
between the former water management body, SAASA, and the new, 
privately-owned entity. Section 5.2 examines the background to the water 
services and explains the politics of the concession programme. The 
presidential role is also examined, as are the hydrological characteristics 
of the city capital at that time (Oct. 1993) - highlighting the critical 
circumstances that faced local authorities. This section will also explore 
the interim period, when the concession had been approved but was not 
yet in private hands. Section 5.3 looks first at the beginning of the 
concession in 1993, and then at the year 1994. This includes a description 
of national and local trends influencing upon the programme. Section 5.4 
considers a third stage - the year 1995. I t  looks at electoral trends in the 
city capital and explains the role and impact of the concession upon these 
trends. This section aims to describe the effects upon local inhabitants of 
the circumstances described in the previous section, and to examine the 
consequences and dramatic changes in the political arena. For these
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purposes one must concentrate upon the last period of the Fernando 
Gomez Esparza government (1993-1995). The concluding section provides 
an overview of the entire chapter.
5.1 The Context of the Water Concession: As a Private Entity 
The Administrative Structure
As stated earlier, the concession for the water utilities was made on 
October 21, 1993, as a result of the local authority's decision to transfer 
total responsibility for the provision of the service to a private entity. An 
examination of how the administrative framework of this concession was 
constituted will reveal how the former water management body, SAASA, 
was linked with the new, privately-owned entity, and with clear 
presidential support.
The new private body granted the concession for the water and 
wastewater services of the city capital was the Comision de Aguas de 
Aguascalientes Sociedad Anonima (Limited Company for the Water 
Commission in Aguascalientes), or CAASA. This body superseded SAASA 
but included it in its organisation. Both were subsidiaries of the 
transnational ICA group and the French company Generate des Eaux, 
which took over operative functions as Operacion y Mantenimiento de 
Sistemas de Agua S.A, or OMSA (Figure 5.1).
The federal body, CNA, responsible for water regulation throughout the 
state, was headed by Martin Molina Ochoa. The regulatory framework of 
the water utilities in the city capital was concentrated in CAPAMA, an 
autonomous and independent body intended to protect the interests of the
173
municipality. 243 OMSA, a subsidiary of the ICA and Generate des Eaux 
partnerships, was represented by Ignacio Castro Castellanos. The CAASA 
subsidiary appointed Pedro Gonzalez Martinez as the General Manager and 
Enrique Valencia Sandoval as SAASA manager, to serve as the legal 
representatives in the city capital. CAASA took responsibility for the 
administrative and financial aspects of the concession, whilst the SAASA 
group was re-contracted to concentrate on the operational functions.244 
Thus, CAASA obtained the administrative control that had earlier rested 
with CAPAMA, and SAASA simply moved into a partnership in which it 
performed similar functions.
The ICA holding became the first beneficiary of the concession scheme, 
with support from all levels of government. Among the major shareholders 
was Gilberto Borja, a leading Mexican businessman who had been heavily 
favoured during the sexenio of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), and who had 
been implicated in the funding scandal surrounding the 1994 presidential 
elections.245 In a personal interview, a top official of the federal 
government argued that the way in which the water services concession
243 Presidencia Municipal (1993-1995). 1994.Comision de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado del 
Municipio de Aguascalientes, Programa 1994, January 11, 1994, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
244 According to a personal interview with Ing. Humberto Blancarte, General Manager of 
CAASA and SAASA, OMSA has two other subsidiary bodies: Servicios de Agua Potable S.A 
(Water Potable Services S.A.), or SAPSA, which controls the water and wastewater services 
in a form o f contrato de servicios in part of Mexico City; and Agua Potable S.A (Potable 
Water S. A.), or APS A, which is responsible for water privatisation contracts in Mexico. Thus, 
OMSA serves approximately 3 million inhabitants in Mexico.
245 To find more about this argument see: Andres Oppenheimer. 1995. Mexico en la Frontera 
del Caos. La Crisis de los Noventay la Esperanza del Nuevo Milenio, Mexico: Javier Vergara 
Editor.
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was given to ICA (no auction) was a clear case of political favouritism. 
Figure 5.1 Water Rights Hierarchy for the Concession Scheme in the 
Municipality of Aguascalientes (1993-1999).
CNA
CAPAMA
43-
OMSA
ICA/Generate des Eaux
CAASA n SAASA
Administrative 4 Operational
The Legal Framework of the Concession
The legal framework for the concession of the water utilities in the city 
capital makes clear the support from all levels of government, and the 
obvious intention to move ahead with further privatisations in other 
municipalities (see table 5.1).
The Mexican constitution is the first body in which the concession of the 
water supply legally rests. The articles specified describe the mechanisms 
available for the provision of public utilities at local government level, and 
the constitution allows private bodies to play a role here through 
privatisation schemes. The second body is the State Constitution of 
Aguascalientes, in which Article 66 allows local authorities to permit the 
concession of water utilities. Likewise, the Ley Organica Municipal del 
Estado de Aguascalientes also allows the municipality to make contracts 
with private entities. The Ley de Los Sistemas de Agua Potable,
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Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del Estado de Aguascalientes defines the 
participation of private entities in the provision of public services, 
especially as regards the water utilities. The concession title represents 
the final document, stating all the financial, administrative, and legal 
aspects of the concession.
T a b l e  5 .1
L e g a l  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  t h e  W a t e r  U t i l i t i e s  C o n c e s s io n  in  t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y  o f
A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 3 )
Law Articles
• Constitucion Politica de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos.
+ Article 25, paragraph four 
+ Article 28, paragraphs four, 
nine, and ten 
+ Article 115, Fraction III
• Constitucion Politica del Estado de 
Aguascalientes.
+ Article 66
• Ley Organica Municipal del Estado de 
Aguascalientes. (January, 1993)
+ Article 58, Fraction XL, 97, 109, 
and 110
• Ley de los Sistemas de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del 
Estado de Aguascalientes.
(October, 1993)
+ Article 49, Fraction I, 50, 51, 
52, 53, 58, and 60
• Titulo de Concesion (Contrato) 
(October, 1993)
+ Whole Document
O wn E lab o ra tio n  using data fro m  the o ffic ia l resolutions
The above laws represent the main framework supporting the concession 
scheme. State and local laws were mainly approved in 1993, reflecting the 
fact that the concession for the water utilities was a policy identified with 
Otto Granados Roldan, state governor from 1992 to 1998. However, 
federal authorities had been considering privatisation schemes for the 
provision of public utilities at local government level since 1983.
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The Concession Title (Contract)
The most controversial and influential part of the privatisation programme 
is the concession title. The following resolutions were taken from the 
original document,246 and represent, for the purposes of this research, the 
core body of the contract, which will be discussed in the following 
chapters. Briefly stated, CAPAMA assumed the responsibility:
To provide the public services o f potable water, wastewater 
and residual water treatment plants and its reuse, in the 
municipality o f Aguascalientes, likewise allowing to make use 
o f the public municipal goods in accordance to the actual 
concession needed for the provision o f the above services...In 
order to be able to operate, maintain, rehabilitate, enlarge 
and administrate the potable water systems, wastewater and 
its treatment, including the generation o f invoices and 
charging o f users.
The following points represent the basic conditions of the concession title:
• The objective of the concession is to provide the services according to 
the law. This includes planning the project, construction of the 
infrastructure, and its operation and maintenance. However, it 
excludes the water treatment plant located to the south of the city.
• The concession period will be for 20 years and may be extended for a 
similar period. At the end of the agreed period, including any extension 
to the concession, all the assets accumulated by CAASA to provide the
246 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1993-1995). 1993. Contrato de Concesion. 
October 21, 1993, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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water services will be passed to the municipality. I t  can exclude some 
of them as stipulated in the contract, but these can be acquired ( valor 
en libros) by local authorities.
• The municipality can terminate the contract if actions taken by the 
private body are considered dangerous to society or to jeopardise the 
provision of the public service. In such a case the municipality must 
assume all the faculties granted in the concession title. This point 
became the focus of discussion amongst local politicians.
• The private entity is not allowed to use any asset as collateral for 
credit. At the end of the concession period the private body must 
return all the assets and respond to any damage. Nonetheless, CAASA 
was allowed to sub-contract the operational area of the water services. 
As stated earlier, SAASA was re-hired in this capacity.
• The municipality is not allowed to serve as a guarantor of any payment 
or debt contract. A trust under the observance of the national 
development bank - NAFINSA - will be constituted during the 
concession period, to approve all the financial resources (incomes and 
expenditures) to which the municipality will be a party.247
• The services must be provided on terms and conditions that guarantee 
their continuity, regularity, clarity, and generality, in order to benefit 
the end user. In the case of any irregularity the municipality is allowed 
to impose an economic sanction or fine on the private body. This rather 
vague point was used by politicians and social groups to pressure
247 The Trust was named Comite Tecnico del Fideicomiso No 918-7 or ‘CONA’ and included 
representatives from the Municipality, CAPAMA, CAASA, NAFINSA and Banco Mexicano.
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CAASA, with arguments about the quality and quantity of the services 
provided by this body.
• CAASA must pay the CNA for the rights to extract the water, as this 
federal body is responsible for assigning the water sources. Since the 
only water supply for the municipality are the wells localised around 
the city, CAASA is responsible both for the quality of the water and for 
making any investment to improve it.
• The regulatory framework (CAPAMA) will remain in public hands, to 
guarantee the provision of the services in accordance with the 
concession title. For this purpose CAPAMA has access to all the 
documents and equipment in the power of CAASA, and is allowed to 
audit the financial, commercial, and technical assets. I t  is empowered 
to approve any technical enlargement or rehabilitation work, to monitor 
the quality of the water and charges made for the rights to use the 
services, and to receive complaints. The normative faculty of 
supervision and fines charges is subject to the private entity criteria.
• The private body has to return to the municipality 10 per cent (rights 
for the concession) of all the revenue generated in each specific time 
period. I t  must pay according to the total of the invoices even when it 
has not been able to recover the full sum. Thus, the municipality will 
have an extraordinary income that will be used to create a contingency 
fund. The fund can be used to finance works not considered in the 
concession title, to subsidise water tariffs, and to obtain financial 
support in case of any contingency. However, in practice, the 
municipality subsidised CAASA by returning 80 per cent, receiving in
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real terms only 20 per cent of the 10 per cent agreed.248
• The private entity must exhibit a surety of 10 MNP during the 
concession period against any violation of the contract on the private 
sector side.
• CAASA promised fresh investments worth 300 MNP for the next 20 
years of the contract for major infrastructure rehabilitation.
• According to the contract, CAASA forecasted income worth 2,799 MNP, 
operative costs of 2,103 MNP, and a profit of 404 MNP during the 20 
years of the contract; however, in the first two years there would not 
be any profit.249
• All the debt payments or liabilities are absorbed by the private entity. 
Thus, all the internal debt from CAPAMA, which represented a great 
financial burden to the municipality, was transferred totally to CAASA, 
which also acquired substantial liabilities via federal funding through 
development banks (BANOBRAS and NAFINSA).
• The water ta riff is constituted according to three categories:250
1. Domestic: subdivided according to social-economic factors as A, B and
C; 2. Commercial; and 3. Industrial. Payment for the services is due every
two months, and the private entity is allowed to cut the services if more
248 This information was obtained from the Regidor (PAN) Edna Lorena Pacheco, who headed 
the water commission in the Ayuntamiento (1996-1998).
249 Manuel Diaz Flores and Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1995. Innovation Financiera en 
Gobiernos Locales: El Caso del Municipio de Aguascalientes. (DAP No.35). Mexico: CIDE, 
pp.36.
250 The water tariff is established according to a specific formula in annexe F o f the 
concession title.
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than two receipts are overdue.251 Any extra costs generated from CAASA 
inefficiencies causing a decrease in incomes will affect its finances and not 
the water tariff. Charges are indexed to the national inflation rate, in order 
to guarantee financial incomes and real prices. The contract stated that 
there would be increments of 10 per cent every two months for a total of 
11 periods starting from January 1994. The basic water rate on the above 
date was 0.98 NP per cubic metre, and the minimum consumption rate 
was set at 40 cubic metres. The tariff was to be increased as stated above 
until November 1995. By this time, according to the concession title, it 
was to be set at a basic rate of 2.78 NP per cubic metre (an increase of 
280 per cent), and for the remaining 18 years of the concession there 
would be no increases other than for inflation. The increments were to be 
set automatically, according to the following considerations: recovery of 
debt payments; infrastructure investments; operational and administrative 
expenditures; payments to federal and local bodies; taxation from federal, 
state, or local laws; generation of a reasonable profit for the private 
entity; and recovery of the operational deficits from the first periods of the 
concession. Any amendment to the ta riff would require approval from the 
Consejo Directivo (Administrative Board) of CAPAMA, and must be in 
accordance with the following points: non-anticipated increases in the 
investment amounts for rehabilitation or enlargement; decrease of 
federal, state, or local contributions under the terms of the contract;
251 According to the concession title, 97 per cent of the water consumption in the municipality 
is in the first category, 2.5 percent and 0.5 per cent are consumed in the remaining two 
categories respectively.
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increase in the payments required for the concession rights or 
contraprestaciones; any other eventuality with negative impact on CAASA 
finances for the provision of the services; or any decrease in the 
investments according to the contract, whereby the water ta riff must be 
adjusted downwards. State and local authorities' buildings and 
infrastructure were excluded from making any payment for the water 
services, whilst a discount of 50 per cent was to be considered for 
pensioned persons. 252
In fact, however, the water tariff was extended beyond these 
considerations. For the purposes of our research this represents the most 
controversial point, and presents an interesting opportunity for further 
analysis of the politicisation and economics of the concession programme. 
Local authorities seemed to gain most from the agreement, although the 
public was unaware of the real conditions of the contract. In a public 
lecture, the Mayor, Fernando Gomez Esparza, justified the concession title 
on the grounds tha t:253
252 This Administrative board was published on the Periddico Oficial on December 18, 1993. 
The basic structure included a Consejo Directivo, Consejo Consultivo (made up by members 
o f the Camara de Comercio, Consejo Patronal de la Republica Mexicana, Camara de la 
Industria de la Transformacion, Camara de la Industria de la Construccion, Camara de la 
Industria del Vestido, Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles and four members representing the users) 
a Comisario (represented by the sindico o f the exchequer) and a Director General (manager 
o f CAPAMA) formed by Direccion Tecnica, Direccion Juridica y  Unidad Administrativa.
253 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1993-1995). 1993. Manejo del Servicio deAgua 
Potable y  Alcantarillado en el Municipio de Aguascalientes. Lecture presented by the Mayor 
Fernando Gomez Esparza on October 5, 1993, Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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The above mechanisms guarantee the provision o f an efficient 
service: the financial constraints facing the municipality are 
solved; more resources are liberated to invest in other public 
services; the administrative structure o f the municipality is 
reduced; and we fulfil the constitutional mandate to become 
a regulatory body in the management o f the service.
This statement provides clear evidence that the local authorities were 
optimistic about the implementation of the programme. This was to 
change later, when all levels of government started realising that a policy 
that was supposed to solve a problem did, in fact, lead to bigger ones.
5.2 The Background to the Programme 
The Water Services Conditions: A Private Challenge
Before any discussion of the programme itself, it is necessary to 
understand just what the private entity was acquiring by means of the 
concession. According to official sources, by 1990 about 89.70 per cent of 
the inhabitants of the municipality were in urban areas (the city capital). 
The potable water provision in the entire municipality (urban + rural 
areas) covered 96 per cent of the total inhabitants, compared to 97 per 
cent in the city capital (urban area). The wastewater provision covered 91 
per cent and 96.6 per cent respectively. Ninety-four per cent of the water 
consumed in the municipality was classified as acceptable as well as 
potable.254
254 Ibidem.,
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Water metering was estimated to be effective for only 55 per cent of the 
total provision, the remaining 45 per cent being non-accountable through 
illegal connections, non-payment, or leakage. By 1993, the number of 
registered users was about 109,825, of which 103,984 were located in the 
city capital, including the 8,560 in the rural areas. The industrial and 
commercial sectors represented 440 and 5,401 respectively.255 
According to official documents other than the concession title, the only 
water sources for the city capital are underground reservoirs. This water is 
supplied to the city through 158 wells, of which 121 are located in the city 
capital. Around 66 million cubic meters per annum are extracted and 
distributed through a pipeline approximately 900 kilometres long. 
Consumption is around 350-400 litres per day per inhabitant.256 
The water sources represent a serious threat to the city capital, as there is 
over-exploitation of around 90 per cent of the underground waters. That 
is, the city extracts 90 per cent more water that can be naturally 
recharged, so that, on average, wells have to go 3 to 4 metres deeper 
every year. In addition to concerns about sufficient quantity, water 
extracted from depths of up to 500 metres can be highly polluted. The 
over-extraction has increased operational costs and caused serious 
malformations in the urban areas. There is also a lack of macro 
measuring.
255 Ibidem.,
256 Ibidem.,
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The Politics of the Concession Scheme
A number of political actors expressed support for the approval of the 
concession title by the state legislature, particularly during the 10-day 
interim period when the concession had been approved but was not yet in 
private hands. Opposition parties, on the other hand, questioned (indeed, 
fiercely opposed) the initiative.257 The local deputies from the opposition 
parties (PAN, PARM, PDM, and PFCRN) stated that they [would] resort to 
mobilising the society in order to force the state legislature to give up on 
the resolution.258
The aim in politicising the concession programme was to link it with PRI 
resolutions and ideology. Opposition parties saw the chance to gain a 
political advantage by questioning the concession. Just days before the 
concession title was passed, a planton (guard) was held. Militants from the 
Frente Estatal de Accion Popular (FEAP - State Front of Popular Action), 
represented by their leader, Rodolfo Solano Gonzalez, attempted to 
heighten the tension around the final resolution of the concession title .259 
External actors with a presence in the city capital exerted pressure at all 
levels of government in order to take advantage of public dissatisfaction 
with the policy.
At the same time, the leader of the LV State legislature (who represented
257 The State Legislature deputies against this resolution were: Antonio Ortega Martinez 
(PRD), Ricardo Avila Martinez (PAN), Francisco Jauregui Dimas (PPS), Rafael Macias de 
Lira (PFCRN) and Juan Rodriguez Martinez (PARM).
258 Politizacion del Asunto de la Concesion. El Hidrocalido. October 23, 1993.
259 Privatization del Agua. El Sol del Centro. October 24, 1993.
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the interests of the state governor), Enrique Pasillas Escobedo, was 
justifying the water utilities concession. He stated that acting against this 
resolution represents irresponsible behaviour; favouring the project is to 
look a fter the interest o f Aguascalientes.260 I t  can be assumed, however, 
that rather than looking after Aguascalientes he was simply following 
orders from the state governor, who ensured that the state legislature 
(PRI deputies), and particularly its leader (who had clear links with him), 
were politically responsible for the concession programme. This 
assumption is reinforced by the views expressed by PRI members 
interviewed for this research.
The leader of the congress also argued that this policy per se would 
prevent major problems, and that it was in accordance with state 
government policy on the water services: this is what the governor Otto 
Granados Roldan is doing, to prevent: like the popular creed says, it  is 
better to prevent than to lam ent261 I t  is evident that this policy was linked 
with state beliefs and policies, and that other public institutions, and lower 
ranking officials, were just the instruments used to justify it.
At the time the contract was moving forward only two forms of ideology 
prevailed in Aguascalientes: support for, and opposition to, the concession 
programme. PRI members were pitched against a coalition of those 
against the programme. The arguments in favour were expressed by the
260 Agua Asegurada Para Futuras Generaciones. El Sol del Centro. October 22, 1993.
261 Tratan de Garantizar “Agua Para Las Decadas Siguientes”. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
October 22, 1993.
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Bishop of Aguascalientes, Rafael Munoz Nunez, who supported the 
resolution, stating that the concession from the water services 
represented a great measure by local authorities...It is better to pay a 
little b it more, to make a true sacrifice to guarantee its supply, than in a 
few years not having the services...Any criticism against this resolution is 
not well-founded.262 I t  seems that the links between the leader of the 
state legislature (his religious faith was well known in Aguascalientes) and 
the local clergy were functioning effectively. All sorts of organisations 
began to form opinions and make statements about different aspects of 
the concession programme.
The Presidential Role in Promoting the Concession for the Water Utilities
On October 29, 1993, the Secretario de Hacienda (SHCP,), Pedro Aspe 
Armella, considered as a potential PRI candidate for the 1994 elections, 
headed a conference on the water resources in Aguascalientes called 
Taking Care o f the Water Today, Everyone Compromise.263 Present at this 
event were the General Director at the Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA), 
Fernando Gonzalez Villareal; General Director of Nacional Financiera 
(NAFINSA), Oscar Espinoza Villareal; and the President of the ICA group 
(who obtained the water services concession in the city capital), Gilberto 
Borja Navarrete. Public officials representing other public funding sources, 
such as the national development bank (BANOBRAS) and other areas of 
the SHCP, also attended, thereby indicating the relevance of the water
262 Preferible la Concesion a la Sequia. El Hidrocalido. October 26, 1993.
263 El Estado: Fragua de Planes Federales. El Sol del Centro. October 30, 1993.
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utilities concession to a large population.
At the conference, Pedro Aspe Armella made explicit the federal support 
for the concession with his statement that under the leadership and vision 
of the governor o f the state Otto Granados Roldan, gives an example at a 
national level to make concessions to the private sector for the services of 
drinking water, wastewater and its treatment.264 He stated further that 
today we attended the conference in which local authorities transferred 
the integral concession o f the drinking water, wastewater and its 
treatment services...This is the first case in our country in which the 
participation from the private sector is not lim ited to the management or 
operation, it  includes the investment in infrastructure over a long 
period.265 The objective was clear: to ensure federal approval and support 
for the transfer of the city capital's water services. He went on to state 
that Aguascalientes is the pioneer o f the concession o f the water services 
to private entities...It is the beginning o f a process that must be extended 
to the whole country...For the above purposes the federal government has 
a fund o f 4,000 MNP266
In order to guarantee the evolution and success of the concession, a 
restructuring of credits from federal institutions was agreed. NAFINSA 
gave a credit line of 107 MNP to the new private entity to enable it to
264 Ibidem.,
265 Ibidem.,
266 Concesionaran el agua en todo Mexico. El Hidrocdlido. October 30, 1993.
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absorb the municipality's (CAPAMA) internal debt.267 The private body 
would also invest 35 MNP and re-negotiate debts from previous 
administrations with BANOBRAS.268 Economic aid was granted to the ICA 
group in order to achieve the best results in the short, medium, and long 
term.
The aim was to start the concession programme with no financial 
pressures, and to make a good impression in Mexico and abroad. As Pedro 
Aspe argued, We came with the people from BANOBRAS because it  is our 
belief that i t  is necessary to learn and to push this programme throughout 
the country.269 These arguments were also supported by the Delegado 
Estatal (State Representative) of BANOBRAS, Dr. Arturo Duran Garcia, 
who stated that this institution has financial resources to push further 
privatisation programmes o f public utilities.270
The above analysis reinforces the argument put forward in this research. 
Public policies at local government level in Mexico are subject to federal 
decisions. In this sense, all local development is tied up with federal 
resolutions, particularly when specific policies are considered as strategic 
to the country's development. The privatisation programme was a product 
of this federal influence. Any other interpretation of the concession
267 No mas Subsidios Distorsionantes a Costa de los Pobres. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
October 30, 1993.
268 El Municipio no le paga a Banobras desde julio 92. El Hidrocalido. October 29, 1993.
269 El Estado: Fragua de Planes Federales. El Sol del Centro. October 30, 1993.
270Apoyo a la Privatization de los Servicios Publicos. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
November 19, 1993.
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programme can only represent the justifications used for it, rather than 
the real aims behind it.
5.3 The Evolution of the Concession Programme 
1993: Private Management of the Water Utilities in Mexico
The private body (CAASA) officially took charge of the water utilities on 
November 1, 1993,271 but there was politicisation of the concession 
scheme from the very beginning. According to official documents, the 
November 8, 1993 session of the ayuntamiento saw the start of a 
permanent campaign by regidores, especially those from opposition 
parties, against its own regulatory body.272 A Regidor of the PAN, 
Fernando Herrera Avila, was in charge of the commission of the water 
services. Members of this political party worked together, making things 
difficult for the ayuntamiento and the state legislature.
At the same time, the Presidente del Centro Empresarial de 
Aguascalientes (CEA), Alfredo Reyes Velazquez, and the vice-president of 
this organisation, Manuel Reed Segovia, started to question the water 
ta riff and its impact upon society.273 These individuals were pursuing 
further political ambitions, to be discussed later on in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, the greater development of Aguascalientes and the high
271 Desde hoy rige la concesion del agua. El Hidrocalido. November 1, 1993.
272 Presidencia Municipal (1993-1995). 1993. Sesion de Ayuntamiento. November 8, 1993, 
Aguascalientes, Mexico.
273 Preocupa al CEA un Posible Incremento Generalizado en Las tarifas del Agua. El Sol del 
Centro. November 09, 1993.
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expectations of its governor Otto Granados Roldan gained national 
attention. Even the former United States Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, stated on a trip to Aguascalientes that, the development 
reached in Aguascalientes is fantastic...The state governor is young and 
talented, with great experience and good relationships in Mexico and the 
USA.274
I t  is significant that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
negotiations lay ahead. Mexico was seen as a potential entrant to this 
circle of first world countries - in other words, the possibility of forming 
commercial partnerships with the United States of America and Canada 
loomed large. The Mexican president, Carlos Salinas, and his cabinet were 
fulfilling all the necessary requirements to move ahead in this aim. 
Privatisation policies represented a clear vision of development for local 
authorities and Aguascalientes led the way for their implementation. This 
was the view nationally and internationally, even if it was not shared 
locally.
The governor of the state was at the peak of his political career and had 
support from all levels of government. Any decision by the state 
authorities was accepted, and the close relationship between Carlos 
Salinas (who was perceived as the great moderniser of Mexico) and his 
collaborator since SPP times, Otto Granados Roldan, was seen as 
synonymous with the positive development of Aguascalientes.
274 Fantastico el Progreso de Aguascalientes: Kissinger. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
November 05, 1993.
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Support for the above argument is given by the fact that, on November 
26, 1993, the fifth presidential visit to Aguascalientes in less than 12 
months took place. The Mexican president was heading the second 
national conference on housing. The presence of six secretaries of state, 
including three potential candidates for the Mexican presidency (Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, Manuel Camacho Solis, and Pedro Aspe Armella), 31 
governors, and the most influential businessmen in Mexico made a great 
impact on the local political arena. The governor of Aguascalientes was 
hosting a political gathering that could impress any politician in Mexico, 
especially as the president was showing open approval for his 
administration.275
A few days later, on November 28, 1993, Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta 
(former national president of the PRI, who declined his support for Otto 
Granados Roldan to run for governor) was selected as the PRI candidate 
for the presidential elections. The governor of Aguascalientes expressed 
his satisfaction with this candidature as the most fortunate decision made 
by the PRI,276 proof of his belief that his political future and policies would 
be successful under the protection of the official candidate and potential 
future Mexican president.
Thus, by the end of this first period (1993), opposition parties represented 
the major opponents to the concession programme. Social and local 
enterprise organisations (mainly represented by members of opposition
275 CSG Preside Hoy, Aqui, la Reunion de la Vivienda. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
November 26, 1993.
276 Colosio Candidato: Una Garantia. El Sol del Centro. November 29, 1993.
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parties) also started to question the concession title, and put pressure on 
the local authorities to take action against CAASA. On the other hand, the 
concession scheme received support from all levels of government. The 
PRI controlled the state, and the national political and economic context 
represented a perfect scenario for the success of the concession scheme. 
Furthermore, local and state authorities were proud to be the first to apply 
such a scheme.
1994: A Year of Political and Economic Turmoil
The beginning of 1994 was marked by a series of events that would decide 
the future of Mexico, including that of Aguascalientes. First, the NAFTA 
agreement tied Mexico into commercial relationships with other countries; 
then, in the south of the country, came insurrection from the Ejercito 
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN). Both developments impacted on 
the political and economic arena, although federal authorities still retained 
some degree of control. By this time, Mexico was once again considered 
by the international community as a third world country, with obviously 
under-developed structures.277 On March 23, 1994, the PRI candidate for 
the presidential elections, Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta, was 
assassinated. This event had an extremely adverse affect on national and 
international confidence in Mexico, especially as regards investment. The 
first suspicion that this was a weak economy reliant on speculative 
investments impacted upon the country's public finances. The fact that
277 Andres Oppenheimer. 1995. Mexico en la Frontera del Caos. La Crisis de los Noventay la 
Esperanza del Nuevo Milenio. Mexico: Javier Vergara Editor.
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power was highly concentrated in the hands of the Mexican president did 
manage to restore some degree of confidence, though. A few days later 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (Colosio's campaign manager) was 
"democratically" elected as the new presidential candidate of the PRI. 
However, despite his success in those elections, the weakness of the PRI 
was now evident.
A month later, on September 28, 1994, the General Secretary of the PRI, 
Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, was assassinated. Many theories were put 
forward, and public opinion linked the assassinations with elite Mexican 
politicians. International investors started to panic and public finances 
faced a serious threat. The government of Carlos Salinas and the PRI 
began to attract further severe criticism.
Mario Ruiz Massieu, brother of the recently assassinated Jose Francisco, 
and the deputy Procurador de Justicia (PGR) were in charge of the 
investigation. He later declared that the government and PRI members 
were responsible for the assassination. This marked the start of an 
economic crisis. International investors were in a state of panic and more 
than US$ 1.5 million left the country in one day. The Mexican president 
also lacked credibility, as public opinion saw him as linked to both 
assassinations. This further undermined confidence in the country, leading 
to even greater financial instability.
On November 1, 1994, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon became the new 
Mexican president. Negotiations to devalue the Mexican peso took place 
before he took office, but the former president decided to pass the 
responsibility to him. On December 22, 1994, the Mexican peso devalued
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and inflation rates started to grow. This affected sharply upon personal 
finances, provoking general dissatisfaction with the government and the 
PRI. In 1995, Raul Salinas, brother of the former president, and Mario 
Ruiz Massieu were jailed by the government, the former for 
masterminding the assassination of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the latter 
for corrupt practices.
How, then, did these developments affect Aguascalientes, and in particular 
the concession of the water supply? During 1994, the Mexican economic 
and political contexts changed dramatically. Aguascalientes represented a 
clear bastion of the PRI, and the governor of the state, Otto Granados 
Roldan, was linked with the former Mexican president Carlos Salinas. The 
fall in prestige of the Mexican president adversely affected the local 
inhabitants' opinion of government in general, and particularly the State 
Governor, Otto Granados Roldan, and the PRI. The concession scheme, 
inevitably, came to be viewed as the result of federal and state policies. 
This influenced upon the local political arena, influencing the politicisation 
of the concession scheme.
Local Level Influences
At the beginning of 1994, the contract delimited the increments for the 
water ta riff for eleven bimesters, as a means to set the water tariff 
steadily closer to real costs. The scheme agreed in the contract - 
indexation of the ta riff to the inflation rate - suggested an uncertain 
future, although in previous years the Mexican government had managed 
to calm inflation and federal policies were enjoying greater credibility at all 
levels of government. The first increments on the water ta riff were
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modest, and not heavily influenced by inflation. However, at the same 
time, CAASA was responsible for the first time for water receipts, 
occasioning greater confusion due to the lack of accurate water 
measurement. Receipts did not correspond to consumption. Political and 
social organisations were severe in their judgement of CAASA, assuming 
that it actually intended to overcharge.278
Furthermore, CAASA was acquiring liabilities supported by the 
development bank, NAFINSA, as accorded by the contract. At the same 
time, it constituted, according to the concession title, a trust supervised 
by this federal body. It  was allowed to issue public debt in order to 
balance its finances, using the ICA group as collateral.279 
During this period, CAASA and CAPAMA were facing a lack of credibility. 
The public body, CAPAMA, was learning how to regulate the water services 
using a trial and error technique, and the local inhabitants were severe in 
their judgement of CAPAMA's inefficiency. Meanwhile, CAASA was trying to 
justify the water increments and other impacts upon the local inhabitants. 
I t  argued that only 76,000 users, out of a possible 121,000, had 
measuring instruments, a fact that was adversely affecting its finances.280 
Nevertheless, the unpopularity of this body was such that bomb threats
278 Hasta en 500% aumentaron el predial. El Hidrocalido. January 27, 1994.
279 Presidencia Municipal (1993-1995). 1994. Contrato de Fideicomiso Irrevocable de 
Administration y  Garantia Numero 918-7 Constituido en Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. April 
19, 1994. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
280 De 121 mil Usuarios, Solo 76 mil Tienen Medidor, Dice CAASA.. El Sol del Centro. May 
31, 1994.
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were received at its office.281 The Delegation Estatal (state representation) 
of the federal body Procuraduria Federal del Consumidor (PROFECO - 
Consumers Federal Attorney) stated through its representative, Baltazar 
Bonilla Padilla, that CAASA was abusing the water charges and affecting 
the economy o f the consumers...More than 50 per cent o f the complaints 
received are about this body and TELMEX (Mexican 
Telecommunications).282 Thus, the water tariff increases were affecting on 
this private entity even at this early stage. I t  occasioned great 
unpopularity, and was the main target of those who sought to influence 
public opinion.
Social representation organisations, such as the Asociacion de Abarroteros 
y Pequehos Comerciantes (Association of Grocers and Small Businesses), 
represented by Antonio Hernandez Esparza, began to exploit public 
dissatisfaction about the water tariff,283 whilst opposition parties like the 
PRD, PAN, and even certain PRI organisations were also acting against the 
water price rises.284 However, whatever interest there may have been in 
finding ways to benefit society was clearly linked with political ambitions. 
Meanwhile, PRI members of the ayuntamiento, state legislature, and
281 Evacuan Nuevamente CAASA por Otra Amenaza Criminal de Bomba. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. June 08, 1994.
282 Se le acumulan las denuncias a la concesionaria de agua en la PFC. El Hidrocalido. June 
13, 1994.
283 Marcha de Protesta por las tarifas de Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. May 31, 1994.
284 Caasa no se mide en sus cobros por la utilizacion del recurso. El Hidrocalido. April 21, 
1994.
197
federal bodies were justifying the increments, in particular by attempting 
to raise awareness amongst the inhabitants of the city capital regarding 
the lack of water.285
The Mayor, Fernando Gomez Esparza, made a declaration that the 
ayuntamiento will not concede more public services to private 
management...It does not m atter that in most developing countries it  
represents a common practice... Here we have to be guided by reality 
and, basically, in tune with the popular sentiment.286 From being one of 
the biggest supporters of privatisation policies, he suddenly became an 
opponent.
How can one explain this shift? In a personal interview he argued that the 
public was affected by the concession programme for the water services, 
especially as regards the water tariff. Besides, the national context 
changed dramatically and this policy represented a political threat for the 
PRI candidates in the coming elections. I t  is safe to assume that public 
opinion mattered, and that rather than being interested in solving the 
problems affecting the concession, he was trying to clean his hands in 
order to minimise the negative effects on his political career.
The 1994 elections represented an important test of the affects of the 
factors hypothesised above. The PRI representatives for senators, federal
285 Festejaran en el Estado el Dia Mundial del Agua. El Sol del Centro. March 20, 1994.
286 No mas Concesiones. Hidrovisor. El Hidrocalido. July 4,1994.
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deputies, and presidential candidates narrowly won all the posts. 287 The 
state's political preferences were changing, exposing the increasing 
weakness of the PRI. Opposition parties moved ahead in Aguascalientes, 
taking advantage of the circumstances prevailing at a national level.
The First Year of the Concession: An Analysis
The results of the first twelve months of the concession scheme were 
summarised in a survey co-ordinated by Agustm Morales Pena from the 
Hidrocalido newspaper.288 He found that 100 per cent of the people in 
Aguascalientes did not consider that there had been any major 
improvement in the water services. The same percentage argued that the 
private body provided a bad service with an unjustified water tariff, and 
that it caused discomfort with its permanent urban works. As regards the 
advantages obtained from the concession, only 31 per cent argued that 
the services, were available for those who could afford them. The 
remaining 69 per cent saw no advantage. Regarding the disadvantages, 
82 per cent mentioned the increase in prices, 10 per cent argued that 
there was more bureaucracy due to the lack of competition, and the 
remaining 8 per cent pointed to excessive, unjustified, and illegal drinking 
water cuts in the city capital.
Clearly then, there were two core concerns among the public: the 
increased prices on the water tariff; and the absence of any perceived
287 Candidates for Senators were Oscar Lopez Velarde Vega and Fernando Palomino Topete. 
The candidates for federal deputies were Hector Hugo Olivares Ventura and Maria del 
Socorro Ramirez Ortega. The candidate for the Mexican presidency was Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de L eon .
288 Perspectiva. El Hidrocalido. October 24, 1994.
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advantage gained by private management of the services. These views 
contradict earlier justifications from local authorities regarding the water 
services, and give clear evidence of public dissatisfaction with local 
authority policy. This explains why political and social representations 
were heavily involved in questioning the water tariff, and in exerting 
pressure to negotiate a new contract.289 The Regidor (PAN) for the water 
and wastewater services, Fernando Herrera Avila, was particularly active 
in this regard. At the same time, however, PRI members at the State 
legislature and the ayuntamiento also saw the political advantage in 
censuring CAASA for the water ta riff increases.290 The main goal was to 
attract voters for the next elections for the state legislature and for local 
mayor in 1995.
The year concluded with a major devaluation of the Mexican peso. The 
country was plunged into a severe economic crisis that impacted 
dramatically upon local inhabitants. Federal, state, and local authorities 
experienced a lack of credibility; furthermore, the PRI experienced the 
greatest unpopularity in its history.
Thus, the politicisation of the scheme during 1994 was closely linked with 
national developments. Furthermore, the new water charges contradicted 
the public perception of good government, and were incompatible with the
289 Partidos Politicos, Contra Injustos Aumentos al Agua. El Sol del Centro. December 9, 
1994.
290 Costo Social y Economico muy Alto en el Servicio del Agua., El Sol del Centro. December 
12, 1994. Diputados Piden Cuentas a Capama. El Hidrocalido. December 26, 1994; Exigiran 
Diputados Cuentas Claras a la Concesionaria del Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. December 
21, 1994.
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prevailing culture of non-payment.291 The private group CAASA was seen 
as a public menace, serving only private interests, and CAPAMA was 
classed as inefficient. The public was not impressed by local authority 
endorsement of CAPAMA's efficiency, which cited annual investment worth 
21.8 MNP, rehabilitation of the water and wastewater lines, and major 
rehabilitation work on urban infrastructure, water equipment, and wells by 
December, 1994.292 Moreover, opposition parties and social organisations 
saw the chance to attract public sympathy by criticising the concession 
programme and its supporters. The aim was to discredit the PRI members 
involved in order to obtain a political advantage.
5.4 1995: The Water Utilities as an Electoral Issue 
The Effect of the Economic Situation on the Concession Scheme
The critical economic situation affecting the country undoubtedly had a 
negative influence on the last year of Fernando Gomez Esparza's 
government. In 1994, CAASA faced a financial struggle to meet the 
repayments for previous issues of public debt. According to official 
documents, it received a further credit line to guarantee the payment of
291 This argument is supported by the results o f a survey from 'Perspectiva', El Hidrocalido. 
December 15, 1994. 90 per cent o f local inhabitants rejected the water increments, and were 
unaware o f the increments every two months; 85 per cent argued that the increments would 
impact negatively on local people's finances; 15 per cent expressed great dissatisfaction with 
the situation. The survey also mentioned that 50 per cent o f water consumers approved 
CAASA services, whilst the same percentage complained about a lack o f availability.
292 Fernando Gomez Esparza. 1994. Segundo Informe de Gobiemo. Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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former liabilities.293 Nonetheless, members from the trust managing 
CAASA's financial resources (headed by NAFINSA) were having intensive 
discussions. According to official acts of the sessions, the main goal was to 
tackle the financial difficulties affecting both private and public entities.294 
The debts absorbed by CAASA came to represent a serious threat to its 
finances, as these were indexed to inflation, which rose steeply. As a 
consequence of this economical turmoil, Generate des Eaux increased its 
presence in the municipality, although it was involved only in operational 
functions.295
CAASA members proposed further economic incomes in the form of 
federal subsidies and direct contributions, as well as the necessity to 
increase the water tariff and to renegotiate the contract in order to adjust 
it to the new national economic realities.296 However, Rene Romo Medina, 
on behalf of the municipality, argued that the potential political 
consequences were such that consideration of the water ta riff increases
293 Grupo Financiero Inver-Mexico. Banco Mexicano. 1995. Contrato de Apertura de Credito 
en Cuenta Corriente que Celebran: CAASA, Banco Mexicano y  Constructoras ICA, S.A de 
C.V. April 12, 1995. Mexico, Distrito. Federal.
294 According to internal documents o f NAFINSA. 1995. Sessions 3/95, 4/95, 5/95, 6/95 and 
7/95. Aguascalientes, Mexico.
295 Gobiemo del Estado de aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: Desafios y  Oportunidades para el 
Siglo XXI. Mexico: Oficina de Coordination de Asesores del C. Gobemador, pp. 201.
296 According to official documents o f NAFINSA this technical trust was formed by Rene 
Romo Medina (ayuntamiento), Miguel Angel Godinez and Jose Luis Becerra (CAPAMA), 
Pedro Gonzalez M and Enrique Valencia Sandoval. Also involved were Jorge Rubio Oramas, 
Carlos Cortes and Hector Ramirez (CAASA), Octavio Novelo and Aurora Angel (NAFINSA 
Trustee), Federico Carstens (Banco Mexicano-Trustor-) and Horacio Vargas Alonso 
(NAFINSA- Trustor).
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must be deferred until after the election period.297
Overdue credits with NAFINSA and other financial institutions meant that 
CAASA was under financial pressure. Federal subsidies were paid late, and 
in part only, serving only to pay the interest on previous credits. At the 
same time, the municipality was, according to its internal comptroller, 
Rene Romo Medina, facing financial difficulties. He argued that the 
municipality's annual budget was equal only to debt services, thus 
affecting any financial contribution. Inflation was rising, and since major 
liabilities were index-linked, this created a chain reaction. Nonetheless, he 
stated that further subsidies from federal (CNA and SHCP), state, and 
local authorities would be considered, due to the relevance of the 
programme and the interest of the federal government in applying this 
scheme throughout Mexico.
CAASA continued to exert pressure for an increase in the water tariff, to 
compensate for the accumulated deficit in its finances.298 The Mayor, 
Fernando Gomez Esparza, was reluctant to agree to this because of the 
likely political effects.299 Water cuts were implemented for non-payment,
297 According to the session 4/95 from this trustee.
298 The municipality negotiated with CAASA to postpone the payment from the 10 per cent 
(rights o f the concession) accorded on the concession title of the total invoices according to 
the session 4/95.
299 According to internal documents from CAASA, the Mayor Fernando Gomez Esparza 
received a letter from Pedro Gonzalez Martinez, General Director o f CAASA on May 16, 
1994. It stated the necessity to increase the water tariff and to re negotiate the concession title 
in order to solve the financial problems. Later, on June 8, 1995, the General Director of this 
body Pedro Gonzalez Martinez wrote again to the Mayor Fernando Gomez Esparza, arguing 
the urgent necessity to increase the water tariff and to absorb the internal debt o f CAASA 
using federal, state, local and own contributions.
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thus persuading political and social organisations to take legal action 
against CAASA.300 The same problems prevailed during 1995, Fernando 
Gomez Esparza's last year in office. He rejected any increment in the 
water ta riff with the clear intention of avoiding any political difficulty.301 
Nonetheless, the effect this had on the concession scheme had a dramatic 
effect on the political arena in Aguascalientes, too.
The Role of the Concession Programme in the Fall of the PRI 
During this year elections took place for mayors in all the eleven 
municipalities, including the city capital, and there were also elections for 
the state legislature in Aguascalientes. The effects of the water services 
concession on the elections for mayor in the city capital help to identify 
and explain the wider consequences, and the role of the concession in the 
fall of the PRI.
Between May and August 1995, the attention of the electorate was 
focused on two candidates.302 The PRI candidate was Enrique Pasillas 
Escobedo, a well-known and wealthy politician linked with the State 
Governor, Otto Granados Roldan.303 He had previously served as leader at 
the LV State Legislature, in which the concession of the water services was
300 CAASA Cancela el Servicio de Agua y Viola la Ley. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. June 
6, 1995.
301 According to internal documents from CAASA its General Director, Pedro Gonzalez 
Martinez sent a petition letter on November 8, 1995, to the General Director Fernando 
Gomez Esparza. He mentioned the financial struggles facing CAASA due to the deficits 
generated by the underestimated water tariffs.
302 The candidate from the PRD was Antonio Ortega.
303 He served on previous governments as Secretario General de Gobierno during Miguel 
Angel Barberena governorship (1991-1992), afterwards became state deputy (PRI) and leader 
of the LV legislature (1993-1995).
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passed, and his candidature was seen by the electorate as a reward from 
the state governor for his loyalty. However, his close relationship with the 
concession of the water services in fact contributed to his defeat.
In a personal interview he asserted that I  definitely lost the elections for 
two main reasons; first the water concession (water increments basically) 
and second my links as a former leader o f the state legislature in which 
the concession title was approved including the PRI label...Nonetheless, 
the economic scenario affecting the society; and the lack o f prestige o f the 
PRI at the time, as well as the politicisation o f the water services, affected 
my campaign. After his defeat, he was relocated by the state government 
and was appointed General Director of the Instituto de Vivienda del Estado 
de Aguascalientes (IVEA - State Housing Institute of Aguascalientes).
The other high profile, and in this case victorious, candidate, was Alfredo 
Reyes Velazquez, better known as "E/ mosco" (mosquito), of PAN. He had 
an entrepreneurial background with links exclusively in the business 
sector.304 However, he had been politically active in previous years in 
order to obtain the PAN candidacy for the city capital. His political 
campaign used, and focused upon solving, the problems caused by the 
water concession as they affected local inhabitants.305 Indeed, his core 
campaign promise was to return the control of the water services to the 
municipality. This was advocated on technical, economic, and ethical
304 Alfredo Reyes Velazquez served as President from business organisation COPARMEX 
(1993-1994) and the Consejo Empresarial de Aguascalientes (CEA).
305 His campaign leaflets proposed die following points: to reduce the water tariff, improve 
public safety, promote jobs, support tourism promotion, improve the resources from the 
municipality, protect the environment and to promote sports and culture.
205
grounds.306
The State Governor, Otto Granados Roldan, was Alfredo Reyes Velazquez' 
greatest political enemy. He maintained that the PAN proposal was 
immoral and populist, and that the initial debt of 100 MP absorbed by 
CAASA could not be re-absorbed by the municipality without causing its 
collapse.307 Reyes emphatically rejected these arguments, giving the 
electorate an unqualified guarantee that, if elected, the PAN would revoke 
the concession and return responsibility for the services to the 
municipality.308 In sum, the PAN proposal was to revoke the concession, 
cut the price of the water supply (and thereby assume the risk of debt), 
and to create a decentralised body to manage the service.309 
In the media war between PRI members and Alfredo Reyes Velazquez, the 
PAN candidate had a clear advantage, since the PRI was explicitly linked 
with the concession programme and avoided public debates on this 
subject, diverting criticism onto the private body, CAASA. Meanwhile, the 
PAN populist strategy to attract voters by revoking the water concession 
and reducing the water ta riff was achieving success. Public forums were 
used to raise local inhabitants' awareness about the water services, and
306 La Concesion del Agua se Debe Revocar y Expondra AN Elementos de Fondo. El Sol del 
Centro. June 9, 1995.
307 Ibidem.,
308 Promesa de Campana de Alfredo Reyes Velazquez. El Sol del Centro. June 16,1995.
309 Alfredo Reyes Velazquez. 1995. Plan de Gobierno Municipal 1996-1998. Aguascalientes. 
Mexico.
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thus to persuade the electorate to vote for PAN. 310
During the 1995 campaign, each political party treated the concession of 
the water services as the main issue, criticising PRI members for 
approving it. Members of the PRD and PPS supported the idea - clearly 
intending to further their political careers somewhat.311 Even the PRI 
candidate argued that the members from the state legislature must revise 
as soon as possible the concession title.312 His electoral campaign was 
focused on this point, and on the restructuring of the management of the 
water service.313 It  is clear that his views changed according to the 
political circumstances that prevailed, an indication of the degree of 
politicisation reached by the water concession. Nonetheless, he had little 
chance of success, since he was seen as the first person in Aguascalientes 
to have supported the concession.
On August 6, 1995, the PAN's anti-politics strategy and the people's desire 
for "change" helped Alfredo Reyes to win the election, with a clear 
majority of 52.12 per cent compared to 31.86 per cent obtained by 
Enrique Pasillas Escobedo from the PRI. This represented the first defeat 
of the PRI in the city capital. PAN candidates also won three other
310 Propone el PAN Foro de Propuestas Para Solucionar el Problema del Agua Potable. El Sol 
del Centro. June 16, 1995.
311 Pedira la Oposicion a la Corte Que Revise la Concesion del Agua. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. June 7, 1995.
312 PAN y PRI politizan el asunto del agua: manifestation para exigir menores cobros. El 
Hidrocalido. June 10, 1995.
313 Enrique Pasillas Escobedo. 1995. Propuesta de Gobierno para el Municipio de 
Aguascalientes 1996-1998, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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municipalities out of 11 in the state, and a majority in the state legislature 
with 13 (55 per cent) out of 27 seats (the PRI obtained 11, and the PRD, 
PT, and PFCRN each won one seat).
The Arrival of the PAN: Electoral Promises and Later Contradictions
The electoral success of the PAN marked the beginning of the new local 
politics surrounding Aguascalientes, especially in the city capital, even 
though their electoral promises were abandoned almost immediately. A 
leading member of the party in Aguascalientes later stated that the 
strategy had been to win the elections by promising to return 
responsibility for the water services to the municipality, and to reduce the 
water tariff. After the elections, they would maintain pressure upon CAASA 
in order to negotiate a new contract.
The mayor elect soon realised the dramatic situation facing the water 
concession. His first declaration after the elections omitted any reference 
to revoking the concession. However, he continued to consider reducing 
the actual water tariff.314 Later, he again insisted on the abolition of 
CAPAMA or CAASA, with the ayuntamiento absorbing the functions of the 
former, and the municipality taking responsibility for the provision of the 
water services.315 He also opted for populist actions such as writing to 
local newspapers, urging CAASA to avoid cutting the supply of drinking 
water.316
314 Agua Barata?. En 3 Minutos. El Hidrocalido. August 10,1995.
315 Como, Cuando, Donde. El Hidrocalido. September 1,1995.
316 The above letter was published in the El Sol del Centro on October 5, 1995 and the 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes in October 6, 1995.
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The announcement by CAASA that it was almost bankrupt generated a 
great deal of public disquiet.317 In response, the Mayor elect Alfredo Reyes 
announced his firm intention to cancel the concession title granted to 
CAASA...due to the greater anomalies as regards the water tariff...besides 
evidence o f a greater inefficiency and a lack o f financial resources.318 The 
state president of the PAN, Jorge Zamarripa, supported him, declaring that 
we will legislate according to the promises made in campaign...such as 
revoking the concession title 319
On November 15, 1995, the elected local deputies formed the LVI 
legislature of the state legislature. The water commission was made up of 
Alfredo Gomez and Fernando Herrera Avila, both members of PAN, the 
latter of whom resigned as a Regidor (1993-1995) of the water 
commission to run (successfully) for the state legislature; Adan Pedroza 
(PFCRN) and Alfredo Gonzalez G (PRI); and Juan Raul Vela (PT) and 
Fernando Alferez (PRD). From the beginning of this legislature actions 
against CAASA were unveiled almost daily.320
Social pressure groups (Union de Usuarios del Agua, Union Campesina 
Democratica, Asociacian de Abarroteros y Pequehos Comerciantes) 
pressured the state legislature to fulfil campaign promises. The state
317 Pediran al Congreso que Investigue la Administration de CAASA. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. October 13,1995.
318 Se Acabara la Concesion para Caasa. El Hidrocalido. October 25, 1995; Aumentos del 10, 
20 y 30 por ciento en Impuestos. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. October 25, 1995.
319 El Sol del Centro. November 5, 1995.
320 Los Usuarios Afectados Ilegalmente, Pueden restablecer su Servicio de Agua y Drenaje. El 
Sol del Centro. November 24, 1995.
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legislature did not hesitate and, supported by members of the water 
commission, they publicly broke the seals used by CAASA to cut off the 
supply of potable water to defaulting users,321 arguing that the increments 
and the cuts to the service were unconstitutional. CAASA was unable to 
charge the last increment (11th) on the water tariff, as agreed in the 
concession title, or to index the inflationary period of 1994 to 1995.
By the end of 1995 it was clear that CAASA had not fulfilled the minimum 
conditions (operational, financial, rehabilitation) established in the 
concession title. The public bodies had failed to fulfil their obligations as 
laid down in the contract, for water price increases, subsidies, and debt 
payments. As a result, the private body was considered to be in danger of 
losing the concession. This did not prevent Enrique Valencia, however, 
manager of CAASA, from declaring that we are going to give up the 
concession... But in twenty years.322 In a further statement he even 
presented the budget for 1996.323 However, the most significant 
contradiction was expressed by Manuel Reed Segovia, former president of 
CANACINTRA (1994) and vice president of COPARMEX (1992), who was 
going to head CAPAMA in Alfredo Reyes' administration.324 He argued that 
CAASA is not going to leave Aguascalientes...we are considering a few
321 Grupos Violentaran Sellos de Caasa. November 24,1995.
322 CAASA Entregara el Titulo de Concesion Pero Hasta Dentro de 20 anos: Valencia. El Sol 
del Centro. December 2,1995.
323 Fin al Suspenso: Se Queda la Concesionaria de Agua. El Hidrocalido. December 11,1995.
324 Manuel Reed Segovia was appointed as Director de Medio Ambiente y  Recursos Naturales 
and later on (March, 96) became Manager o f CAPAMA.
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changes to the concession title as regards the water ta riff besides its legal 
relationship with the municipality...it is very important to keep the 
concession scheme in Aguascalientes because it will be implemented in 
the coming years in the 100 most important cities in Mexico.325 Thus, PAN 
campaign promises evaporated, whilst the PAN and the elected candidates 
(state legislature and mayor) were playing 'yo-yo' with every declaration. 
All of them had contradictory versions regarding the concession scheme. 
In particular, the elected mayor, Alfredo Reyes, was adopting different 
postures according to daily demands. Once again, a populist government 
was in place. Once again, there was a lack of knowledge regarding the 
water concession.
Concluding Note
The introduction of the water concession in Aguascalientes was driven by 
the desire of the Mexican government to fulfil the requirements of 
international institutions (the World Bank and its subsidiaries), and thus 
join a select group of developing countries. Local and state authorities 
were thus following federal resolutions, but were also influenced by 
international trends and policies.
I t  is clear from the administrative structure that the municipality intended 
to favour the ICA group, which would then move ahead with further 
concessions throughout Mexico. Similarly, the legal framework shows the 
willingness of all levels of government to support the scheme, and to
325 Anuncia el PAN que Caasa se queda. El Hidrocalido. December 22, 1995.
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encourage further concessions programmes throughout the country.
The concession title or contract is the most convincing proof of the 
politicisation of the privatisation programme. The level of subordination 
and the rush to apply the concession scheme persuaded local authorities 
to sign a contract with clear disadvantages for all parties involved. The 
water ta riff was a particularly contentious area, and the indexation to 
inflation generated great disquiet amongst local inhabitants. Campaigns to 
revoke the concession scheme impacted heavily on the electoral 
preferences in the city capital, to the advantage of the opposition parties. 
Meanwhile, the regulatory body (CAPAMA) showed a lack of control and 
independence in applying the agreements in the concession title, and 
liabilities acquired by CAASA resulted in great pressure on all levels of 
government to contemplate further subsidies for the water utilities. 
Unexpected events at the national level had a dramatic affect on the water 
concession. There was significant politicisation of the concession, 
culminating in the first defeat for the PRI in the local elections. The 
elections for state legislature, and for mayor in the city capital, 
demonstrated a clear desire for change on the part of the electorate. 
Thus, from the launch of the concession scheme in October 1993, until the 
end of the administration that had supported it in 1995, the weaknesses 
of the concession title, combined with the advantages granted to CAASA, 
made politicisation inevitable, to the advantage of the PAN. The next 
chapter will analyse the period of government following the election of the 
PAN.
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Chapter Six
The New Political Hegemony in the Municipality of 
Aguascalientes: An Evaluation of the Affects upon the 
Water Concession (1996)
Introduction
This chapter examines the new political hegemony in the city capital and 
describes how, as mentioned in the previous chapter, electoral promises 
regarding the concession scheme were not met. In section 6.1, the 
beginning of the term of office of Mayor Alfredo Reyes will be examined, 
concentrating on the first quarter of 1996 (January-March), and then upon 
the rest of this most significant and controversial year in terms of the 
evolution of the concession scheme. Section 6.2 identifies the social and 
political organisations influencing the fall of the concession scheme, and 
analyses the political reverse suffered as a result of the rescue initiative; 
while section 6.3 focuses upon the influence of interest groups in the 
promotion of the scheme, sets out the conditions under which CAASA was 
able to regain the concession, and the political affects of revoking the 
rescue initiative. In other words, the section will examine the re- 
emergence of the concession scheme in the form of a new concession title. 
Section 6.4 examines the process of approval of the new concession title, 
demonstrating the dominance of the PAN at all four stages, and describing 
the core modifications that took place. The concluding section presents an 
overview of the chapter.
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6.1 The Arrival of the Panista Government in the Municipality of 
Aguascalientes: Electoral Promises; Governance Contradictions 
The New Political Hegemony
The term of office of the new PAN Mayor, Alfredo Reyes Velazquez, 
officially commenced on January 1, 1996, to run for a three-year period.330 
At the same time, a clear PAN majority was confirmed within the 
ayuntamiento, with two PAN smdicos and 10 regidores, including the 
Regidor for the water utility commission, Edna Lorena Pacheco.331 Of the 
six opposition members, two represented the PRI, and the PRD, PT, 
PFCRN, and PVEM each had one representative. Carlos Gonzales Garcia 
replaced Miguel Angel Godinez Antillon as manager of CAPAMA, a position 
now in the gift of the mayor, thus bringing the regulatory body under 
political scrutiny and highlighting the lack of real autonomy. The new PAN 
hegemony in the ayuntamiento and the state legislature gave that party 
an opportunity to revoke previous PRI decisions, which had been 
determined by political expediency rather than real local necessities. 
During this period of government (1996-1998) the PRI became an 
opposition party with little real political power.
The State Governor, Otto Granados Roldan, was still the main political 
actor, but the PRI minority on the LVI State Legislature (11 seats out of
330 As is common in Aguascalientes, the ceremony investing the new mayor was held one day 
before the official commencement o f his term on December 31,1995.
331 Is important to note that since 1970-73 Ayuntamiento PAN Regidores have acted as the 
representatives for the water utility commission. Thus, the water utilities policies have been 
under the scrutiny o f this political party.
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27) meant that his role as promoter of the concession scheme dwindled. 
Moreover, the loss of prestige of former Mexican president Carlos Salinas, 
with whom he had been closely associated, further damaged Otto 
Granados' standing. His style of policy-making and state governance was 
an exact copy of the former Mexican president's style - based on a close 
circle of collaborators and excluding the wider society. The new political 
scenario in the state meant that the governor was facing an end to this 
autocratic system. Nonetheless, the influence of Otto Granados on the 
evolution of the concession scheme remained significant.
The First Challenge to Fulfil Electoral Promises: The Early Contradictions 
The first signs of decisions contrary to electoral promises were evident in 
the inaugural speech of Mayor Alfredo Reyes, in which he gave special 
attention to the water utilities. Three alternatives were to be considered:
• to reduce the water ta riff to fair and affordable levels, with a proposal 
to the state legislature to modify the concession title;
• to revoke the concession scheme and evaluate the possibility of a new 
proposal or remunicipalizar (giving back total responsibility to the 
municipality);
• to replace the private group CAASA (ICA and Generate des Eaux 
partnership) controlling the concession.
Thus, the electoral promise to revoke the concession title as the first aim 
of his government was mentioned only as a possibility.332 He even stated
332 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Toma de Protesta de Alfredo Reyes 
Velazquez. December 31,1995, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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in public interviews that I  never promised to revoke the concession 
scheme...Local media distorted my proposal which was focused on 
adapting the concession title according to the new national and local 
realities. This dramatic shift was reinforced by Edna Lorena Pacheco, 
Regidor (PAN) for the water utilities (1996-1998), who told me that 
Alfredo Reyes never promised to revoke the concession scheme but to 
adjust the concession title.
I t  is clear that Alfredo Reyes had been aware of the critical circumstances 
facing the water utilities since the elections (August 1995). Official 
documents show that, from mid-1995, he was trying to negotiate a 
solution with CAASA, irrespective of electoral promises.333 Furthermore, 
CAASA had, since early 1995, been pressuring the municipality to adjust 
the water ta riff according to the new economic scenario, and to modify the 
concession title .334 For political reasons - that is, the electoral campaigns - 
Mayor Fernando Gomez had passed the responsibility to the new 
government. The discussions soon moved to the federal level, which 
persuaded Mayor Fernando Gomez and mayor elect Alfredo Reyes to 
continue with the concession scheme.335
Alfredo Reyes evidenced this dramatic shift in his position even before he 
came to power, almost reaching an agreement with CAASA days before he
333 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. El Agua Potable de Aguascalientes: La 
Busqueda de Soluciones. June 18, 1996. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
334 CAASA. 1995. Modificaciones Propuestas a las Bases del Titulo de Concesion. November 
13, 1995. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
335 Ibidem.,
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assumed office.336 He declared on local television that:
The federal government rejects the idea o f remunicipalizar, 
due to the negative effect on the programmes for the water 
utilities in the 100 most important cities in Mexico...however, 
i t  will not withdraw economic support... On the contrary, the 
federal government proposes a negotiated solution amongst 
all the parties...In which further federal economic support 
could be considered...In this sense, it  is essential to fix a 
political posture to persuade the society to keep the 
concession scheme, as corresponds to the interests o f the 
federal government...the position o f the Ayuntamiento 1996- 
1998 is not against the concession scheme, but the way it 
was applied.237
The electoral promises to reduce the water tariff, to revoke the concession 
scheme, and to remunicipalizar the water utilities were not translated into 
governmental action. At this stage, Alfredo Reyes was clearly following 
instructions from federal authorities. According to official documents,338 
meetings took place with the SEGOB after he won the elections and an 
agreement was almost reached in January 1996.339 The aim was to
336 CAASA. 1995. Propuestas de Reformas al Titulo de Concesion. November 13, 1995. 
Aguascalientes. Mexico.
337 The program went out on the local channel 2 (Televisa) at 1:00 P.M on December 23,
1995, conducted by Mario Mora.
338 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. El Agua Potable de Aguascalientes: La 
Busqueda de Soluciones. July 18, 1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
339 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Convenio Complementario. January 22,
1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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negotiate with CAASA, with mediation from the federal authority and the 
CNA. The core areas under discussion, 340 supported by local authorities, 
were:341
• The concession schemes would not be revoked and an extension period 
of ten years would be granted to CAASA. Mayor Alfredo Reyes also 
requested that this private group change its name in order to avoid any 
social problems when presenting it to the public as a 'new' 
organisation.
• Mayor Alfredo Reyes recognised that it was impossible to reduce the 
water tariff. However, he proposed a subsidy (representing 2.6 MNP 
monthly) to the water ta riff for six months. I t  would then be set 
according to the national inflation rate and the current costs incurred 
by CAASA to provide the water utilities. The aim was to persuade the 
public that he was fulfilling his campaign promise, by effecting a 
temporary reduction.
• In order to keep the concession scheme, further economic 
contributions from federal, state, and local authorities, and from the 
CAASA group, were established, amounting to 160 MNP. The 
municipality also agreed to receive only two per cent of the water 
rights charged to CAASA, instead of the ten per cent agreed in the 
concession title. Both accords contradict promises made during Reyes1
340 The participating officials were the Sub Secretario de Gobernacion, Arturo Nunez and the 
Director General de Gobierno, Juan Burgos Pintado.
341 Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes (1992-1998).1996. El Agua Potable de 
Aguascalientes: La Busqueda de Soluciones. July 18, 1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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electoral campaign, when he emphasised that he would never reduce 
public incomes in order to finance CAASA.342 
It  is clear that the public was unaware of this possible agreement, and 
that the state government, state legislature, and the ayuntamiento did not 
participate. I t  was legally, financially, and technically impossible to fulfil 
electoral promises. Clearly, a spectacular solution had to be found.
The Economic Pressures Jeopardising the Concession Scheme: The Failure to 
Fulfil Campaign Promises
The critical economic inheritance from former Mayor Fernando Gomez had 
a considerable effect on CAASA finances, and PAN's electoral promises 
were no longer on the agenda. The economic constraints on CAASA 
obligated the municipality to put aside their electoral promises and PAN 
ideology.
A significant factor in CAASA's financial difficulties was the large number of 
defaulting users, not surprising given the ban on disconnections (overdue 
payments on the water receipts had reached almost 25 MP). Other factors 
included the liabilities absorbed from CAPAMA, operational deficits 
(because the water tariff had not been adjusted to reflect real prices), and 
the credits obtained to finance these liabilities.343 By early 1996, liabilities 
obtained in 1995 through NAFINSA and Banco Mexicano represented a 
serious threat to the concession scheme. According to CAASA, the core
342 Apunte del Nuevo Municipio Libre. El Sol del Centro. October 25, 1995.
343 El Rescate no Revoca la Concesion. El Hidrocalido. March 30, 1996.
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factors affecting the concession scheme at that time were the following:344
• Negotiations to find a solution for the water utilities had been in 
progress for almost a year (May 95-January 96), but with no results.
• Financial conditions were worsening by the day, with liabilities and 
operational deficits estimated to reach about 7 MNP per month.
• Income obtained via the water ta riff was not sufficient to cover 
CAASA's costs.
• The concession title required the municipality to pay the deficits 
generated by not adjusting tariffs to real prices, but the municipality 
had not complied with this since 1995.
• The concession scheme was surrounded by political conflict generated 
by the municipality.
• In December 1995, the new local authorities had proposed a new 
agreement, but this was suddenly cancelled during the first week of 
January 1996 without considering any other proposal.
• Mayor Alfredo Reyes and his collaborators had persuaded CAASA to 
make extra financial sacrifices and had publicly anticipated water tariff 
reductions for the first six months. The aim was to promote public 
acceptance of the concession scheme. Nonetheless, the municipality 
jeopardised these efforts by not fulfilling the agreement reached in 
December 1995.
This document also included a new complementary agreement adjusted
344According to an internal document prepared by the General Director o f CAASA, Pedro 
Gonzalez Martinez, and forwarded to Alfredo Reyes on January 23, 1996.
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and prepared by CAASA, which described the necessary amendments to 
the contract in order to continue with the concession scheme. This was an 
exact copy of the December 1995 agreement. At the same time, the 
financial trust supported CAASA's arguments regarding the lack of 
economic resources jeopardising the concession scheme.345 CAASA was 
struggling to cope with overdue payments (estimated at 2.5 MP) to the 
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE), and the provision of potable water 
to the city was at risk, since the CFE was prepared to cut the electricity to 
the water sources.
Thus, local authorities were aware that they could not continue with 
populist solutions that did not look like solving the real problems facing 
the water utilities. What could be questioned at this stage is the role of 
CAPAMA, since, as noted, its regulatory autonomy was subject to 
instructions from higher levels (mayoral resolutions according to federal 
instructions). CAPAMA's role in enforcing both the public and the private 
sides of the concession title was not fulfilled, and the body's weakness 
meant that it could not be justified as part of the water utilities structure.
345 The first session of the Comite Tecnico del Fideicomiso No 918-7 ‘CONA’ was held on 
January 11, 1996. It was formed by Jose de Jesus Munoz and Noe Aguilera Prieto 
(Municipality), Carlos Gonzalez Garcia and Rodrigo Reyes Perez (CAPAMA), Pedro 
Gonzalez, Pedro Martinez, Jorge Rubio Oramas and Enrique Valencia Sandoval (CAASA). 
This trust also included representatives from NAFINSA and Banco Mexicano.
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6.2 The Rescue Initiative for the Concession Scheme: A Populist
Initiative?
The Role of Social Demands Pressuring Local Authorities to Fulfil Electoral 
Promises: The Fall of the Concession Scheme?
The populist style and ideology of Alfredo Reyes had been established by 
actions such as the creation of the Miercoles Ciudadano (Citizen's 
Wednesday), whereby civil servants, including the mayor, personally 
attended to petitions from the local public.346 This was intended to serve 
as a direct link between the inhabitants and public officials, but it had 
clear political implications since public funds were used in order to 
discount the public utilities. The water utilities represented the primary 
concern of the public, and the objective was to calm local agitation by 
granting discounts on the water receipts, amounting in some cases to 60 
or 70 per cent.347
From the beginning of Alfredo Reyes' administration there had been public 
pressure for local authorities to implement electoral promises.348 The 
promise to reduce the water tariff was partially fulfilled due to an 
agreement made between former Mayor Fernando Gomez and federal 
authorities, as part of a deal whereby from the start of 1996 the Impuesto
346 The Miercoles Ciudadano started on January 17,1996.
347 Agrupaciones Politicas y Sociales por la Remunicipalizacion del Servicio del Agua. El Sol 
del Centro. January 6, 1996.
348 On the proposed reduction see: Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1995. Toma de 
Protesta de Alfredo Reyes Velazquez. December 31, 1995. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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al Valor Agregado (IVA - Value Add Tax) would no longer be charged by 
federal authorities, representing an immediate saving of 15 per cent on 
the water receipt. Alfredo Reyes promoted this as an achievement of his 
own government.
The Consejo Consultivo (Board of CAPAMA) passed an initiative from 
Mayor Alfredo Reyes (under CAASA scrutiny) granting an extra reduction 
of five to ten per cent on the water payments in the poorest areas (zone 
A).349 The tariff was also adjusted to reflect a flat rate on domestic water 
consumption ranging from 40m3 to 70m3.350 However, the public remained 
unaware that this measure was to remain in force for only six months, and 
that the subsidy was financed by public funds.351 The goal was to persuade 
citizens that electoral promises were being met, whilst postponing a final 
resolution on the role of CAASA and negotiating a new concession title in 
the first half of 1996.352 The CAPAMA board also approved charging the 
water receipts monthly instead of bimonthly,353 and CAASA was no longer
349 The Consejo Cosultivo was formed by the Mayor Alfredo Reyes, Carlos Gonzalez Garcia 
(CAPAMA) Francisco Valdes de Anda (Municipality Internal Affairs Secretary), Jose de 
Jesus Munoz Gutierrez (Secretary o f Finances from the Municipality), the manager of the 
CNA in Aguascalientes Martin Molina Ochoa, a representative o f the Usuarios del Agua and 
the president o f the Colegio de Ingenieros de Aguascalientes Refugio Mascorro. The 
SEDESOL (Federal) and SEDESO (state) authorities were also represented.
350This measurement increased the fixed domestic consumption accorded in the concession 
title (contract) from 40m3 to 50m3 and from 50m3 to 70m3. Thus, the new flat measurement 
was set at 50m3 to 70m3 but at prices o f 40m3 to 50m3.
351 Ajustes y Beneficios Para la Poblacion Consumidora de Agua Propone el Alcalde. El Sol 
del Centro. January 5, 1996.
352 Los Diputados Panistas en Plena Actividad: JMG. El Sol del Centro. January 14, 1996.
353 En adelante, facturacion mensual de uso del agua. El Hidrocalido. March 3, 1996.
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allowed to disconnect users in arrears.354
However, reducing the water ta riff was evidently not the main issue; social 
organisations were more interested in obtaining a political gain by 
pressuring local authorities to revoke the concession and, afterwards, to 
remunicipalizar the water utilities. The Frente de Organizaciones 
Ciudadanas (FOCA),355 a partnership amongst 16 social and political 
organisations, delivered an ultimatum to Alfredo Reyes, stating that i f  we 
don't have a concrete solution...we will mobilise to demand the resignation 
o f the mayor.356 Other organisations357 were involved in daily marches and 
meetings against CAASA and the mayor, protesting at the overdue water 
bills and abuses (potable water disconnections) by CAASA, and demanding 
that the local authorities get rid of this private body.358 Mayor Alfredo 
Reyes offered a compromise by promising a definitive solution by March 
31, 1996, instead of at the end of the six months as earlier proposed.359 
Pressure groups were, therefore, obtaining results. The PRD party took 
advantage of the political circumstances surrounding the concession
354Probable Auditoria a la Pasada Administration. El Hidrocalido. January 4,1996.
355 The political parties supporting this organisation were PFCRN, PDM, Foro Democratico 
and PVEM; social groups included Barzon, Transbarzon, Union de Usuarios de Agua Potable 
y Servicios, Asociacion de Abarroteros y Pequenos Comerciantes and Ferrocarrileros 
Jubilados.
356 Cumple AR o se va: 16 Organizaciones. El Hidrocalido. January 6, 1996.
357 It was integrated by Federacidn Estatal de Action Popular (FEAP), Federation Estatal de 
Organizaciones Independientes (FEOI), Asociacion de Abarroteros y  Pequenos Comerciantes 
(AAPC) and Union Campesina Democratica (UCD).
358 Se Violentan Cada Dia Mas las Protestas Contra Abusos de CAASA en Cobros del Agua. 
El Sol del Centro. January 24, 1996.
359 El 31 de Marzo, la decision respecto del agua. El Hidrocalido. January 25,1996.
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scheme,360 as did other political organisations (PRI, PVEM, PFCRN, and 
PT). The PAN was the only political institution supporting decisions from 
the mayor, and this party now stood alone in the midst of the political 
turmoil.
The remunicipalizar of the water utilities was rejected once again by Mayor 
Alfredo Reyes, who argued that we don't want to have constitutional 
problems.361 At the same time, negotiations between CAASA and the 
ayuntamiento were progressing. A solution was almost reached but, while 
it was supported by federal bodies (CNA and SEGOB), the State Governor 
Otto Granados Roldan was reluctant and it was, therefore, finally 
unsuccessful. The political war between governor Otto Granados and 
Mayor Alfredo Reyes prevented a solution being found. Regidores from the 
opposition (PRI, PRD, PVEM, PT, and PC) were even involved in 
discussions with the governor to pressure the mayor to resign.362 As 
already demonstrated, the only settlement that could satisfy political and 
social demands would be to remunicipalizar. Mayor Alfredo Reyes was 
suffering a lack of credibility, and was being pushed by his political rivals 
to agree to this option.
The Fall of the Concession Scheme
As noted, the federal authorities had sought, ever since the election of the
360 No mas Irregularidades en el Servicio de Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. February 4, 
1996.
361 Descartada la Desprivatizacion del Servicio de Agua Para no Metemos en Broncas 
Constitucionales: Reyes Velazquez. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. February 15,1996.
362 En Gobemacion se Demostrara la Voluntad Politica de las Partes. El Sol del Centro. March 
14, 1996.
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PAN government, to avoid any action against CAASA, in order not to 
jeopardise federal policies. The SEGOB mediated between CAASA and 
Mayor Alfredo Reyes during intensive negotiations; achieving a solution 
that was unexpected, and that took state and federal authorities, as well 
as CAASA, by surprise.363 On March 28, 1996,364 Mayor Alfredo Reyes 
demonstrated to the ayuntamiento a change of ideological stance, arguing 
that today's proposal aims to crystallise and to make a reality one o f my 
greatest campaign promises...attending the demand from the
Aguascaletenses to solve the dramatic problem affecting their economy... 
the declaratoria de rescate (rescue initiative) to CAASA has been
decided.365
The ayuntamiento passed this initiative at a 'secret session', with 14 votes 
(12 PAN, and two from the PT and PRD) for, and four against (PRI (two), 
PVEM, and PFCRN).366 Thus, the ayuntamiento, as well as the board of 
CAPAMA, legalised the municipality's assumption (via CAPAMA) of absolute 
control of the water utilities in the capital. Local authorities supported the 
rescue initiative in article 58 of the Ley de Los Sistemas de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del Estado de Aguascalientes and in Article 
60, fraction III ,  of the Ley Organica Municipal. The aim was to avoid the
363 Linea Privada. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 7, 1996.
364 Rescate del Servicio del Agua. El Sol del Centro. March 29, 1996.
365 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1996-1998). 1996. Secretaria del H.
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Diario de Debates 1996. Acta No.13/96. March 28, 1996.
Aguascalientes. Mexico.
366 The Regidores who voted against this resolution were: Miguel Angel Juarez Frias (PRI), 
Jose Antonio Garcia Gonzalez (PRI), Jaime Davila Cleto (PFCRN) and Ma. Del Carmen 
Esparza Hernandez (PVEM).
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legal aspects established in the contract by means of obtaining control of 
the water utilities but evading the responsibility of CAASA liabilities.367 
Alfredo Reyes justified his decision at a ceremony considering 'social 
demands', arguing that CAASA was entangled in a severe financial 
imbalance occasioned by its own administrative deficiencies, resulting in 
inadequate provision of the water services and affecting negatively on the 
local economy.368 The rescue initiative stipulated that the municipality 
would take over the concession granted to CAASA, which would return all 
the assets used to provide the water services, including all the operative, 
technical, and administrative functions; thus, CAASA and its subsidiaries 
(including SAASA) would lose any prerogative over the concession. 
CAPAMA would absorb the rights and obligations of CAASA, excluding 
liabilities, and compensation to CAASA would be considered on the basis of 
expert evaluation. The rescue would not affect any statutory rights of the 
employees or the service provision. The comision de rescate (rescue 
commission) comprised,369 by invitation of the mayor, representatives
367 According to the contract, if  both entities agree to cancel the concession of the water 
utilities, the municipality will absorb CAASA's liabilities. However, if  the municipality 
considers that CAASA is not fulfilling the contract (financially, operational or administrative) 
and thus jeopardising the provision o f the service creating a social imbalance, it has the right 
to cancel the water concession without absorbing any CAASA liabilities.
368 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1996-1998). 1996. Secretaria del H. 
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Diario de Debates 1996. Acta N o.13/96. March 28, 1996. 
Aguascalientes. Mexico.
369 The Comision de rescate or comision plural was intended to be formed by Roberto Diaz 
Ruiz (President o f the CEA), Felipe Gonzalez Gonzalez (as a compromised citizen with 
Aguascalientes), the representatives o f PAN (Jorge Zamarripa), PRI (Fernando Gomez) and 
PRD (Cecilio Avila), the titular o f the CNA (Martin Molina) and the titular o f the Comision 
Estatal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado -CEAPA- (Pedro de Jesus Toledo) besides the 
representatives o f FOCA (Antonio Hernandez, Alfredo Cervantes, Rodolfo Solano and Felipe 
Hinojoso) and two members from the Comite Municipal de Colonos.
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from social organisations headed by Manuel Reed (former titu lar head of 
the Secretarfa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturaies in the 
municipality), who was appointed General Manager of CAPAMA.370 The 
rescue was conditional upon the following points:
• The conditions of the contract were to be modified.
• CAASA was to adopt an integral, efficient, and equitable financial 
system for the provision of the water services.
• The water ta riff was to be adjusted.
• CAASA was to make a financial contribution to correct its financial
imbalance.
• There was to be an extra contribution from CAASA towards 
investments to rehabilitate the hydraulic infrastructure.
Thus, in legal terms, there was a partial rescue of the concession in that 
the municipality was willing to reinstate it. Alfredo Reyes stated that the 
administrative rescue o f CAASA does not revoke the concession title nor 
does it  imply the failure o f this scheme in the operation o f the water
services in Aguascalientes or in the rest o f the country.371
This decision generated considerable legal controversy. Article 58 of the 
Ley de Los Sistemas de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del 
Estado de Aguascalientes (on which the rescue was suppose to rely) refers
370 Manuel Reed Segovia was appointed titular o f CAPAMA on April 2, 1996 replacing 
Carlos Gonzalez Garcia.
371 El Rescate no Revoca la Concesion. El Hidrocalido. March 30, 1996.
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to a total, definitive, and absolute rescue (remunicipalizacion).372 
Furthermore, the contract does not allow for a temporary or partial rescue 
of the concession scheme.373 Nonetheless, local officials, headed by 
Manuel Reed (General Manager of CAPAMA and titu lar head of the rescue 
commission), Carlos Gonzalez (former General Manager of CAPAMA and 
titu lar head of the Secretarfa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales of 
the municipality), Francisco Javier Valdes de Anda (secretary o f the 
ayuntamiento), and Guillermo Ulises (municipality) took over CAASA 
headquarters, assuming the operative and administrative controls as well 
as control of the water sources in the municipality.374 At the same time, 
local authorities announced a new set of water tariffs, establishing prices 
at the levels set after the last increments of 1995.
The Effects of the Rescue Initiative: The Supporters
I t  is clear that Mayor Alfredo Reyes was pressured by social and political 
organisations to move forward regarding the rescue of the concession. 
However, his motivation in challenging federal policies was to secure his 
own political advancement. He never contemplated revoking the 
concession, but used the rescue as a strategy through which to improve
372 La Ley No Preve Un Rescate Temporal: Es Remunicipalizacion. El Sol del Centro. April 2, 
1996.
373 For more information see: concession title articles 36 and 37, the Constitucion Politico, del 
Estado de Aguascalientes article 27 fraction IV, Ley Organica Municipal 97 and 100 and the 
Constitucion Politico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos articles 14 and 16; and articles 52, 53, 
57 and 58 from the Ley de Los Sistemas de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y  Saneamiento del 
Estado de Aguascalientes.
374 Reasume el Municipio el Control del Agua. El Hidrocalido. March 29, 1996 and Caasa 
podria ampararse o de piano irse de la ciudad. El Hidrocalido. March 30, 1996.
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his own standing, and that of the PAN. He had nothing to lose by the 
rescue of the water services, and a failure to accomplish it would have 
resulted in pressure for him to resign (Table 6.1).
These arguments are supported by the fact that the first effect of the 
rescue initiative on the local inhabitants was, as expected, positive. A 
survey carried out by CESMA revealed that 67 per cent of the inhabitants 
knew that the municipality had regained control of the water utilities, and 
85 per cent of this group supported the mayor.375 Seventy-five per cent 
agreed with the rescue initiative, and 70 per cent considered that they 
would benefit from the measure. There was also an immediate defence of 
the measure from PAN state headquarters, with the statement that the 
National Action Party expresses its total support...to the rescue initiative 
for the water services...it represents an answer to electoral promises.376 
At a meeting attended by 2,000 local PAN members, Alfredo Reyes stated 
that the problems facing the water utilities represent an inheritance from  
corrupt people who treat us as i f  we generated the problem.377 He was 
supported by PAN Local Deputy Fernando Herrera, who declared that the 
PRI is going, we are going to take them out, we are going to kick them 
from Aguascalientes.378 There was, therefore, a clear offensive against the
375 Centro de Estudios Sociales del Municipio de Aguascalientes (CESMA). 1996.Resultados 
del Estudio de Opinion Acerca del Rescate de CAASA por la Administracion Municipal de 
Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
376 A La Opinion Publica. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 26, 1996.
377 El Problema del Agua no esta Resuelto el Problema Apenas Empieza: Alfredo Reyes V. El 
Sol del Centro. April 1,1996.
378 Ibidem.,
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PRI. In fact, the new PAN hegemony in the state was operating in a 
manner which recalled previous PRI practices. For example, the PAN 
majority in the ayuntamiento and the state chamber ensured that no PRI 
initiative could be successful; there was an open campaign to discredit PRI 
members; and a deterioration in the relationship between the mayor and 
the governor. The concession scheme was to be manipulated in order to 
decrease the influence of the PRI amongst the electorate. The municipality 
gained support from business boards, PAN members, and at some stages 
from the general public (as shown by the CESMA survey). Most of the 
supporting organisations had links with Alfredo Reyes. He was a member 
of business organisations and a former president of two of them (CCE and 
COPARMEX). I t  is also important to consider that supporters' interests 
were affected because of the perceived impossibility of recovering overdue 
payments from CAASA.379 Goods and services provided by local investors, 
especially from the construction side, amounted to 20 MP.380 Nevertheless, 
members of some of these groups, including CCE and CEA, remained 
opposed to the rescue initiative. Social organisations (FOCA) were also 
active, and PAN members, favouring any resolution from the mayor, were 
in open battle against the PRI and other opposition parties and 
organisations against the rescue initiative.
379 Lo Importante es que ya se Sereno Todo: Noriega Aguilar. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
April 3, 1996.
380 El Rescate sera la ruina de muchos. El Hidrocalido. April 1, 1996.
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Table 6.1 Independent Citizens, Political, Social, and Civil Groups Supporting 
the Municipality of Aguascalientes Rescue Initiative (1996).
Political P a rtie s 381
PAN •  President of the C D E  Jorge Zam arripa, 
m em bers from  the ayuntam iento and Local 
Deputies.
Business Organisations 382
C C E  
C E A  and  
C O P A R M E X
C A N A C O
C N IC
•  President Rogelio N oriega Aguilar
•  President Roberto D ia z  Ruiz.
•  President Luis M iguel R enteria.
•  President Ricardo M agdaleno R.
Local Institutions
Comision del Rescate  
del Agua
Consejo Consultivo  
de C A P A M A .
•  T itu lar H ead M anuel R eed  Segovia.
•  M ayor Alfredo R eyes V elazquez.
National Organisations 303 A M M A C •  President Ram on Galindo
Social O rganisations 384
F O C A  (including  
A .A ..F E A P .U C D , 
A E A C P  and F O C I.
Consejo Municipal de  
Colonos
•  H eaded  by Rodolfo Solano, Antonio  
Hernandez, and Alfredo C ervantes.
•  Teodulo C astaneda and Felipe Carrillo.
Independent C itizens 385
S enator
Clergy
Influential Inhabitant
•  Enrique Franco M unoz (P A N ).
•  Bishop Rafael M ufi6z Nunez.
•  Felipe G onzalez G onzalez with links to PAN  
and business organisations; also a m em ber of 
the Comisidn de Rescate del Agua.
381 Anuncia el PAN un Mitin de Respaldo al Alcalde Reyes Velazquez Para el Domingo. El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996 and El Rescate del Agua no Significa 
Remunicipalizacion. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996.
382 Apoyaran los Empresarios el Rescate del Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 2, 
1996, Necesaria Readecuacion del Titulo. El Hidrocalido. April 15, 1996, Habrian Negado el 
Amparo al Apendice de ICA. El Hidrocalido. April 13, 1996 and El Unico Medio Para Meter 
en Cintura a CAASA fue el Rescate, Opina Ricardo Magdaleno Rgz. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. April 16, 1996.
383Desplegado de la Asociacion Mexicana de Municipios de Mexico, A.C. El Sol del Centro. 
April 1,1996.
384 Lo importante de la decision municipal fue la voluntad para acabar con los abusos. El 
Hidrocalido. April 4, 1996 and Al Rojo Vivo el Caso del Agua. El Sol del Centro. March 31, 
1996.
385 Comunicado de Prensa. El Sol del Centro. March 30, 1996. Felipe Gonzalez y Roberto 
Diaz Aceptaran, si se Oficializa, la invitation a la Comision Plural. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996 and La Autoridad Municipal Esta Haciendo lo Posible por 
Resolver el Problema del Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 1, 1996.
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Also, whilst local citizens like Felipe Gonzalez (later to become state 
governor (PAN) 1998-2004) and the Bishop of Aguascalientes Rafael 
Munoz (who supported PAN "behind the scenes") were influential, they 
had clear political interests behind their support. This evidence leads us 
inevitably to the conclusion that the rescue commission was constituted 
largely of organisations or individuals supporting Alfredo Reyes or linked 
with PAN.
Although supposedly 'plural' in composition, social interests were to be 
represented by Manuel Reed (head of CAPAMA and member of PAN), 
whilst other members included: Felipe Gonzalez G. (independent citizen 
linked to PAN); Luis Miguel Rentera (President of CANACO linked to 
Alfredo Reyes); Rogelio Noriega (President of the CCE linked to Alfredo 
Reyes); Rodolfo Solano (representative of FOCA and linked to the 
municipality); Jorge Zamarripa (President of the CDE of the PAN); Teodulo 
Castaneda; and Felipe Carrillo (both elected from the Consejo Municipal de 
Colonos promoted by Alfredo Reyes). Martin Molina of the CNA 
represented federal authorities. The only member from an opposition 
party was Cecilio Avila (President of the CDE of the PRD), since the state 
president of the CDE of the PRI and former mayor, Fernando Gomez, had 
declined the offer to join. Thus, the commission was highly politicised, and 
represented the interests of the PAN and Alfredo Reyes completely.
The Political Reverse of the Rescue Initiative: The Opponents 
The strategy to rescue the concession brought an immediate response, in 
the form of a coalition of opposition political parties and social 
organisations. Two ideologies prevailed within these groups: one pro the
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state government and pressuring local authorities to abandon the rescue 
initiative; the other promoting the extremist idea of carrying out a 
remunicipalizar of the water utilities (Table 6.2). The common aim of all 
the above organisations and political parties was to discredit PAN 
members and Mayor Alfredo Reyes. There was a clear political advantage 
to be gained by putting pressure on the mayor. Since the weakness of the 
concession scheme first became clear in 1995, social and political 
organisations had come to the fore, first against the PRI and later against 
the PAN. It  is clear, therefore, that the turmoil generated by the water 
utilities was being used simply as a pretext for the support or opposition of 
any local authority decisions. The real aim was to obtain a political gain by 
criticising any act of the party in power.
There was fierce opposition towards the PAN authorities from the PRD, 
PFCRN, PT, PVEM, and PRI. At the beginning of the PAN government, they 
were pressuring the mayor to fulfil campaign promises. When the rescue 
initiative was proposed, however, they opposed it, defining it as an act o f 
political illusion.386 Social organisations (including the 16 organisations 
that made up the APDC) were also determinedly against the rescue 
initiative, and were supported by a petition of 19,000 signatures. These 
groups defined the rescue plan as a unilateral and populist decision that 
does not guarantee any solution.387
386 Es un Acto de Ilusionismo Politico lo que Hizo el Ayuntamiento. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996.
387 Decision Populista y Unilateral que no Garantiza del Problema: AP. El Hidrocalido. March 
30, 1996.
234
The local trade union (FTA) played an important role, arguing that the 
rights of CAASA workers (600 employees of whom 400 were members of 
this union) had been jeopardised because of the legal impediment to 
recognising CAPAMA as the new employer. However, according to Manuel 
Reed, general manager of CAPAMA, and later in charge of CAASA (during 
the rescue initiative), none of these employees belonged to any trade 
union.388
Considering that the water concession was used as an instrument to make 
progress politically, one can assume that here again, for opponents of the 
rescue initiative, the objective was to destabilise the new political scenario 
in the capital rather than to look for a real solution. Even governor Otto 
Granados Roldan had been reluctant to reach any agreement, or to 
participate in any negotiations between federal and local authorities and 
CAASA. Alfredo Reyes stated that we all played our part; excluding the 
governor...It will be good to know i f  he is willing to meet the demands o f 
72 per cent o f the state inhabitants that represent the municipality. ,389The 
governor's disapproval was a result of his hostile relationship with Alfredo 
Reyes and with the PAN in Aguascalientes. He was clearly trying to avoid 
giving any assistance in order to minimise the possibility of reaching an 
agreement that could be interpreted as a political gain for Alfredo Reyes 
and the PAN, especially since elections were due during 1997 and 1998.
388 A la Opinion Publica. El Sol del Centro. April 3, 1996.
389 Rescataron el Agua..! Y Luego..?. El Sol del Centro. March 30, 1996.
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Table 6.2 Social, Political and Civil Organisations against the Municipality of 
Aguascalientes Resolution for the Rescue Initiative (1996).
Political P a rtie s JSU
PRI
P R D
P F C R N
P V E M
P D M
P T
P P S
PA R M
•  President of the C D E  and form er M ayor Fernando  
G om ez.
•  President of the C D E  Cecilio Avila and Local Deputy 
(LVI Legislature) Fernando A lferez Barbosa.
•  President o f the C D E  A d£n Pedroza E.
•  Rodolfo Lopez G arcia.
•  President o f the C D E  R ene Cam pos Zam brano.
•  President of the C D E  Juan Raul V e la  G onzalez.
•  M anuel de Jesus Banuelos H.
•  President of the C D E  Jorge G arc ia  D.
Social O rgan isa tions^1
A P D C •  Rodolfo Lopez G arcia.
U U A S P /F E O I •  Elias Castillo. Alfredo Cervantes and R am 6n Bciez.
Barra de Abogados •  Juan Jose M artinez Gallegos.
Business
O rganisations 392 C A N A IV E •  President Ernesto Lopez Valdivia
C A N A C IN T R A •  President Edgardo Rom o Muftoz
Union W orkers
F T A -C T M •  S enator Jorge Rodriguez Leon.
LCA •  Isidoro A rm endariz G arc ia .
S N O I •  Ism ael M artinez S anchez.
C R O C •  Refugio M arin.
Source: Own Elaboration using data from different publications.
390Acto de Autoridad que no se baso en los procedimientos establecidos: Gomez. El 
Hidrocalido. April 2, 1996. Es un Acto de Ilusionismo Politico lo que Hizo el Ayuntamiento. 
El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996, Empresarios e Invitados a la Comision 
Ciudadana del Agua son Empanizados. El Sol del Centro. March 2, 1996, No Cuenta con 
Consensos de la Poblacion ni del Congreso: AP. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 30, 
1996 and El Rescate del Agua es Espectacular Pero Insustancial Senalan en el PARM. El Sol 
del Centro. March 31, 1996.
391 Solution inmediata, contundente y seria demandan organizaciones al manifestarse. El 
Hidrocalido. March 31, 1996. Manifestaciones de Descontento son Provocadas por el 
Problema del Agua. El Sol del Centro, March 29, 1996 and Si fue sin Acuerdo, Tendra que 
Indemnizar a CAASA: Abogados. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. March 30, 1996.
392 No es Seguro que Bajen las Tarifas, Resuelto el Lio del Agua. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. April 9, 1996 and La Canacintra no respalda el metodo invocado para rescatar 
la concesion. El Hidrocalido. April 4, 1996.
393 A La Opinion Publica. El Hidrocalido. April 2, 1996, Manejo Populista ha Dado el 
Alcalde del PAN al Problema del Agua: IAG. El Sol del Centro. April 1, 1996 and Lo que la 
Ciudadania Quiere es que se Solucione Realmente el Problema del Agua. El Sol del Centro. 
April 3, 1996.
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6.3 The Rise of the Concession Scheme: A New Concession Title 
The Role of Interest Groups in Applying Pressure to Revoke the Rescue 
Initiative
Interest groups (state government, local business associations, the ICA 
group, and social organisations and opposition parties) played a 
fundamental role in pressuring local authorities to revoke the rescue 
initiative. This section will seek to identify the real aim behind revoking 
the rescue initiative, especially considering the key role of federal 
authorities in obtaining a solution.
The discussion so far has made clear the inexperience of Mayor Alfredo 
Reyes in local politics, and his shift in ideological stance regarding the 
water concession. The political and social turmoil generated by his 
unilateral decision to rescue the concession scheme provoked a serious 
threat to all levels of government. The immediate response from the ICA 
group (CAASA) was to take legal action against the municipality by 
arguing for protection in the form of habeas corpus (rejected by the 
judge). 394 This private group argued that an excessive act of power - 
ignoring the financial, operative, and technical justifications used by the 
municipality to rescue the concession - was actually taking place. The 
municipality was at a clear disadvantage in negotiations with CAASA due
394 The legal action was solicited to the judge in Aguascalientes on April 9, 1996. However, 
the second judge o f the State District rejected the injunction claimed by CAASA and SAASA 
on April 10, 1996. The same day this private body reached an agreement with the 
municipality. For more detail see the document prepared by Manuel Reed: Presidencia 
Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Reunion Informativa. Comision Plural para el Rescate de 
la Concesion del Servicio de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado del Municipio de Aguascalientes. 
April 13, 1996. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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to the weak legal position of the rescue initiative. An earlier presidential 
policy, supported by the new Mexican president, was also jeopardised by 
this action. Since 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994- 
2000) had demonstrated his desire to continue with concession schemes 
covering public utilities at a local government level. According to the Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda 1995-2000, such schemes were 
to represent a common technique used to provide water utilities 
throughout the Mexican municipalities.395
The interest from federal authorities, headed by the SEGOB (a clear sign 
of federal interest and the degree of politicisation of the water utilities in 
Aguascalientes), and represented by the Sub Secretario de Gobernacion, 
Arturo Nunez, and the Director General de Gobierno, Juan Burgos Pinto, 
encouraged lower levels of government to find a solution (i.e., to revoke 
the rescue initiative). The federal interest in continuing with the 
concession scheme also persuaded the State Governor Otto Granados 
Roldan that he had no choice but to collaborate with Alfredo Reyes, who 
publicly invited the governor to serve as a mediator.396 Furthermore, local 
authorities, as well as members of the ICA group (CAASA), became 
involved in the search for a final agreement.
The first sessions were held almost immediately after the rescue initiative 
was announced, with the exclusive aim of revoking it. The official minutas
395 Presidencia de la Republica. 1995. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y  Vivienda 1995- 
2000. Mexico: Direction General de Comunicacion Social.
396 Invitan al GE a ser parte de la solution del problema del agua. El Hidrocalido. April 2, 
1996.
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de trabajo reveal participation from members of the municipality (the 
Mayor Alfredo Reyes, the Secretario General de Ayuntamiento Francisco 
Javier Valdez de Anda, and the Sfndico Leobardo Gutierrez), CAPAMA 
(titular Manuel Reed), CAASA (General Manager Pedro Gonzalez, the 
Manager of SAASA Enrique Valencia and the legal representative of these 
bodies Pedro Martinez), the state government (the Secretario General de 
Gobierno Jesus Orozco Castellanos and the Sub Secretario General de 
Gobierno Luis Fernando Munoz Lopez), and federal authorities (the 
Comision Nacional del Agua Deputy Director, Cesar Herrera). 397 
I t  is important to note that the State Governor Otto Granados Roldan was 
represented by members of his cabinet and did not participate personally 
in the negotiations. This was a clear symbol, in the context of Mexican 
politics, of his disapproval of the PAN government and its policies. The 
recently constituted Comision del Rescate was not included (Manuel Reed 
did participate but as General Manager of CAPAMA) and was suddenly 
dissolved by Alfredo Reyes to incorporate some members on the board of 
CAPAMA.398 This is confirmation that this commission never represented a 
serious or genuine attempt to solve the water problems. All of the social 
organisations that had appeared spontaneously on the political scene, and 
which did not participate directly in any definitive meetings, met the same
397 According to the official documents {minutas de trabajo) the firsts session using the state 
government as a mediator was held on April 3. Further sessions were held on the 4 and 10 
April; May 11,13,14,15,25; and June 3, 6, 12 and 24 1996.
398 De un Plumazo Borraron la Comision Plural del Rescate. El Hidrocalido. April 9, 1996. 
The Comision de Rescate, or Comision Plural, was intended to be integrated with the Board 
of CAPAMA.
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end. Political parties were also excluded from the negotiations. In fact, 
CAASA and the municipality were the only parties involved, with mediation 
by the state government.
The Fall of the Rescue Initiative
The willingness of Alfredo Reyes to revoke the rescue initiative was 
evident from the first session (April 3), in which the mayor announced his 
intention to revoke it.399 Thus, it is clear that Alfredo Reyes had two 
different faces: one for the real negotiations and the other for the public, 
who were told that the ayuntamiento is evaluating the possibility o f 
remunicipalizar the services.400 At the third meeting, on April 10, the 
municipality agreed, under certain conditions, to revoke the rescue 
initiative. At the same time, all assets reverted to CAASA from local 
authorities. The municipality justified the return of the water utilities to 
CAASA on the grounds that this private body had agreed to certain 
conditions (as imposed on the rescue initiative), and consequently further 
support could be considered from federal, state, and local institutions.401 
The conditions were as follows:
• the modification of the conditions of the contract and its annexes
399 Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Minuta de Trabajo de la Primera Reunion 
de Negociaciones con la Mediacion del Gobierno del Estado entre las Autoridades del H. 
Ayuntamiento y  CAASA para Resolver el Problema de la Prestacidn del Servicio Publico del 
Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado en el Municipio de Aguascalientes. April 3, 1996, 
Aguascalientes, Mexico.
400 No hay decision sobre futuro del Agua. El Hidrocalido. April 8, 1996.
401 Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Minuta de Trabajo de la 3ra Reunion de 
Negociacion con la Mediacion del Gobierno del Estado entre las Autoridades del H. 
Ayuntamiento y  CAASA para Resolver el Problema de la Prestacidn del Servicio Publico del 
Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado en el Municipio de Aguascalientes. April 10, 1996, 
Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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according to the agreements reached under the title of sfntesis de los 
cambios propuestos al tftulo de concesion; the adoption of an integral, 
efficient, and equitable financial system for the provision of the water 
utilities; the restructuring of the water ta riff according to new 
modifications to the consumption rank (lowering the minimum 
consumption); the contribution of financial resources to modify its 
economic structure; and the capacity to re-invest in new infrastructure 
and repair of the existing one.402 
• CAASA must make a fresh financial contribution worth 40 MP: 30 MP 
for existing liabilities and 10 MP for fresh investment. In consequence, and 
under specific conditions, federal subsidy worth an extra 40 MP would be 
considered through the CNA in order to pay CAASA liabilities, and 60 per 
cent of the payments made by CAASA for the rights to extract water to 
the CNA would be returned as direct and extra subsidy. The municipality 
would also contribute a total of 40 MP of indirect subsidy, investing 13 MP 
during the rest of 1996 and 1997 in water infrastructure. I t  would also re­
absorb former liabilities from BANOBRAS transferred to CAASA in 1995, 
worth 27 MP. The state government would generate an extra subsidy 
worth 40 MP to rehabilitate the financial schema of the concession. In 
total, this package represented financial support or subsidies from all 
levels of government worth 160 MP against CAASA's debt - estimated at 
around 230MP and mainly owed to the infrastructure development bank,
402 Exigen el Saneamiento Financiero a CAASA. El Hidrocalido. April 16, 1996.
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Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios (BANOBRAS).403 
In view of the agreements reached through these negotiations, one can 
assume that the only objective of the rescue initiative - which, according 
to official sources, cost the tax payer 3.5 MP - was to convince the public 
that Alfredo Reyes was fulfilling a campaign promise.404 The municipality 
agreed to respect all the previous accords with CAASA that had been 
reached before Reyes announced the rescue initiative. The financial 
conditions imposed on CAASA did not differ from those established during 
previous negotiations, mediated by the SEGOB and the CNA, as discussed 
earlier.
However, the general public were unaware of Reyes' previous negotiations 
with CAASA, and believed former agreements to be new achievements. 
The rescue initiative was an attempt simply to revalidate the image of 
Alfredo Reyes and, consequently, of the PAN in the municipality, and to 
rush CAASA and state authorities into modifying the contract. However, as 
noted earlier, the actual financial and political results pointed in another 
direction, putting further pressure on Reyes to revoke it.
The state authorities played a key role, and were supported by State 
Governor Otto Granados Roldan, who encouraged CAASA and the
403 Se Busca Financiamiento para el Agua. El Sol del Centro. May 4, 1996.
404 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Diario de Debates 1996. Secretaria del H. 
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Acta No. 20/96. Tomo I, pp. 225, Aguascalientes, Mexico. The 
financial burden absorbed by the municipality, representing 3..5 MP, is accounted for by the 
period in which CAPAMA took over CAASA responsabilities and confronted its operational 
costs such as wages and salaries, power, and rent.
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municipality to reach a new agreement. What interest, therefore, did the 
governor have in mediating (using state government officials) these 
meetings? It  is clear that federal authorities, encouraged by international 
institutions willing to invest in the modernisation of the water 
infrastructure (World Bank and BID), persuaded the state government to 
move towards finding a solution.405 I t  can be concluded, therefore, that all 
the economic aid granted to resolve CAASA's financial difficulties was 
granted in order to avoid possible negative repercussions upon federal 
policies, which might jeopardise the implementation of further 
privatisation schemes in the Mexican municipalities. I t  is important also to 
consider that a large part of CAASA liabilities were owned by federal 
institutions. Furthermore, the State Governor Otto Granados Roldan 
legitimised his image and credibility, and proved that without the 
governor's support, local politics does not work.
Even when the future of the water utilities had been decided, the local 
inhabitants were unaware that CAASA was going to regain the concession. 
There was daily speculation until April 18, when it was officially announced 
that the rescue initiative was to be revoked.406 The initiative, proposed by 
Alfredo Reyes, was passed in the ayuntamiento thanks to the PAN 
majority.407 The opposition parties (PT, PC, PVEM, PRD, and one member
405 Negocios. Sequia en el negocio del agua. El Financiero. May 19, 1996 and En Riesgo, el 
Financiamiento del BID Para la Concesion del Servicio del Agua en Mexico. El Financiero 
Occidente. June 17, 1996.
406 Reintegraron instalaciones a Caasa. El Hidrocalido. April 19,1996.
407 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Diario de Debates 1996. Secretaria del H. 
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Acta No. 18/96, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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of the PRI) rejected the petition, and there was one abstention from the 
remaining regidor of the PRI, later on the Board of CAPAMA.408 Three legal 
impediments remained: the modifications to the concession title  had to be 
approved by the ayuntamiento, and the state legislature had both to 
modify the Ley de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y su Reuso 
del Estado de Aguascalientes, and to revalidate the new contract.
The Repercussions of Revoking the Rescue Initiative: The Political Aims 
As has been shown, the decision to revoke the rescue initiative was made 
by CAASA and the municipality by means of state mediation but without 
the consent of local inhabitants or social and political organisations. By the 
time the negotiations regarding the new contract began, PAN was the only 
party involved in the process. Alfredo Reyes confirmed this with his 
statement that the reforms to the concession title reached 99 per cent...I 
did not allow the participation o f regidores from the oppositionf because 
they were contaminating the environment.409 However, the PAN was 
facing internal conflicts, which postponed modifications to the concession 
title and contributed to the confusion of local inhabitants regarding the 
future of the water utilities. At the same time, Alfredo Reyes was 
experiencing external pressure to reach a solution (from the national 
committee of the PAN). Juan Miguel Alcantara stated that the water 
conflict is damaging the party (PAN); due to this, a fast political solution
408 to find the members from this regulatory board see: CAPAMA. 1996. Acta de la Sesion 
Extraordinaria del Consejo Directivo de la Comision de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado del 
Municipio de Aguascalientes. April 18, 1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
409 A Proposito. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. July 2, 1996.
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must be found, as it  will be by means o f remunicipalizar (regaining control 
over the water utilities).410 The Regidor (PAN) Eduardo Suarez stated that 
the final modifications have been delayed because there is not consensus 
amongst the sfndicos and regidores.411 Nevertheless, Alfredo Reyes 
suddenly discovered the benefits of an open economy, and dismissed his 
core campaign promise of revoking the concession scheme. He argued; 
that alternative, it  does not fit  in a country whose model is focused on 
globalisation, the liberation o f controls and where the government, by its 
own financial disability, can no longer attend directly to certain services, 
even though it  is its responsibility to regulate them, to guarantee and to 
provide them through third parties.412 The euphoria then prevalent over 
privatisation was an important tool for his administration, without regard 
for electoral promises. According to this new political and economic 
ideology of Alfredo Reyes, the water utilities will never be returned to 
public management.
The immediate response from opposition parties was to resist the 
modifications to the concession title, on the grounds that CAASA is the 
only beneficiary. These parties were excluded from the negotiations, and 
only the PRD participated at a later stage.413 Even the private sector
410 Revolotea el Fantasma Remunicipalizacion. El Hidrocalido. July 4, 1996.
411 Urgen Cambios de Fondo y no de Forma en la Concesion del Agua. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. June 21, 1996.
412 No hay vuelta de Hoja: Caasa se queda. El Hidrocalido. July 8, 1996.
413 Devuelve el Alcalde la Concesion del Agua a Caasa. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 
19, 1996.
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(CCE), through Rogelio Noriega, who had previously lent strong support to 
the mayor, argued that it  is true that the society will have to pay for the 
financial rescue o f CAASA... nonetheless, it  was the only option.41* The 
mayor's reply was that the ones who made this problem were the previous 
administration —  PRI...what we are doing now is ju s t solving the 
problem inherited from th em 415 As has been shown, the battle between 
PAN and its opposition parties still represented the real political issue 
behind the fight over the water utilities. The influence of CAASA in the 
negotiations was also heavily questionable. Meanwhile, social 
organisations (UUAP, APDC) were making it difficult for Alfredo Reyes to 
move forward with the modifications to the concession title, promoting a 
ju icio politico (political judgement) against him.416
In order to minimise the effects of the failure to meet the campaign 
promise to reduce the water tariff, CAASA and CAPAMA introduced the 
programa de canceiacion de adeudos (debt cancellation programme), the 
idea of which was to eliminate overdue receipts.417 This was used as a 
strategy to placate the public, and there were also internal negotiations 
promoted by regidores to favour members of their own parties. However, 
the core promise to reduce the water ta riff (representing the main reason
414 Rasposa censura de Canacintra por la farsa del rescate fugaz. El Hidrocalido. April 20, 
1996.
415 El Impacto Social del Regreso de la Concesion a CAASA es Satisfactorio. El Sol del 
Centro. April 20,1996.
416 Con Usted. Procede el Juicio Politico? El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. July 12, 1996.
417 Programa Canceiacion de Adeudos CAASA y CAPAMA Para mas de 35 mil usuarios de 
Agua. El Sol del Centro. July 3, 1996.
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to revoke the concession scheme) did not last long. The manager of 
CAPAMA, Manuel Reed, soon announced unavoidable increments to the 
water ta riff for the coming months, arguing that the inflation rate had 
severely affected the provision of the water services. Indexation to the 
inflation rate meant that, in theory, this should have been automatic. This 
added to public dissatisfaction with the new concession title .418 In the 
meantime, the manager of SAASA, Enrique Valencia, and the general 
Manager of CAASA, Pedro Gonzalez, (General Manager of OMSA, 
subsidiary of ICA and Generate des Eaux water concessions) were replaced 
by Humberto Blancarte Alvarado. Taking charge of CAASA and SAASA, he 
urged the municipality to hurry up and make the modifications to the new 
concession in order to start the 40 MP financial programme previously 
agreed.419 The rescue of the water utilities and the delay to the 
modifications of the contract thus generated a great deal of political 
instability and uncertainty regarding the future of the concession scheme, 
and provided extra ground for those against the PAN government and its 
policies to campaign upon.
418 Ante lo Costoso del Sistema de Operacion del Servicio del Agua Obliga a Subir Tarifas: 
MR. El Sol del Centro. July 12,1996.
419 Sin nuevo titulo no habra mas inversiones. ElHidrocalido. July 3, 1996.
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6.4 The Dominance of the PAN in the State: Recalling Previous PRI
Practices
The New Paternity of the Concession Scheme: A PAN Prerogative
The control by PAN of the ayuntamiento and the state legislature recalled 
previous PRI dominance, as did the practices they used to pass the 
concession title. Alfredo Reyes managed, during secret meetings, to 
persuade the PAN faction inside the ayuntamiento and the state legislature 
to pass his initiative; opposition parties were excluded from this 
process.420 In order to explain how PAN dominance was used to return the 
concession scheme to CAASA, this section will look at the process in four 
stages.
• First Stage
The return of the concession scheme to CAASA was subject to 
modifications to decrees 32, 89, and 62. On August 30, the state 
legislature passed, by a slight majority (13 votes from the PAN and two 
from the PRI in favour; five from the PRI, one from the PRD, one from the 
PT, and the remaining from the PC against, with four PRI abstentions), the 
reform of decree 32, extending the period of the concession from 20 to 30 
years, amongst other financial and operational amendments.421 There 
were modifications to decree 89, allowing CAASA to effect the financial 
guarantee in accordance with article 1 of this decree; and to decree 62, 
establishing the financial conditions of the concession scheme and its
420 Descartada ya la Remunicipalizacion del Servicio de Agua. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
July 10, 1996.
421 Seguira la Mafia del Agua Potable. El Sol del Centro. September 14, 1996.
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period of duration.422 These were published by decree 44 in the Periodico 
Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes (POEA) on September 15.423 
• Second Stage
The most controversial element was the modification, on September 13, to 
the Ley de los Sistemas Agua Potable, Alcantarillado/ Saneamiento y su 
Reuso del Estado de Aguascalientes. This was published, by decree 47, in 
the Periodico Oficial on September 15. One of the most substantial 
modifications was the creation of organismos municipales (municipality 
boards) for the provision of the water utilities in the state. These would 
act as either direct providers, using a consejo directivo (executive board); 
or, where there was a concession, through a regulatory supervisor 
ciudadanizado (citizens' supervision board), made up of representatives 
from federal, state, and local authorities, and social representations. 
CAPAMA would have no further place in the water structure in the state. In 
the light of previous experience, it can be assumed that the aim behind 
these amendments was primarily political. By passing responsibility for the 
turmoil to the newly-created board, and consequently to the state 
legislature, the municipality could escape its own responsibility. The law 
was passed with 13 votes from PAN, two from the PRI, and one from the 
PT. The PC, PRD, and six members of the PRI voted against, with three 
PRI abstentions.
422 Decrees 32, 89 and 62 were previously published by the Periodico Oficial del Estado de 
Aguascalientes on January 31,1993, January 30,1994 and October 24, 1996 respectively.
423 Nos Receto AN 30 Anos de Agua Cara. El Sol del Centro. August 31,1996.
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• Third Stage
The final document was due ten months after the arrival of Alfredo Reyes. 
On October 11, the modifications to the concession title were approved by 
the ayuntamiento with 12 votes from the PAN and one from the PT. There 
were votes against from the PRI (two), PFCRN, PVEM, and PRD, which 
emphasised the PAN's unfulfilled campaign promises.424 Whilst the final 
document was being prepared, Alfredo Reyes used all the PAN force in the 
state to avoid any confrontation with the opposition that could jeopardise 
the concession scheme. The political doctrines of the PAN took precedence 
over any other social or political ideology or solution to the problem: they 
believed that the new contract represented the best deal for the local 
inhabitants.
• Fourth Stage
The final approval for the concession scheme came on December 13, and 
was published by decree 65 in the POEA on December 29, 1996. At this 
session, the 13 PAN Deputies, supported by one from the PRI, passed the 
initiative returning control over the concession of the water utilities to the 
private group CAASA under the ICA and Generale des Eaux partnership. 
The remaining deputies, without any intervention from any political party, 
rejected it.
At each of these stages the PAN majority prevailed, in collusion with 
members from the PRI. At the first stage, the goal was to modify decrees
424 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Diario de Debates 1996. Secretaria del H. 
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Tomo II. Acta 33/96. October 11,1996. Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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32, 62, and 89, and the water law, to cope with the proxy modifications of 
the concession title. The co-operation of the PRI at later stages begs the 
question of why that party was interested in promoting this reform. The 
Oficial Mayor (chief administrative officer) of the LVI State Legislature, 
Miguel Angel Najera, argued that State Governor Otto Granados Roldan 
was behind this support; he encouraged PRI members to pass the 
initiative for two reasons. He wanted to avoid jeopardising federal 
programmes, and to continue with further concession schemes in the 
remaining municipalities; and he was concerned to pass the political 
consequences of modifying the water law, and later of approving the 
concession title, to the PAN.
The New Concession Title: The Core Amendments
The new concession title was intended, according to the Regidor for the 
water utilities, Edna Lorena Pacheco, to adapt the conditions of the 
concession scheme according to municipal necessities. I t  would match 
demand and availability of the hydraulic resources; guarantee an 
equitable, regular, and efficient provision of the water utilities; and 
consolidate a just administrative relationship between the municipality and 
CAASA. For these purposes, 42 out of 46 conditions were modified.425 
Mayor Alfredo Reyes argued that it  is considered an exportable work in 
support o f the programme o f president Zedillo, since all cities with more 
than 80 thousand inhabitants will make concessions for the water 
services...the adjustments to the concession title will be complemented
425 Ibidem.,
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with the reforms proposed to the Ley de Aguas Naciona/es.426 I t  can thus 
be assumed that the new agreement was reached under federal scrutiny, 
using previous experience to avoid repeating earlier mistakes.
An examination of the core amendments illustrates the ways in which 
CAASA was favoured. Even so, the municipality was actively trying to 
persuade local citizens of the benevolence of the new contract. The most 
relevant of the modifications,427 for this case study, were the following:
• The concession scheme was extended from 20 to 30 years, subject to 
CAASA's efficiency in the provision of the services.
• In case of proven serious deficiencies, there could be partial 
intervention (previous notification) into any of CAASA's internal 
functions for no more than 90 days. I f  no accord could be reached, the 
concession could be terminated by mutual consent, or it could be 
terminated unilaterally if CAASA failed to fulfil any of its obligations. In 
that case the municipality would absorb the total responsibility for 
provision of the services. In any contingency CAASA must indemnify its 
workers. The figure of patron subsituto (employer substitute) was also 
introduced.
• The water tariff was to be formulated according to the maintenance
426 Avaladas en 99% Reformas al Titulo de Concesion del Agua: ARV. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. July 2, 1996.
427 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1996. Diario de Debates 1996. Secretaria del H. 
Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. Tomo II. Acta 33/96. October 11, 1996. Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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and operative costs and return on CAASA's investment capital, and 
fixed according to: a) the inflation rate as established on the Indice 
Nacional de Precios a! Consumidor (INPC), b) CAASA investments, c) 
tax payments, and d) operative deficits generated during previous 
years actualised at real prices. I t  would also include grants to the social 
fund, concession rights (ten per cent of the invoices) and rights to 
exploit the water sources, and the charges made by state authorities 
for usage of the treatment plants. The tariff also included the following 
modifications: the reduction of the minimum consumption from 40m3 
to 20m3; the introduction of a tarifa con memoria (charge for exact 
consumption after 20m3), which eliminated the cobros escalonados 
(scaleable charges) and was indexed to the inflation rate to reflect the 
effects on CAASA operational tools (electricity, gasoline, and salaries, 
amongst others); the creation of a Fondo de Apoyo Social (social fund 
aid); the stipulation that the ta riff would be revised every four years or 
when necessary, and that charges would be due every two months but 
calculated in monthly instalments; all levels of government were to be 
required to pay for water services; overdue users were to be required 
to pay an interest rate of CETES (28 days) but would not have their 
water services entirely suspended; and the municipality was to 
reimburse CAASA for any deficit occasioned by the impossibility of 
adjusting the water tariff, and to exhibit a surety worth 15 MP to the 
SHCP, actualised annually accordingly to the INPC, notwithstanding the 
statement in the contract that CAASA would not be profitable until year 
18 of the concession. In fact, other ICA subsidiaries, including SAASA,
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were profitable.
• CAASA could sub-contract only in specific circumstances approved by 
the municipality. Also, the CNA would reimburse 60 per cent of income 
from the rights to extract the water.
• The three levels of government (federal, state, and local authorities) 
would participate by proposing solutions to the ever-present problem of 
finding alternative water sources. Also, CAASA must monitor the 
quality of potable water and, for the first time, pay the state 
government for the use of the water treatment plants.
• The municipality would charge ten per cent of the rights of the 
concession but return 80 per cent of this for water investments and 
electricity payments, the remaining 20 per cent to be used to finance 
the Fondo de Apoyo Social.
• CAASA must present its audited financial reports to the municipality 
when requested, must recognise a financial ceiling for debt, and must 
exhibit a surety to local authorities to be actualised annually, worth 15 
MP.
• Any urban growth and consequent necessary investments in the water 
utilities would be absorbed by the privately-run companies responsible 
for house building or fraccionadores, excluding only rehabilitation 
works.
Further, the board of CAPAMA authorised the water tariff (valid until
December 1996) to be set at a minimum consumption of up to 20m3, at
$28 for zone A, $35.5 for zone B, and $46.5 for zone C domestic
properties, $60 for the industrial areas, for commercial users $47 and for
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the rural areas $16; each additional m3 consumed would be charged 
according to a different tariff.
Even so, these modifications did not result in any considerable reduction. 
Compared to prices in December 1995, the only benefit was for consumers 
of less than 40m3 - basically those in domestic zone A (daily consumption 
of around 300 to 400 litres per inhabitant).428 For all other users, there 
were considerable increments for consumption greater than 50m3. The 
promise to decrease the water tariff was thus no more than demagogy, 
since this was clearly economically impossible.429
The new contract invited further questions regarding the aims behind 
returning the concession scheme to CAASA. I t  is not the aim of this 
research to make an exhaustive analysis of the modifications, but Alfredo 
Reyes' promises to find a solution that would benefit the whole society 
evaporated completely with the arrival of this concession title. Instead, he 
contributed only to solving the financial problems facing CAASA. A clear 
example of this was the revaluation of the water ta riff authorised under 
the new contract. At the start of 1997 this represented a nominal increase 
of 32 per cent; from February 1997 it was to be adjusted monthly until 
the end of the year according to the INPC, leading to additional 
increments of seven per cent in real terms at the start of 1998 and 1999,
428 Siguen las Dudas del Pueblo Sobre el Servicio del Agua. El Sol del Centro. May 3, 1996.
429 For more detail see: Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes 1996-1998. 1996. Comision 
Plural para el Rescate del Servicio de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado del Municipio de 
Aguascalientes. April 13, 1996, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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in addition to a monthly indexation (INPC) until the end of the concession. 
Thus, the rescue initiative only generated false expectations and 
contributed to greater politicisation. The financial burden accumulated by 
CAASA, and the impossibility that the municipality could absorb this, made 
it unrealistic for CAPAMA to reassume responsibility for the services. Any 
attempt to abolish CAASA could only have been for the purposes of 
political expediency. Table 6.3 presents data on the evolution of the 
concession scheme during 1996. The dates refer to official sessions of the 
ayuntamiento and the state legislature.
T a b le  6 .3
E v o lu t io n  o f  t h e  C o n c e s s io n  S c h e m e  f o r  t h e  W a t e r  U t i l i t i e s  in  t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y
o f  A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .
1 9 9 6 A m e n d m e n t
J a n u a r y  1 • Arrival of Alfredo Reyes Esparza representing the first opposition 
government (PAN) in the Municipality.
M a r c h  2 8 • The Ayuntamiento approves the Declaratoria de Rescate, 
reversing the concession scheme to the Municipality.
A p r i l  1 8 • The Ayuntamiento returns the concession scheme to CAASA 
under certain conditions and modifications to the concession title 
(contract).
A u g u s t  3 0 • The state legislature passes the initiative (decree 44) to reform 
decrees 32, 62 and 89 to cope with the concession title.
S e p t e m b e r  1 3 • The state legislature adjusts, by decree 47, the Ley de Agua 
Potable, Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y su Reuso del Estado de 
Aguascalientes (decree 60).
O c t o b e r  11 • The Ayuntamiento passes the modifications of the concession title.
D e c e m b e r  1 3 • The state legislature endorses the modifications to the concession 
title and legally returns the concession scheme to CAASA.
Own Elaboration using data from the official resolutions
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Concluding Note
The arrival in power of the former opposition party (PAN) was no 
guarantee that campaign promises would be met, especially as these were 
focused on reducing the water tariff, revoking the concession, and the 
remunicipalizar of the water utilities. The elected mayor, Alfredo Reyes, 
was inexperienced, indecisive and entirely politically motivated, and the 
government simply reproduced the undemocratic behaviour and practices 
of the previous administration.
The dominance of PAN, and their failure to fulfil campaign promises, 
encouraged the arrival on the political scene of a variety of social 
organisations and political parties, aiming to exploit social dissatisfaction 
and destabilise the PAN government. The water utilities were used and 
politicised by any and all political groups in order to benefit from the 
public dissatisfaction with the PAN - basically, it was clear that the first 
political benefits would be reaped by whichever group was perceived to 
have resolved the problems. The PAN response was clearly populist and 
political, rather than realistic, but the actual result was a political reverse 
for that party, and CAASA was put in a favourable position in which to 
negotiate a new contract. The municipality's financial obligations to CAASA 
made the reversal of the concession unavoidable.
Thus, the arrival in power of an opposition party does not necessarily 
mean .better government, especially in the context of the rigid political 
structures that have prevailed during the last 70 years in the Mexican 
municipalities. Campaign promises, and a people's desire for 'change', are 
core factors in gaining power, but the evidence here shows that campaign
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promises are not necessarily equal to governmental actions. Policies are 
linked to interests and not to necessities. The re-integration of the 
concession scheme with the private body CAASA proves two definitive 
hypotheses. First, the concession scheme resisted the politicisation 
generated around the water utilities. Second, the municipality cannot 
move forward without considering the concession scheme for the water 
utilities, since its own development is tied to it. The next chapter will 
investigate whether the modifications granted to the concession title 
resulted in better services and lower costs, and will examine the 
subsequent political affects.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Effects of Political Change on the Future of the Water 
Concession: The Dominance of the PAN in
Aguascalientes - Setting the Scene (1997-1998)
Introduction
This chapter will focus on the development of the water utilities concession 
during 1997 and until the end of the elections period in 1998. Section 7.1, 
focusing on 1997, first examines the affects upon the local inhabitants of 
the two core modifications granted to the concession title by PAN 
prerogative. Later, it examines the hydrological conditions facing the 
water utilities, and explains the affects of the water ta riff upon local 
inhabitants. Section 7.2 looks at the events surrounding the federal 
elections period in 1997, highlighting the predominance of the PRI whilst 
also noting the opposition parties, specifically the PAN and PRD. After 
looking at the results, it examines the further politicisation of the 
concession scheme caused by the ta riff referred to above, and then looks 
at the uncertain future facing the scheme by the end of 1997. Section 7.3 
considers the events of 1998, in particular the rise of the PAN in the state. 
For this purpose, it concentrates upon explaining the role of partisan 
groups, who politicised the arena by promoting an audit of the private 
group, CAASA. In Section 7.4, it concentrates on the last period of our 
research by focusing upon the fall of the PRI and the rise of the new 
political hegemony in the state with the arrival of the PAN. Firstly, the 
section explains the results of these local elections. Later, it analyses them 
and attempts to explain how the PAN gained power. Finally, this section
259
describes the characteristics of the water utilities, by 1998, and their 
future. The final section presents an overview of the water concession, 
and draws conclusions.
7.1 1997: New Concession Title, New Collateral Effects, and One Winner: 
The PAN.
The Effects of the Modifications to the Concession Title (Contract)
Elections for federal deputies were planned for the summer of 1997 (June 
6), and the run-up to them was marked by political effervescence. The 
affects of the new concession were still politically unpredictable for the 
PAN, but were already progressing. To put it another way, the water tariff 
had already been increased, but the backlash from this had not yet 
materialised. Consequently, this section will attempt to identify the effects 
of the modifications granted to the concession title on the local political 
arena.
As already noted, mixing water and politics creates a lethal cocktail for 
any political party. Therefore, the modifications granted to the concession 
title by PAN prerogative must be evaluated with consideration of two main 
actions carried out at the start of 1997. First, an amendment was 
introduced abolishing the regulatory body CAPAMA, and replacing it with a 
new organismo supervisor ciudadanizado (citizen's board).430 The 
ayuntamiento passed by majority the creation of the new body, the
430 As established in the modifications granted to decree 47 o f the Ley de Agua Potable, 
Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y  su Reuso en El Estado de Aguascalientes on September 15, 
1996.
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Comision Ciudadana de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Munfcipio de 
Aguascalientes (CCAPAMA - Citizen's Commission for the Potable Water 
and Wastewater of the Aguascalientes Municipality). The former regulatory 
body CAPAMA suffered two main modifications: first, a letter C was added 
to its name,431 and second, its board included representatives from 
federal, state, and local authorities, besides local organisations (employee 
boards and council representatives).432 However, the ayuntamiento 
neglected to pass this reform to the state legislature for its revalidation, 
and it became legal only after eight months.433
The second amendment was to the imminent increases in the water tariff 
(32 per cent plus an inflation actualisation) established in the concession 
title and which were due to start at the beginning of 1997. The CCAPAMA 
authorised the following water tariffs for consumption up to 20m3: 
domestic zone A $39.21, zone B $49.73, zone C$65.14, commercial 
$70.13, and industrial $84.16; for the rural sector, up to 30m3 
consumption would be charged at $39.21. Additional consumption would 
be charged according to a different tariff. The new structure of the water 
ta riff also included state and local official dependencies, such as churches, 
schools, hospitals, public parks, and gardens, all of which were assessed
431 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes 1996-1998. 1997. Diario de Debates 1997. 
Secretaria del H. Ayuntamiento 1996-1998. January 15, 1997. Session 48/97. Aguascalientes. 
Mexico.
432 To find out about the members o f the Comision Ciudadana see: Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes 1996-1998. 1997. Diario de Debates 1997. Secretaria del H. Ayuntamiento 
1996-1998. January 15,1997. Session 48/97. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
433 CCAPAMA no Existe. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 19,1997.
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for a water ta riff equal to domestic ta riff B. Nevertheless, some subsidies 
were considered for hospitals and schools.434 These figures represented 
substantial increases compared to the December 1996 figures, and prove 
two main hypotheses of this research: Firstly, that the PAN and Alfredo 
Reyes' campaign promises were only a strategy to gain power. They 
exploited the dissatisfaction of the local inhabitants regarding the granting 
of the water concession to the private group CAASA, specifically with 
regard to the water tariff. Even when the PAN campaign promises and 
government actions (revoking the concession scheme) were used as a 
strategy to reduce the water tariff, the reduction was subsidised by local 
authorities during 1996 in order to minimise the negative effects on the 
electorate. I t  is clear that local authorities recognised the impossibility of 
implementing populist policies, such as a long-term direct subsidy of the 
water tariff, in order to obtain a political gain. Secondly, the role of CAASA 
in the negotiations, and the subsequent modifications to the concession 
title, proved to be of benefit initially to this private group. Nonetheless, it 
is necessary to consider that the former conditions might well have worse 
for the municipality.
Thus, the concession scheme was fixed according to PAN ideology and 
political philosophy. This view is reinforced by Alfredo Reyes' statement 
that the water utilities are a decisive factor in the coming elections...it is
434 CCAPAMA. 1997. Tarifas de Agua, Valor Abril de 1997. Aguascalientes. Mexico, as 
published on the El Sol del Centro on April 1,1997.
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going to be a decisive factor but for the good, because there have been 
achievements from the government to solve the problems and to tie 
CAASA's hands to avoid abuses.435 Although his comments focused on 
what he believed to be great achievements, it is evident that the PAN 
strategy in promoting the benefits of the new concession title was 
designed to make progress in the coming elections.
The Critical Hydrological Circumstances Facing the Water Utilities: An Extra 
Factor Affecting Efficient Provision of the Services, Adding a Political 
Implication
Although the city capital of Aguascalientes is considered by the national 
research institution, INEGI, and revalidated by the CNA, as among the 
municipalities with the most extensive coverage of potable water (98 per 
cent) and wastewater (97.8 per cent) in Mexico; and although the state is 
one of the top two states, with 98 per cent of potable water and 94 per 
cent of wastewater coverage436 (the estimated national average is 84 per 
cent for potable water, and 67 per cent for wastewater),437 the very 
precarious condition of the water utilities in the city capital of 
Aguascalientes prompted local authorities to consider further investments 
in the sector.438 Not only the water utilities, but the actual natural
435 Podria Desaparecer la Concesion del Agua. El Hidrocalido. March 10,1997.
436 Just behind the Distrito Federal which represents the first city (not municipality) with the 
most extensive coverage o f water and wastewater services in Mexico. To find more see: 
Nuestro Estado en, 2 lugar nacional en agua. El Hidrocalido. December 8,1997.
437 INEGI. 1997. Estadisticas: Aguascalientes. Aguascalientes, Mexico.
438 This argument is reinforced by an interview given by the president to the Asociacion 
Mexicana de Hidraulica in Aguascalientes published in: Red de agua potable, obsoleta. El Sol 
del Centro. June 11, 1998.
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resource itself, faced dramatic conditions (over-exploitation, pollution, and 
low water quality). For our purposes, this section will seek to discover how 
the conditions of the water utilities undermined confidence in the 
concession scheme, encouraging a permanent politicisation. See Table 7.1 
for details of the water conditions in the city capital of Aguascalientes.
T a b l e  7 .1  C o n d i t io n s  o f  t h e  W a t e r  S e r v ic e s  in  t h e  M u n ic ip a l i t y  o f  
A g u a s c a l i e n t e s  ( 1 9 9 7 )
C o v e r a g e  o f  P o t a b le  W a t e r  S u p p ly 98% (state media 98%)
C o v e r a g e  o f  W a s t e w a t e r  S e r v ic e s 97.8% (state media 94%)
W a t e r  U s e s 78 % agricultural
22 % domestic, industrial, and services
A n n u a l  W a t e r  E x t r a c t io n 574 million of M3
A n n u a l  D e f ic i t 274 million of M3
D e e p  W a t e r  E x t r a c t io n 300-600 metres
A n n u a l  S u b s i d e n c e 3-4 metres
N u m b e r  o f  W e l ls 137 urban 
37 rural
D a i ly  W a t e r  E x t r a c t io n 2.6-3 M3x second
I n h a b i t a n t ’s  W a t e r  C o n s u m p t io n 350-400 litres
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  W a t e r  L o s t  in  t h e  P r o c e s s 55-65 per cent of the water extracted 
(leakage and illegal connections)
N u m b e r  o f  U s e r s 146,000
Y e a r ly  W a t e r  B i l l in g 36 million m3 out of 80 million m3
Own Elaboration using data from  Gobierno del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: Desafios y  
Oportunidades para el Siglo XXL  Memorias del Seminario Intemacional sobre la Gestion Eflciente del 
Agua. Aguascalientes, Mexico and INEGI. 1997. Estadisticas: Aguascalientes. Aguascalientes, 
Mexico.
After the turbulence generated by the PAN government regarding the 
future of the water utilities came to an end with the return of the 
concession scheme to CAASA (Dec. 13, 1996), the collateral affects from 
the financial problems facing local authorities and CAASA irremediably 
affected the water utilities. This was not simply a financial problem but 
also a logistical and hydrological one, which gained in relevance after the 
concession scheme was returned to CAASA. General Manager Humberto 
Blancarte stated that the wastewater services present a serious
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deterioration putting at risk the potable water (due to the potential risk in 
the mix o f residual and potable water)... As a consequence o f the large 
procedure that took the rescue initiative and the modifications to the 
concession title. Because of the lack of investment and attention during 
that period (almost a year), he considered applying to the World Bank for 
an extra credit, worth 40 MP, with the aim of tackling the severe 
deterioration (in 75 per cent of the cases) occasioned by the age of the 
wastewater pipelines. These were on average more than 50 years old, 
whereas their useful life was 25-30 years, and many had suffered 
ruptures caused by subsidence (earth movements occasioned by the over­
exploitation of underground waters).439
At the same time, the possibility of abolishing the water concession once 
more entered the political debate. As Alfredo Reyes argued, I'm  not 
interested in what CAASA managers said...the bottom o f their arguments 
is to obtain greater increments on the water tariff...Nonetheless, in the 
case o f a failure o f the concession scheme affected by an abrupt 
devaluation or by CAASA pressures to obtain increments on the water 
tariff, the ayuntamiento is in a much better position compared to last year 
to reassume the water services...besides, we have tied the hands o f 
CAASA to avoid any abuse on the water charges.440
439 Corre Peligro la Potabilidad del Agua. El Hidrocalido. February 16, 1997, Nada impedira 
que se agote el aculfero. El Hidrocalido. March 9, 1997 and Peligro de Contamination del 
Acuifero. El Hidrocalido. April 26, 1997.
440 Podria Desaparecer la Concesion del Agua. El Hidrocalido. March 10, 1997.
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The main role in promoting the politicisation was now played by CAASA, 
which made clear its intention to proceed with higher tariffs in order to 
obtain greater revenues. Jean Michel Tiberi, a top manager of the French 
company Generate des Eaux (CAASA partnership), argued that the 
average water ta riff for domestic use represented less than half its cost.441 
However, the lack of availability of potable water, permanent 
dissatisfaction with the water tariff, and the deficient provision of the 
water utilities encouraged the public to question the role of CAASA in the 
whole process.
Furthermore, an even greater problem was now discovered (or at least, 
was now considered in more detail). I t  was realised that local variables 
were affected by one common denominator: the over-exploitation of the 
underground waters. This over-exploitation of the only source available for 
the city affected costs and the availability of services. Extracting the water 
from greater depth requires greater consumption of electricity and other 
assets (personnel, equipment, gasoline), which in turn impacts on the 
water tariff. Thus, the deterioration of the underground water is linked to 
increases in costs and to water availability.
Figures in Table 7.1 show that the over-exploitation of the ground waters 
has caused a growing annual deficit of 274 million cubic metres, with 574 
million cubic metres extracted annually, and only 300 million naturally 
replaced. Also, the wells go deeper, by between four and five metres,
441 Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. 1996. Agua: Desafios y  Oportunidades para el 
Siglo XXI. Memorias del Seminario Intemacional sobre la Gestion Eficiente del Agua. 
Aguascalientes. Mexico.
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every year. The water is extracted at around 300 to 600 metres (in 1950, 
it was extracted at 30 metres), using 174 wells (137 in urban, and 37 in 
rural areas, of which 90 per cent work 24 hours a day, extracting around 
2,660 litres per second), affecting the quality and the price of the water 
and ensuring that the subsidence that has caused severe damage to the 
urban infrastructure continues to grow worse.
Because Aguascalientes is located in dry territory, potable water is 
suffering an excessive consumption of 350 to 400 litres per inhabitant (not 
including pipeline leakage), comparing badly to cities in France and 
England, in which the figure is around 200 litres. Thus, as demonstrated, 
the hydrological conditions are a significant factor affecting the price and 
provision of water, and promoting its politicisation. The above figure does 
not contrast dramatically with 1989 and 1993 data (discussed earlier), but 
do show that minor improvements had been accomplished by 1997.442 
Another problem was the contamination of the potable water caused by 
the leaks in the wastewater pipelines. Since the city capital has an inverse 
arrangement of wastewater and potable water pipelines, the wastewater 
pipeline runs over the potable water, occasioning constant infiltration. 
Furthermore, the water treatment plants lose a high percentage of the 
treated water in the process.443 In making the link between the
442 The above figures were obtained from interviews with the Regidor o f  the water utilities 
Edna Lorena Pacheco, the General Manager o f CAASA Humberto Blancarte, the Manager of  
the CNA in Agauscalientes Martin Molina and the Manager o f CCAPAMA Manuel Reed 
Segovia.
443 Altas Perdidas en el Tratamiento del Agua. Pagina 24. October 30, 1997.
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hydrological facts and the water tariff, the lesson is clear: the water tariff 
increases in proportion to the damage caused to the water aquifer. 
Greater damage requires more energy and assets to extract the water, 
affecting its quality and the availability of the service. Financial resources 
are channelled to improve the service, thus affecting the water ta riff and 
consequently establishing the path to politicisation of the water utilities. 
The difficult conditions facing the water services in most of the Mexican 
municipalities, accompanied by the paternalist government, have created 
a chain effect (corruption, inefficiencies, high costs and subsidies, the non­
paying culture, and irrational use) in which the water resources have been 
seriously damaged. Consequently, the justifications used, at all levels of 
government, for the implementation of privatisation policies are 
jeopardised by the unrealistic set of expectations also created. 
Unfortunately, there is no theoretical framework that guarantees any kind 
of success for these policies. Since 1989, when the first scheme using 
private bodies was allowed in the city of Aguascalientes, and the launch of 
the first concession scheme in 1993, with the subsequent financial and 
political turmoil, few improvements have been achieved by means of the 
concession. Consequently, there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction 
on the part of local inhabitants, and a dramatic affect on the political 
arena and, specifically, the official party.
The Political Effects of the Unfulfilled Promise of the PAN Municipality to 
Reduce the Water Tariff
The unfulfilled promise to reduce the water ta riff led to a negative 
perception of PAN strategies and CAASA practices by the public, thus
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promoting further politicisation. Also, the role played by the municipality 
since the concession scheme was given back to CAASA had been to resist 
any decision from this private group. The common denominator in their 
relationship was conflict, with daily declarations disqualifying each other's 
previous public announcements regarding the water utilities, specifically 
concerning the water tariff. On the one hand, with elections in view, the 
municipality was trying to minimise the affects of the monthly increments 
in the water tariff. On the other hand, CAASA wished to obtain a fast 
financial reimbursement by pressuring the municipality to approve greater 
increments in the water ta riff and financial contributions. In order to 
explain this development it is necessary to pose the question: "What was 
the political affect on CAASA and the municipality of the imminent 
increases in the water tariff?"
Local inhabitants can be expected to identify the benefits of the 
concession scheme according to two main determinants: first, the water 
tariff; and second, the availability of the service (what you get for what 
you pay). Neither of these aspects had been tackled since 1993 by either
the PRI or the PAN government. As a result, during 1997, those two
factors increased in importance, affecting the provision of the water
services in the city (due to the politicisation generated). Both were
affected by one common variable: money.
The critical hydrological conditions facing the underground water sources 
have further complicated the situation. About 50 per cent of the water 
extracted is lost in the pipelines -  urban and residential - (43.5 million m3 
out of 87 million m3 extracted), directly affecting the water ta riff and its
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efficient provision. Furthermore, the lack of investment means that there 
is no efficient micro (domestic) or macro -  source of supply (wells) - 
measurement, and only 35 per cent of the water extracted is invoiced. 
This promotes non-rational and illegal use (non-paying users represent 10 
per cent of the 146,000 registered) that further affects the already 
declining water sources.444
Thus, an under-estimated water ta riff has chain effects (economic, 
hydrological, service provision) which inevitably lead to politicisation of the 
concession scheme. On the other hand, charging cost-based prices causes 
greater political problems. Finally, it is clear that the perception, by users, 
of a fair price for the water ta riff determines the feasibility, at the first 
stage, of the water concession. Considering this point, one can assume 
that the water ta riff has been the common denominator in the 
politicisation of the water utilities.
In this regard, the general manager of the CNA argued that the tariffs for 
water consumption will be adjusted as many times as needed during the 
year [1997]...this is how it  is established on the concession title and must 
be done according to the inflation costs.445 As a result, political parties 
(PRD) argued that in spite o f the promise o f fair water tariffs, they are fair
444 The above data was obtained though interviews with the manager o f CCAPAMA Manuel 
Reed and the General Manager o f CAASA Humberto Blancarte during the last quarter of
1997.
445 Nuevo Golpe Para los mas Pobres; Aumentaran las Tarifas del Agua Cuantas Veces se 
Requiera en el ano: M.Molina. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 12, 1997.
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but to CAASA not for the inhabitant.446 Also, the precarious conditions of 
the pipelines became evident; as did the affect upon the inhabitants. This 
added to the sense of dissatisfaction with the water ta riff that 
predominated.
At the same time, CAASA was disconnecting overdue users from the water 
services, by means of promoting a water culture. This created great 
discomfort amongst the local inhabitants, and even health problems. 
Furthermore, it appeared that CAASA was acting contrary to the Ley de 
Saiud del Estado de Aguascalientes (Health Law of the State of 
Aguascalientes).447 The scarcity of potable water was affecting different 
sectors of the city every day,448 and this, in combination with the constant 
increments in the water ta riff (a new price was established in June) had 
clear political implications for the PAN candidates in the coming 
elections.449 CAASA was also once again facing financial difficulties due to 
an estimated 58,000 overdue accounts, worth 15 MP.450
446 En Cuestion de Agua Estamos Peor que Antes: Las Tarifas son Justas Pero Para CAASA, 
no Para los Ciudadanos, Dice el PRD. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. April 25,1997.
447 According to article 111 o f this law, disconnecting the potable water service are subject to 
rules established in the Ley de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y  su Reuso del 
Estado de Aguascalientes. To find more see: Es Criminal que se Corte el Agua por Falta de 
Pago. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. May 11, 1997 and Son Legales, subraya Caasa, los 
“cortes” de agua a los deudores. El Hidrocalido. September 12, 1997.
448 Pura Palabreria y las Colonias, Centro y Fraccionamientos Estan sin Agua Potable. El Sol 
del Centro. May 15, 1997.
449 CCAPAMA. 1997. Tarifas de Agua, Valor Junio de 1997. Aguascalientes. Mexico. The 
water tariff was adjusted for the minimum consumption o f 20m3 in zone A $39.67, zone B 
$50.31, zone C $65.90, commercial $70.96 and industrial $85.15.
450 58 mil usuarios no liquidan el agua. El Hidrocalido. June 30, 1997.
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7.2 The Political Rise of the PAN in the State: Reducing the Influence of 
Opposition Parties Among the Electorate 
The Role of the Concession Scheme in Federal Elections: A PAN Identification
Federal elections for deputies (1997-2000) were held on July 6, 1997. 
Although federal and local elections are quite separate, they share one 
common variable: the concentration of votes on the urban side and the 
influence of the city capital on the final results. The political affects of the 
concession scheme, now in PAN hands, were not what might have been 
expected. Even when this political party was identified with the water tariff 
increments, it obtained two strategic positions on the federal congress. It 
won II  district by uninominal election (direct vote),451 and it was 
represented by Benjamin Gallegos Soto, the mayor substitute (1996- 
1998), former state deputy, and ex president of the CDM of the PAN in the 
municipality. In addition, the PAN obtained one proportional 
representation seat designated to the former president of the CDE of the 
PAN, Jorge Humberto Zamarripa. As well, the PRD obtained one seat (PR) 
for the federal congress represented by Angelica de la Pena G.
Even though these PAN members had been active in previous years 
favouring the concession scheme and supporting the municipality 
decisions, Benjamin Gallegos (who later became sceptical about the 
concession scheme) won the II  district with 42,985, or 40.10 per cent, of 
the votes. These were concentrated in the city capital but represented a 
slight majority over the PRI candidate Jesus Armado Lopez Velarde
451 By the 1997 federal elections Aguascalientes' political circumscription had increased by 
one district.
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Campa, who obtained 40,696, or 37.96 per cent, of the electoral 
preferences, and the PRD candidate Cecilio Avila Garcia, who polled 
13,792 votes (12.87 per cent).452
The remaining two districts were won by the PRI candidates, who obtained 
two seats for the federal congress. The candidate elected for the I District 
was Oscar Gonzalez Rodriguez, who obtained the greatest advantage (17, 
291 votes) by means of the corporate vote in the rural area: 40,287 
compared to 22,996 for the PAN and 9,244 for the PRD.
The final elected representative for the I I I  District was the former mayor 
responsible for the water concession, Fernando Gomez Esparza, who was 
elected with a slight majority (2,579 votes). He polled 41,105 votes 
compared to 38,526 for the PAN and 14,290 for the PRD candidates.
One can identify two main reasons for the resurgence of the PAN, the 
permanency of the PRI, and the political moves of the PRD. First, the 
votes obtained by the PRI in the 1997 elections were determined by the 
PRI corporativist vote outside the city area, mainly in the I and III 
districts, and the candidates shaped the people's perception.
The huge majority obtained by Oscar Gonzalez was linked to his popular 
influence in the state and his control over the rural vote. Nevertheless, as 
a result of the urban vote, Fernando Gomez, although a popular figure 
(according to the polls at the time, 71 per cent of the public recognised 
him), and despite being selected as the best mayor that Aguascalientes 
had ever had, obtained the post with only a slight majority. His
452 Institute) Federal Electoral. Resultado de las Elecciones de 1997 en Aguascalientes, 
accessed through the Internet on www.ife.org.mx/wwworge/aes.htm , on August 1998.
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responsibility for the concession scheme, besides his PRI label, minimised 
his appeal to the electorate. Consequently, the PAN's dominance played a 
fundamental role in neutralising his influence.453
Second, the economic burden from the constant increments in the water 
ta riff lessened the influence of this political party. Its candidate, Benjamin 
Gallegos, won the post by a slight majority; nonetheless, the PAN 
remained, and the PRD moved forward, representing a threat to the PRI in 
the coming 1998 elections. In this sense, the constant politicisation of the 
water concession, now by PAN prerogative, did not affect the PAN, but 
decreased the influence in real terms of the PRI, and impulsed the PRD 
compared to the 1994 elections. Thus, the voto razonado (conscious vote) 
and people's desire for change were making themselves known. 454 
An important outcome of these federal elections in the national context 
was the decline of the PRI from being the dominant party on the LVI 
legislature (1997-2000). Nonetheless, none of the political parties 
obtained a majority inside it (251 seats to obtain the majority or 334 seats 
to approve constitutional reforms). From 500 seats (including uninominal 
and proportional representatives) the PRI obtained only 239 (compared to 
300 in previous elections), PAN 121, PRD 125, PT 7, and the PVEM
453 Crisol. 1997. Crece el Optimismo en la Ciudad. Ano VII, Numero 99. Agosto 21, 1997. 
Aguascalientes. Mexico.
454 For the results o f the 1994 elections for federal deputies see: PAN. Asuntos Electorales. 
Resultados Federales 1997, accessed through Internet on 
www.pan.org.mx/electoral/r fed97.htm. August 1998.
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achieved eight.455 For the first time in more than 65 years Mexico was 
facing the fall of the official party within this body. This development 
marked new tendencies at a national level and established the precedent 
for the PRD and the PAN as the second and third political forces inside this 
federal congress.
The Effects of the Water Tariff: Signs of Further Modification of the Concession 
Title?
After the elections, further attention was paid to the invariable monthly 
increments in the water ta riff and the affects of these on the inhabitants. 
As discussed, this represented the most controversial aspect of the 
concession scheme. The weakness of the municipality's efforts to enforce 
the modifications to the concession title, proves our earlier arguments 
regarding the favourable position of CAASA leading to a greater 
politicisation. Consequently, it is now necessary to seek to identify the 
effects of the increments on the water tariff after the election period.
By the time the political effervescence of the federal elections had come to 
an end, the PAN strategy was to prepare the land for the coming elections 
in 1998. The other political parties were aiming in the same direction but 
via different means. The main variable in dispute was the water ta riff and 
its collateral effects. The increments in the water ta riff had led to almost 
50 per cent of users being in debt to CAASA. These overdue accounts
455 Institute) Federal Electoral. 1998. Elecciones de Diputados por Mayoria Relativa: 97, 
accessed through the Internet on www.ife.org.mx. August, 1998. The PAN web page on 
www.pan.org.mx/electoral/97integcamaradip.htm. gives an interesting analysis o f the results.
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were worth 53 MP, and prompted a chain reaction, jeopardising the 
feasibility of the concession scheme by adding an extra financial burden to 
CAASA, affecting investment in the sector and consequently promoting its 
politicisation amongst social and political representatives.456 In this sense, 
the water ta riff recalled previous errors.
The Regidor (PVEM) Maria del Carmen Esparza stated that by the time the 
PAN faction signed the modifications to the concession title...we were 
defined by CAASA managers as mentally retarded because everything was 
on their side.457 Even assuming that CAASA has some clear advantages 
(subsidies, investment participation, federal support, and a lack of a truly 
regulatory body) its permanency is linked with the revenues obtained by 
the water tariff. Thus, CAASA was applying almost any available 
alternative to persuade local inhabitants to pay for water services. There 
was an increase in drinking water disconnection's, leading to a legal 
dispute that became a political matter, with subsequent attempts to 
modify the water law to prevent CAASA from doing th is .458 
CCAPAMA and CAASA launched a programme granting discounts of up to 
35 per cent to overdue users. The programme had positive results in the 
short-term, but soon encouraged everyone not to pay in order to secure
456 Financieramente se hunde la Concesionaria de Agua. El Hidrocalido. July 26, 1997.
457 CAASA no corre ningun riesgo al suministrar el agua potable. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. July 15, 1996.
458 The dispute generated was linked to the rules established for disconnecting the potable 
water in the Ley General de Salud del Estado de Aguascalientes and the Ley de Agua 
Potable, Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y  su Reuso del Estado de Aguascalientes. To find more 
about these legal contradictions see: Aberration juridica permite ‘cortes’ del agua. El 
Hidrocalido. September 9, 1997.
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the discount.459 Later, after pressure from the social organisation, FEOI, 
the Mayor, Alfredo Reyes, made the clearly populist move of proposing to 
the leader of that organisation, Alfredo Cervantes Garcia, that the 
municipality use the fondo de contingencia (contingency fund) to subsidise 
overdue payments to CAASA. I t  was supposed that this would benefit
2,000 families from the less developed sectors.460 Ironically, however, the 
mayor emphasised that every user must pay for the water services with 
no exemptions. Nonetheless, the Miercoles Ciudadano played a 
fundamental role in promoting further discounts on the water bills for 
almost every user, including residential areas in which most of the 15,000 
unauthorised users are located. Also, CCAPAMA representatives attended 
to more complaints than did any other local body.461 As a response to the 
municipality measures, in which CAASA and CCAPAMA, with PAN support, 
were trying to recover overdue charges, the PRI saw the chance to 
promote the non-paying culture among the local inhabitants. Clearly, in 
their belief, the ends justified the means.462 As a result, arguments about 
the feasibility of maintaining the concession scheme and modifying the
459 Amenaza CAPA con Sancionar a morosos. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. August 7, 1997. 
For the results achieved with this measure see: 14 de 50 mil morosos ya pagaron a Caasa. El 
Hidrocalido. September 4, 1997.
460 Pagara el Ayuntamiento a CAASA todo lo que adeudan dos mil familias pobres. El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 25, 1997.
461 Si no quieren corte de agua, Ipaguen!. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 25, 1997. 
See also: Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes (1996-1998). 1997. Segundo Informe de 
Gobierno. Anexo Estadistico. Aguascalientes. Mexico.
462 Reed acusa al PRI de impulsar la cultura de no pago del agua. El Hidrocalido. August 25,
1997.
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concession title erupted daily, signifying a clear battle of interest between 
the PAN and opposition parties. The common factors were the excessive 
water tariff, abuses by CAASA, and the critical financial struggles facing 
this private body.463
The End of 1997: Evidencing an Uncertain Future for the Concession Scheme
In the last quarter of 1997, the municipality experienced greater pressures 
as the water ta riff became the major topic. This section will now attempt 
to find out how the municipality was affected by this development. This 
will show the lack of an autonomous regulatory body, and the 
disadvantages faced by the municipality with the new concession title.
Old arguments once again came to the fore, as Mayor Alfredo Reyes 
emphasised that CAASA could be substituted... nonetheless, the 
concession scheme will remain.464 Once more, the municipality sought a 
political battle with the CAASA, conscious that this private body provoked 
great dissatisfaction amongst the inhabitants of the city, that there were 
continuous protests against it,465 and that it had been in danger of losing 
the concession scheme due to the unfulfilled actualisation of a surety 
worth 15 MP. Later, the failure of federal, state, and local bodies to fulfil 
promised investment worth 160 MP made the pressure on the concession
463 La concesion podria cancelarse. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 5,1997.
464 No es Inviable el cambio de Concesionario. El Hidrocalido. October 24, 1997.
465 Masiva protesta por cobros impagables en el agua; exigen que sea retirada la Concesion. El 
Hidrocalido. October 23, 1997 and Aumentan Manifestantes del FEOI Cada Miercoles 
Ciudadano: ACG. El Sol del Centro. October 23,1997.
278
even more unbearable.466 The manager of CAASA, Humberto Blancarte, 
argued that there were no intentions for CAASA to solicit the extinguishing 
o f the concession....even when the three levels o f government did not 
fu lfil their promises., due to this, we have not called in the surety o f 15MP 
because the state government has not contributed and in consequence we 
haven't done it.467 In CAASA's view, any unfulfilled promise has collateral 
effects affecting it directly and leading to the possible non-fulfilment of 
promises by this body.
According to the concession title, if any of the parts fail to fulfil the 
previous financial accords, the concession title can be modified. In the 
case of CAASA, it can lose the concession scheme. The figures show that 
the state government only contributed 5 MP out of 40 MP promised and, in 
a clear political move for the 1998 elections; the CNA contributed 35 MP 
out of the 40 MP and the municipality was thus forced to obtain further 
federal participation.468 This represents clear evidence reinforcing our 
arguments about the lack of a truly independent regulatory body 
(CCAPAMA) - a view supported by its General Manager, Manuel Reed, in a 
personal interview. He stated that all the parts have been non fulfilling 
earlier accords making it  difficult to apply the law to each o f them.469 In
466 Pueden Cancelar Concesion. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 8, 1997.
467 No solicitaran extinguir la concesion. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. September 18, 1997.
468 The data was obtained though an interview with the Regidor for the water utilities Edna 
Lorena Pacheco on December 9, 1997 in Aguascalientes, Mexico.
469 The interview was held on January 15, 1998 in Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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the absence of a truly regulatory body, the society obtains few benefits 
and CAASA faced serious problems in efficiently providing water services. 
Daily problems such as contamination of the potable water, inefficient 
invoice mechanisms, and lack of public attention are rarely sanctioned by 
the regulatory body, the aims of which are political rather than enforcing. 
As noted earlier, the financial schemes included in the concession title fell 
below CAASA expectations, adding an extra financial burden to the 
concession scheme that affected the water utilities. However, federal 
bodies granted extra financial contributions to the water utilities through 
the Ramo XXVI (changed to Ramo XXXIII) and the programme called 
APAZU.470 Furthermore, the national programme Fondo Bancario de 
Protection al Ahorro (FOBAPROA), used earlier to save the privatised 
banks, was another tool used to help correct the critical financial situation 
affecting CAASA and, consequently, the inhabitants. Local authorities were 
negotiating with the federal government, via the SHCP, to re-absorb 65- 
70 per cent of CAASA's liabilities, worth 230 MP, and consequently to 
become a partner with about 30 to 35 per cent.471
In this way, by direct public (paternalist) intervention in the structure of 
CAASA, the privatisation scheme would be partially reversed into public 
hands. The federal government would be partially involved in the public 
utility, thus evidencing a shift of policies to ones promoting a backward
470 Permanente Esfuerzo para mejorar la red de agua. El Hidrocalido. November 19, 1997.
471 Demandan condonar 60 % de la deuda bancaria de Caasa. El Hidrocalido. November 7, 
1997 and La SH, socia de la Concesion si Fobaproa absorbe la deuda. El Hidrocalido. 
December 1, 1997.
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(private to public) movement from that proposed by the privatisation 
theory. However, this course of action did not prosper during 1997.
As a foretaste of the following year's difficulties, the deterioration of the 
hydrological sources had become more evident by the end of 1997. Three 
of the most important wells collapsed and 50 urban and 26 rural wells 
were severely over-exploited, adding an extra political and financial 
implication for 1998, in which greater financial resources would be needed 
to tackle the dramatic circumstances facing the water utilities.472
7.3 1998: The Effects of the Concession Scheme Favouring the Rise of
the PAN in the State 
Partisan Perspectives on the Concession Scheme: The Elections Target
The start of 1998 presented two challenges for state and local authorities: 
first, the local elections; and second, to minimise the negative effects on 
the electorate of the water tariff increments. This section will look at how 
local authorities (PAN) encouraged a further politicisation 'against' CAASA 
in order to minimise the affects of the water concession upon the 
electorate.
Since the main determinant of public perceptions regarding the water 
concession, CAASA, and the municipality is not the privatisation scheme 
per se, but the water ta riff and availability,473 1998 commenced with
472 Nebuloso Horizonte para la Dotation de Agua. El Hidrocalido. December 31, 1997.
473 These arguments are reinforced by a survey prepared by CESMA. 1998. April, Presidencia 
Municipal de Aguascalientes 1996-1998, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
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struggles over the first price increases since the 54.93 per cent rise during 
the previous year.474 At the same time, the Miercoles Ciudadano 
programme of direct subsidies reached 100,000 inhabitants.475 The 
question this raises is: How many votes did it represent for the PAN? The 
constant battle against water disconnections, supported by the Regidor 
(PAN) for the water utilities, Edna Lorena Pacheco, incited further conflict 
amongst PAN-opposition factions. At the first session of the 
ayuntamiento,476 the Regidor Judith Baca was expelled from the PAN, and 
became an independent, because of apparently 'immoral practices' in her 
private life. In an open response she fought back against the PAN, arguing 
that she had been forced by internal interests to vote in favour of the 
concession scheme in 1996, despite the fact that the municipality would 
not be receiving federal assistance, putting the city capital into financial 
bankruptcy, and thus affecting more public utilities.477
474 According to the concession title (96) the water tariff was to be increased at the start of 
1998 and 1999 by an extra 7 per cent besides the monthly indexation to the INPC. Thus, the 
water tariff for the minimum consumption o f 20m3 was set in January 1998 at $46.70, 
compared to $43.10 in December, 1997 for domestic A; for domestic B it was $59.20 
compared to $54.70; for domestic C the tariff reached $77.50 in contrast to $71.70. For 
commercial use the tariff was established at $83.50 in contrast with the previous $77.20 and 
for the industrial sector the tariff reached $100.20 compared to the previous $92.60. To find 
more on the increment per centage during 1997 see: CCAPAMA. 1998. Informe Definitivo de 
Auditoria a La Empresa Concesionaria de Aguas de Aguascalientes S.A de C.V. (CAASA). 
July 18, 1998, Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Mexico, pp. 4.
475 Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes. 1998. Aguascalientes en Action. Official 
Gazzete. January, 1998, No. 17. Aguascalientes, Mexico.
476 Auspicia el PAN “cortes de agua”: PRI. El Hidrocalido. January 6, 1998; also, Cortes de 
agua, insensible actitud. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 6,1998.
477 Nos Obligaron a votar a favor de CAASA. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. January 17,
1998.
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The concession was further politicised as a result of political and social 
pressures during the local electoral year. Social organisations like the FEOI 
organised marches against CAASA,478 arguing an excessive water tariff 
and lack of availability of the service.479 The social pressure group ADC 
argued that CAASA profits were of the order of 70 MP,480 assuming that
160,000 registered users generated that income.481
As a result of social pressures, opposition political parties (PRI) perceived 
the advantage of using CAASA as the target - they would obtain votes by 
claiming that this private body was in complicity with the municipality, 
arguing that it was essential to audit this private group and, consequently, 
disapprove the PAN concession scheme.482 CAASA's response, through the 
local media, was to discredit any such claim, arguing that it was working 
according to the concession title and that no profits would be generated 
until the 18th year of the concession.483
As one can see, the strategy of using CAASA was a determining factor in 
the coming elections. In response, local authorities and PAN members
478 Frente Estatal de Organizaciones Independientes represented by Alfredo Cervantes Garcia.
479 ‘!CAASA Robando, y el Mosco, Apoyando!. Pagina 24. January 13, 1998.
480 Agrupacion de Defensa Ciudadana headed by Erasmo Diaz Gonzalez.
481 Cruel Saqueo de CAASA al Pueblo. El Sol del Centro. January 20, 1998.
482 Pediran se Audite a CAASA. Pagina 24. January 21,1998.
483 The private group CAASA advertised its position in local newspapers. See: CAASA 
Actua con Base en lo Estipulado en el Titulo de Concesion. El Heraldo. January 27, 1998 and 
CAASA Obtendra Utilidades Hasta el Ano 18 de Concesion. El Sol del Centro. January 21,
1998.
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were discrediting any social or political arguments.484 In a clearly political 
move, because the municipality had known about CAASA irregularities 
(further described in the audit results) earlier than any other social or 
political representation, the PAN majority inside the ayuntamiento 
balanced the political costs and passed, by PAN prerogative, an initiative 
aimed at auditing CAASA by means of public (local) authorities and with 
the endorsement of civil bodies (local organisations). 485 Mayor Alfredo 
Reyes emphasised that in case of any irregularity there would be 
economic sanctions and the possibility of remunicipalizar the water 
utilities.486 Anticipating the results, the Regidor (PAN) of the water utilities, 
Edna Lorena Pacheco, started to shift position by arguing that CAASA was 
not coping with the concession title .487 At the same time, the General 
Manager of CCAPAMA, Manuel Reed, declared that the ayuntamiento 
would defend the concession scheme but not CAASA practices.488 
Both of these close collaborators of the mayor denied the possibility of 
remunicipalizar. The PAN majority in the ayuntamiento was trying to
484 No hay Complicidad Entre CAASA y el Municipio: Edna Lorena Pacheco. Pagina 24. 
January 22, 1998.
485 According to a confidential document from the Presidencia Municipal de Aguascalientes in 
which the financial results from CAASA on 1997 evidenced clear sights o f financial and 
operational problems.
486 Auditara el Municipio a CAASA. Pagina 24. February 3, 1998, Auditaran a CAASA, la 
empresa administradora de los servicios de agua potable en Aguascalientes. El Financiero. 
February 7, 1998 and La auditoria a CAASA aclarara todo. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. 
February 17, 1998.
487 CAASA no Esta Cumpliendo con el Titulo de Concesion. Pagina 24. February 17,1998.
488 No a la Remunicipalizacion del Servicio de Agua Potable: Manuel Reed Segovia. Pagina 
24. February 17, 1998.
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revalidate its image among the voters, recognising that any result from 
the audit would be potentially negative for their compact group. The 
failure of the PAN-style concession scheme and of its permanency as a 
political flag was publicly recognised. Mayor Alfredo Reyes, in response, 
argued that he had not solved the problems facing the water utilities but 
that he would leave the basis for this solution, to be implemented by the 
coming administration.489 
The 1998 Elections: The Actors
In the midst of the potential turmoil caused by the expectation of the 
results of the CAASA audit, political parties nominated their 
representatives for public posts in the coming elections. This section will 
now look at the main political actors in the 1998 local elections, 
concentrating exclusively on the candidates from the city capital for state 
governor and mayor.490
In the most rigid system of selection, and against the candidate of State 
Governor Otto Granados Roldan,491 the CEN of the PRI, by 'unanimous' 
decision, nominated the well known dinosaurio (PRI member from the old 
guard) Hector Hugo Olivares, son of the former governor Enrique Olivares
489 Reconoce A. Reyes que no ha resuelto el problema del agua. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. March 10, 1998.
490 For an interesting description of the candidates see: Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti. 1998. 
Candidatos de reacomodo: un panista en el PRD y  un priista en el PAN; en el PRI, un dino. 
Proceso Magazine, seccion reportajes, No. 1126. Mayo 31, 1998. Mexico; also, Guillermo 
Correa. 1998. En el palenque electoral de Aguascalientes, P R Iy PAN amarran navajas, sin 
poder asegurar quien va a ganar. Proceso Magazzine, seccion reportajes, No 1134. July 26, 
1998 and Mas empleo y mayor seguridad, oferta comun para Aguascalientes. El Nacional. 
August 2, 1998.
491 It was mentioned that the state governor candidate was his Secretary of Social 
Development Armando Romero Rosales.
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(1962-1968). He had waited 18 years for the nomination, and had served 
as senator (twice), and federal deputy (twice) amongst other top federal, 
state, and party posts. His selection left behind seven potential 
candidates, including senators, deputies, and public officials from the 
official party who were pressuring for a democratic selection process.492 He 
was also supported by the social groups Generation Fuerza 21 and H20, 
and focused his campaign on social participation and governance.
The PRD suffered from a lack of political figures and nominated Alfonso de 
Jesus Bernal, a noted academic, who had formerly stood as PRI candidate 
for the governorship (1980), and served as a PAN local deputy (1995- 
1998), although he had never joined either party officially.493 He was also 
supported by the group Option Ciudadana. With no political manifesto his 
campaign was focused on three promises: to speak the truth, to exercise 
honesty in the public administration, and to act with justice and within the 
law. I t  is important to remember that, while local deputy, his duties had 
included representing the state legislature on the board of CCAPAMA. He 
was the board's tiudadanisation ideologist, and a clear enemy of its
492 The remaining candidates were: the Federal Deputy Oscar Gonzalez, Federal Deputy 
Fernando Gomez, Senator Oscar Lopez Velarde, Senator Fernando Palomino, Jorge 
Rodriguez (leader from the Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico -CTM- in the state), 
Augusto Gomez and The Secretary o f Social Development at the State Government Armando 
Romero Rosales.
493 El Diputado Bernal Sahagun renuncio al PAN: sera candidato del PRD en Aguascalientes. 
La Cronica Newspaper. April 29, 1998 and Dejan AN: Bernal Sahagun por el PRD. El Sol del 
Centro. April 29,1998.
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General Manager, Manuel Reed, who left the job to run (successfully) for a 
local post on the state legislature.494 This reinforces our arguments 
regarding the highly politicised management of the water regulatory body, 
which is influenced by opportunism ideologies and is used to promote 
individual public figures. Its manager is in the spotlight every day, 
exercising influence. An official survey estimates that CCAPAMA has an 
approval rating of 7.4/10 from the local inhabitants, whilst CAASA is 
perceived as the body primarily responsible for the water utilities.
The PAN candidate for State Governor was Felipe Gonzalez, who had only 
recently joined the party (January 1998). Despite speculation about his 
PRI background, he beat federal deputy Benjamin Gallegos to win the 
internal candidacy with 80 per cent of the votes. The PAN candidate 
represented a non-political ideology, with a business background 
(groceries) and links to business organisations (CANACO, COPARMEX, and 
USEM), the clergy, and the former State Governor of Guanajuato and PAN 
presidential candidate (2,000-2,006) Vicente Fox. His candidacy was also 
supported by the social group "Macabeos", and core campaign promises 
focused on economic development, credits for the self-employed, 
promotion of a social market economy in which the government is only the 
promoter and generator of development, and the establishment of a fair 
financial distribution system for federal funding.
494 Appointed to take charge o f CCAPAMA was Mario Alfonso de la Mora Lopez, former 
controller at the municipality supervising the quality o f the works from CAASA and 
CAPAMA. He was ratified on May 4, 1998 by the Ayuntamiento.
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As part of Gonzalez' former duties in 1996, he had played a key role in the 
rescue initiative for the water utilities, participating on the plural 
commission as an independent citizen. There had been speculation that he 
was promoting his candidacy under a PAN strategy and support. As a 
result of his candidacy, two local deputies, Anselmo Sotelo and Enrique 
Pimentel, linked to the PRD candidate, resigned from the PAN, arguing 
anti-democratic selection of candidates. Thus, the PAN lost its relative 
majority in the LVI State Legislature, instead finding itself and the PRI 
with 11 members each (out of 27).495
The only woman competing for the post was Martha Esperanza Campos, a 
solicitor and former civil servant at the Procuradurfa General de la 
Republica (PGR) at the state government. She represented the PT-PVEM 
coalition, and focused her campaign on tackling government impunity and 
promoting greater public safety. However, the real battle was between the 
PAN and PRI candidates.
The PRI candidate for Mayor in the city capital was Armando Romero 
Rosales, a former state official and mayor (1990-1992, resigned 1991). He 
obtained 52 per cent of the votes, beating the other three competing for 
the candidacy. His core campaign promises were to increase public safety 
and to resolve the problem of charges for the water services. I t  is relevant 
to note that, with the former State Governor Miguel Angel Barberena 
(1986-1992), he promoted the privatisation process by granting extra 
responsibilities (second stage of the concession) to the ICA group, which
495 En Igualdad de Circunstancias el PRI y el PAN en el Congreso del Estado. El Sol del 
Centro. May, 14 1998.
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later obtained the concession. 496 The PRD nominated Jose Luis Gutierrez 
Lozano, financial advisor of the PAN candidate Felipe Gonzalez. He had 
stood as a PAN pre-candidate for mayor (1995), and federal deputy 
(1997), and had sought the PAN pre-candidacy for mayor this time, but 
his lack of success led him to join the PRD, with the support of that party's 
candidate for governor. His core promises were to radically transform 
public management, to work together with the people to solve the 
problems of employment, and to solve the problems of water and public 
safety.
The PAN nominated a former PRI supporter, Luis Armando Reynoso 
Femat, who has a business background. He competed against the other 
six to obtain the candidacy.497 He made clear his disapproval of the PAN 
government in the city capital and of the Mayor, Alfredo Reyes. His main 
message was to save moral values. Finally, and with little chance of being 
elected as mayor of the city capital, Gabriela Martin was nominated by the 
coalition PT-PVEM.
This list of candidates points to two main determinants for our case of
496 The elected candidate in the internal PRI elections, beat by 2 to 1 his closest rival, Jesus 
Alvarez, who obtained 27 per cent o f the total votes. The businessman Roberto Diaz also 
participated, obtaining 13 per cent, and the remaining 8 per cent was obtained by the Secretary 
of the FTA Alfredo Gonzalez. To find more see: Romero Rosales, candidato del tricolor al 
Ayuntamiento de Aguascalientes. El Nacional. May 26, 1998 and Armando Romero gano la 
candidatura del tricolor a presidente municipal con el 52% de los votos emitidos. Pagina 24. 
May 26, 1998.
497 The CDE o f the PAN registered as pre candidates: the local deputies Fernando Herrera, 
Humberto David Rodriguez and Jesus Martinez, the Secretary o f the Ayuntamiento Francisco 
Valdes, Audomaro Alba and Jose de Jesus Jimenez and the elected Luis Armando Reynoso 
Femat. To find more see: Se registran 7 aspirantes panistas a alcaldes. El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes. March 17, 1998.
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research. Firstly, the main political promises were to generate more jobs 
and better public safety, leaving behind the controversial water 
concession. Secondly, all the political actors had one thing in common: 
surprisingly, at some stage of their political careers, they had all been 
linked to the PAN (excluding PRI candidates) or to another political party. 
The majority of state governor and mayoral candidates had also been 
involved with the concession of the water utilities in the city capital, either 
by participating directly or by promoting it as a way to move forward 
politically. I t  is also relevant to consider that no political manifesto 
considered how to solve the problems facing the water utilities and the 
concession scheme; only a few comments were made concerning the 
water resources, along with unrealistic electoral promises to lower or 
freeze the water tariff.498
A Final Overview on the Concession Scheme by PAN Prerogative: The Results 
of the Audit of the Private Group in Charge (CAASA)
The results of the audit were delayed for a few months due to the legal 
imposition from CAASA in the form of habeas corpus. However, the 
political campaigns were still running. The audit demonstrated that which 
has been suggested throughout this research - that is, the favourable 
position enjoyed by this private group by the time the concession scheme 
was reversed in 1996, the poor results achieved by means of the 
concession until 1998, the lack of a truly autonomous regulatory body
498 For example the PRI candidates. To find more see: Un acto de justicia social resolver el 
problema del abasto de agua y tarifas. El Sol del Centro. July 14, 1998.
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(CCAPAMA), the failure of that body to take control over the monopoly 
transferred to CAASA, and the incompetence of local authorities (including 
members of the ayuntamiento and state legislature) in the elaboration and 
approval of the concession scheme by PAN majority. All of these factors 
had, in turn, affected the local inhabitants and the feasibility of the 
concession scheme, leading to a continuous politicisation.499 
According to the official and final resolution, the core outcomes were 
disproportionate to what had been agreed. For example, CAASA did not 
have any assets or employees. The services were sub-contracted to the 
filial enterprise, SAASA, and through them to other entities (mainly ICA 
subsidiaries), affecting the operational costs and accountability of CAASA, 
which served as a holding company. Profits generated were kept by these 
sub-contracted ICA enterprises, affecting the financial condition of CAASA, 
which was technically bankrupt.500 Other major findings refer to the 
unfulfilled efficiency goals. The collection of water invoices assumes a 
decrease of 21 per cent (to March 1998, the overdue payments dated 
back, on average, in excess of 28 months). In consequence, revenue 
decreased by 32.21 per cent and thus the operational costs suffered a loss
499 CCAPAMA. 1998. Informe Definitivo de Auditing a La Empresa Concesionaria de Aguas 
de Aguascalientes S.A de C.V. (CAASA). July 18, 1998, Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Mexico.
500 Some o f the re hired services were: bacheo (pot hole refurbishment), cambios de tomas 
(rehabilitation o f domestic water sources), desinfeccion de equipos (equipment disinfection), 
analisis fisico quimico (physicalchemical analysis), monitoreo (monitoring), reparacion de 
equipos (equipment repair), talleres externos (external workshops), mantenimiento preventivo 
(preventive maintenance) and Videograbaciones (videofilming). Some o f the ICA companies 
subcontracted were: OMSA Agua Potable, Servicios de Agua Potable S.A. de C.V (both 
companies under Generate des Eaux partnership)., Maxipistas S.A de C.V., ICA Fluor Daniel, 
ICA Construction Urbana and Equipos Nacionales S.A de C.V.
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of 1.91 times the projections. 501 Furthermore, the evidence shows that 
the water lost in the process represented 62 per cent (compared to the 50 
and 30 per cent estimated by CAASA), of which only 26.19 per cent was 
accounted for and billed. Of the water extracted, only 18.66 per cent 
generated sufficient revenue to cover costs. The water ta riff was running 
26.36 per cent behind real costs, and of the invoices generated during 
1997 only 57 per cent were paid, accounting for an extra 15 per cent in 
overdue invoices. Thus it is evident that CAASA, by means of the 
concession scheme, lost control (legally) over the water utilities and thus 
the financial projections became invalid.
The official resolution by the local authorities stated that, while CAASA 
presents losses, and the ayuntamiento responds to the political and 
financial costs, the subsidiaries operate profitably...with this level o f debt 
and actual costs it  will be necessary to adjust the water tariff, which is 
socially unacceptable. The local authorities accepted that the actual 
conditions o f the contract are non equitable...this situation was not 
detected during the rescue initiative in 1996 due to the lack o f information 
at the time compared to what we have now, thanks to the modifications 
effected on the concession title that have allowed this auditing. 502 
There was also conclusive information regarding the transfer of CAASA
501 A technical bankruptcy is considered when income does not cover the costs incurring to a 
deficit. By 1998, CAASA had lost two thirds o f its capital social (investment capital) and 
consequently is into a financial deficit.
502 CCAPAMA. 1998. Informe Definitivo de Auditing a La Empresa Concesionaria de Aguas 
de Aguascalientes S.A de C.V. (CAASA). July 18, 1998, Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Mexico, pp. 13 and 14 (Conclusions).
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liabilities worth 300 MP (revalidated by the Mayor Alfredo Reyes) by using 
the federal programme, FOBAPROA.503 Thus, federal authorities moved 
one step forward by means of absorbing the financial burden from CAASA, 
and one backwards, in that the justification to apply concession schemes 
at a local level had been promoted by federal authorities.504 It is evident 
that the essence (private versus public efficiency) of the privatisation 
theory was erased with this action, whereby privatisation beliefs no longer 
justified th£ presence of private entities in the provision of public 
monopolies.
As a consequence of the irregularities uncovered by the audit, there was 
an intense battle, involving CAASA versus CCAPAMA and the 
ayuntamiento, and with each discrediting the others resolutions. As a 
result of this battle, the board of CCAPAMA lowered the water tariff by ten 
per cent at the beginning of August (coincidentally, during election time) 
to compensate the users.505 Also, local authorities delimited the necessity
503 To find more see: Ibid., pp. 14 and Sobreproteccion municipal a la Concesionaria. El 
Hidrocalido. February 6, 1998 and El que la SHCP Absorba Deuda de CAASA, Revela que 
el Municipio y la Concesionaria son Complices. Pagina 24. February 7, 1998.
504 The Mayor Alfredo Reyes gave the FOBAPROA position in: El agua, pozo sin fondo. El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes. July 7, 1998.
505 Both public and private entities have been answering (using official and public channels) 
and using any argument available to justify actions previously taken. Some of the internal 
documents in the power o f CCAPAMA exemplifying this trend are serial numbers: AJ.67- 
564\98, Dg. 134-1325/98, 98-936/98, AJ.55-444/98; from the municipality: Of.C.M101/98 and 
Of.C.M 091/98;, from CAASA the document with folio number GG/266/98.
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to review annexe G of the concession title and CAASA itself,506 arguing 
that the objective is to operate under a fairer operational agreement on 
the areas o f hard labour, material, furniture and equipment, sub contracts, 
affiliates, taxes and efficient collection charge and operational 
parameters.507
In this sense, the ayuntamiento has openly accepted the very many 
inefficiencies surrounding the concession title, including those of the 
regulatory body CCAPAMA in ensuring that CAASA and other levels of 
government fulfil the conditions established. Thus, the failure of the 
rescue initiative and the PAN-style concession title is evident. Therefore, it 
was not just the CAASA management and operation that was at fault, but 
also both public (federal, state, and local) and private organisms mislead 
the public about the stark reality facing the water utilities in the city 
capital.508 The raw information shows that the results achieved by means
506 The new water tariff was set for the minimum consumption o f 20m3 at $ 44.30 on 
domestic A compared to the previous tariff in July, 1998 set at $49.20; on domestic B the 
tariff was $ 56.10 compared to $62.40; on domestic C $73.50 compared to $ 81.80; for 
commercial use $ 79.20, and industrial $ 95.0, compared to $ 88.10 and 105.70 respectively 
the previous month (July 1998). For every m3 consumed over 10 m3 the tariff varies 
according to a specific formula.
507 CCAPAMA. 1998. Informe Definitivo de Auditing a La Empresa Concesionaria de Aguas 
de Aguascalientes S.A de C.V (CAASA). July 18, 1998, Presidencia Municipal de 
Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Mexico, p. 14.
508 A clear example is the 160MP worth of extra contributions, o f which the state government 
still owes $35.8MP, the CNA $2.5MP and federal authorities are still below what was 
promised. Also, the municipality, via the absorption of former CAASA liabilities, besides 
CAASA, has invested the 40MP agreed showing interest in meeting the agreement. To find 
more see the internal document from CCAASA prepared on May 14, 1998 with reference 
number GG/266/98.
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of the concession were negative for the local inhabitants. Both PRI and 
PAN ideologies failed to cope with social expectations, instead following 
partisan ideologies.
This can be seen by examining both concession titles (1993 and 1996), in 
which the only common denominator is not the transfer from public to 
private provision, but the politicisation of these contracts; the problem is 
not who provides the water services, but how the users are affected by 
their provision, especially in terms of prices and the availability of the 
service. Thus, local and state officials' use of a trial and error system in 
learning how to make concessions for the water utilities in Mexico has 
encouraged the use of Aguascalientes' city capital as a practice laboratory. 
The city capital has, consequently, had to cope with greater economic, 
social, and political pressures, making it vital that the newly-elected 
authorities reach a solution by means of negotiating a new concession 
title. This could well result in the continuing politicisation of the concession 
scheme, given that partisan ideologies could remain dominant over local 
necessities (especially when one takes into account that the PAN could 
dominate the political scenario).
7.4 The Fall of the PRI and the Rise of the PAN in the State and the City
Capital: Transferring Unfulfilled Responsibilities to the Newly-Elected
Governments 
The 1998 Elections: The Final Results
The 1998 local elections in Aguascalientes saw the fall, and the greatest 
historical defeat, of the official party, and clearly showed the arrival of the
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PAN in the political arena.509 These elections, which were considered the 
most important, competitive, and close run in the history of 
Aguascalientes, involved historic numbers in all aspects. They included the 
posts for state governor, mayors of all the municipalities (eleven), and 
uninominal deputies for 18 local districts in the state. According to official 
sources, the nominal list of electors was the highest ever in the state. 
There were 515,743 (99.61 per cent) potential voters, of which 70 per 
cent were in the city capital, 52.78 per cent were women, and 47.22 per 
cent men. The young population (18-39) was estimated at 64 per cent of 
the 517,747 registered on the padron electoral (electoral roll).510 
The elections were held on August 2, and despite predictions of a narrow 
PRI victory, or a PAN-PRI tie, the PAN candidates obtained the majority of 
posts.511 The PAN gained the post of state governor with 182,362 votes, or 
52.38 per cent; retained the city capital with 130,616 votes or 52.83 per 
cent, and obtained a majority in the state legislature with 12 elected
509 The electoral data was obtained through the following sources: EFE. 1998. Elecciones: 
Aguascalientes on the Internet, www.ife.org.mx ; Recibio FG constancia de Mayoria. El 
Heraldo de Aguascalientes. August 10, 1998; Pan 4, PRI 4 y PRD 1, el reparto de las 
diputaciones plurinominales. El Heraldo de Aguascalientes. August 10, 1998; Para el tricolor, 
cinco de los once Ayuntamientos de Aguascalientes. El Nacional. August 4, 1998; Luis 
Armando Reynoso recibio constancia de mayoria y lo acredita como Alcalde electo. El Sol del 
Centro. August 7, 1998, and Computo final de la eleccion. El Sol del Centro. August 10, 
1998; Cerrada contienda entre PRI y PAN en Aguascalientes. El Universal. August 1, 1998, 
and Hasta el consejo electoral preve contienda cerrada. La Jornada. August 1, 1998.
510 Instituto Federal Electoral. 1998. Estadisticas del Padron Electoral and Estadisticas del 
Padron Nominal, accessed through the Internet on
www.ife.org.mx/RFE/estadist/html/ags.html. on August, 1998.
511 Some o f the surveys showing a clear PRI dominance or a PAN-PRI tie were published in: 
Mantiene PRI ventaja de 10 puntos porcentuales en Aguascalientes. El Nacional. June 25, 
1998; No se sujetaran a concertacesiones los triunfos del PRI en Aguascalientes: Romo. El 
Nacional. July 21, 1998, and Cerrada lucha PRI-PAN en Aguascalientes. El Nacional. July 
22, 1998.
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deputies and four obtained via proportional representation, giving them a 
total of 16 out of 27 seats. I t  also won in six municipalities (including the 
city capital), resulting in 87.94 per cent of the state population coming 
under direct PAN administration.512
The official party suffered an irreversible loss. I t  obtained only 130,592 - 
or 37.51 per cent - of the votes for state governor and 35.96 per cent - or 
88,917 votes - for city capital mayor. I t  won only six seats by direct vote 
at the state legislature, and obtained four by proportional representation, 
to become the second force in the state. The party also obtained the 
remaining five municipalities (of which two were previously governed by 
the PAN) to govern 12.06 per cent of the total state population.513 
The PRD, far from representing a threat, only achieved 23,519 votes (or 
6.75 per cent, 50 per cent less than in the 1997 elections) for state 
governor, and 6.88 per cent, or 17,041 votes, for city capital mayor. 
Through proportional representation it gained one seat on the state 
legislature. The coalition PT-PVEM achieved 1.95 per cent (6,775) of the 
votes for state governor, and failed to gain any seats for the state 
legislature by proportional representation.
These results show the high level of participation in the elections process,
512 The municipalities won by the PAN were Aguascalientes concentrating 67.55 per cent o f  
the total population, Asientos with 4.15 per cent, Calvillo accounting for 5.99 per cent, Jesus 
Maria with 6.31 per cent, San Francisco de los Romo with 2.07 per cent and Tepezala with 
1.87 per cent. The per centage data was obtained from: INEGI. 1996. Anuario Estadistico del 
Estado de Aguascalientes. INEGI-Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes. Mexico.
513Ibidem., The municipalities are: El Llano (1.66%), Pabellon de Arteaga (3.67%), San Jose 
de Gracia (0.83%) including the two former PAN municipalities; Cosio (1.41%) and Rincon 
de Romos (4.49%).
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and consequently the difficulty of reversing the results. The number of 
abstentions was the lowest ever, at 32.4 per cent; 348,177 electors took 
part; and the city capital accounted for 243, 515 valid votes, or 70 per 
cent of the total votes cast.514 This unprecedented mass participation 
impacted directly on the PRI, erasing that party's influence.
The remaining political parties showed a decrease in real terms of their 
persuasive power and were relegated to third place in the case of the PRD 
and fourth for the PT-PVEM coalition. These parties remain political forces 
in the state but are far from representing a threat to the PAN. These 
elections were also considered the most closely observed, by social, 
NGO's, and private entities, in the history of the state.515 
The Electoral Results: The Influence of the Anti-Political Candidates and the 
Effects of the Conscious Vote
The electoral results evidence a clear tendency in the state favouring the 
PAN and shunning the PRI. However, the questions remain of why the PRI 
lost, and consequently, how and why the PAN won. In answering these
514 The remaining missing votes are represented by 4, 889 void votes and 40 votes to non 
registered candidates, that in sum with the votes obtained by the political parties totals 100 per 
cent o f this figure.
515 Data from the IFE headquarters mentions that 8,643 party representatives were distributed 
among the state. There were 7, 928 funcionarios de casilla (electoral officials); the 
population voted on 991 casillas (897 basic and 94 extra ordinaries). The elections also 
included participation from 296 electoral observers from ONGs and private bodies. To find 
more see: Cerrada contienda entre PRI y PAN en Aguascalientes. El Universal. August 1, 
1998 and Hasta el consejo electoral preve contienda cerrada. La Jornada. August 1,1998.
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questions, this section will discover a dramatic change in the electoral 
political context, evidencing a new political culture in the state. I t  will 
highlight the role played by both external and internal factors, and look at 
the affect on the electorate of the modifications to the concession scheme. 
There is no single definitive reason for the results of this electoral process, 
but a common trend can be identified. Since the real electoral battle was 
between the PRI and the PAN, the people's desire to 'change' the party in 
power, but to maintain the same economic strategy, led to a voto 
razonado (conscious vote). The electorate voted against the PRI, and 
against opposition candidates identified as inexperienced and without a 
specific economic policy, which could therefore jeopardise the state's 
development. Thus, the PAN candidates, promoting an entrepreneurial and 
alternative vision of government, were the beneficiaries.
In seeking to explain these trends, and the reasons for the PRI defeat, it is 
arguable that the State Governor Otto Granados Roldan became the 
party's worst enemy, as his unpopularity and lack of political touch 
jeopardised the PRI candidates. In particular, his rigid policy-making 
mechanisms, which excluded the public and potential electorate, resulted 
in massive social disaffection. The exclusion of the young political 
community in the state and the break with the old political guard (Olivares 
Santana's gangs) encouraged greater enemies, whilst his constant political 
battle against PAN policies and politicians also had an adverse effect on his 
government. Furthermore, his relationship with the disgraced former 
president, Carlos Salinas, to whom he owed his candidacy, identified him 
with the obsolete political system, despite his recognised administrative
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skills and successful economic policies.
Another major factor was the unfair selection of Hector Hugo Olivares by 
the most orthodox and rigid PRI mechanisms. This caused a great deal of 
unrest and disunity within the party, with negative affects on the 
electorate. Furthermore, the perception of the PRI's candidates was linked 
with the old corrupt, paternalist, and corporativist political system, and 
was incompatible with the ideologies of voters in a progressive state like 
Aguascalientes. The unexpectedly high level of participation of urban 
voters was also extremely important (as stated by a PRI campaign 
member), eliminating at once the PRI influences. Another apparent factor 
was the rumour of a PRI-PAN arrangement having been formulated 'under 
the table' - the candidacy of Armando Romero fitted this scenario and 
suffered the consequences; conversely, however, this rumour did not 
affect the PAN candidate.
In looking for reasons for the PAN victory, one can find chain effects 
influencing the state governor and mayoral elections, in which the 
common denominator was to be in the right place at the right time. The 
business profile of Felipe Gonzalez and Luis Armando Reynoso fitted the 
new trend in Mexican politics, whereby an anti-political ideology met the 
electoral perception of good potential candidates who could form good 
governments. Their role as critics of the system won the support of the 
electorate and the economic and political turmoil during recent months 
revalidated their postures.
The clergy also played a key role, using the 'hand of God' in the electoral 
process. The characteristics of the state, with the votes concentrated in
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the city capital, and the large proportion of young people and women 
voters, were also determining factors. The influence of the PAN in the 
adjoining Panistas states of Jalisco and Guanajuato also shows that the 
political changes in Aguascalientes reflect national currents. Finally, it is 
necessary to consider that the closely monitored and transparent elections 
did not allow any possibility of the PRI altering the balance of the results. 
Even if it seems to contradict previous discussions, an important lesson 
can be drawn from these elections: the permanent politicisation of the 
water concession, and its inherent problems, did not represent a threat, 
either for the PAN or for the PRI candidates, and was not used as a 
political flag to de-legitimise any political party. Rather, the electoral 
results pointed in another direction, whereby a local desire for change 
persuaded the electorate to cast a conscious vote regardless of 
perceptions about the constant politicisation of the water concession.
A Final Overview of the Water Utilities: An Unsolved Problem and a Continuing 
Challenge to the Elected PAN Administration
There is still an unsolved problem on the political agenda: the concession 
of the water utilities has not proved to be of benefit to the local 
inhabitants. This represents an important challenge to the elected 
government and to future administrations. Since the problems facing the 
water utilities have not been solved by any political party, the future 
remains uncertain, and it is clear that a realistic solution is still far away. 
As stated by the Mayor, Alfredo Reyes: i f  I  had had the support from the 
state governor in 1996, the private body (CAASA) wouid not be here... 
considering that its presence was induced by the Mexican presidency, it
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was decided not to give up with the concession scheme, nonetheless, the 
future governments (elected) can take other measures.516 This declaration 
came right on time for the purposes of this case study. I t  helps to prove 
the core points discussed in this empirical case of study: the failure of the 
concession scheme, under either PAN or PRI prerogative, to solve the 
problems facing the water utilities; unmet electoral promises; lack of 
control over the concession scheme by local authorities; implementation of 
privatisation policies by federal authorities at any social cost, and 
supported and encouraged by the state governor as personal projects.
I t  also proves that the development of the city capital has been tied to 
federal and state whims. The future is still in the hands of the newly- 
elected governors, upon whom relies the solution of the concession 
scheme. I t  remains to be seen whether local authorities will be prepared 
to challenge these trends. Ultimately, one experience is definitive - all 
local policies lead to the same end: politics.
Concluding Note
The inclusion of a Comision Ciudadana in the structure of CAPAMA, which 
is intended to serve as the regulatory body for the water utilities, 
represents an unrealistic and meaningless board with limited functions. 
Despite its legal function - to force any level of government or CAASA to
516 The above declaration was in: Alonso y Asociados en Comunicacion. Buenos Dias 
Aguascalientes. August 10, 1998. Aguascalientes, Mexico, p i.
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fulfil any agreement established on the concession title or laws - it is 
jeopardised by the politicisation within it. The independence of this body is 
subjected to political considerations instead of real necessities. I t  was also 
made up of people without knowledge of the water problems facing the 
municipality, and more interested in the politics surrounding it. In fact, the 
partisan ideologies inside this body represent the dominance of the PAN in 
the state as a whole.
Therefore, the PAN-style modifications to the concession title make the 
concession scheme extremely vulnerable to external factors (macro- 
economic variables). Any economic turmoil (abrupt devaluation of the 
Mexican peso) would represent a serious threat to the survival of the 
concession scheme, directly affecting the water ta riff and its politicisation. 
Thus, one can assume that the modifications granted are still far from 
solving the problems that face the water utilities, and highlight the 
inability of the PAN to meet electoral promises.
The users' perceptions of the merits of a concession scheme are mainly 
determined by two factors: first, the water tariff; and second, the 
availability of supply. With regard to the precarious condition of the water 
utilities and resources, this research observed a chain reaction whereby 
the over-exploitation of the underground waters is linked to cost 
increases, encouraging constant price rises, low water quality, and scarce 
availability, in turn putting the health of the inhabitants at risk. This 
results in a never-ending politicisation, becoming ever deeper due to the 
lack of any serious study of the water utilities and their resources, and 
more especially to the absence of any willingness from the government to
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solve the problem from the roots up. The results achieved by the 
concession by 1998 were revealed dramatically by the auditing of CAASA, 
reaffirming our arguments and pointing to one common denominator: 
private means did not cope with the expectations, but only became an 
important electoral and political weapon. The application of further 
concession schemes for the water utilities in Mexico is thus still far from 
being a national policy, despite initial federal intentions.
An important political lesson can be drawn from the slight victory of the 
PRI in the 1997 federal elections - the narrow victory achieved by the PRI 
in those elections was the first sign of the decline of that party. Despite 
the involvement of the PAN with the problems regarding the water 
concession, the electoral consequences were not as severe as they had 
been in 1995. Even later, the 1998 local elections were determined not by 
the effects upon the local inhabitants of the water utilities concession, but 
by the rejection of the old PRI. In this sense, the politicisation of the water 
utilities moved to a second level, in which the most important variable was 
linked to getting rid of the PRI, rather than to the effects of PAN policies 
and politics. Thus, one can assume that an anti-PRI current in 
Aguascalientes unified the people to vote against the PRI and to support 
the PAN, even though this political party had not solved the most 
important problem for which it was elected to sort out in 1996. The lack of 
results, and the unfulfilled electoral promises, were not a threat in this 
election as they had been in the 1995 elections.
To sum up, neither PRI nor PAN governments have proved willing to solve 
the problems facing the water utilities and resources, and have instead
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only encouraged greater politicisation. The lack of a truly regulatory body, 
and of a fair contract, plus a solution to resource abstraction, rights, and 
reallocation, has affected first the local inhabitants, and then the feasibility 
of future privatisation schemes for the water utilities in Mexico.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions
Local Governments, Privatisation Policies, and Water 
Utilities in Mexico: Is this the Responsibility of the State or 
the Private Sector?
Introduction
This thesis has analysed the implementation, undertaken in an attempt to 
further the privatisation ideology, of the first water concession in Mexico. 
This development, promoted by the neo-liberal ideology of the federal 
government, has encouraged an ongoing debate about the formation of 
public policy, and thus the thesis has examined the relationship between 
an economic theory embracing privatisation and politics. This debate has 
as many approaches as the social sciences can provide, focusing on, for 
example, the presidential system, interest groups, economic theories, or 
even the collateral effects of globalisation. At the local level in Mexico, the 
main issues lie in explaining the broad heterogeneity amongst the 
municipalities, and the shadow of the federal government over local 
politics and policies. Economic policies at this level have been analysed 
according to descriptive approaches or legal perspectives.
There is a widespread belief that government bureaucracies or state- 
owned utilities are inefficient, in contrast to a more efficient private sector. 
In conditions in which the market is supported by stable economic 
variables, normative and regulatory frameworks, competition and 
democratic practices, there is evidence of this supremacy. However, in 
general, the real aims of any policy innovation or implementation appear
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to be political. In practice, both sectors exhibit strengths and weakness. 
The private sector must make profits in order to provide investment 
capital, while the public sector must balance a reasonable income and 
respond to consumer demands. Thus, both approaches have inherently 
political connotations. Nevertheless, almost all the literature, and in 
particular that relating to the local level, concentrates on the financial 
aspects of privatisation. The aim here has been to widen the debate and 
to discuss the effects in political, rather than economic, terms. The 
privatisation programme is forced, at every stage, to balance political and 
economic goals that are subject to specific federal prerogatives, limiting 
the scope and autonomy of the municipalities. Thus, our investigation of 
privatisation contributes to knowledge of the Mexican political system and 
policy-making at the local level.
The case study was chosen for its relevance in identifying the policy­
making decision and implementation, and later the effects and changes, 
brought about by a federal experiment (the first water concession) at a 
local level. The case of the water concession in the municipality of 
Aguascalientes demonstrates how an economic policy aimed at solving a 
problem at a local level brought with it greater economic, political, and 
social problems that affected the internal life of the state and thus the 
municipality; however, the question of just how many of these problems 
would also have arisen in public hands cannot be ignored. As a result, this 
economic policy accelerated a political transformation at the state and 
municipal levels of government, pressured by the arrival to power of a 
former opposition party with a new set of ideologies. The effects were felt
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in the internal political, economic, and social life of the municipality, and 
also influenced upon federal projects. In addition, the case study 
challenges the theory that privatisation policies, per se, enhance the 
development (economic, social, and political) of municipalities. This final 
part of the thesis also aims to draw some final conclusions from the 
experience gained through this case study.
8.1 The Water Concession PRI-style: A Menace to the Public Interest? 
The PRI Political Machinery: A Useful Tool to Influence Local Politics
The official party played a key role in the implementation of the first water 
concession in Mexico. After the modifications to article 115 of the Mexican 
constitution became law in 1984, the first steps at local level, propelled by 
neo-liberal ideology, were made in Aguascalientes. One must therefore 
seek to find out how the privatisation beliefs were developed until the 
water concession was granted, and in so doing, one will be able to draw 
some final conclusions.
Our case study has shown that the municipality of Aguascalientes took the 
lead in applying privatisation policies concerning the water supply in 
Mexico, and that after the first programme was introduced, two different 
privatisation schemes were used. The first was in the form of contrato de 
servicios, in four different stages from 1989 to 1993; the second, from 
October 1993, was a concession of the water utilities. Both were made 
under PRI auspices.
The common factor, from the launch of the first privatisation scheme 
(1989) until the concession scheme was approved in 1993, was the lack of
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knowledge about privatisation. The critical circumstances facing the water 
utilities (human, technological, hydrological, and economic) jeopardised 
any private or public effort to improve the services. Another important 
factor was the absence of any exchange of experiences (socialisation) at 
this level. I t  is unfortunately common for Mexican municipalities to 
implement new policies without external support. The three-year 
municipal period is also often too short to evaluate these policies.
Official arguments justifying the concession of the water utilities were 
based on two main considerations. First, the utilities had been operating 
under serious economic constraints, with a high level of subsidy and 
financial burdens on the municipality. The water ta riff was under-priced 
and increases would be unavoidable. The goal was to pass the 
responsibility for the increases to the private sector, and the local 
authority clearly wanted to wash their hands of any social or political 
conflict resulting from this decision. Second, the lack of an effective water 
infrastructure, inexperienced management, and the dramatic hydrological 
situation facing the state were further incentives to implement 
privatisation policies. It was supposed that expanding the role of private 
entities in the provision of the water utilities would solve the economic 
difficulties of the municipality, and influence positively on a rationalisation 
of the service. In fact, the concession scheme never actually tackled these 
problems, but instead brought with it greater problems.
However, the most important factor was the influence of federal decisions. 
Political factors (never mentioned by any authority) played the critical 
role. First, governor Miguel Angel Barberena Vega (1986-1992) promoted
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the scheme in the form of a service contract in accordance with federal 
ideologies. Later, governor Otto Granados Roldan promoted the 
concession, clearly considering it a personal project. Aguascalientes was 
selected to implement this policy, with the intention being to apply similar 
schemes in the 100 most important cities in Mexico. The decision had 
already been taken and local authorities were expected to justify it, 
presenting a unified front with federal authorities. This explains the real 
facts behind any economic or technical justifications.
In the case of Aguascalientes, there were serious concerns regarding the 
concession scheme. A public natural monopoly was transferred to become 
a private monopoly, with no auctions or bids considered, and no 
competition allowed. Local authorities kept the normative and regulatory 
framework, but with little chance to be truly independent. Furthermore, 
the public was allowed very little involvement in the evolution of the 
privatisation schemes. Local and state authorities even confused the terms 
'privatisation' and 'concession', which could explain the level of 
misinterpretation evident at the time the decision was made (e.g., a public 
official confused the terms and, in consequence, the inhabitants were less 
informed of exactly what was taking place). Nevertheless, neither local nor 
state authorities ever represented a threat to its implementation; the high 
degree of subordination at both levels ensured that federal instructions 
would be followed.
These facts represent important evidence for economic theorists or 
sceptics on the application of privatisation policies at a local level. The 
economic feasibility of any privatisation programme relies on the political
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interests involved. Economic considerations play an important role, but 
considering how local authorities in Mexico operate, one can assume that 
they are subject to political decisions. Our case study is a clear illustration 
of this. From the launch of the first privatisation scheme in 1989, until the 
concession scheme, the same economic arguments were used. The 
privatisation policy introduced to solve these problems achieved little. The 
scheme in Aguascalientes never achieved its intended goals, and the 
results obtained point to one main factor: political decisions. Finally, and 
fundamentally, federal support is always a key variable for success, 
especially when a policy is implemented as an experiment to move 
forward in other municipalities.
The Experience of the PRI Water Concession: An Overview
In view of the PRI influence on the local political arena, one must explore, 
and draw some final conclusions regarding, the development of the 
concession scheme from the implementation of the policy to the end of the 
period of PRI control.
By the time the water concession was formally approved by state and local 
laws in Aguascalientes, this policy was seen as a major development. The 
Mexican government was keen to apply the scheme in order to be able to 
fulfil the requirements of international institutions (World Bank and its 
subsidiaries), and thus join a select group of developing countries. In this 
sense, local and state authorities were following federal resolutions but 
were also influenced by international trends and policies.
The municipality granted the concession scheme with the clear aim of 
favouring the ICA group, whose subsidiary SAASA was initially hired as a
311
private entity in charge of the water management in the municipality 
using a service contract scheme. This was the first step towards this 
company obtaining the water concession for its newly-created CAASA 
subsidiary, with the intention of going on to gain further concessions for 
the water supply in other cities in Mexico. ICA's major shareholder, and 
former president of this group, Gilberto Borja, took advantage of good 
relationships with the federal government, and especially with president 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and the company benefited from its partnership 
with the leading French company Generate des Eaux. In order to back up 
the federally-supported privatisation movement, evidence supporting the 
concession scheme was found in the legal framework, a move which 
showed the willingness of all levels of government to comply with the 
scheme. In particular, it was pointed out that the Mexican constitution 
allowed private entities to provide public utilities. The clear aim was to 
encourage further concessions programmes throughout the country.
The contract was the most controversial aspect of the scheme, and 
contributed most to its politicisation. The level of subordination and the 
rush to apply the concession scheme, especially from PRI members, 
persuaded local authorities to sign a contract with clear disadvantages. A 
public policy aimed at improving the quality and quantity of the service 
dramatically altered the political environment, resulting in greater 
economic and political pressures. The treatment of the water tariff was 
particularly contentious. The staged increments were a first step towards 
setting the ta riff at a rate comparable with real costs. However, the 
indexation to the inflation rate generated great disquiet among the local
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inhabitants. At the same time, campaigns by social and political 
organisations to revoke the concession scheme affected heavily upon the 
electoral preferences in the municipality, to the advantage of the 
opposition parties. The private body, CAASA, was the first and most 
seriously affected, and was used as a focus for local disaffection with the 
water services. Many different types of organisations, and even members 
of the PRI, saw the opportunity to obtain a political advantage by 
criticising CAASA, and thus, the water concession.
One of the most serious flaws of the water concession was the weakness 
of the regulatory body (CAPAMA), which showed a lack of control and 
independence in applying the agreements on the concession title. In fact, 
CAPAMA was financially tied to, and receiving orders from, the 
municipality. I t  was therefore used as a political weapon, serving partisan 
ideologies with only limited autonomy.
The liabilities acquired by the private body CAASA were a further factor 
promoting the politicisation of the scheme, and evidencing the lack of 
control over it. The requirement to pay the municipality the internal debt 
of CAPAMA, by issuing public bonds, and to obtain fresh resources for the 
concession scheme, resulted in greater pressure on all levels of 
government to contemplate further subsidies for the water utilities.
The local political arena was also highly influenced by events at the 
national level. The fall in prestige of the Mexican president, Carlos Salinas, 
and the PRI, assassinations, financial instability, and a major devaluation 
(94), had a dramatic affect on the water concession. There was significant 
politicisation of the concession, culminating in the first defeat for the PRI
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in the local elections. The elections for state legislature, and for mayor in 
the municipality, show a clear desire for change on the part of the 
electorate.
The PRI Lessons: A Summary
The PRI influence on the first water concession in Mexico encompasses 
both the rise and fall of the use of neo-liberal privatisation ideology 
concerning the water utilities in Mexico at local level, at least during the 
presidential term of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). Federal support vanished 
and the privatisation movement suddenly came to a halt.517 Nevertheless, 
the legacy of this policy remains in our case study. In order to define its 
relevance for future administrations, one must now focus on the PRI-style 
first water concession in Mexico, and its consequences.
From the launch of the concession scheme in October 1993, until the end 
of the administration that had supported it in 1995, two main factors 
influenced its politicisation. The first was the weaknesses of the concession 
title or contract together with the inadequacies of its elaboration, including 
the underestimation of future political and economic scenarios surrounding 
the concession scheme.
The second was the public criticism directed against the 'advantages'
517 As reviewed earlier, only our case o f study, which represents the municipality of 
Aguascalientes and the case of Cancun Isla Mujeres remains as a legacy o f privatisation 
beliefs in the form o f concession schemes for the water utilities in Mexico. Nevertheless, 
alternative mechanisms such as service contracts for the operative or administrative services 
are identified in the Mexican case.
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granted to CAASA to manage the water utilities, including federal support 
in the form of direct credits and subsidies (which never came on time and 
in full), the adjustment of the water ta riff to suit the needs of the private 
body (which was never adjusted according to the contract), and the lack 
of a truly regulatory body. These factors provoked great discontent among 
the local inhabitants, affecting them economically and having a 
consequent affect on the political scenario for the PRI. The biggest winners 
from the concession scheme were the recently-elected PAN members, 
whose party was seen as most likely to improve the municipality . 
Nonetheless, its campaign promises differed greatly from its later 
practices.
8.2 The Water Concession, PAN-style: Reproducing Earlier Practices 
The Nature of the Water Concession under PAN Prerogative
The period of the water concession under PAN control highlights the other 
side of the coin, whereby politics and policies of a former opposition 
government influenced the development of the water concession, adding 
an extra political connotation. This section will explore how the water 
concession influenced the electorate to elect a former opposition party, 
and how the PAN-style water concession developed.
The rise to power of a former opposition party marked the beginning of 
the new electoral tendencies not just in the municipality but in the entire 
state of Aguascalientes. Inevitably, the water concession as implemented 
by the PRI was used by the PAN as a political flag to attract voters, and its 
messianic campaign promises considered briefly a chord with the
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electorate, which voted for the PAN out of a desire for a better quality of 
life - to get rid of PRI practices and policies and to move forward with a 
solution to the water concession. Ultimately, however, the politicisation of 
the water concession benefited not the public, but this political party. The 
PAN majority inside the ayuntamiento and the state legislature was no 
guarantee that campaign promises would be met, especially as these were 
focused on reducing the water tariff, revoking the concession, and the 
remunicipalizar of the water utilities. Nevertheless, the PAN victory does 
prove that an economic policy aimed at benefiting the inhabitants did at 
least encourage the process of democratisation, which was heavily 
influenced by the politicisation surrounding the water concession.
The populist political campaign and promises brought electoral success, 
but once in power the new mayor, Alfredo Reyes, evidenced a clear 
inexperience, lack of decision-making skills and, in particular, the 
presence of political aims behind every government action. Thus, the 
former rigid mechanisms of government practised by the PRI (lack of 
consensus with other political parties, mayoriteo, following political 
doctrines instead of local necessities, media campaigns against opposition 
parties, submission to higher levels of government, and negotiations 
'under the table1) were reproduced by the newly-elected PAN. 
Aguascalientes moved from one rigid and hegemonic system of 
government to an inexperienced party democracy recalling the previous 
practices - a trend that is affecting most of the Mexican municipalities 
facing similar political transitions. Thus, the evidence shows that the 
bringing to power of a former opposition party is no guarantee of new
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policies and practices.
The fall of the concession scheme proved the dominance of the PAN, but 
they failed subsequently to meet their campaign promises, as can be seen 
in the elaboration of the new concession title. The issue encouraged the 
arrival on the political scene of a variety of social organisations and 
political parties, aiming to use social dissatisfaction with unfulfilled PAN 
promises to destabilise the PAN government. The water utilities were used 
and politicised by any and all political groups in order to benefit from the 
public dissatisfaction with PAN: it was clear that the first political benefits 
would be reaped by whichever group was perceived to have resolved the 
problems. The PAN efforts to reach a solution made it clear that the rescue 
initiative was a populist action, initiated by the newly-elected mayor, 
Alfredo Reyes, on the grounds that the financial instability of CAASA 
forced the municipality to rescue the water utilities in the public interest. 
The real aims were to politically revalidate the PAN in the state, and to 
promote Alfredo Reyes himself; and to obtain control of the water utilities 
without assuming the liabilities from CAASA. The legal support for this 
action (the rescue initiative) was controversial but represented the best 
chance of questioning this initiative, occasioning even greater politicisation 
and the beginning of a permanent campaign against the PRI. However, 
the actual result of the initiative was a political reverse quite contrary to 
Reyes' expectations.
In fact, the private group CAASA was put in a favourable position to 
negotiate a new contract, and what was supposed to benefit the end users 
encouraged greater disadvantages. The municipality's financial obligations
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to the ICA and Generate des Eaux partnership group (CAASA) made the 
restoration of the concession to this private group unavoidable, and 
together with federal support, this explains why CAASA has always 
managed to avoid any confrontation. The modifications to the contract 
support our arguments regarding the benefits granted, in theory, to 
CAASA.
The Outcomes of the PAN Water Concession
As a result of the political turmoil generated by the inconsistency of the 
PAN policies, the concession title was modified and granted again, in 
moves reminiscent of PRI practices towards the same private group (ICA). 
The aim was clearly to modify the conditions of the concession title and to 
erase any trace of the former government. Thus, the elaboration of this 
new concession title had the seal of the recently-arrived PAN government. 
The modifications to the concession title were marked by a series of 
partisan ideologies held by the new government. For example, the 
inclusion of a Comision Ciudadana in the structure of CAPAMA, intended to 
serve as the regulatory body for the water utilities, is practically 
meaningless, having only limited powers. Despite its legal function to force 
any level of government or CAASA to fulfil any agreement established on 
the concession title or laws, it is jeopardised by internal politicisation, and 
its independence is subject to political considerations instead of real 
necessities. I t  was also made up of people without knowledge of the water 
problems facing the municipality, and more interested in the politics of the 
situation. In fact, the partisan ideologies inside this body reflect the 
dominance of the PAN in the state as a whole.
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Therefore, the PAN modifications to the concession title make the 
concession scheme extremely vulnerable to external factors (macro- 
economic variables). Any economic turmoil (abrupt devaluation of the 
Mexican peso) would represent a serious threat to the survival of the 
concession scheme, directly affecting the water ta riff and the politicisation 
of it. Thus, it can be assumed that the modifications granted are still far 
from solving the problems facing the water utilities, and highlight the 
unwillingness of the PAN to meet electoral promises.
The users' perceptions of the merits of a concession scheme are mainly 
determined by two factors: first, the water tariff; and second, the 
availability of the resource. The transfer of the water utilities from public 
to private depends on the affects on these two variables, and politicisation 
increases proportionate to these affects. In turn, this affects the 
perception of good government.
In the case study a chain reaction was identified, whereby the exploitation 
of the ground water is linked to operative cost increases, encouraging 
constant increases in the water tariff, low water quality, and water 
shortages, putting at risk the health of the inhabitants. This results in a 
never-ending politicisation, becoming ever deeper due to the lack of any 
serious study of the water utilities and resources, and more especially to 
the absence of any willingness from the government to solve the problem 
from the roots.
In this case, however, the PAN did not suffer electorally as might have 
been expected. Rather, the narrow victory achieved by the PRI in 1997 
was the first sign of the decline of that party. Despite the involvement of
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the PAN with the problems regarding the water concession, the electoral 
consequences were not as severe as they had been in 1995. Further on, 
the 1998 local elections were determined not by the affects upon the local 
inhabitants of the water concession (water tariff increases), but on the 
rejection of the old PRI.
The politicisation of the water utilities was passed to a second level, in 
which the most important factor was linked to removing the PRI, rather 
than to the affects of PAN policies and politics, e.g., the rescue initiative 
concerning the water concession. Thus, one can assume that an anti-PRI 
current in Aguascalientes unified the people to vote against the PRI and to 
support the PAN, even though this political party had not solved the most 
important problem for which it was elected to solve in 1996. The lack of 
results, and the unfulfilled electoral promises, were not a threat in this 
election as they had been in 1995.
Overall Conclusions: The Effects of PAN Policies and Politics
Most literature concerning transition governments argues that opposition 
parties are willing to alter the balance of the political scenario in which are 
operating. In our findings there is clear evidence that the arrival to power 
of an opposition party does not necessarily mean better government, 
especially in the context of the rigid political structure that has prevailed 
during the last 70 years in the Mexican municipalities. Campaign promises 
and people's desire for 'change' are core factors in gaining power, but the 
evidence here shows that campaign promises are not necessarily equal to 
government actions. Policies are linked to interests and not to necessities. 
Our case study illustrates that the reintegration of the concession scheme
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with the private body, CAASA, proves two definitive hypotheses. First, the 
PAN-style contract resisted the politicisation generated around the water 
utilities, challenging policy-makers about the outcome obtained previously 
with the PRI, which was heavily politicised and contributed to its political 
fall. Second, the municipality could not move forward without considering 
the concession scheme for the water utilities, since its own development is 
tied to it. Thus, after being seriously questioned by social and political 
organisations, as well as by local inhabitants, it returned as an essential 
privatisation scheme that could be modified according to circumstances. 
One must assume that the municipality is tied to the concession scheme 
permanently, due to the political and economic costs of getting rid of it. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the first water concession in Mexico 
demonstrates that neither PRI nor PAN governments have been willing to 
solve the problems facing the water utilities and their resources. The lack 
of a proper regulatory body, and of a fair contract for both parties (public- 
private), has affected first the local inhabitants, and subsequently the 
feasibility of future privatisation schemes for the water utilities in Mexico. 
Our case study provides important evidence regarding who benefits from 
privatisation ideology, albeit that there is no conclusive answer; rather, 
the perception of benefits depends upon one's standpoint. Privatisation 
could be seen first to benefit the municipality, by eliminating a financial 
burden, while the lack of regulatory frameworks means that there is, 
potentially, a high level of benefit to be gained by the private enterprise in 
charge of the services. It  is even arguable, as noted in our case study, 
that the main beneficiary was the opposition party fighting to obtain
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control of the municipality, who used the concession scheme as a political 
banner. Looked at in this way, it can be seen that an economic policy 
served to encourage the democratic process - economics transformed 
political aims and means. However, one must keep in focus the crucial 
point that society, supposedly the main intended beneficiary of these 
schemes, is always the last to receive any benefit. Privatisation at a local 
level, and specifically in this case study, serves partisan beliefs first, with 
no account taken of real local necessities and demands regarding the 
water utilities. This is a common disease at this level, in which local 
politics and policies are easily cheated and manipulated to benefit anyone 
but the first user.
Lessons to Draw from the First Water Utilities Concession in Mexico: Is it the 
Responsibility of the State or the Private Sector to Ensure Efficient Provision?
Having analysed both PRI and PAN legacies concerning the water utilities, 
the obvious questions are: 1) who is responsible for the provision of water 
utilities in Mexico?; and, 2) given a case study that points to a failure of 
the first water concession scheme in the country, is it the responsibility of 
the state or the private sector to create conditions in which privatisation 
will be effective?
From an official and legal perspective the state has the intrinsic 
responsibility for the provision of public utilities in Mexico. According to 
such rhetoric, most of the public services are provided by public means, 
and the state is fully responsible, through the three levels of government, 
to ensure both its efficiency and the adequate provision of services. Thus, 
most of the water utilities in Mexico are provided by public means due to
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their implicit relevance to and effect on the local inhabitants,518 and one 
can identify this public utility as the most important and controversial. 
Paradoxically, the water utilities have less-developed characteristics 
compared to other services, e.g., water utilities require greater (i.e., more 
capital-intensive) and faster solutions than do other infrastructure 
improvement or financial investment programmes undertaken by federal, 
state, or municipal means.519
Having identified that the state has the responsibility in the first instance, 
one must then ask just who becomes responsible when private 
involvement is permitted? The results obtained suggest that the state, 
through regulatory policies in which federal, state, and local laws provide 
the 'muscle', should control and monitor the public utilities. 520 
In this sense, the private body in charge of the water utilities has an 
inherent responsibility to cope effectively with the contract - even when 
one considers that such companies have to maintain costs-based prices, 
and to make a profit for their investors. I t  is arguable that profit-seeking
518 Official sources can be found in: INAP (coed.). 1994. Manual de Servicios Publicos 
Municipales, INAP-BANOBRAS, Mexico, pp. 99-116, INAP (coed.). 1995. La 
Administration de Servicios de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado, Mexico: INAP-CEDEMUN- 
SEGOB and INAP. 1993. La Administration del Servicio de Agua Potable y  Alcantarillado, 
Guia Tecnica 22, Mexico: INAP.
519 For an ecological perspective o f the water utilities in Mexico see: OECD. 1997. 
Biotecnologia Para Uso y  Conservation del Agua, (taller de trabajo, 1996). Mexico: OECD- 
CONACYT.
520 For a discussion using a view from the consumers of the water utilities in Mexico see: 
Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo. 1998. Los Servicios de Agua Potable, Electricidad y  
Telecomunicaciones. Una Optica desde los Consumidores, Chile: CONSUPAL.
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enterprises are far superior institutions through which to ensure efficient 
production, of course; however, where competition is completely absent, it 
is difficult to test private capabilities regarding public purposes. It  is also 
important to consider that the water utilities have special features that 
governments must take into account - when designing both contracts and 
their supporting policy frameworks - if private sector participation is to 
succeed. (For example, systems for allocating scarce raw water resources 
amongst alternative users - domestic, industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural - are often under-developed or incompatible with the efficient 
use of these resources.)
Clearly, the success of private participation in the water utilities depends 
to a large degree upon the quality of the policy framework that the 
government constructs in response to such issues. A failure to adequately 
address them will increase the risk that the government will be unable to 
find a partner for its preferred form of private sector participation, or that 
a private sector arrangement will fall short of the government's broad 
policy objectives. Overall, however, the use of private intervention points 
to one obvious conclusion: privatisation policies are far more than a 
simple variable. They need deep study in order to be successful, due to 
their inherently political nature that transforms the scenario in which they 
are applied.
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Appendix 1: A Note on Primary Sources and Methodology
The aim of this section is to describe how this research employed specific 
data and procedures in order to test our hypothesis. For this purpose, 
there are two main types of tools that were used to achieve this; the first 
of which - primary sources - explain the premeditated and non- 
interpretative material or data.521 This 'category' was further subdivided 
into two specific sections: namely, documentary sources and interviews. 
All the material used for this purpose is cited in the bibliography.
The second 'tool type' employed in this thesis embraces the methodology 
applied, which relied on diverse mechanisms and a non-specific theory set. 
Nonetheless, one can identify two basic frameworks through which to 
explain the methodology used - firstly, encompassing the background to 
the thesis from chapters one to three and, secondly, by building our 
research employing both historical and bibliographical perspectives until 
recent time. Both sections encouraged the author to use different 
methodology mechanisms with a specific set of objectives according to the 
case under examination.
521 For a broad description on the use o f primary sources see: Bell, Judith. 1987. Doing Your 
Research Project, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
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1. Primary Sources
1.1 Documentary Sources
• Official and Non-Official Publications and Documents 
This research considers the development of the first privatisation 
programme for the water utilities in Mexico carried out on a municipal 
level. Essentially, it is presented and discussed in fourteen different charts 
throughout the thesis (see list of tables and figures); however, because 
our thesis deals with a specific case of study, the official and non-official 
publications and document sources are divided into four core areas.
Firstly, the introductory chapter contains an important analysis of the 
situation that approaches things from a national perspective. In order to 
achieve this, the data employed comes largely from official material and 
expert writings (both published and non-published). The main official 
documents come from the Presidencia de la Republica 1988-1994 and 
1994-2000, Secretarfa de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion (DOF), and the official party Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (CEN del PRI), and include documents from other political 
parties like the Partido Accion Nacional (CEN del PAN) and the Partido de 
la Revolucion Democratica (CEN del PRD). These official documents are 
also divided into two 'types': firstly, expert opinions, largely obtained from 
writings from the CIDE, World Bank, OECD, BANOBRAS, CNA, CEDEMUN, 
INAP, INEGI, and internal publications from governmental agencies, think- 
tanks (LSE experts in Mexico), and academics (both national and 
international, and including unpublished or forthcoming research material 
from these institutions); and, secondly, commercial (non-official) literature
326
obtained primarily through non-specialised centres (libraries) and defined 
in the bibliography.
Next, this section addresses national trends regarding the public utilities 
and the use of privatisation schemes as they relate to the Mexican 
constitution, represented by chapter two, uses various official publications 
and reports, and the data examined here - including statistical, 
descriptive, qualitative, and quantitative information - comes from various 
sources. This involved researching the Mexican constitution, state, and 
local laws, as well as federal programmes from the 1994-2000 
government, including the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000, 
Programa Hidraulico 1995-2000, and Programa Nuevo Federalismo 1995- 
2000. In addition, official sources such as the CD-ROM, Los Municipios de 
Mexico: Informacion para el Desarrollo (1997) from the CEDEMUN- 
Secretarfa de Gobernacion, the Programa de las 100 ciudades (1994b) 
from SEDESOL, and other governmental documents like the Estadfsticas 
Nacionales (1998) INEGI (CD-ROM), the Federalismo y Desarrollo gazzete 
from Ba no bras, and writings on Los Municipios de Mexico and Servicios 
Publicos Municipales from the INAP, were also consulted. Finally, certain 
other official material, obtained through specialised publications, including 
writings and internal documents from the CNA, CIDE, Colegio de Mexico 
(COLMEX), INAP, Banobras, and commercial publications in the field, were 
also employed.
A third section - one focused exclusively on chapter three - provides a 
more descriptive outlook, identifying the economic and political 
background of our case study of the city of Aguascalientes, Ags, largely by
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means of official publications from local authorities, such as official 
transcripts from city hall sessions, mayoral speeches, statistical municipal 
data, and informes de gobierno (annual mayoral addresses to the city) 
covering various years. Other sources of data consulted here include state 
documents (state government and chamber of deputies) concerning work 
sessions within the municipality and internal documents and 
memorandums, including data from the Periodico Oficfal del Estado de 
Aguascalientes (POEA).522 Other major official sources included the 
Anuario Estadfstico Municipal del Estado de Aguascalientes and the 
Cuaderno Estadfstico Municipal Aguascalientes (both covering various 
years and published by the INEGI), and the results of different federal, 
state, and local elections, from which the Elecciones Aguascalientes (again 
covering various years) from the IFE were invaluable. Relevant information 
regarding hydrological conditions applicable to our case study was gleaned 
from the CNA's vast literature upon the subject, including the Ley de 
Aguas Nacionales (1997). Finally, other official and commercial sources 
assisted with the construction of this chapter. For example, the Insituto 
Cultural Aguascalientes (ICA), and the Coordinacion de Asesores del 
Estado de Aguascalientes 1992-1998, both provided publications and 
working documents regarding major topics in the state of Aguascalientes.
522 The POEA is an official publication which is concentrated in to publicise new state 
legislation as well as changes in the existing one. It includes modifications or new laws to 
any o f the municipalities conforming the state.
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Chapters four to seven examine the start of the first water privatisation in 
Mexico - i.e., the concession scheme in the city of Aguascalientes. These 
chapters constitute the core section of the thesis, in which the 
privatisation programme is analysed from its conception in 1989 to the 
period covering the 1998 elections. In order to achieve this effectively, this 
section uses a great deal of both unpublished and official material.
From the various sources employed, the most relevant data was obtained 
from the state and local authorities in the state and city of Aguascalientes, 
including internal and classified documents and memorandums, official 
agreements and accords, laws and fiats, official gazettes, leaked 
documents, information gleaned from 'behind the scenes', speeches, 
statistical data, and audit results. In addition, certain 'external' sources, 
such as private individuals working at CAASA headquarters (the private 
company managing the water concession), were able to provide classified 
information, much of which was vital. Notwithstanding this, however, a 
great deal of information in this section comes from research centres 
(CIDE, INAP, and Banobras) and libraries in Aguascalientes, Ags (both 
state and local libraries). Finally, chapter eight discusses the overall results 
of our findings, and thus relies exclusively upon the preceding chapters.
• Newspapers and Magazines
One of the greatest challenges facing the author in this endeavour, largely 
thanks to the lack of accurate historical information available in the field in 
question, was the need to sift through newspaper and magazine library 
sources (both locally and nationally) in order to build this research. In fact, 
most of the empirical evidence examined or quoted in the literature, and
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the core arguments and hypotheses, either come from or are corroborated 
by such sources.
Firstly, empirical material regarding local or state issues concerning 
Aguascalientes and linked to our specific area of research were consulted 
in the archivo municipal (city library) in the city of Aguascalientes, at the 
Aguascalientes State Library " Torres Bodet", the Aguascalientes chamber 
of deputies library, and the Instituto Cultural Aguascalientes library. The 
main local newspapers used were the Hidrocalido, El Heraldo de 
Aguascalientes, El Sol del Centro, and Pagina 24, as well as the magazine 
Cnsol and the official statistical review, CESMA.
Secondly, unpublished and published material regarding national trends of 
relevance to this thesis were found in Mexico City at the federal chamber 
of deputies' and senators' libraries, the Biblioteca de Mexico, and the 
library facilities of the CIDE, ITESM, Colegio de Mexico, IBERO, CEDEMUN 
BANOBRAS, INAP, and ITAM academic and research centres. The core 
national newspapers used were La Jornada, Reforma, El Financiero, El 
Economista, El Universal, Excelsior, and Uno mas Uno, and the magazines 
consulted included Proceso, Epoca, Nexos, Contenido, and Vuelta. Some of 
the journalistic and academic materials were found in the El Municipal 
newspaper and journals like Gestion y Polftica Publica, Federalismo y 
Desarrollo, Hacienda Municipal and Sociologica. Finally, archival work was 
carried out in the Archivo General de la Nacion.
Thirdly, a number of the international newspapers and magazines listed in 
the bibliography were obtained though the LSE and British libraries. Some 
of the publications consulted included The Financial Times, The Guardian,
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The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal (including the magazines), 
The Times, The Economist, Euromoney, the Harvard Business Review, and 
those of The Economist's Intelligence Unit. Specialised ones looked at 
included CEPAL, the Journal o f the American Water Works Association, the 
Economic Journal, Price Waterhouse publications, Privatization Review, 
Public Administration, Reason Foundation publications, and articles from 
the World Bank and its subsidiaries.
• Electronic Data
All the Internet resources (world wide web, electronic mail, and chat tools) 
were of immense value. Much official and non-official data, and 
publications, interviews, biographies, statistics, and speeches, were 
obtained thanks to the LSE's network facilities in London. Statistical and 
electoral data was obtained, from the INEGI and IFE, largely via the world 
wide web. Information from the CNA, CONAPO, and SHCP was also 
gleaned through their web pages, as was that from various private 
national and international organisations. Invaluable data was obtained 
from Alonso y Asociados en Comunicacion which, via e-mail, provided daily 
synopses from the most important newspapers and magazines (both local 
and national) used in this research. A number of other local and national 
Mexican newspapers and magazines were also consulted via the Internet, 
as were most of the international newspapers, magazines, and journals 
employed. Finally, relevant CD-ROMs and/or other forms of electronic data 
were obtained through the LSE library, the Institute of Latin American 
Studies (ILAS), and the British Library (all in London), as well as the CNA, 
IFE, INEGI, BANOBRAS, CIDE, and CEDEMUN libraries in Mexico City.
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1.2 Interviews
• Non-Structured Interviews
All interview data used in this research was elicited via informal, non­
structured interviews conducted without the use of any specific qualitative 
or quantitative tools. Such interviews provided both 'o ff the record' 
material and some what more 'official' information.
Informal discussion with local inhabitants and daily users of the water 
services, ranging from those in the less-developed areas to those in the 
industrial and commercial sectors, was also of value. In order to facilitate 
this, the author spent several months in the city of Aguascalientes, 
providing an opportunity to get a look at the water situation from a 
consumer's perspective, and to experience, first-hand, the economic, 
political, and social problems. I t  is important, however, to stress that most 
of the relevant data in this regard was obtained off the record.
The author conducted a total of twenty-four unstructured interviews 
during the period 1995-1999 in London, Madrid, Mexico City, Guanajuato, 
and Aguascalientes, Ags. These were held with 'official' individuals, ranging 
from local civil servants to mayors, state deputies, governors, federal 
deputies, senators, under-secretaries of state, officials from political 
parties, and with academics, researchers, private agents, and relevant 
entrepreneurs. In four cases a pledge of absolute confidentiality was 
guaranteed, and consequently only the positions and dates of these 
interviews are listed below. Indeed, many informal interviews with 
mayors, sindicos, and regidores from different municipalities
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(<ayuntamientos)  were also held; however, these were only for evaluation
purposes and thus are not listed.
Interviews
• Agustin Morales Pena: researcher and General Manager of the 
Hidrocalido newspaper. Interviewed in the city of Aguascalientes, Ags, 
on November 23, 1998; in London on October 20, 1998; and in Madrid 
on October 15 and 16, 1998.
• Edna Lorena Pacheco: former Regidor of the water utilities during the 
1996-1998 period of government in the city of Aguascalientes, Ags. 
Various interviews during the period 1997-1999.
• Enrique Pasillas Escobedo: former PRI candidate for mayor in the city 
of Aguascalientes. Interviewed in Madrid, Spain, on the 10 and 12 
September, 1998; and in Aguascalientes, Ags, on January 13, 1996, 
November 21, 1997, and March 15, 1999.
• Fernando Gomez: former mayor of the city of Aguascalientes during 
the 1993-1995 period and federal deputy for the 1997-2000 period. 
Interviewed in Aguascalientes, Ags, on February 12, 1998.
• Humberto Blancarte: General Manager of CAASA. Interviewed on 
January 20, 1998, in Aguascalientes, Ags.
• Ignacio Vazquez Torres: Guanajuato state senator for the period 1994-
Present. Consulted in San Miguel de Allende, Gto, on 10 January, 1998;
and in London on 13, 14, and 15 May, 1998.
• Jose Aben Amar Herrera: Local Deputy in the Guanajuato State
Chamber 1997-Present. Interviewed in Irapuato, Gto, on January 7, 
1998.
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• Julio Velasco: entrepreneur and industrialist from the water extraction 
industry. Interviewed in Irapuato, Gto, on 15, 17, and 18 January, 
1998; and in London on 23, 24, and 25 October, 1998.
• Luis Alberto Perez Aceves: former high official at the Secretariat of 
Finance and Public Credit, NAFINSA, and BANCOMEXT, and General 
Director and co-owner of IXE banking services, Mexico City. Various 
interviews during the period 1995-1998.
• Martin Molina: General Director at the CNA for the state of 
Aguascalientes. Interviewed in Aguascalientes, Ags, on January 14, 
1998.
• Martin Werner W: Under-Secretary of State from the Secretariat of 
Finance and Public Credit. Consulted in London on June 27, 1997.
• Miguel Angel Najera: Oficial Mayor from the LVI Legislature. 
Interviewed in Aguascalientes, Ags, on 15 and 27 November, 1998.
• Pedro Ferrfz de Con: Deputy President of MVS News. Interviewed in 
London on 25 October, 1998.
• Rodolfo Garcia del Castillo; Researcher at CIDE, Mexico City. 
Interviewed in Mexico City on 13 and 18 February, 1998.
• Vicente Fox Quesada: Guanajuato's state governor 1994-Present and 
PAN presidential candidate (2000-2006). Interviewed in London on 5 
June, 1997; and in Leon, Guanajuato, on 24 November, 1998.
• Victor Rodrfguez: General Director of Televisa Centro. Interviewed on 
30 November, 1997, and 15 January, 1998, in Aguascalientes, Ags.
• Armando Sandoval P: academic and researcher at the Universidad de 
Guanajuato. Interviewed in Guanajuato, Gto, on 7 December, 1996.
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• Mark Evans: academic and Director of the Politics Department at the 
University of York, U.K. Various interviews during the period 1995- 
1998.
• Manuel Reed Segovia: General Director of CCAPAMA. Interviewed on 
15 January, 1998, in Aguascalientes, Ags.
• Juan Raul Vela: Aguascalientes Local Deputy from the LVI State 
Legislature. Interviewed in Aguascalientes, Ags, on 5 November, 1997.
Confidential Interviews
• Interview A: senior official at the CEN del PRI. Interviewed in Mexico 
City on 13 November, 1998.
• Interview B: senior official at the CDE del PAN in Aguascalientes. 
Interviewed in Aguascalientes, Ags, on 16 January, 1998.
• Interview C: senior Civil Servant at SHCP. Consulted in Mexico City on 
11 December, 1998.
• Interview D: senior Civil Servant at the CNA. Interviewed in Mexico 
City on 01 December, 1998.
I t  is relevant to mention that, due to the impossibility of including all the 
information provided by the above interviews, some of this data was not 
included in the text. Nonetheless, all the arguments and information 
obtained helped the author to visualise specific point of debate in this 
thesis. Finally, other interview material came from such sources as 
national and international magazines and newspapers, theses, official 
publications, TV media, and other secondary sources.
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• Bibliographical Data
The bibliographical data analysed and presented in this thesis comes from 
various sources. The most relevant data obtained through official sources, 
such as the CEDEMUN-INEGI census from the Secretarfa de Gobernacion, 
provided historical information regarding the Mexican municipalities and 
their provision of public services. The IFE covering various years provided 
electoral references of great value (Elecciones Federates, Estatales y 
Locales: Aguascalientes). Historical data from the state and city of 
Aguascalientes, from which state and local authorities provided a wide 
range of documents, was also useful, as was information from the INEGI 
(for example, the Estadisticas: Aguascalientes), which provided the author 
with comprehensive information regarding certain economic, social, and 
political aspects of the case in question. In a more specialised sense, the 
CNA was extremely useful, as were a number of other research centres - 
like the CIDE, Banobras, INAP, and COLMEX, in Mexico City.
2. Methodology
Though this thesis focuses upon one specific empirical case in order to test 
its primary hypothesis, it would be unrealistic to use a single method or 
approach in order to facilitate this. Rather, it is necessary to consider that 
the results one obtains are down to different causes and, consequently, to 
use a number of different methodologies.
This thesis required two different sets of historical and bibliographical 
analysis data and, consequently, has been divided into two parts - 
chapters one to three, and chapters four to seven. The conclusions 
discussed in chapter eight encompass aspects of both sections. The first
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part includes historical data regarding the provision of public utilities by 
the Mexican municipalities. As well as researching the facts concerning the 
privatisation programmes within a national context, we here describe, in 
great detail, the economic and political facts surrounding our particular 
case study. This endeavour required the building of a suitable frame of 
reference, while tables presenting electoral results required a great deal of 
patience and further elaboration in order to corroborate all the results, as 
was also the case with the economic references used in this section.
The second part perhaps required even more elaboration, because of the 
necessity to create a historical background for our particular case study. It 
is this section (i.e., chapters four to seven) in which the historical 
development of the first national water privatisation is surveyed, from its 
early beginnings to the present day.
• The results o f analysing the data
The lack of material evaluating the role of the private sector in the 
provision of public utilities gives a great deal of relevance to the charts 
presented in chapter two. In addition, the CEDEMUN-INEGI census - used 
as the main tool to determine the relationship between the private sector 
and the provision of public services - demonstrated great incongruencies 
and is discussed in the thesis. The main problem here was the need to 
interpret the outcomes obtained, and examine the methods used, in such 
surveys. The same applied to the electoral results obtained from various 
official and non-official sources - these showed different outcomes, and 
even the official bodies (IFE) employed confused terms and numbers.
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Notwithstanding the above, however, an added value of the thesis is 
represented by the compilation of material and by the way in which the 
case study is dismembered step-by-step. The core discussion, contained 
within chapters three to seven, strives to understand the process from its 
earliest beginnings and to discover the facts that lie beneath the surface. 
Overall, then, the result of this research is a useful tool with which to 
understand other privatisation programmes in Mexico, and a resource that 
will, therefore, be of immense use in future local government studies.
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• Financial Management
• Financial Times
• Harvard Business Review
• Interamerican Development Bank
*
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3.2 National (Mexico)
• Contenido
• El Economista
• El Financiero
• El Municipal
• El Nacional
• El Universal
• Epoca
• Excelsior
• Federalismo y Desarrollo
• Gestion y Polftica Publica
• Hacienda Municipal
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• Nexos
• Proceso
• Reforma
• Sociologica
• Uno mas uno
• Vuelta
3.3 State and Local (Aguascalientes)
• Alonso y Asociados en Comunicacion
• Crisol
• Cesma
• El Heraldo de Aguascalientes
• El Hidrocalido
• El Sol del Centro
• Pagina 24
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3.4 Selected Laws and Fiats
• Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
• Constitucion Politica del Estado de Aguascalientes.
• Ley de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado, Saneamiento y su Reuso del 
Estado de Aguascalientes.
• Ley de Aguas Nacionales.
• Ley de los Sistemas de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento del 
Estado de Aguascalientes.
• Ley de Salud del Estado de Aguascalientes
• Ley del Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Estado de 
Aguascalientes.
• Ley General de Bienes Nacionales.
• Ley General de Deuda Publica.
• Ley General de Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al Ambiente.
• Ley Organica Municipal del Estado de Aguascalientes.
• Ley para Regular la Prestacion del Servicio de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado.
• Periodico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes (POEA).
• Diario Oficial de la Federacion (DOF)
• Titulo de Concesion Para la Prestacion de los Servicios Publicos de Agua 
Potable Y Alcantarillado y Tratamiento de Aguas Residuales y su Reuso 
en el Municipio de Aguascalientes (October, 93)/(October, 96).
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